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TRANSLATIONS

Les conséquences tragiques pour Parménide d'une erreur d'Aristote

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The difficulty of grasping the thought of Parmenides led interpreters already in antiquity to approach his philosophy according to later schemes of thought. This was the case of Aristotle, whose interpretation was inherited by his disciple Theophrastus and by his commentators, especially Simplicius. Simplicius, a Neoplatonist and Aristotelian at the same time, proposed an interpretation, strongly dualistic (dominated by the sensible/intelligible dichotomy), which is not found in the recovered quotations. The origin of this interpretation is an "error" of Aristotle, inherited by Simplicius, who attributed to Parmenides himself the paternity of the "opinions of mortals". In 1795 G.G.Fülleborn, inspired by Simplicius, proposed a division of the Poem into two "parts", unanimously accepted today, and which must be urgently revised and rejected.

Certainement l'éventuel lecteur de ces lignes se sentira blessé: Aristote a pu commettre une erreur? S'est-il trompé? ? Impossible! J'espère que les multiples précautions que je prendrai chaque fois que j'aurai la désinvolture d'utiliser le mot "erreur" l'inviteront à poursuivre la lecture. Mais il faut dire d'ores et déjà que la notion est pertinente, car dans le cas que nous verrons il ne s'agit par d'une "interprétation erronée", car toute interprétation peut être réfuté pour une autre, mais d'une véritable erreur de lecture, car dans des passages où Parménide dit que "A appartient à B", Aristote a cru lire que "A appartenait à C". C'est la lecture même, et non son interprétation, qui est erronée.

Une question préalable s'impose: Aristote possédait-il une version du Poème de Parménide? On peut dire que *très probablement* Aristote possédait ses *opera omnia*, un Poème dont le titre était apparemment *Sur la phúsis*.[1] En effet, Aristote cite littéralement quatre passages, très brefs, du Poème: la deuxième partie du fragment DK[2] 13 (*Mét.* A.984b26), le fragment DK 7.1 (*Mét.* N.1089a4), la première partie du fragment DK 8.44

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[1] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv.Math.* VII.111. Étant donné la signification de la notion de "*phúsis*" chez les "présocratiques", ce titre équivaut à "*Sur ce qui existe*" ou *"Sur ce qui est en train d'être"*, comme dit Simplicius dans le cas de Mélissos. En effet, Simplicius commente que, si le traité de Mélissos avec comme titre "*Sur la phúsis"* ou *"Sur ce qui est [Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος]"*, "est évident que pour lui [=Mélissos] la *phúsis* est ce qui est" (*Phys.* 70.16).

[2] Par inertie nous reprenons la numération classique de Diels-Kranz, même si elle est un héritage d'une reconstruction totalement arbitraire des citations retrouvées du Poème, proposée en 1795 par G. G. Fülleborn (*Fragmente des Parmenides,* Züllichau). Nous reviendrons sur ce sujet.

(*Phys.* 207a18), et le fragment DK 16 (*Mét.* Γ.1009b21). Mais, si nous avons utilisé le mot "probablement" c'est parce que les trois premières citations (celles des fragments DK 13a, DK 7.1 et DK 8.44a) se trouvaient déjà chez Platon[3], et Aristote aurait pu les emprunter de son maître; mais, en revanche, Aristote est la source la plus ancienne du fragment DK 16. C'est curieux, mais ce texte réapparaît peu après chez Théophraste, mais avec quelques variations, ce qui suggère que, même dans la bibliothèque du Lycée -et certainement aussi dans celle de l'Académie-, il y avait en même temps plusieurs versions différentes du Poème.[4] Si on voudrait commencer à nous expliquer les causes de l'erreur d'Aristote, on pourrait trouver dans cette différence textuelle une piste probable pour le justifier, mais nous rejetons la possibilité. La phrase suivante de H. Cherniss est un résumé de ce que nous allons trouver chez Aristote: "For him -as for every philosopher- the doctrines of his predecessors were materials to be remoulded for his own purpose".[5] Nous reviendrons sur cette question.

Si la citation littérale du fragment DK 16 garantit la lecture directe de Parménide de la part d'Aristote, pouvons-nous en déduire que sa connaissance de Parménide s'appuyait sur une version complète du Poème? Étant donné que l'écart temporel écoulé entre les deux philosophes n'était pas si grand (un siècle, environ), les dégâts normaux d'un texte lorsque plusieurs siècles séparent un auteur de son lecteur, sont à exclure. Donc, il est probable que les copies du Poème qui étaient en usage aussi bien dans le Lycée que dans l'Académie aient été complètes, et fidèles au modèle original.

Ce fait indéniable semblerait réfuter déjà *a priori* le but cet article, car le jugement de quelqu'un qui connaît la totalité d'un ouvrage est plus recevable que celui d'un lecteur condamné à s'appuyer longtemps après sur des citations indirectes de l'original, car il a moins des chances de se tromper.

