

Brazilian Party Formation from the Regency to the Conciliation, 1831-1857

Jeffrey D. Needell

Professor in the Department of History at the University of Florida (College of Liberal Arts & Sciences/UF - Flórida/EUA)
e-mail: jneedell@history.ufl.edu

Abstract

The parties derived from Chamber factions, led by orators representing the planting and commercial oligarchies and mobilized urban groups. The antecedents, clear in the 1823 Constituent Assembly, crystallize in the "liberal opposition" of 1826-31. The moderate majority dominated the first years of the Regency, but divided over more radical liberal reform. A reactionary movement led to a new majority party in 1837, emphasizing a strong state balanced by a representative parliament and cabinet. This party, eventually known as the Conservatives, faced an opposition, eventually known as the Liberals, who, while sharing some liberal beliefs, initially comprised an alliance of opportunity. After the emperor took power, he proved suspicious of partisan loyalties and ambitions, and increasingly dominated the cabinet, enhancing its power, undercutting the parties and parliament, and increasing state autonomy, as demonstrated in the Conciliação and its heir, the Liga Progressista. These tensions explain the meaning of the political crises of 1868 and the 1871 Lei de Ventre Livre and the legacy of cynicism over representative government which followed.

Keywords

political practices, monarchy, slavery, legislative power, parliamentary debates, liberalism

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I have been done the great honor of being asked to submit a piece regarding party origins during the Monarchy, an honor associated with the publication of *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871*. Stanford: Stanford University, 2006. Given the circumstances, I beg the indulgence of the reader with respect to the notes. The piece itself draws from one of the foci I tried to set out over more than four chapters of text and roughly 60 pages of notes. As whatever contribution I have made to the historiography of this period rests mostly upon analysis derived from archival and contemporary published sources, I thought it best to limit myself here to a very selective series of notes drawn from such sources, except when direct reference to published sources seemed strictly necessary. There is enough discussion of the historiography in *The Party of Order* to recommend that those more interested in such debates consult there, instead. All contemporary sources are cited in the original orthography. Please note that, in reference to the more recent historiography, my research and writing in this area was completed between 1997 and 2003, when I submitted the manuscript to the publisher and confined myself to revision alone. There are many works published since which I doubtless would have found useful when doing this work.

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The role and rights of majority and minority parties, relations with the cabinet, and so on, may be observed in the heated Chamber debates of 1831 and 1832; see, e.g., Hollanda. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 30 August, 1831. p.50; Ribeiro de Andrada. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 15 May, 1832, p.165 and 17 May, p.171, p.173. The latter speeches had much to do with recent threats to the cabinet and accusations of restorationist conspiracy and coups.

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[Eusébio] to [unknown, Rio,] 24 April 1849. *Arquivo Nacional* [hereafter, AN], AP07, caixa 9, pacote 1, PM 2082; Same to Ribeiro, Rio, 15 March 1852. *Arquivo Nacional*, caixa 5, pacote 2, PM 1281.

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This part of my analysis is based on a synthesis of secondary works, rather than archival research, as it concerns a period preceding that of my particular focus.

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NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. Provincial Origins of the Brazilian state: Rio de Janeiro, the Monarchy, and National Political Organization, 1808-1853. *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 36, n.3, p.132-153, especially, p.138-139, 2001.

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See NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. Party Formation and State-Making: The Conservative Party and the Reconstruction of the Brazilian State, 1831-1840. *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol.81, n.2, p.259-308, may/2001, especially p.261-265, p.289-298, and the more elaborate analysis in NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. *The Party of Order: Op.Cit.*, chs.1-2, *passim*.

The very nature of a political party needs to be discussed as a preface to the problems of partisan origins in Brazil.¹ One must remember that, for political actors after independence, there was no history of parliamentary parties – or of parliament, for that matter. Indeed, in some of the Regency Chamber's first struggles, the basic role of the political party, particularly the idea of an opposition party, was clearly one fiercely debated, not least because the threat of violence was very real. For some, one was with legitimate authority, or one was not, and the repressive role of that authority was a salient one.² This notion is not something that vanished quickly in the development of the parties themselves, either; indeed, it was a critical argument of the Party of Order in the late 1840s that the party opposed to it, the *lúzias*, was essentially illegitimate, because it proposed the reform of the constitution and because it had taken up arms against the state in 1842.³

Another aspect of the party at the time has to do with its organization, which was quite foreign to what is often thought of as a political party nowadays. A party was clearly characterized by a highly personalized sense of leadership, by a lack of general, ideological published policy statements or manifestos, by its transparent relationship to kin networks, and by its appeals to specific interests (class, nationality, etc.).

Something of this is evident from the very first, in the way in which the Constituent Assembly of 1823 divided into two large factions, each led by orators, and each appealing to combinations of class and nationality. Many of the same statesmen who represented their local and regional constituencies in 1823 were returned to Rio in the first and second legislatures of 1826-1831, and formed up, again, into what was known as the "liberal opposition." This period is not one for which I can claim any special expertise, but my sense is that it very much set the scene for the partisanship of the initial Regency, in that the Chamber was divided between two factions. One was a faction supporting the emperor and allied to the Luso-Brazilian oligarchy which dominated the state's appointments and the principle merchant-planter families of the Court and the fluminense lowlands, and to their counterparts in the Northeastern provinces. Another was a faction allying regional oligarchies excluded from state appointments and preferences and the middling, urban populace who longed for a more representative form of government. The latter faction, the alliance of excluded oligarchies and subaltern urban elements, was the basis for the "liberal opposition," associated particularly with such men as Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Evaristo Ferreira da Veiga, and Diogo Antônio Feijó.⁴

In a first attempt I made to discuss models or sites of organization, three seemed evident in early Regency historical practice: freemasonry, clubs and associated periodicals, and orators speaking for and to established local oligarchies.⁵ In my research into the period's political history, the first seemed more of a secondary, supportive organization, as did the second. In the end, the third model, orators speaking for and to established local oligarchies, seemed to be primary and fundamental to how the parties originated. The orators, necessarily linked to the oligarchies by blood, marriage, or perspective, articulated the political direction; the oligarchies provided the basis for the votes.⁶ As we shall

see, orators speaking to or for middling socio-economic groups or the free urban poor were unable to sustain political strength unaided; the elements that they represented could not provide the necessary modicum of wealth, deference, influence, and enduring presence. Thus, such orators, the *exaltados* – the most radical political activists, had to ally with oligarchies if they were to build strength sufficient for survival (much less any hope of political success). What they offered, in exchange for such support, came into play at moments of political crisis. It was then that such orators and groups could be critical in alliance with more oligarchical factions, and even carry the day. Let us turn to the history itself to provide specificity and life to many of these generalities.

1. Origins of the Reactionary Majority Party, 1820s-1837

Most of the historiography agrees that the first enduring party was the one that formed a majority in the Chamber in 1837, the party that came to be called the Conservative Party. Contemporary published sources and the early historiography also make it clear that this party derived from the *moderados*, the moderate liberals who dominated both the "liberal opposition" and the earliest Regency administrations, after they had broken with their more radical allies, the *exaltados*, associated with the most radical, even republican wing of the 1820s opposition. In my work, I recovered the history of this transition, in which the moderate liberals, who had already spurned the *exaltados*, themselves divided over the issue of how far to take more liberal constitutional reform while maintaining state power, particularly against the threat posed by the *caramurus*, the restorationist party that still hoped to bring the first emperor back. In a phrase, an initial attempt (1832) to undertake immediate, radical reform using the cover of violence, divided the more reformist *moderados*, under Feijó, from more cautious *moderados*, led by Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, later marquis de Paraná, who became appalled by the threat a violent, rapid radicalization posed to a strong, constitutional state. The men who rallied to him formed a group large enough to foil the attempt, but not stable enough yet to dominate the Chamber and, in turn, the state. Instead, five years of divisive debate ensued, in which the moderate reformists, having barely passed the Additional Act of 1834, then had to withstand both the criticisms of its opposition and the threats to the social order and national integrity which followed the Act's passage. Students of the period will recall the repeated urban and rural revolts of the middle 1830s, particularly the attempt at southern secession and the northern racialized social revolt in Amazonia.⁷

In the triumph of the reformists of 1834, we also see the first steps towards organizing a party reacting against the Additional Act's reformists and the violent threats to the established order they associated with them. Some of these steps were taken in the debates themselves, in which moderate statesmen defended the need for a strong state and the retention of the monarchy. Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres was particularly striking in his defense of both.⁸ Other steps were less rhetorical. They were occasioned by the election that year for the new, reformed regency. The Additional Act had done away with the three regents of the 1824 Constitution and called instead for the direct election of a single regent, a sort of American-style president. Honório, key figure

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The key events are reflected in the Chamber debates and contemporary journalism or memoirs; see, e.g., *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 30-31 July, 1831, p.129-38; *Aurora Fluminense*, 3 August 1832, passim, 21 September 1832, passim; SILVA, João Manuel Pereira da. *Historia do Brazil: durante a menoridade de D. Pedro II, 1831 a 1840*. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier [c.1878], p.99-105, p.112, p.124-130, p.133-134, p.140-142, p.151-152, p.153-154; regarding the context and debate of the liberal reforms and the threat of restorationism leading up through the Additional Act, see OTTONI, Theophilo Benedicto. *Circular dedicado aos Srs. Electores pela Provincia de Minas Gerais*. 2ªed. São Paulo: Irmãos Ferrez, 1930 [1860]. p.40; OTONI, Cristiano Benedicto. *Autobiografia*. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1983 [1908]. p.34-35, p.37-38; Visconde do Uruguay. *Estudos practicos sobre a administração das provincias no Brazil*. 2 volumes. Rio de Janeiro: 1865, vol.1, p.xii-xviii; SILVA, João Manuel Pereira da. *Historia do Brazil: durante a menoridade de D. Pedro II, 1831 a 1840*. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier [c.1878], p.23-27, p.43-44, p.106-110, p.150-158; *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1831, p.70-87, p.220-224. *Ibidem*, t.2, p.133-142; *Ibidem*, T.I,1834, p.9-34. *Ibidem*, t.2, 29 July, p.161-165.