Cependant, cette objection peut être relativisée, voire contestée. Comme la cohérence d'un philosophe de la taille de Parménide ne peut pas être mise en doute, il serait inimaginable qu'il aurait pu soutenir une chose dans l'une des citations conservées, et une autre, très différente, dans une section connue par Aristote, mais perdue par la suite. D'autre part, nous croyons que les passages du Poème cités par d'autres auteurs et aujourd'hui récupérés, dix-neuf en tout[6], contenaient certainement les thèses fondamentales du texte. Un

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[3] Fr. DK 13: *Symp.* 178b; fr. DK 7.1: *Soph.* 273a et 258d; fr. DK 8.44: *Soph.* 244e.
[4] E. Passa (2009) 26.
[5] H. Cherniss (1935) 347.
[6] Elles ont été retrouvés dans la période qui va de Henri Estienne (dans *Poesis philosophica,* Genève, 1573) jusqu'à Amédée Peyron (dans *Empedoclis et Parmenidis fragmenta ex codice Taurinensis Bbliothecae restituta et illustata,* Leipzig, 1810).

auteur ne cite pas un passage anodin d'un autre; la citation est un "morceau choisi" par sa relevance dans un raisonnement, même si la reconnaissance de son importance arrive tardivement. Un exemple: le texte connu aujourd'hui comme "fragment DK 2", qui est peut être le passage le plus important du Poème, fut cité pour la première fois par Proclus et Simplicius, plus d'un millénaire après son écriture.

Revenons à notre sujet. En fonction de sa propre conception de la philosophie, Aristote, chercheur des premiers principes et des causes premières, consacre une grande partie de ses ouvrages à l'étude des penseurs (philosophes, mythologues, médecins, etc.) qui l'ont précédé. Dans le cas où nous possédons les ouvrages qu'il commente -c'est le cas de Parménide- nous voyons que très souvent son interprétation a une forte tendance soit à adapter à son propre système les idées de l'auteur commenté, soit à les critiquer comme modèle à ne pas suivre. Comme il n'est pas un "historien de la philosophie", son regard du passé ne prétend pas être totalement objectif -si, dans ce domaine, on peut parler d'objectivité- et la conviction de que sa propre philosophie est l'aboutissement d'une longue marche amorcée par ses antécesseurs le conduit parfois à tergiverser -inconsciemment, supposons, pour ne pas utiliser encore une fois le verbe "se tromper"- leur pensée.

Dans la longue marche que nous venons de mentionner, il y trois grandes étapes: les "présocratiques", les sophistes et Platon. Avant de dire deux mots sur les "présocratiques", parmi lesquels se trouve notre sujet, nous savons (et Aristote le savait certainement aussi) qu'il fallait atteindre Platon pour trouver la dichotomie qui par la suite sera le noyau de tous les systèmes philosophiques: la systématisation et la justification de la différence entre ce qui est intelligible et ce qui est sensible. Avant Platon nous ne trouvons que des ébauches de cette division, notamment chez les sophistes qui, du fait de privilégier la sensation comme "réalité réelle" se méfient de l'existence de "l'autre", une réalité seulement intelligible, appelé parfois "l'être", qui, pour eux, n'existe pas.

Pour nous prononcer sur ce sujet dans le cas des "présocratiques" nos sommes victimes de la rareté des textes conservés, et la frontière entre ce qui sera appelé "intelligible" et "sensible" est très poreuse ou directement n'existe pas. Voyons quelques exemples. La vie que cache la pierre aimantée, selon la théorie attribuée à Thalès, est-elle sensible ou intelligible? Pour les atomistes, la réalité "sensible" est le résultat de deux notions seulement "intelligibles", les atomes et le vide. Et dans quelle catégorie peuvent se placer les numéros des Pythagoriciens? Il faut atteindre Héraclite pour trouver quelqu'un qui affirme qu'à l'être "lui plaît demeurer caché" (fr. DK 123), et que même le plus renommé protège les apparences (fr. DK 28).

Et Parménide? Il est contemporain d'Héraclite[7]; or, toute influence réciproque est impensable, mais, contrairement à ce que la *vox doctorum* affirme habituellement, il est impossible de trouver chez lui une dichotomie du type "sensible/intelligible" et de son corrélat "apparences/être".[8] Les très nombreuses références à la pensée ou à l'intellect (νόος, νόημα, νοεῖν) que nous trouvons dans les textes récupérés soutiennent qu' "on pense des ὄντα", c'est-à-dire, tout ce qui est peut être objet de l'activité de νοεῖν, sans distinction. Et parmi ces ὄντα il y a le corps humain (fr. D 16), la *physis* des astres (fr. DK 10) et, surtout, l'état d'être lui-même, qui se trouve dans *tout* ce qui est, représenté par le singulier générique ἐόν, car "il n'y a pas des choses qui ne soient pas" (fragment DK 7.1). Pour un "présocratique" l'étude de τὰ φυσικά n'est pas le même que pour Aristote. Τὰ φυσικά est synonyme de τὰ ὄντα, qui sont des "échantillons"(et non "manières de se montrer") de la φύσις, notion pour laquelle Parménide, pour la première fois, utilise le singulier générique ἐόν.

Or, comme nous verrons, la tradition a fait de Parménide quelqu'un qui s'est occupé aussi d'une notion qui n'existait pas encore, les "apparences". La plupart des interprètes de la pensée de Parménide, à partir d'un moment que nous préciserons, sont partisans de réunir un nombre considérable de citations sous l'étiquette "voie *of Seeming*". Or, ceci est impossible, car Parménide n'a rien dit sur les "apparences" parce que la conception parménidienne de l'être (reconnue pour son premier "doxographe", Platon), empêche leur existence. Platon a bien saisi ce point de la pensée de Parménide lorsqu'il soutient, dans le *Sophiste,* que pour admettre qu'il y a un φαίνεσθαι et un δοκεῖν (verbe en rapport avec δόξα) (236b1), donc, des "apparences", il faut *réfuter* Parménide, car ces notions supposent l'existence du non-être, ce que Parménide n'admettait pas.

Regardons maintenant l'interprétation aristotélicienne. Nous avons dit qu'il est très probable qu'il possédait la version originale complète du Poème. Il connaît donc mieux que nous la structure réelle du Poème. En revanche, nous ne saurons jamais dans quel ordre se trouvaient, dans l'ensemble du Poème, dix-huit des dix-neuf citations récupérées. L'exception est un texte qui était une sorte d'introduction[9] au Poème et qui est connu aujourd'hui comme

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[7] Selon Diogène Laërce (*apud* Apollodore) Héraclite et Parménide avaient atteint leur *akmé* lors de la même Olympiade: la 69e.
[8] Dans un passage de la *Physique* Aristote admet que "Parménide ne voyait pas *encore*" une différence entre l'unité et la multiplicité, qui est une nuance de la dichotomie "intelligible/sensible" quand il aurait admis qu'il y a des choses (multiplicité) blanches, lorsque le blanc es un (I.186a30).
[9] B. L.Conte parle d'une "autobiographical fiction" (2023, 2)

"fragment 1".[10] L'arrangement (et la numérotation) des dix-huit citations restantes, que par commodité ou, plutôt, par inertie, nous utilisons dans ce travail, est tout à fait arbitraire. Comme on le sait, il fut proposé en 1795 par le philologue kantien Georg G. Fülleborn[11], inspiré par Simplicius (on le verra), qui, comme Plutarque avant lui, avait en réalité déjà "platonisé" Parménide.[12] Cependant, la question de l'ordre des citations n'est pas décisive pour notre recherche, car l'erreur d'Aristote se trouve dans des cas précis, à l'intérieur des citations qui peuvent être lues de manière isolée.

Aristote s'est occupé souvent de Parménide, soit directement, soit d'une manière indirecte. Nous ne verrons de près que quelques passages dans lesquels il est question des "principes" de ce qu'Aristote appelle "la physique de Parménide". Dans les autres passages consacrés à cet auteur, Aristote critique surtout le monisme et l'immobilisme de la conception parménidienne de l'être, tel qu'il les interprète en fonction des σήματα de l' ἐόν énumérés entre les vers 2 et 50 du fragment DK 8. Sur ce point nous nous permettons seulement de dire qu'Aristote ne fait qu'appliquer à Parménide la conception mélissienne de "ce qui est" (le nom de Mélissos accompagne presque toujours celui de Parménide, parfois en premier lieu). La copie non-conforme de Parménide qu'il trouve chez Mélissos est plus facile à comprendre que celle de l'original, Parménide.[13]

Le monisme et l'immobilité de ce qui est, qui, selon Aristote, sont les piliers de la philosophie de Parménide, placent à celui-ci en dehors des *physiologoi*, car la réalité, en tant que τὰ φυσικά, est multiple et est soumise à la génération et à la corruption, qui supposent un mouvement dans le sens d'une altération. En conséquence, Parménide (et Mélissos) se sont exprimés comme "οὐ φυσικοὶ" (*De Caelo,* 298b18). Si Aristote avait interprété seulement de cette manière la pensée d'e Parménide, la notion d'erreur n'aurait pas eu de sens, car, *mutatis mutandis*, il est possible de respecter cette interprétation, que, même si elle est critiquable, elle n'est pas erronée.

Mais Aristote ne peut pas éviter la tentation de faire de Parménide -malgré le diagnostique qu'il a offert de la philosophie de l'Éléate et que nous avons présente

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[10] Avant de citer ce texte, Sextus Empiricus avait écrit: "Au commencement de son *Peri physeos,* il [=Parménide] écrivit…" (*Adv. Math.* VII.111).

[11] Dans *Fragmente des Parmenides,* Züllichau.

[12] Nos nous sommes occupés de cette question dans plusieurs articles, notamment dans Cordero (2015).

[13] Aristote aurait dû lire cet émouvant texte de son maître: "Parménide m'a paru avoir une sorte de profondeur qui, en tous points, dénote une grande race. Je crains donc tout à la fois que ses paroles, nous ne les comprenions pas, et que ce qu'il pensait en les prononçant nous dépasse beaucoup plus" (*Theetète* 184a) (trad. M.Narcy).

sommairement ci-dsssus- un *physiologue* comme les autres et pour le justifier il doit trouver chez Parménide la dichotomie entre l'intelligible et le sensible qu'il croit avoir trouvé déjà chez ses collègues "présocratiques". Concernant le domaine de l'intelligible, Aristote dit ce qu'il avait toujours dit: la conception moniste de Parménide découlait d'un regard κατὰ τὸν λόγον sur l'être, qui le séparait des φυσικοὶ (*Phys.* 184b17). Mais un penseur de l'envergure de Parménide -suppose Aristote- ne peut pas ignorer l'univers sensible (τὰ φυσικά) et, comme lui, il ne peut pas éviter de se prononcer sus ses principes (ἀχαί) et ses causes (αἰτίαι). En conséquence, Aristote se voit dans l'obligation de classer Parménide parmi les pluralistes et soutient qu'il était *aussi* un dualiste. Ce curieux Parménide δίκρανος (moniste et dualiste à la fois)[14] se trouve présenté d'une manière très brève à la page 984 de la *Métaphysique,* et, d'une manière plus détaillée, à la page 988.