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See, e.g., TORRES, Rodrigues. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1834, p.97, 16 July.

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See H.H. Carneiro Leão to José da Costa Carvalho, Rio 9 Oct. 1834. *Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* [hereafter IHGB], lata 219, doc.49, ns. 1, 2; *Aurora Fluminense*, 22 June 1835, 3596; 1 July, 1835, 3960; the electoral data are in *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1835, p.368-369.

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Paulino. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro*, Op.Cit., T.I, 1841, p.556, 15 June.

among those moderates opposed to the reformist wing, tried to cultivate an alternate to the reformist candidate, Feijó. In order to attract sufficient votes, it had to be a statesman whose appeal would bring together both the more cautious moderados and the former followers of the first emperor, and unify the oligarchies of Rio de Janeiro, Minas, São Paulo, Bahia, and Pernambuco. Honório's appeals spoke to fear and the need for respectable, stable leadership – it was more an anti-Feijó, anti-radical appeal than anything else. It lacked a positive, unifying ideological appeal and, more important, it lacked a single standardbearer whose prestige would be sufficient to win. Thus, it failed; while Feijó's reactionary opposition numbered more votes than Feijó's supporters, they divided their votes between various regional favorites and Feijó won.⁹

Nonetheless, over the next two years, the origin of a stable, organized core for a party of reaction developed, and it developed precisely from one of those regions, the critical one formed by the Corte, the Province of Rio de Janeiro, and associated elements of southern Minas. Here, I pieced together the history from contemporaries and careful analysis of careers and chronology. In essence, key moderados, linked by a combination of ideological reaction, state appointments, elected representation, and regional oligarchies came together in the very institutions of imperial and provincial government and legislatures set up by Feijó's reformists and began to organize both legislative projects and partisan voting designed to oppose the Additional Act and Feijó. The sites for this organization involved the magistracy, the provincial presidency of Rio de Janeiro, the fluminense provincial assembly, and the Chamber. Its key leaders allied Vasconcelos and Honório to a key fluminense group led by Rodrigues Torres, who himself pulled together by appointment, election, and marriage a group of men ensconced in the provincial assembly and directly connected to a widely networked sugar-planting family of the fluminense lowlands. Paulino José Soares de Sousa was a key player in this and recalled it later, stating in 1841 that the move to make a new party finally took place in 1837 as something done by his "friends, and the circle in which I lived."¹⁰

Paulino thus pointed precisely to the ideologically charged networking to which I allude. Appointed to the magistracy in 1832 under the protection of the then regent (José da Costa Carvalho, later marquis de Monte Alegre), and Feijó, Paulino had quickly proven himself as capable. Honório had brought him into the magistracy of the Corte in 1833, where he impressed Rodrigues Torres, the brother-in-law of Paulino's uncle, Bernardo Belisário Soares de Sousa. Paulino himself married a sister of their wives that same year, thus bringing him the support and prestige of the Álvares de Azevedo family, the influential, widespread planter family to which I alluded above. When Feijó's faction sought to secure his support through a flattering appointment as a minister, he declined it, choosing to enter the fluminense assembly, instead. There he built up his political connections, succeeded Rodrigues Torres as provincial president, and began laying the network for provincial support. It is critical to observe that Paulino apparently did this by reaching out from the *baixada* sugar lands to the Paraíba coffee planters, who were in the midst of the initial coffee boom which was just then supplanting sugar in fluminense (indeed, Brazilian) exports. While their

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On Paulino's views and political networking, see, e.g., *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1837, p.68-73, 10 July, and Paulino José Soares de Souza to Francisco Peixoto de Lacerda Verneck, n.p., 22 Sept. 1836. AN, AP29, PY caixa 379, pacote 1, doc. 183; same to same, Nictheroy, 19 Feb. 1837. *Ibidem*, doc. 233; same to same, Nictheroy, 15 March 1837. *Ibidem*, doc.234; same to same, Santo Domingos, 29 Sept. 1837. *Ibidem*, doc 235.2; same to same, Nictheroy, 9 Jan. 1838. *Ibidem*, doc.235.3; same to same, Nictheroy, 25 March 1839. *Ibidem*, doc.235.4.

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For Feijó's sense of the situation, see Feijó to Antonio Pedro da Costa Ferreira, Rio de Janeiro, 5 Jan. 1836. *Biblioteca Nacional, Seção Manuscrito, Coleção Tobias Monteiro* [hereafter, BN,SM,CTB], P110. For the more general sense in the Chamber, see the debates and memoirs cited above in n.7 for the reforms and their context.

political weight was still building, compared to the established and well networked *baixada*, in time, such planters would be critical to the party's following. However, Paulino was not simply a successful judge and partisan chief; he was both because of a combination of personal tact yoked to intellectual and judicial acuity. A measure of this is his being rapidly recruited to work with key reactionaries in the looming critique of the Additional Act, first in the assembly, with José Clemente Pereira, and then, after his election to the Chamber, in 1836, with Vasconcelos.¹¹

This fluminense core with which Paulino was quickly associated was the foundation of the party. However, as Honório had done, its chieftains successfully cultivated chieftains from planting-merchant oligarchies of the Northeastern provinces. By 1837, those Northeastern chieftains had been successfully recruited; Bahia's Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida and Francisco Gonçalves Martins; Pernambuco's Antonio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro and Pedro de Araújo Lima. Each a formidable orator, each a representative or exemplar of the great planting oligarchies of the ancient sugar region, they would serve to legitimate the new party to their region and carry that party to victory. Theirs was not simply a matter of common views – the fact that such chieftains had common interests with the fluminense-mineiro axis in terms of political and social stability for the established order. It was a very practical matter, as well. As Honório had demonstrated, the reactionaries of north and south recognized the obvious political need for the provincial deputations from Bahia and Pernambuco if they were to add up to a majority vote in the Chamber. They had failed to find a common standardbearer to contest the election of Feijó; now, to oppose him, they needed to find, at least, a common stand around which to rally in the debates. Let us turn to the interests and ideas critical to that stand.

If the ideas Honório had put forth in common correspondence and his speech of 1832 had one thing in common, it was fear, fear of radical, rapid, irresponsible change, all of which he and his allies associated with Feijó and the reformists and radicals who supported him and further political reform. The Additional Act debates had also raised fundamental challenges to the very idea of a monarchy, as well as to the nature of the monarch's role, and the degree of decentralization appropriate to national governance. Such debates, particularly in the early and mid-1830s, when attempted coups, Rio Grande do Sul's provincial secession, urban revolts, and long running rural *guerrillas* in the *sertões* of the Northeast (and, after 1835, up through the Amazon), were hardly hypothetical exercises. Rather, they made the threat to both national integrity and the established social order far too palpable. In 1834, some deputies had voted for the Additional Act largely because they feared the restoration of Pedro I and wanted to weaken the monarchy and the imperial state as a brake on Pedro's perceived absolutism. However, after the vote, the news came that the former emperor had died that same year (1834). Now the potential for too much power in the Corte seemed much less frightening than the reality of too much social and political upheaval in the provinces and port cities.¹² More, one must remember that the African slave trade, after a brief slowdown after it was made illegal in 1831, was now picking up rapidly in volume, to maintain the ongoing production of sugar and the boom in coffee. The need for a strong state, both to maintain a social order based on increasing African slavery and

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For the contraband slave trade and its resumption, see NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade in 1850: Historiography, Slave Agency, and Statesmanship. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol.33, n.4, p.689-711, especially p.682-687, p.688-696, nov./2001. José Clemente's pressure to legalize the African slave trade again was through the fluminense assembly; see *Jornal do Commercio*, 2 dec. 1837, 1; Vasconcelos, through the Chamber, see, *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1835, p.109, 24 July.