Le premier texte s'occupe de ce qu'Aristote appelle "la cause motrice", et il dit qu'aucun des philosophes qui ont soutenu "l'unité du tout" n'est arrivé à proposer une cause pareille, "sauf Parménide, et cela dans la mesure où il pose l'existence non seulement d'une cause (αἰτία) mais en quelque sorte de deux" (*Met.* A.5.984b2-5). Quelques pages après il est beaucoup plus explicite: "Parménide pense que nécessairement il existe une seule chose, l'être et rien d'autre -nous avons fait sur ce point un exposé plus clair dans nos traités Sur la Nature[15]-; mais, contraint (ἀναγκαζόμενος) de suivre les phénomènes (τοῖς φαινομένοις) et considérant que l'un est d'ordre rationnel (κατὰ τόν λόγον) et le multiple d'ordre sensible (κατὰ τήν αἴσθησιν), il revient à deux causes (αἰτίας) et à deux principes (ἀρχάς) qu'il nomme chaud et froid, comme s'il disait (λέγων) feu et terre. De ces causes, il range le chaud du côté de l'être (τὸ ὄν), et l'autre du côté du non-être (τὸ μὴ ὄν)" (*Mét.* A.5.986b27-987a2) (trad. M.P. Duminil et A.Jaulin).

Avant d'analyser ce texte, qui est fondamental pour notre sujet, une question préalable s'impose: pourquoi la présentation d'un aspect si important de la pensée de Parménide (la reconnaissance d'une réalité, le sensible, qui l'a littéralement "obligé" a ajouter une justification à côté de celle du monisme qui avait toujours monopolisé sa conception de l'être), n'a pas été appuyée par une citation, même minime, du Poème? On peut répondre que rarement Aristote cite mot à mot les idées des philosophes qu'il mentionne, mais il faut remarquer que les quatre citations littérales de Parménide qu'il reproduit ailleurs se trouvent dans des passages moins relevants pour connaître la pensée de Parménide que celui que nous venons de citer.

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[14] Voir notre travail Cordero (2016).
[15] Il semble évident qu'Aristote fait allusion au chapitre 3 du Livre I de la *Physique*.

Comme la thèse exposé ici par Aristote n'est pas un *hapax* qui ne concerne que la *Métahysique* (car d'autres allusions à ce sujet se trouvent aussi dans d'autres ouvrages), nous ne savons pas dans quelle étape de la pensée d'Aristote devons nous placer la naissance de ce Parménide bicéphale. Étant donné la mouvementé genèse du recueil que nous appelons aujourd'hui la *Métaphysique,* il est impossible de dater le Livre A. Le couple mentionné dans cet ouvrage apparaît (ou était déjà apparu, ou apparaîtra) aussi deux fois dans *De generatione et corruptione*. Dans cet ouvrage, quand il est question de la génération des éléments, Aristote mentionne le cas de la terre et du feu, "pour reprendre le couple de Parménide lorsqu' il affirme que l'être et le non-être (τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν) sont le feu et la terre" (318b6). Et, dans un autre passage du même ouvrage Aristote dit que certains philosophes séparent un seul principe pour en faire deux, et que d'autres "posent directement deux , comme Parménide avec le feu et la terre" (330b14).

La même interprétation se trouve dans un passage de la *Physique*: "Tous [les philosophes] posent les contraires comme principes, aussi bien ceux qui disent que le tout est un et qu'il n'est pas mû (en effet, même Parménide pose le chaud et le froid comme principes, mais il les appelle feu et terre), que ceux qui <ont recours>au rare et au dense […]" (A.5.188a19-23) (trad. P.Pellegrin). Ce texte ajoute un détail qui confirme, selon Aristote, que, concernant τὰ φυσικά, les principes choisis par Parménide étaient des opposés, voire des contraires.

Nous avons dit que très probablement Aristote avait une connaissance directe de la version (complète peut-être) du Poème. Son interprétation doit s'appuyer, donc, sur un texte authentique. C'est le cas de sa présentation du Parménide "moniste", interprétation que, si bien a été et est l'objet de plusieurs critiques, s'appuie sur des citations littérales, notamment la série des σήματα de l'ἐόν qui se déploient le long d'une cinquantaine de vers au fragment DK 8. Ces σήματα sont concevables seulement si, comme reconnaît Aristote, l'analyse de l'ἐόν a été mené κατὰ τὸν λόγον: "Parménide semble s'être attaché à l'un κατὰ τὸν λόγον" (*Mét.* A.5986b19). Et, de son côté, la porte-parole de Parménide exhorte son auditeur à juger ce qu'elle dit moyennant le λόγος (fragment DK 7.5). Aristote certainement connaît ce texte car il cite littéralement un vers qui précède ce passage: "cela ne sera jamais imposé: qu'il y ait des choses qui ne soient pas" (fragment DK 7.1). Précisément la non existence du non-être est essentielle dans l'interprétation aristotélicienne de Parménide: "il soutient que par rapport à l'être, le non-être n'est rien" (*Mét.* A.5.986b28).

Et nous arrivons -un peu tard, pourrait dire le lecteur éventuel de ces lignes- à la question centrale de notre travail: le Parménide dualiste et φυσικός qu'Aristote fait cohabiter

avec le Parménide "moniste", trouve-t'il lui aussi un appui sur une lecture littérale du Poème, ou Aristote s'est trompé dans sa présentation de la pensée de Parménide en attribuant à l'Éléate quelque chose qu'il n'avait pas écrit? Avant de répondre à cette question nous devons parcourir un long chemin, car une série de questions doivent être précisées d'abord.

La première question concerne le but de la philosophie de Parménide, qu'un lecteur du Poème ne pouvait pas ignorer. Ce but fait de lui (et Héraclite aura le même privilège) un "présocratique" différent, aussi bien par rapport à ses rares prédécesseurs comme à l'égard de ceux qui viendront après. Ce rare privilège est le suivant: Parménide ne s'est pas intéressé, ni directe ni indirectement aux "premiers principes et aux premières causes". Non seulement les mots ἀρχαί et αἰτία son absents des dix-neuf citations récupérées[16] (mais on pourrait objecter qu'ils étaient dans des passages non conservés), mais aussi leur signification, qui serait incompatible avec la notion répétée dans plusieurs occasions d'absence d'origine de ce qui est, de sa non-génération, voire de son atemporalité. Le point de vue parménidien n'est pas diachronique mais synchronique: il y a de l'être νῦν (fr. DK 8.5) dans tout ce qui mérite d'être considéré un ἐόν, qui est quelque chose qui existe et qui peut être saisie par la pensée, ne serait-ce que comme simple objet de pensée; en revanche, ce qui ne peut pas être pensée (par exemple, un cercle carré), n'existe pas. Cela va de soi que cet état ou fait d'être est unique, car c'est une notion générique, et tout genre à des espèces, et celle-ci, des individus, mais il est éparpillé dans tout ce qui est. La dichotomie sensible/intelligible n'a rien à voir ici. Ne sont pas τὰ φαινόμενα qui ont "obligé" à Parménide à leur trouver une "cause"; c'est Aristote qui a "obligé" Parménide a rentrer dans son système causal.

Une deuxième question découle de ce que nous venons d'exposer: même dépourvues de leur rôle causal, les notions de "chaud/feu" et "froid/terre/" se trouvent elles dans le Poème? La notion de "feu", notamment celle de la flamme", apparaît au vers DK 8.56 et au vers DK 12.1. En revanche, le remplacement de "nuit" par "terre" ou "froid", n'est pas évident.[17] Pour le justifier il faut faire une sorte de déduction. Dans la présentation de la notion de "nuit" Parménide avait dit qu' elle avait une forme "épaisse et lourde" (πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές) (DK 8.59); or, ceux-ci, chez les éléments, sont les caractères propres à la terre, opposés à la légèreté de la flamme. D'autre part, le royaume d'Hadès, maître de la sous-

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[16] En s'appuyant sur le *Sophiste* (242c), I. Guiu dit que les recherches des Anciens sur τὰ ὄντα coïncident avec la recherche des principes, et affirme que dire qu'il y a seulement un être veut dire qu'il y a un seul principe (2009, 29).

[17] Selon Simplicius, Alexandre d'Aphrodise dit que Parménide avait appelé "lumière" au feu et "obscurité" (σκότος) à la terre (*Phys.* 38.24)

terre, est caractérisé par l'obscurité[18], elle aussi opposée à la luminosité du soleil. Un millénaire après Parménide et Aristote, Simplicius, qui dit posséder "le livre" de Parménide[19] affirme avoir trouvé une explication à la question dans un commentaire en prose ajouté (ou appartenant? La question reste ouverte[20]…) au Poème: "Le rare est aussi ce qui est subtil, mou et léger, tandis que le froid, l'obscurité, le solide et le lourd font référence au dense" (*Phys.* 28.31). Disons, enfin, que nous ne croyons pas trahir Parménide si nous acceptons la synonymie des "principes" proposé par Aristote: chaud/lumière/feu/flamme, d'un côté, et froid/obscurité/nuit/terre, de l'autre côté, car l'important est leur opposition; en effet, ils sont contraires les uns par rapport aux l'autres.

Or, dans quelle étape du Poème, qui reproduit l' "acheminement" du raisonnement de Parménide, se trouvait la référence aux deux "principes", même si cette notion est inexistante chez lui? Une autre question préalable s'impose. Nous avons dit que nous ne saurons jamais dans quelle partie du Poème se trouvaient dix-huit des dix-neuf citations récupérées. Mais comme le caractère éminemment didactique du Poème oblige Parménide à suivre une certaine méthode (c'est-à-dire, un chemin)[21], quelques affirmations auraient dû se trouver dans l'original forcément avant ou après d'autres.

Or, vers la fin du fragment DK 1, la porte-parole du poète, une déesse anonyme, véritable "maîtresse de philosophie"[22], avait ordonné un auditeur éventuel d'être au courant aussi bien du cœur de la vérité que des opinions des "mortels" (?). Ces deux sujets, vérité et opinions, seront traités après de manière interchangeable, car l'affirmation de l'une signifiera la négation de 'autre. Un texte très bref pourrait se placer après ce fragment DK 1: "Il est commun, pour moi, où je commence, car j'y reviendrai à nouveau". Cette citation est placée dans la version "vulgata" -que nous rejetons- en tant que fragment DK 5.[23]

Fidèle à sa méthode circulaire, dans un texte transmis dans sa totalité pour Simplicius, connu aujourd'hui comme fragment DK 8, Parménide expose un "discours (ou "raisonnement", λόγον) digne de foi (πιστόν) ainsi que la pensée concernant la vérité" (DK 8.50); et, après, c'est le tour de la présentation des "opinions": "À partir d'ici, apprends les opinions mortelles (δόξας βροτείας)" (DK 8.51). C'est dans cette description que nous allons

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[18] Étymologiquement Hadès proviendrait de ἀειδής, "non visible".