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The older men's liberalism is well established in the debates cited above and in the historiography. Paulino's is transparent in Visconde do Uruguay. *Ensaio sobre o direito administrativo*. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1862 and Idem. *Estudos practicos sobre a administração das provincias no Brazil*. 2 volumes. Rio de Janeiro: 1865. For Eusébio's, see his speeches opposed to Honório's electoral reforms in the Conciliação administration, cited below. I hope to publish something about the Conservatives' role in Brazilian nineteenth-century liberalism in Variations on a Theme: Liberalism's Vagaries Under the Brazilian Monarchy. In: JAKSIC, Iván and CARBÓ, Eduardo Posada (eds). *Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Latin America*, forthcoming.

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Evaristo may have used "regresso" first in tainting Vasconcelos; see *Aurora Fluminense*, 1 July 1835, 3960; 4 Nov. 1835, 40076; cf. T. Ottoni, *Jornal do Commercio*, 22 May 1838, 2. See Vasconcelos's response in *Sete d'Abril*, 19 May 1838, 1, 16 May 1838, 1-2, 25 May 1838, 102; *Jornal do Commercio*, 21 May 1838, 4; Vasconcelos. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1837, p.293-294, 9 Aug. *Ibidem*. T.I. 1838, p.106, 12 May; p.301, 7 June.

to guarantee such constant investment and economic aspiration, must have weighed heavily in the councils of the planters and merchants who dominated so much of the countryside and so many of the ports. Indeed, both Vasconcelos (in 1835) and José Clemente (in 1837) called for a repeal of the treaties and legislation that were supposed to have ended the African trade in 1831.¹³

If fears for the established order and direction of society were fundamental to the reaction of so many deputies, it is also critical to recognize that, in their own pasts and assumptions, many of these, particularly the chieftains leading the new party, remained liberals, with a fundamental commitment to a balance of powers between the monarch and a parliament representing their interests. Vasconcelos, Rodrigues Torres, and Honório had all been stalwarts of the "liberal opposition" of the First Reign and critical figures in the first moderado administrations of the Regency. Younger supporters, such as Paulino and Eusébio, neither of whom was old enough to have been involved in the First Reign, had not been involved in the defense of representative government over against the first monarch, but, they, too, would give evidence of a firm belief in the balance of power, the representative role of cabinet government, and other principles of liberalism.¹⁴ While such men were slurred as reactionaries by their former allies, there is less contradiction than might appear. They remained firm supporters of parliamentary, representative, constitutional government, as they always had been. They had simply become concerned about the security of the state and society over which they and the oligarchies they represented dominated.¹⁵ Hence, their return towards monarchy and the more centralized, authoritarian state it signified. While such a mix, liberal monarchism, seems an oxymoron to many today, particularly in the hemispheric context of the time, the political references apposite to many involved in the debate were European ones, particularly French theory and English parliamentary practice. In both France and England, constitutional monarchy was a common solution to the problem posed by the desire for a stable but progressive polity in the aftermath of the French Revolution and in the context of the liberal revolutionary movements of the early nineteenth century.

One sees this in the mid-1830s parliamentary debates. While the more reformist liberals tended to refer to the United States, the leadership of the new majority tended to refer to Guizot and the *doctrinaires* of France's July Monarchy (1830-1848). Vasconcelos, the most theoretical of the new party's leaders, was explicit in his admiration for Guizot and in his criticism of the United States model. While he dismissed American solutions to government as inappropriate for Brazilian realities, he found Guizot's example and thought eminently applicable. Thus, we find what is an exceptionalist argument about Brazil, but one lent strength by the adaptation of a particular foreign model and ideology. The search for a balance in powers and in government, the embrace of parliament as the critical site for finding reason through informed debate, the critical role of the monarch as the guarantor of a stable order, the horror of extremes, either of democracy or absolutism – all of this is central to Guizot's political thought and practice, and became integral to Vasconcelos's articulation of his new party's approach

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Vasconcelos. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1834, p.170, 23 June; p.199, 26 June; *Ibidem*, t.2, p.10-12, 1 July; *Ibidem*, p.32-33, 4 July; *Ibidem*, p.41-44, 7 July; *Ibidem*, p.72-73, 11 July; *Ibidem*, p.77, 12 July; *Ibidem*, p.99-100, 16 July; *Ibidem*, p.114, 18 July; *Ibidem*, t.1, 1837, p.191, 5 June; Limpo de Abreu and Vasconcellos. *Ibidem*, t.2, p.128-129, 17 July; Vasconcellos. *Ibidem*, p.287, 7 Aug.; *Ibidem*, p.293, 9 Aug.; *Ibidem*, t.1, 1838, p.300, 7 June. Visconde do Uruguay. *Ensaio sobre o direito administrativo*. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1862 and *Ibidem*. *Estudos practicos sobre a administração das provincias no Brazil*. 2 volumes. Rio de Janeiro: 1865.

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For the party and its names, see the shifts in practice in these exemplars of the party's public leadership (Pereira da Silva was a distinguished party militant from the beginning and its outstanding historian; Justiniano José da Rocha, whose loyalty also dates back to the 1830s, was the party's most distinguished journalist): SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. *Memorias do meu tempo*. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895-1896, vol.1, p.12; p.6-27; Honório. *Jornal do Commercio*, 7 March 1843, 1 and 14 May 1844, 1; [Justiniano José da Rocha,]. *O Brasil*, 16 June 1840; 20 June 1840, 4; 28 Sept. 1844, 1; 23 Nov. 1847, 4; Paulino. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1850, p.200, 15 July; Eusébio. *Jornal do Commercio*, 19 July 1855, 4.

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Constituição politica do Imperio de Brazil. Rio de Janeiro: Silva Porto, 1824, cap.VI, Arts. 90-97; on electoral influence, see, e.g. *Aurora Fluminense*, 1 April 1833, 3206; 9 March 3199-3200. Paulino José Soares de Souza to Francisco Peixoto de Lacerda Verneck. Santo Domingos, 29 Sept. 1837, AN, AP29, YP, caixa 379, pacote 1, doc.235.2; same to same, Nichteroy, 25 March 1838. *Ibidem*, doc.235.4; H.H. Carneiro Leão to José da Costa Carvalho, Rio de Janeiro, 9 Oct. 1834, IHGB, lata 219, doc.49, ns. 1-3. Cf. the surveys of electoral behavior in BIEBER, Judy. *Power, Patronage, and Political Violence: State Building on a Brazilian Frontier, 1822-1889*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1999, ch.3 and GRAHAM, Richard. *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil*. Stanford: Stanford Univ., 1990, ch.4.

and to their practice. While it has been a commonplace that the July Monarchy and Eclecticism were important influences on the Monarchy, the defining debates of 1837-1841, the decisive years of *o Regresso*, make this explicit, as does the work of Paulino, Vasconcelos's intellectual heir, in many of the assumptions of his 1860s published studies of liberal administration.¹⁶

In effect, the party that formed the majority in 1837, while it was referred to without a proper name (the references were to the political reality itself – people spoke of the party of the majority, the cabinet's party), was very much a party which derived out of the traumas of the moderados during the middle Regency, 1832-1837. It was a party organized around the political challenges of the day and very much the creature of certain statesmen who, by 1835, had begun to work together against a common set of threats. It was they who reached out of parliament and down into the provinces, initially finding their core in the Corte and its hinterland, and then finding alliances with men of similar background and similar constituencies in the greater provinces of the Northeast. These alliances provided their majority; their understanding of the need for a balanced, representative, liberal polity secured by a strong, centralized state -- these provided their ideological perspective. All this was in place by 1837. A careful study of the individuals and contemporary publications make it clear that these were the origins of the party we know as Conservative, a name they only began using in the 1850s, eschewing the older, more useful one of Party of Order, or the more colloquial one, of *saquaremas*.¹⁷ What, then, were the origins of the party that opposed them?

2. Origins of the Opposition Party, 1831-1840

Within the large mass of those qualified to vote, a much smaller number were qualified to serve as electors, and an even smaller groups to stand for office as deputy or senator. In this way, the Constitution had replicated the hierarchical nature of Brazilian society. In effect, for the most part, the voters were simply the elite of the mass of free men, in that they had a minimum of property, income, or another claim to independence. In reality, the voting patterns suggest that even these men were dependents of the local "influences," the critical figures among the local great landholders or merchants to whom the voters apparently deferred in countryside and town.¹⁸ This is obviously why those who voted in the hope of breaking down or modifying the established social, political, and economic order were consistently a minority of the voters – even before the massive fraud and coercion that was employed with increasing regularity and acceptance after 1841.