[19] Voir *Phys.,* 144.28.

[20] Sur ce passage en prose, voir E.Passa (2009) 41.

[21] Voir, *contra,* Aristote: "Ses [prémisses] sont fausses, et, d'autre part, la conclusion n'est pas valide" (*Phys.* I.3.186a). Parménide n'est pas coupable d'ignorer la syllogistique…d'Aristote.

[22] Voir notre travail Cordero (1990), *passim.*

[23] Cette citation avait été placée comme "fragment 3" par H. Diels dans son ouvrage *Parmenides Lehrgedicht,* Berlin, 1897.

trouver les deux "principes" mentionnés par Aristote, car ils sont exposés en tant qu'
"opinions des mortels". Nous rentrons dans un terrain miné: la signification d' "opinion"
(δόξα) chez Parménide. Comme nous allons essayer de montrer, le thème, qui est absolument
secondaire dans le Poème (si, comme nous croyons, les citations récupérées contiennent les
passages principaux du texte), fut l'objet d'une croissance démesurée chez les doxographes et
il conditionne, voire, il détermine, même aujourd'hui, l'interprétation totale de la pensée de
Parménide.

Voyons en détail le passage dans lequel Parménide expose "les opinions mortelles",
où se trouvera la présentation du couple "feu" (qui deviendra "lumière" en DK 9, et "chaud"
chez Aristote), d'un côté, et "nuit" (qui deviendra "froid" et "terre" chez Aristote), de l'autre
côté: "À partir d'ici, apprends les opinions mortelles (δόξας βροτείας), en écoutant la
trompeuse série de mes paroles. Ils [=les mortels] ont établi deux points de vue (γνώμας)
pour nommer (ὀνομάζειν) les formes extérieures (μορφάς), dont ils n'ont pas fait une unité -
en quoi ils se sont trompés-; ils ont jugé la présence de figures opposées, et en ont posé des
preuves éloignées les unes des autres; d'une part, le feu éthéré de la flamme, doux et très
léger, totalement le même que lui-même, mais pas le même que l'autre; d'autre part, ce qui est
en soi son contraire, la sombre nuit, figure épaisse et lourde" (fragment DK 8.51-58).

Une lecture même superficiel de ce passage (qu'Aristote certainement avait sous ses
yeux) permet d'affirmer, en respectant littéralement les mots, (a) que les "opinions" que
l'auditeur doit apprendre (μάνθανε) (DK 8.52) n' appartiennent pas à la porte-parole de
Parménide mais aux "mortels". La Déesse ne fait que les exposer "pour empêcher que
n'importe quel pont de vue (γνώμη) des mortels puisse te dépasser" (DK 8.61). Tout lecteur
du Poème savait *déjà* que les opinions appartenaient aux "mortels", car *toujours* la notion
d'opinion est accompagnée par la mention de ceux qui ont leur *copywright*, les "hommes" ou
"les mortels" ("Il faut que tu apprennes tout [….] et les opinons *des mortels*, d'où toute vrai
conviction est absente […]", DK 1.30; "Ainsi sont les choses selon l'opinion […] . Pour
chacune *les hommes* ont établi un nom distinctif", DK 19).[24] Il serait inconcevable que
Parménide ait changé les auteurs des opinions dans les parties du Poème qui n'ont pas été
récupérés. Comme l'a remarqué A.P.D. Mourelatos, c'est l'attribution de la doxa aux
"mortels" la cause de son caractère négatif.[25]

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[24] Même si le mot "opinion" est absent, l'activité nominatrice décrite en DK 8.38-41 est propre des
βροτοί.
[25] A.P.D. Mourelatos (2008² : 202).

La lecture littérale de ce passage nous montre aussi que (b) Parménide *critique* les opinions des mortels. La Déesse annonce qu'elle se voit pratiquement obligé de les exposer, pour éviter que son auditeur soit attiré par le chant des sirènes "des autres", mais elle prévient qu'il va écouter une "trompeuse" (ἀπατηλόν) série de paroles. Il ne s'agira pas d'un "discours" (λόγος), car un discours est convaincant (πιστόν λόγον, DK 8.50) parce qu'il persuade (il suit le chemin de πείθω, DK 2.4), et les paroles (ἐπέα) qu'elle va prononcer sont trompeuses. Et, en outre, on avait dit déjà lors de la première utilisation du mot "δόξα", que des opinions "toute vrai conviction (πίστις) est absente" (DK 1.30). On savait déjà qu'elles étaient "trompeuses".

Disons, enfin, que si le récit qui expose les opinions est trompeur c'est parce que ses auteurs, littéralement, "ne savent rien" (ou "savent rien" : εἰδότες οὐδέν, DK 6.4). En effet, après avoir dit qu'il est nécessaire de proclamer (ἄνωγα) qu'il faut dire et penser qu'être est possible (ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι) et que le néant n'existe pas (μηδὲν δ'οὐκ ἔστιν) (DK 6.1-2), Parménide, toujours dans son raisonnement circulaire, fait une description très sévère des gens qui suivent le chemin contraire, les "mortels". Non seulement ils ne savent rien, mais ils ont des sensations "insensibles" (des oreilles qui n'écoutent pas, des yeux incapables de voir et, pire encore, un intellect qui tâtonne, car il est incapable de suivre un chemin, DK 6.5-7, DK 7.4). Ils sont victimes de l'habitude et ne savent pas prendre des décisions (c'est-à-dire, de "juger": ils sont ἄκριτα). Si Parménide lui-même aurait été le producteur des opinions, cette description peu sympathique serait valable pour lui…

Et, finalement, du texte analysé (ainsi que d'autres passages du Poème sur lesquels nous reviendrons) surgit avec évidence que, surtout, (c) les opions sont des points de vue (γνώμαι) placés (κατέθεντο) sur les choses, comme des étiquettes, pour les reconnaître. Le rôle causal attribué par Aristote aux opinions des mortels, qui justifierait leur existence, n'est confirmé par *aucune* des citations conservées. Les vers DK 8.38-41 avaient déjà avancé cette idée de "nomination" ("Ne sont que des noms ce que les mortels ont établi [κατέθεντο], persuadés que c'était la vérité"), et elle réapparaîtra au fragment DK 19: "Les hommes ont établi (κατέθεντ') un nom distinctif [pour chaque chose]". Les points de vue choisis par les mortels s'appuient sur l'opposition la plus évidente, celle du jour et de la nuit ("Tout a été *nommé* [ὀνόμασται] lumière et nuit" 9.1), couple qui représente un ordre inexorable sans lequel la réalité serait un chaos. La cohabitation simultanée de ces deux "principes" -pour utiliser la terminologie aristotélicienne-, qui sont opposés, permet aux "mortels" de considérer comme réels d'autres oppositions, telles que "se produire et mourir", et même "être

et ne pas être" (DK 8.38-41), ce qui démontre que, pour les mortels, "être et ne pas être sont la même chose et non la même" (DK 6.8).

Ils se sont appuyés sur la conjonction, et ont fait cohabiter deux principes opposés, "en quoi ils se sont trompés" (DK 8. 54). Non seulement la διακόσμησις qui pourrait se constituer avec ces principes (dont un seul exemple se trouverait dans le fragment DK 12) n'appartient pas à Parménide (les génitifs "des mortels" ou "des hommes" en est la preuve), mais elles sont la négation des raisonnements disjonctifs qui s'étalent tout au long du Poème: domaine de la nuit *ou* lumière des Filles du Soleil (DK 1), une voie *ou* une autre (DK 2), être absolument *ou* ne pas être du tout (DK 8.11), on est *ou* on n'est pas (DK 8.16).

Nous arrivons au point central de ces pages: pourquoi Aristote, que certainement était au courant des points que nous avons développé en (a), (b) et (c), attribue sans hésitation à Parménide lui-même[26] une explication des phénomènes, et, de surcroît, dualiste? La réponse se trouve implicite dans la question: nous avons déjà vu qu'Aristote attribue déjà aux "présocratiques" la dichotomie platonicienne "sensible/intelligible", et sa conséquence naturelle, "paraître/être"; par conséquent, elle ne pouvait pas être absente de Parménide qui, comme *tous* les "présocratiques", et "obligé" -comme dit littéralement Aristote- par les phénomènes a dû, lui-aussi, proposer deux principes, *grossso modo,* le feu/chaud et la nuit/froid.

Or, cette opposition se trouve bel et bien littéralement dans six vers du long fragment cité par Simplicius, appelé "fragment 8". *Mutatis mutandis,* on pourrait dire que, avec les mots cités ou des synonymes, Aristote est fidèle a Parménide, comme il l'était quand il interprétait la formule "tout est un seul être". L'erreur d'Aristote consiste à attribuer à Parménide ce que Parménide attribue *toujours*[27] à d'autres personnages, soit à d'autres philosophes, soit à la foule en général.

Avant de nous pencher sur l'héritage que cette erreur aura chez la tradition doxographique qui en dépend, essayons, en tant qu' "avocats du diable", de justifier la position d'Aristote. Nous avons trouvé le mot "opinion" accompagné d'un génitif subjectif: les hommes ou les mortels "possèdent" des opinions; elles sont leur propriété, dans la version du Poème que, jusqu'ici -à notre avis- nous avons supposé être connue de la part d'Aristote. Si

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[26] "*Il affirme* que l'être et le non-être sont le feu et la terre", *De Gen.* 318b6; "*Il pose* l'existence non seulement d'une cause mais en quelque sorte de deux", *Met.* A.5.984b2-5; ".*Il revient* à deux causes et à deux principes qu'*il nomme* chaud et froid, comme s*'il disai* feu et terre. De ces causes, *il range* le chaud du côté de l'être, et l'autre du côté du non-être", *Mét.* A.5.986b27-987a2; "Autres [philosophes] posent directement deux [principes], comme Parménide avec le feu et la terre", *De Gen.* 330b14.

[27] Dans les citations récupérées, en trois occasions: DK 1.30, DK 8.51, DK 19.3.

nous voulons innocenter Aristote, nous pouvons proposer cette hypothèse: la version complète du Poème qui Aristote avait connu était très différente de celle que nous avons récupérée aujourd'hui -en partie- et dans cette version la déesse anonyme s'attribuait à elle-même la théorie proposée dans les "opinions". Selon cette hypothèse, Aristote ne s'était pas trompé: Parménide s'était occupé lui-aussi des phénomènes, des apparences.