In effect, while a more democratic political arrangement might be objectively in the interest of most of those who could vote, they did not vote for such. Those who did – the exaltados or the reformist moderados of the late 1820s and the Regency – elected a minority faction of the Chamber. To have any power at all in the debates and legislation, such a minority had to ally with others to confront the dominant party. In the periods 1826-1831 and 1831-1834, this is what happened – the exaltados allied opportunely with another minority party to oppose the administration and its party in the Chamber. The first of the two allies

of the exaltados was later known as the moderados; the second of the two allies has been noted earlier – the restorationists, or caramurus. As had occurred in the “liberal opposition” of the 1820s, the exaltados thus helped form the opposition to the dominant party; in the 1820s, this dominant party had been the emperor’s party; in the early 1830s, it was their former allies, the moderados.

The moderados dominated because they had the majority in the Chamber. As has been explained, however, the moderados’ unity broke down over the period 1832-1834 and finally dissolved altogether in the aftermath of the Additional Act of 1834 and the death of the former emperor, Pedro, duke de Bragança. Feijó, one of the traditional moderado chiefs in the moderados’ left wing, simply remained as the chief of that wing, as the moderado right wing left the party, in reaction against the Additional Act and Feijó’s leadership and, recruiting most of the caramurus, reformed into the reactionary party that comprised the Chamber’s majority by 1837. If the right wing, under such moderados as Vasconcelos, Rodrigues Torres, and Honório, successfully won the support of caramurus and other more conservative elements from the provincial oligarchies, the merchants, and the crown bureaucracy, Feijó’s party also enjoyed new adherents. The reformist won the support of the exaltados, such as Teófilo Benedito Otoni. More interestingly, by 1837, with the rise of the reactionary majority, this new reformist-radical minority party allied with those elements in the former opposition who, for personal or provincial reasons, could not support the reactionaries: men like Francisco Gê Acaiaba de Montesuma (later, viscount de Jequitinhonha), Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu (later, viscount de Abaeté), Aureliano de Sousa e Oliveira Coutinho (later, marquis de Sapucaí), the two remaining Andradas (Antônio Carlos and Martim Francisco), and Antônio Francisco de Paula e Holanda Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (later, viscount de Albuquerque).¹⁹ As had been the case in the First Reign or the early Regency, this was an alliance of opportunity, designed to strengthen opposition to the dominant party. The fact that there was no over-all, binding ideology binding the fractions together was entirely within this tradition. The point was not to advance a new perspective: the point was to oppose being overwhelmed in the Chamber and to slow the majority’s legislation and accretion of power. Thus, contemporaries referred to the party as the minority party or the party of opposition.

The ideological or political contradictions could, at times, be interesting. The Andradas and Montesuma, for example, had opposed the first emperor at one time or another. However, by the Abdication (1831), they were reconciled and loyal to Pedro I; like so many others, such as Aureliano or José Clemente, they were displaced by the emperor’s fall. While men such as Aureliano or José Clemente either adhered to the moderados or left active political participation for private affairs, the Andradas, willing to dispute primacy with the moderados, sought to overturn the regime through partisan organization or violence. By 1837, while Aureliano’s successes among the moderados had raised him into their first rank, and while José Clemente and his son-in-law, Eusébio de Queirós Coutinho Matoso da Câmara, had thrown in with the reactionaries (a decision consistent with their crown service, their economic interests, and José Clemente’s past difficulties with

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The vagaries of the new opposition party’s origins are glimpsed in Paulino José Soares de Souza to Francisco Peixoto Lacerda Verneck, Nictheroy, 25 March 1838. AN, AFW, caixa 373, pacote 1, doc.234.4; *Jornal do Commercio*, 25 May 1838, 2-3; 26 Aug. 1843, 1-2; *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1839, p.164, 25 May; p.184-186, 28 May; p.245, 1 June; *Ibidem*, t.1, 1840, p.580, p.584, 2 June; p.598-602, 3 June.

the exaltados), the Andradas simply remained in opposition. However monarchist, their personal ambitions and past conflicts with such men as Vasconcelos, Honório, and Rodrigues Torres, made reconciliation impossible. Instead, they continued to contest state power, once again allied with the exaltados, but now, like the exaltados, in league with former moderado enemies in Feijó's fraction and others in the opposition party, *faut de mieux*.

Albuquerque, a grand figure in the monarchist planter elite of Pernambuco, had opposed the first emperor's centralization, playing an opportune role in the "liberal opposition" until 1831. Then, either concerned with the threat of the moderados' links to his more liberal opposition in Pernambuco or too reformist a shift in the Constitution (probably both), he had gone into opposition, allied with the Andradas. Again, like them, he remained there after 1837, now opposing the reactionary majority, particularly out of concern for their commitment to a strong, centralizing state antagonistic to his provincial interests. Hence, the odd situation of a planter patriarch, who was desperately at odds with exaltados in Pernambuco, allied with reformists and exaltados in Rio, in order to present an effective opposition to the new majority party.

In effect, it is only in the study of personal and partisan specificity and contingency that the seeming contradictions of the new opposition party make sense. However opposed to one another in terms of past or present principles or politics, its chieftains had to ally if they were to have any hope of braking or challenging the new majority. In terms of the political history of the parliamentary regime established in the 1820s, this sort of thing was entirely traditional. More, while the reactionary majority party of 1837 seems to have an ideological coherency that makes sense in terms of both its leaders and the oligarchies' interests which they represented, their opposition had, if not the same degree of coherency, enough of an ideological and socio-economic coherence to demand attention. As could be argued in noting the general liberal background of the leaders of both parties, liberalism as an ideology is capacious enough a mansion to shelter quite a number of legitimate variations. The appeal of democratic reform, clearly a bulwark of liberal ideology, would make sense for the urban middling groups of which Teófilo Otoni was representative. The appeal of decentralized, more local governance, another bulwark of liberal ideology, made sense for Otoni, as well – and would make sense for provincial chieftains such as Albuquerque. Thus, while it is true that exaltados and provincial planters such as Otoni and Albuquerque had more differences in background and attitudes towards political participation than they did ideological common ground, they could still both claim liberal ideological antecedents that put them at odds with the reactionaries – clearly more elitist and centralizing than Otoni and more centralizing than Albuquerque. In a phrase, the opposition's alliance had more to it than opportune opposition alone.

Nonetheless, political opportunism remains critical to understanding the party's 1837-1840 origins and its first triumph – the Majority Movement and the coup of 1840. Indeed, such political opportunism (and associated ideological incoherence) are transparent there. The movement was launched as a conspiracy at the beginnings of the parliamentary sessions of 1840 to achieve power and to forestall the final triumph of

the reactionaries. The majority party was clearly about to pass its critical "Interpretation of the Additional Act" (and did so, in fact, in May 1840), as well as its key judicial reform, known afterwards by its date of passage, 3 December (1841). Both reforms would strengthen the state dramatically and promote its intervention in local affairs. Indeed, they would provide the monarchy with direct political control at the lowest, most local level in the nation, the *município*, through the cabinet's new power to appoint judicial officials there. The opposition realized that, among other things, this would bring the central government unprecedented political potential. In effect, whoever dominated the Ministry of Justice could choose their local allies to fill critical local judicial, police appointments and they, in turn, could shape the local electoral process. In early 1840, of course, that ministry was in the hands of their enemies. The opposition, already a minority, faced the prospect of being maintained out of power in perpetuity and facing the agents of a hostile central state in their provincial and urban bailiwicks.

Only one solution was apparent to the opposition; winning appointment to the cabinet themselves, and using its powers to strengthen their partisan power and to reverse their minority status in the next election through electoral abuse. However, the opposition could hardly expect such appointments as things stood, for the cabinet was appointed by the regent, and the regent at the time was Araújo Lima, past ally of the reactionaries. It was true that he had just broken with the reactionaries' founders in a struggle over primacy (1839). However, the regent remained far more hostile to the opposition than he was to his former allies. Araújo Lima's differences with the majority leadership were more over personal primacy than principles; with regard to the latter, they had a great deal in common. His differences with the opposition, however, were long standing and had to do with both personal and ideological differences. To win appointment to the cabinet, the opposition would have to supplant the regent, and that could be done only by bringing the emperor to his majority early, and then benefiting from the monarch's gratitude.

This concept, the explanation and driving force of their conspiracy and coup, places the opposition's ideological inconsistencies and opportunism in sharp relief. One has the spectacle of Otoni, the democratic admirer of American republicanism, a man who had attacked the regent for kissing the hand of the emperor in public, as well Lima Abreu, Aureliano, and Montesuma, former Feijó ministers and champions of the Additional Act, working together with provincial magnates such as Albuquerque, and former restorationists such as the Andradas, to compel the emperor's early majority through organized, coordinated popular mobilization and parliamentary maneuver alike. Their success, in the coup of July 1840, brought the emperor to the throne against the Constitution and without majority support in Parliament, and quickly ushered in the troubled, tumultuous 1840s and the Second Reign.²⁰

The contradictory ideological and partisan antecedents of the opposition minority party, draped over by the desire for power in 1840, would be disclosed repeatedly in the incoherence and confusion of the decade that followed. Divided between an exaltado-reformist left wing and a moderate, monarchist right wing, the opposition party would

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The preceding analysis of the opposition by way of the Majority movement derives in part from ARARIPE, Tristão de Alencar. *Notícia sobre a Maioridade*. In: LEAL, Aureliano de Araújo and ARARIPE, Tristão de Alencar. *O golpe parlamentar da Maioridade*. Brasília: Senado Federal, 1978. p.135-225 and LEAL, Aureliano. *Do Ato Adicional à Maioridade (historia constitucional e politica)*. In: LEAL, Aureliano de Araújo and ARARIPE, Tristão de Alencar. *Op.Cit.*, p.3-134. See, also, *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro*: Camara dos Srs. Deputados. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1840, p.279-280, 13 May; p.337-350, 18 May; p.360, 19 May; Paulino José Soares de Souza to Fco. Peixoto de Lacerda Verneck, Rio de Janeiro, 15 July 1840. AN, AFW, P4, caixa 379, pacote 1, doc.235.5; Honorio Hermeto Carneiro Leão to Luis Alves de Lima, n.p., May 1840. IHGB, lata 748, Pasta 29 [1935 transcript from undated article in *O Jornal* by Vilhaena de Moraes]. BARMAN, Roderick J. *Brazil: The Forging of a Nation: 1798-1852*. Stanford: Stanford Univ., 1988. p.204-209, is most acute on the legislative context.

fragment in its direction and decisions, lurching from the conquest of power in 1840 to division and a fall from power in 1841, to provincial revolts in 1842, to the ephemeral cabinets and divided Chamber majorities of the Liberal Quinquennium (1844-1848), to the dramatic turnabout and final, repressed provincial revolt of 1848, when the reactionaries once more were called to power.

3. Party Consolidation, the Monarch, and Anti-Partisan Moderation, 1840-1857

The reactionary administrations of 1848-1853 represented the high point of the Party of Order; by 1854, they had taken to referring to themselves as the Conservatives. Their established opposition, the minority opposition party of 1840, had generally been referred to as *lúzias* in the 1840s, after their defeat at Santa Lúzia, which ended the 1842 revolts. By the mid 1840s, *lúzias* had also become known as Liberals.²¹ The establishment of the two major parties of the Second Reign was thus established in the Court and several of the major provinces over the course of 1837 to 1848. I cannot determine how these parties began the process of creating support in the majority of provinces on the basis of my research. However, some of this research, and the published work of a few others, does suggest plausible, general patterns of that organization. For example, as seen above, I have argued that the two major parties basically grew out of political conflicts represented in the Chamber by certain leaders and their followers there, and that such deputies were representative of larger groups of influential chieftains at the local, provincial level. The familial, local oligarchical nature of this in the Province of Rio de Janeiro is suggested by the connections explicit in the biography of Paulino traced earlier. In this initial party formation, the great Chamber leaders functioned as organic intellectuals, the more articulate, educated, and eloquent members or representatives of socio-economic elites in the Court and its hinterland. I have presumed a similar process in the great port cities of the Northeast and their hinterlands.²² There are also local particulars of the cases of Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco, as well as São Paulo and Piauí, which might serve us, too, because they suggest what might have been the general nature of partisan organization at the provincial level.

In Bahia, for example, Wanderley Pinho's classic study of Cotegipe's career indicates that the province was not politically partisan until the late 1840s.²³ In this case, the local provincial influences preferred a certain independence in relationship to the reactionary majority party of 1837. While some did commit to the party early on (one thinks of Gonçalves Martins, for example), others had to be courted and remained at a distance (Cotegipe, then João Maurício Wanderley, a rival of Martins, was one of these). They would, however, commit to the reactionaries over the course of the Liberal Quinquennium, as the Liberal cabinets of that era intervened in the province to acquire and sustain support. In effect, intervention from the center compelled local provincial partisan adherence; if one's enemies were empowered by the cabinet, one had to commit to the cabinet's opposition, in the hope of a better day and reversal of fortunes.

Certainly, something along these lines seems to have happened in the *mineiro* hinterland, in Judy Bieber's analysis.²⁴ There, until the

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On the shifts in naming, see the references in n.17, above. The reader may be aware that the two main parties' names also had provincial variations, an indication of the local realities and partisan integration to the national parties to be discussed in part III, here.

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See, NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871*. Stanford: Stanford University, 2006. p.68-70; the notes derive from contemporary or later biographical data and such key studies as Maciel de Carvalho and Mosher.

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PINHO, Wanderley. *Cotegipe e seu tempo: primeira fase, 1815-1867*. São Paulo: Typ. Nacional, 1937. p.67, p.69-82, p.94-101, p.110, p.112, p.115-116, p.120-123, p.125, p.127, p.130-131, p.144-148, p.150, p.153, p.161-162, p.167-173; see, also, SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. *Memórias do meu tempo*. 2 Volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895-1896, vol.1, p.122-23, p.124, p.127, p.140 for the Liberals in Bahia and the divisions among provincial reactionary chieftains Wanderley and Gonçalves Martins.

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BIEBER, Judy. *Power, Patronage, and Political Violence: State Building on a Brazilian Frontier, 1822-1889*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1999, chs.3,4,7, passim.

voting violence and increasing significance of cabinet penetration down through to the local level took place over the 1840s, there was no partisan mobilization. Local, provincial mobilization into one of the two great national parties thus came as a response to the intervention from Rio. One could not remain indifferent; when the local representatives of state power became increasingly partisan, the local oligarchies lined up for or against those representatives and the party with which they were associated. Bieber goes on to make an argument related to ideological penetration, as well. While she is clear in arguing that one's personal honor and family connections were critical to much of partisan loyalty, she also suggests that ideas were significant, too. As the two parties became associated with established local oligarchies and their established rivalries, Bieber also suggests that there was also an identity with the respective ideologies of the two parties, as well. In essence, the choice between parties was not always wholly a function of established, non-ideological, local rivalries.

An ideological appeal makes sense. As argued earlier, the positions staked out by the reactionaries had, at their very basic level, a great deal to do with their supporting elites' desire for a stabilized socio-economic order, in which an empowered monarch and central state, if balanced by a Chamber and cabinet representing their point of view, made good sense. While the local, dominant planters and merchants may not have been well versed in Guizot, these larger issues would have been easy to grasp and to associate with the reactionary party; their local enemies – less established or connected people, would, obviously, move in the direction of that party's opposition. However, while provincial partisans and national party leaders or delegates worked together to secure political power in Rio, it makes sense that their perspectives on local issues might vary. Indeed, the potential for a distance between the national leaders' more intellectual vision of the state and the nation and the more locally constrained perspective of their provincial followers should not surprise us. Men like Paulino and Honório and Vasconcelos understood petty provincial politics, but, by study, training, and experience, would inevitably have a broader view, as well. They understood the state as having a "civilizing mission" in regard to the nation's backward society, and were clearly aware of the distance between their hopes for Brazil and its present realities.²⁵ At times, the evidence suggests that such men felt at odds with the less cultivated followers of their party.

In Pernambuco, for example, Honório, as provincial president during the Praieiro Revolt (1848–50) described the oligarchies supportive of his party with some contempt and surprise; he found them short-sighted and entirely focused along lines of provincial rivalries, opportunism, and violence.²⁶ Another provincial president, Inácio Francisco Silveira da Mota, indicated something similar of the expectations and views of the local saquaremas and their opposition in Piauí.²⁷ In both cases, the province's saquaremas, headed up by great extended families and their allies. expected provincial presidents of their national party to use their office to defend local saquarema interests and attack those of the local opposition. Honório and Mota, in contrast, viewed their mission as representatives of a more impartial, civilizing state. I do not mean to suggest that the more intellectual, worldly leaders of the national

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See, e.g., SOUZA, Paulino José Soares de. *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios de Justiça... na sessão ordinária de 1841, pelo respectivo ministro e secretario de estado* [...]. Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1841, p.7, p.9, p.21; SOUZA, Paulino José Soares de. Op.Cit., p.3-4, p.24-26; LEÃO, Honório Hermeto Carneiro. *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios de Justiça... na 2ª sessão da 5ª. Legislatura*. Rio de Janeiro: J. Villeneuve, 1843. p.7. Cf. Vasconcelos's exceptionalist argument for adapting liberal reform to Brazil's fragile circumstances in his speeches of 1834–37, cited above, n.16 and in B.P. de Vazos. to Eusebio de Queiros Couto. Matoso da Camara, [Rio.] 7 Nov. 1849. *Arquivo Historico do Museu Nacional*, Coleção Eusébio de Queirós, [hereafter, AHMN, CEQ] Eqqr31.

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H.H. Carneiro Leão to Exmo. Amo. e Snr. Queiroz, Recife, 30 July 1849. IHGB, Coleção Leão Teixeira, lata 748, pasta 28, [copy].

27

Ignacio Francisco Silveira da Mota to Illmo. Exmo. Senr., Oeiras, 29 Jan. 1850, marked "particular". AN, AP07, caixa 4, pacote único, PM 1054; same to same, Oeiras, 11 Feb. 1850. *Ibidem*, PM 1058; same to same, Oeiras, 28 May 1850. *Ibidem*, PM 1064.

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Eusébio's ascent and role in the party over the 1840s and early 1850s, as the notorious "saquarema pope," is clear in Rocha to Firmino, [Rio,] 21 March 1844, quoted in MASCARENHAS, Nelson Lage. *Um jornalista do Império (Firmino Rodrigues Silva)*. São Paulo: Nacional, 1961. p.113; SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. *Memórias do meu tempo*. 2 volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895-1896, vol.1, p.123; RIBEIRO, Manuel de Queiroz Mattoso. *Apontamentos sobre a vida do Conselheiro Eusébio de Queiroz*. Rio de Janeiro, 1885. p.29-30, p.31-32, p.40-44; J.M. Pereira. Da Sa. to Exmo. Amo. e Sr., S. Paulo, 28 Dec. 1848. AHMN, CEQ, Eqcr15/1; Firmino Rodrigues Silva to Exmo. Amo. e Sr., Ouro Preto, 30 Jan. 1852, AHMN, CEQ, Eqcr7/2; [Eusébio] to [unknown,] [Rio,] 24 April 1849. AN, caixa 9, pacote 1, PM 2082; same to Ribeiro, Rio, 15 March 1852. AN, caixa 5, pacote 2, PM 1281. João Evangelista de Negros. Sayão Lobato to Exmo. Amo. e Sr. Porto Alegre, 29 Dec. 1852. AN, AP07, caixa 4, pacote único, PM 1094; same to same, 4 Nov. 1853. AN, PM 1095; [Eusébio] to Illmo. E Exmo. Amo. e sr., [Rio,], 21 Jan. 1849. AN, PM 2085, same to same, [Rio,] 9 March [1849]. AN, PM 2087; same to same, [Rio,] 20 March 1849. AN, PM 2088; same to same, [Rio,] 23 April 1849. AN, PM 2089; same to J.E. Sayão Lobato, [Rio,] 24 April 1849. AN, PM 2091; same to Sousa Ramos, [Rio,] 3 Jan. 1851. AN, PM 2094; same to same, [Rio,] 3 Jan. 1851, marked *confidencial*. AN, PM 2095; same to [unknown,] Rio 12 Nov. 1851. AN, caixa 5, pacote 2, PM 1298; Wanderley to Illmo. E Exmo. Sñr., Bahia [Salvador,], 19 Nov. 1848. AN, caixa 1, pacote 1, PM 129; same to same Bahia, 16 Nov. 1848. AN, PM 130; same to same, Bahia, 16 Dec 1848. AN, PM 131.

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I should hasten to remind the reader that, in the face of the Majority movement's threat to his regency and the Constitution, Araújo Lima shuffled his cabinet to include key chieftains of the reactionary majority in the early days of the parliamentary session of 1840.

party were out of touch with the brutal realities of provincial politics. I mean only to suggest that there could be an understandable difference, one which one should expect, between European trained magistrates representing a national party and their provincial supporters, bloodied and embroiled in local struggles.

In the end, however, one can always point to evidence indicating how these differences evaporated when the issue of electoral success arose. One need look no farther than Eusébio, who had emerged as the national party's most successful partisan leader. Indeed, however subtle and cultivated, Eusébio understood and engaged in brutal political calculation with skill and success, and, precisely in the two cases noted above, he sided with the party's provincial supporters, removing both Honório and Mota, as they themselves made it clear that they did not fit into the puzzle of local provincial politics. Like the local oligarchs, Eusébio expected the party's provincial representatives to cultivate and defend local connections, doubtless because of the desire to sustain local support for coming elections. He handily conflated such political pragmatism with the most stark ideological understanding: local saquaremas were the bulwark in the party's war to defend the nation state against an opposition he viewed as "anarchist." In effect, Eusébio understood that ideology and pragmatism both dictated the need to attain and hold power state power. However parochial their perspective, local provincial chieftains and their capacity to organize local support were crucial to that end. Indeed, in São Paulo, the lack of local chieftains who could successfully help the cabinet in organizing and sustaining local alliances was an issue of great concern.²⁸

If the evidence noted gives us some idea of how the parties may have organized at the provincial level over the 1840s, one would be mistaken to assume that such organization, once attained, was maintained successfully. Whatever the electoral and ideological needs driving such organization initially, the highly personalized, contingent, parochial aspects of that organization could prove to be an unstable foundation. There are clear indications, for example, that the more successfully organized, coherent, and disciplined of the two parties, the Conservative, was still subject to regional vulnerabilities from first to last. This is clearest in the fragility of the party in the Northeast. Thus, the reactionaries' first victory, 1837, brought in an ally as regent: Pedro de Araújo Lima, later marquis de Olinda. Unwilling to partner with the party's leaders in the cabinet, he broke with them briefly, in 1839, and tried to rule through a cabinet of conservatives of distinctly Northeastern origin.²⁹ This was, if anything, simply the first instance of a tendency noteworthy over the Second Reign. While the Northeast was crucial to the Conservatives' early successes, as indicated earlier, it would also be crucial to the Conservatives' failures. I do not mean to allude to the Northeastern origin of so many of the ministers during the Liberal Quinquennium – those were men associated with the moderate wing of the Liberals, after all. However, these Northeastern Liberals do suggest a common trait with a significant group of the Northeastern statesmen of the Conservative party – a moderation, even an opportunism, in partisan history which distinguished them from both the radical left and right of imperial politics – from both *praieiros* and *lúzias* on the one hand, and from saquaremas, on the other. Just as the ministers who dominate

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This key point was early indicated by BARMAN, Roderick J. and BARMAN Jean. The Role of the Law Graduate in the Political Fate of Imperial Brazil. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol.18, n.4, p.423-430, p.432-447, nov./1976; and CARVALHO, José Murilo de. *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial*. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1980, p.79, p.84.

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See, e.g., the private estimate of the loss of power on political loyalty among Conservatives in the era 1854-1868 by the Bahian Conservative, Eunápio Deiro to Meu caro Sr. Barão de Cotegipe, Bahia [Salvador], 15 July [1868] quoted in PINHO, Wanderley. O incidente Caxias e a queda de Zacharias em 1868. In: *Política e políticos no império: contribuições documentais*. Rio de Janeiro: Nacional, 1930. p.55-128, see p.119-120.

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It is interesting to see how often T. Otoni explicitly recognized the commonalities of the two parties *vis-à-vis* representative government and the threat posed by the monarch; it is also interesting to see the way in which the publicists of both parties responded to the emperor's assertion of his powers over the 1840s. See T. Otoni, *Circular*; SILVA, Firmino Rodrigues. *A dissolução do Gabinete de 5 de maio ou a facção áulica*. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Rodrigues de Paiva, 1901 [1847]; HOMEM, Francisco de Salles Torres, [Timandro]. *Libelo do povo*. In: MAGALHÃES JÚNIOR, R. *Três panfletários do Segundo Reinado*. São Paulo: Nacional, 1956 [1849]. p.47-126.

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For the period, see NABUCO, Joaquim. *Um estadista do Império. Nabuco de Araújo: sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época*. 3 Volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, s.d. [1897-1899], vol.1, p.40-111; SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. *Memórias do meu tempo*. 2 Volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895-1896, vol.1, caps.1-10; BARMAN, Roderick J. *Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798-1852*. Stanford: Stanford Univ., 1988. p.209-210; MOSHER, Jeffrey Carl. Pernambuco and the Construction of the Brazilian Nation-State, 1831-1850. Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Florida, 1996, cap. 3; CASTRO, Paulo Pereira de. A reação monárquica. In: HOLANDA, Sérgio Buarque (dir.). *História geral da civilização brasileira*. 3 Tomos. 5 Volumes. Tomo 2: *O Brasil monárquico*. São Paulo: DIFEL, 1967-1972, vol.2, p.509-540. For the emperor, see BARMAN, Roderick J. *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-91*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1999, caps.2-4, *passim*, e LYRA, Heitor. *História de Dom Pedro II: 1825-1891*. 3 vols. São Paulo: Nacional, 1938, vol.1, caps.1-5. Critical documents for aspects of the period, particularly the illustrative political crisis associated with the fall of Honório's 1844 cabinet, include *O Brasil*, 23 March 1841, 3-4; Tobias Monteiro, oral history notes, BN, SM, CTM, 116, p.9-10, p.16; Paulino. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1843, p.347-349, 23 de janeiro; Honório Hermeto Carne. Leão to Senhor [Dom Pedro II], [Rio, before 8 June 1843]. *Arquivo Histórico Museu Imperial*, Arquivo da Casa Imperial [hereafter AHMI,ACI], maço 27, doc. 970, 1-2; Honório, *Jornal do Commercio*, 15 May 1844, 2 and 29 May 1844, supplement, 1; Dom Pedro

the ephemeral cabinets of 1844-1848 tended to be Liberal moderates whose distinguishing loyalty was to the monarchy, the same could be said of the Conservative moderates – statesmen such as Olinda, José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo, and José Maria da Silva Paranhos (later visconde do Rio Branco). Perhaps initially because the Conservatives' inner circle was dominated by fluminenses and mineiros, perhaps later because the need for state patronage was increasingly critical (given the slow decline of the elite's private means and prospects, with the decline of Northeastern sugar exports around mid century³⁰), Northeastern statesmen tended to be more pragmatic in their political careers. It is noteworthy that such men would be critical to both the Conciliação and to the Liga Progressista, and that so many of them moved back and forth from the two great established parties in the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s.³¹ In that era, the era in which the emperor began to assume greater direct control of political affairs, such men were apparently drawn to an increasingly non-partisan moderation and gradual reformism, swept along and into power in the wake of the emperor's own political direction.

The coincidence between the emperor's increasing role and this shift in partisanship is telling. After, all, the two great parties of the monarchy developed in the absence of the monarch as a source of power; they developed in the immediate aftermath of the First Reign's collapse and the rise of the Chamber as the focus of political power. The ideological leadership of both parties, however distinct in many respects, both emphasized representative, parliamentary government. The reactionaries emphasized it as the balancing partner of a strong monarch and as the key legitimizing aspect of the central state; the radical-reformist wing of their opposition emphasized it as critical to braking that monarch and constraining inherent tendencies towards tyranny. It is the differing perspective on the monarch which distinguishes these parties most significantly. As the reactionaries, by winning a majority in parliament, dominated, it was their perspective on the monarch which triumphed. Accordingly, they legislated an empowered and enabled monarch in the key laws of *o Regresso*. If they had any concerns about the monarch's use of that power and capacity, I have not found them – at least not before 1840.³²

After the Majority coup of 1840, the monarch immediately indicated a personal desire for independence and oversight. Both were explicitly his role in the Constitution of 1824; representative cabinet government was not. Neither in 1840 nor later would the emperor accept being a figurehead or act to strengthen the principle of a representative cabinet government derived from a truly representative majority. His view of political parties' role and the hopes of the party chiefs was distinctly suspicious. Dom Pedro had grown up in the Regency, a period which challenged the constitutional role of the monarch, and he grew up in great personal and political insecurity. He had been effectively orphaned by the leaders of the "liberal opposition" of the 1820s and, then, alternately terrorized or courted by many of those same men in the 1830s, as some sought to undercut his power, and others sought to use it. Can one blame him for perceiving the founding statesmen of the parties with apprehension or for dealing with them as self-seeking and power-hungry? Again and again, he made it clear by his appointments, his use of

II, *Conselhos à regente*. Rio de Janeiro: São José, 1958 [1871], p. 54; Honorio Hermeto Carno. Leão to Candido José de Aro. Vianna, Rio, 2 Feb. 1844. AHMI, ACI, maço 107, doc. 5174; correspondence cited in Lages Mascarenhas, p.111-113; Carneiro Leão, *Jornal do Commercio*, 14 May 1844, supplement, 1, 15 May 1844, 2; Vasconcellos, *Jornal do Commercio*, 14 May 1844, suplemento, 2.

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The centrality of electoral corruption to the Second Reign is a political motif of great importance, because, of course, it undercut any claims by deputies or ministers that they stood for a legitimately representative Chamber; rather, they obviously served at the pleasure of the cabinet, which served at the pleasure of the emperor.

This was because by the end of the 1840s, it was generally recognized that the emperor appointed the cabinet and the latter, if it did not already enjoy the support of the Chamber's majority, asked for the emperor to dissolve the Chamber to allow them to conduct elections. It was assumed that a cabinet overseeing elections was a cabinet corrupting them to return a supportive majority. While neither party would refrain from this tradition, once set, both party's ideologues and leaders recognized its dangers in terms of the balance of powers, specifically the capacity and the reality of the emperor's intervention in political affairs and policy. Thus, both the Liberals and the Conservatives championed electoral reform, and the need to recover parliamentary legitimacy was a common rationale for these efforts. For early pronouncements on the issue of representative cabinet government, see, e.g., Vasconcellos. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1837, p.287-288, p.292-295, 9 Aug.; Calmon. *Ibidem*, p.569-570, p.572, p.573, p.576, 23 Sept.; Carneiro Leão. *Ibidem*, p.588-89, 27 Sept.; Vasconcellos, *Jornal do Commercio*, 14 May, 1838, 2-3; Rodrigues Torres. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1839, p.56-57, 20 May; Carneiro Leão. *Ibidem*, p.168, 27 May; Rodrigues Torres. *Ibidem*, p.292, 5 June, p.230-231, 8 June. For the first assaults on its legitimacy, see the 1844 and post 1844 documents cited in n.33, as well as SILVA, Firmino Rodrigues. *A dissolução do Gabinete de 5 de maio ou a facção áulica*. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Rodrigues de Paiva, 1901 [1847]. T.B. Ottoni, *Circular*, chs.10, 11. On electoral reform, the classic is SOUZA, Francisco Belisário Soares de. *O sistema eleitoral no Império*. 2ª ed. Brasília: Senado Federal, 1979 [1872]; Francisco Belisário, a saquarema, cites the Liberal, CARVALHO, Antonio Alves de Sousa. *O imperialismo e a reforma anotado por um constitucional do Maranhão*. Maranhão [São Luiz?], 1866, as pioneering. For the use of electoral reform as a political battlestandard, see, e.g., Andrade Figueira, *Jornal do Commercio*, 4 Oct. 1870, 2; José de Alencar, *Jornal do Commercio*; Pereira da Silva, *Jornal do Commercio*, and SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. *Memórias do meu tempo*. 2 volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895-1896, vol.2, p.124.

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Critical sources on the Conciliação include Instruções de D. Pedro II ao Visconde de Paraná:

a favorite, and his unwillingness to surrender to ministers' pressures, that he would not be a puppet to the older political chieftains who surrounded him.³³ His own representative and impartial role was explicit in the Constitution; their representative or impartial role was hardly as clear. Indeed, over the early 1840s, he had every reason to associate them and their parties with the electoral corruption that undercut the legitimacy of representative government. The first opposition cabinet of 1840 had flagrantly abused its power to elect a majority in 1841, and every cabinet thereafter had engaged in electoral fraud, as well.³⁴

When the emperor returned the Conservatives to power in 1848, it was because the Liberals' weakness and destabilizing radicals had proved the party a poor instrument. He correctly understood that the Conservatives were the stronger party and the one more coherently associated with both the Constitution and his role within it. However, he would not accept the Conservative chieftains' desire for partisan domination of the state. He worked hard to undercut their partisanship while simultaneously using that partisan strength to consolidate the regime and defend its interests at home and abroad. What he sought after they resigned, in 1853, was to maintain the arrangement and increase his direction within it. That is the essential meaning of the Conciliação (1853-1857). It was a cabinet administration which, benefiting from the partisan discipline of the Conservatives and the political capital of Honório, sought to demoralize ideological partisanship and party electoral influence while strengthening the electoral role of the cabinet, which was explicitly under the emperor's direction in terms of general policy.

That direction emphasized a non-partisan (even anti-partisan) approach to government, in which judicial and electoral reforms would diminish the role of the parties in the electoral process, enhance the role of the cabinet still further, and in which the cabinet would undertake the nation's gradual financial and infrastructural development. The emperor wanted this development to be carried out by men, whatever their political antecedents, who were primarily loyal to the nation-state – that is, to him, and to his view of the monarchy's "civilizing mission." For men such as Honório, who had lost ground to other Conservative chieftains, or for others, such as Olinda, Nabuco de Araújo, Caxias, or Silva Paranhos, who had never been in the inner circle of the saquaremas, as well as for many Northeasterners, increasingly concerned with state patronage, such a direction meant a spectacular opportunity. Although the emperor repeatedly offered the same opportunity to the Conservative ideologues, men like Paulino, Eusébio, Rodrigues Torres, for the most part, they did not take it. They opposed the electoral and judicial reforms and the Conciliação as clear attacks on the role of the party and parliament in representative government. They understood and attacked the reforms' potential for aggrandizement of the executive power. Unwilling to accept cabinet positions themselves, they sought to organize and sustain their party as best they could, from seats in the Senate or in the Chamber, and by attempting to maintain their networks at the local, provincial level. Although they were the most powerful, the inner circle of the Conservatives, they were hamstrung. They could not directly confront the emperor without contradicting their monarchism; instead, they

1853. In: VIANNA, Hélio. *D. Pedro I e D. Pedro II: acréscimos às suas biografias*. São Paulo: Nacional, 1966. p.134-135; PINHO, Wanderley. *Cotegipe e seu tempo: primeira fase, 1815-1867*. São Paulo: Typ. Nacional, 1937. p.416-419; and BARMAN, Roderick, J. *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-91*. Stanford: Stanford Univ., 1999. p.162, p.164-165. The classic treatment is that of NABUCO, Joaquim. *Um estadista do Império. Nabuco de Araújo: sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época*. 3 Volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, s.d. [1897-1899], vol.1, livro segundo. Documents on saquarema response include Paulino and Wanderley, quoted in NABUCO, Joaquim. Op.Cit., vol.1, p.189; Franco. de Paula de Negros. Sayão Lobato to Meu estmo. Compr. e Sr., Sorocaba, 18 March 1854. AN, AP07, caixa 4, pacote único, PM 1035; I.F. Silveira da Mota to Exmo. Amigo e Snr., [Mato de Pipa, early 1854.], AN, PM 1075; SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. *Memórias do meu tempo*. 2vols. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895-1896, vol.1, p.243-249; Ferraz, *Jornal do Commercio*, 30 June 1854, 2; Silveira da Mota, *Jornal do Commercio*, 30 June 1854, *suplemento*, n.179; Francisco Jose Teixeira Leite, Joaquim José Teixeira Leite, Carlos Teixeira Leite, João Evangelista Teixeira Leite to Illmo. Exmo. Snr., n.p., n.d. [probably Vassouras, c. May 1855]. AN, AP07, caixa 6 pasta 1, PM 1380; "Vassouras," *Jornal do Commercio*, 26 May 1855 in "Publicações a Pedido.;" Sayão Lobato. *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.I. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1855, p.35, 18 May; p.39-42, 19 May; J.J. da Rocha, *Ibidem*, p.45, 19 May; p.132-137, 25 May; Ferraz, *Ibidem*, p.74-81, 22 May; Sayão Lobato et al., *Ibidem*, p.89-95, 23 May; J. J. da Rocha, Ferraz, *Ibidem*, p.111-119, 25 May; J. J. da Rocha, *Ibidem*, p.132-137, 26 May; *Ibidem*, t.3, p.26-29, 3 July; Eusébio, *Jornal do Commercio*, 19 July 1855, 3-4; 7 August 1855, 1. On the emperor's relations with his ministers, see NABUCO, Joaquim. *Um estadista do Império. Nabuco de Araújo: sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época*. 3 Volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, s.d. [1897-1899], vol.2, p.94-95, p.140-41; vol.3, p.6-7. On saquaremas' attitudes towards cabinet position and the emperor, see, e.g., Visconde do Uruguay to Exmo. Ao. e Sr., Paris, 30 may 1855. AHMN, CEQ, Eqcr84/4; Visconde do Uruguay to [Paulino José Soares de Sousa, filho], Rio, 10 Dec. 1856. IHGB, Arquivo Visconde do Uruguai [hereafter, AVU], lata 4, 2/54; SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. Op.Cit., vol.1, p.260; NABUCO, Joaquim. Op.Cit., vol.2, p.30 (cf. the emperor's perception of the saquaremas in *ibid*, s:30,n.2). Eusébio's sentiments are likely those passed on by his son; see Ribeiro, *Apontamentos*, p.66-69. A great deal of this came to the surface in the responses of the last saquarema cabinet of 1868-1870, headed up by Rodrigues Torres, then visconde de Itaboraí, when the cabinet came into fatal conflict with the emperor over the latter's abolitionism. See [Paulino José Soares de Sousa, filho] to Illmo. e Exmo. Sr. Visconde de Itaboray, n.p., n.d. [probably Rio, early 1870]. IHGB, AVU, lata 10, pasta 1, n.85 (cf. *idem*, *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Camara dos Srs. Deputados*. (1876-1884). T.II. Rio de Janeiro: Hypolito José Pinto, et al., 1860, p.61-68, 6 July). N.B. that Uruguay's son, in his responses to this cabinet crisis, was faithful to the published doctrine of his father (see Uruguay, Visconde do. [Paulino José Soares de Sousa]. *Ensaio sobre o direito administrativo*. 2 Volumes. Rio de

directed their frustration and wrath at the "opportunists" who joined what they often termed the "official party." The latter, associated with the Conservative moderates surrounding Honório, strengthened with the adherence of those fearful of the loss of power, would even reach out to the Liberal minority to sustain themselves. After Honório's passing, in 1856, the emperor sought to replicate his success, offering power in exchange for submission to cabinet after cabinet, until the combination of moderate Conservatives and Liberal allies metamorphosed into the Liga Progressista, which incorporated the formula in its antecedents and many of its statesmen.³⁵

It is a historical irony that the emperor's tactics, while they sustained an increasingly corrupt electoral process, executive aggrandizement, and ephemeral administrations, also brought about the mobilization of the radical wings of each of the two traditional parties. The left wing of the Liberals saw in the era their political nightmare materializing: the emperor, like his father, was emerging as a force for absolutism, by the abuse of his Constitutional role. By 1860, Otoni had returned from self-imposed political exile to lead a new generation towards the beacon of constitutional reform by way of increasingly successful urban political mobilization among a newly emerging middle class and new urban-based entrepreneurs. By the same date, the saquaremas and their heirs were mobilizing to recover the legitimacy of representative parliamentary rule, criticizing the moderates and their heirs for opportunist corruption. While the Liberals blamed the corruption of partisan parliamentary government on the emperor, the Conservatives, constrained by their identification with the monarch, generally spared the emperor direct attack, and, instead, struck at his cabinets, for their lack of representative credibility, their betrayal of party and parliament, and called for electoral reforms to legitimate parliamentary government again.

It would take the pressures associated with the emperor's promotion of the gradual abolition of slavery and the War of the Triple Alliance to bring all these tendencies to bear in the political crisis of 1868. That year, the emperor, desperate to win the war, would discard his instrument, the Liga Progressista, and bring in the saquarema wing of the Conservatives, in order to satisfy Caxias, his best general, who did not trust the Liga's political support. This transparent exercise of personal power threw the Liga Progressista into the Liberal camp, in a radicalized opposition party. It would also bring the saquaremas back into a position where they had to confront the emperor over his abolitionist project. Unlike the Liga, the saquaremas refused their support for that project when the emperor pressed them in 1868, 1869, and in 1870. That last year, however, with the war ended, the emperor no longer needed them, and pressed them from power to find a more amenable cabinet. After the viscount de São Vicente's ephemeral cabinet evaporated, Rio Branco accepted the prime ministry and the emperor's abolitionist project, cobbling together a cabinet and a majority of the Chamber, at the expense of party coherence and unity. The saquaremas were just barely reduced to a dissident minority among the Conservative deputies, and the party, divided among themselves, was torn between power and principle, in the constitutionalist debates over gradualist abolition imposed upon them by the monarch and Rio Branco in 1871.³⁶

Janeiro: Nacional, 1862, vol.2, p.33-34, p.55, p.78-79, p.89, p.96-100), with regard to the appropriate relationship between the monarch and a cabinet which disagreed with the monarch's policies. On the Conservatives' attempts to organize and maintain the faithful at the local level in this period, see Visconde do Uruguai to Joaquim Pedro de Melo, [Rio,] [c. June 1863], quoted in SOUZA, J.A. Soares de. *A vida do visconde do Uruguai (1807-1866)*: Paulino José Soares de Souza. São Paulo: Nacional, 1944, p.619; Paulino José Soares de Souza, filho to Primo e amo. [Francisco Belisário Soares de Souza], Novo Friburgo, 7 Jan. 1862. IHGB, Coleção Francisco Belisário, lata 277, pasta 71, n.1; same to same, Cantagalo, 24 June 1863. IHGB, Coleção Francisco Belisário, lata 277, pasta 71, n. 21; and same to same, [Rio,] 14 April 1865. IHGB, Coleção Francisco Belisário, lata 277, pasta 71, n.4. On the origins and nature of the Liga Progressista, see NABUCO, Joaquim. *Um estadista do Império*. Nabuco de Araujo: sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época. 3 Volumes. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, s.d. [1897-1899], vol.2, p.75-76, p.82-94, p.99-100, p.102; SILVA, João Manoel Pereira da. *Memórias do meu tempo*. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895-1896, Vol.I, p.316-317, p.320; and the correspondence cited in Mascarenhas, *Um jornalista*, ch.13.

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Up to this point in this last paragraph, discussing the period following the focus with which I was charged by the *Almanack*, I attempt a summary of the complicated narrative and analysis in NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871*. Stanford: Stanford University, 2006, chs.6,7. The reader may turn there for the required evidence.

Such division, often in association with the key question of slavery, would be the commonplace of both parties for the rest of the Monarchy. For the radicals of both parties, as had been the case since 1840, the role of the emperor would bring about partisan transformation and a more profound cynicism about the regime which would bear fruit over the next twenty years. The key distinction between the era before 1868-1871 and the era afterward is that the saquaremas' faith in the Monarchy would finally flag, struck repeated blows by the monarch, himself, in precisely the era when popular mobilization about profound social reform would threaten the regime and change the nature of political life dramatically.