En réalité, cette possibilité hypothétique nuit plus l'image d'Aristote que celle qui s'appuie sur une "erreur". Voyons pourquoi. Le noyau de la physique des "mortels" est la cohabitation *simultanée* de deux "principes" opposés. Le fragment DK 9 est très précis: "tout est plein en même temps de lumière et de nuit obscure" (DK 9.3), et la même simultanéité apparaît dans les noms que les mortels ont mis sur les choses, croyant qu'ils sont la vérité: se générer *et* périr, être *et* ne pas être. Les opinions s'appuient sur la *conjonction* des principes. Cette position ne peut pas cohabiter, dans une même version du Poème, avec la *disjonction* qui caractérise la philosophie de Parménide, visible dans les passages principaux du texte, comme nous avons déjà dit.

Et enfin, le philosophe qui, selon Aristote, avait proclamé haut et fort que "par rapport à l'être, le non-être n'est rien, car il pense que nécessairement il existe une seule chose, l'être et rien d'autre" (*Mét.* A.986b), n'aurait pas pu écrire que l'un des principes, le froid/terre "équivalait (τάττει) au non-être" (A.5.987a1), car, dans ce cas, il n'existerait pas. Il faut atteindre le *Sophiste* de Platon pour trouver une sorte de non-être que, dans un certain sens, existe. Comme résumé, il s'impose d'avouer que nous devons nous résigner à conserver la très antipathique notion d'"erreur" chez Aristote.[28]

Nous avons mentionné ci-dessus le nom de Platon. Or, la dichotomie κατὰ τόν λόγον/κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν qu'Aristote a cru trouver chez Parménide est, comme on le sait, l'un des piliers de la philosophie de Platon. Une hypothèse à ne pas rejeter, et qui pourrait expliquer l'"erreur" (involontaire?) d'Aristote est celle si: il a regardé Parménide à travers des lunettes platoniciennes. Ce qui était évident chez Platon était déjà en germe chez Parménide. Le raisonnement sur l'être-Un, tel qu'Aristote l'interprète, appartient au domaine de

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[28] Nous sommes soulagés car, à propos du passage *Phys.* I.4.188a2à, que nous avons analysé plus haut, l'un des éditeurs de l'ouvrage, W. D. Ross, avait dit, avant nous: "Aristotle either is simply mistaken" (*Aristotle's Physics,* Oxford, 1936, 48). Le même auteur, à propos de *Mét.* 984b4, où Aristote dit que Parménide avait proposé deux causes, fait cette remarque: "This is inconsistent with what Parmenides himself says in the verses quoted above, which imply that the second part of the Poem merely states the false opinions of mortals" (*Aristotle'Metaphysics,* Oxford, 1924, I, 134). Pour sa part, dans une note à sa traduction de la page 188a22 de la *Physique,* à propos de l'affirmation du caractère causal du feu et de la terre, P. Pellegrin a écrit: "Ce qu'A. dit ici de Parménide a paru faux et étonnant a plus d'un commentateur", et il cite le cas de Ross (*Aristote, Physique,* Paris, 2000, 92, n. 2).

"l'intelligible", chez Platon, les Formes. Et les opinions qui décrivent les principes de la multiplicité qu'il attribue à Parménide auraient précédé l'explication platonicienne de l'univers sensible, qui n'est pas réellement réel (au moins, jusqu'au *Sophiste*), mais seulement "apparent". La δόξα qui, chez Parménide, n'est qu'une "opinion", trouverait son objet ontologique chez Platon, le δοξαστόν (nous verrons cette notion chez Plutarque et chez Simplicius), "l'opinable", synonyme du "sensible". Mais le problème subsiste: les deux domaines, sensible et intelligible, se trouveraient déjà chez Parménide, *avant la lettre*.

Dans le titre de ce travail nous avons dit que l'erreur d'Aristote aurait eu, certainement malgré lui, des effets tragiques pour l'interprétation de Parménide. Étant donné le prestige d'Aristote, ce qu'il avait dit était *vox dei*, d'abord dans le Lycée et par la suite, dans la totalité de la tradition doxographique qui dépend de lui, les néoplatoniciens y compris. Parménide est devenu un philosophe qui s'est occupé de la vérité, dont l'objet est l'exégèse d'un "être" seulement intelligible, et, en même temps, des "apparences", dont le principe il explique moyennant deux "causes" matérielles. Cette image d Parménide est née dans Aristote et est encore vivante et monopolise les études parménidiennes. Pour survivre, elle n'a pas hésité à faire des victimes: les "mortels" ou "les hommes"[29], qui ne sont pas mentionnés ni par Aristote ni par aucun doxographe (seulement Théophraste et Alexandre disent timidement "τῶν πολλῶν", *Phys. Op.* fr. 6; *Phys.* 37.24).

Il faut avouer que le troisième doxographe de Parménide (après Platon et Aristote), Théophraste, est plus ambigu qu'Aristote, car il admet que Parménide expose aussi bien la vérité que l'opinion, ce qui est vrai, mais Théophraste ne dit pas qu'il a proposé le contenu de celle-ci comme une théorie propre à lui. Alexandre d'Aphrodise, dans son commentaire à la *Métaphysique* dit que, selon Théophraste, "Parménide a marché sur les deux chemins (ἀμφοτέρας ἦλθε τὰς ὁδούς), car, selon lui, tout n'est qu'une seule chose selon la vérité, tandis que, selon l'opinion, il y a deux principes" (A.3.984b3).

Après la présence attesté du Poème dans le Lycée, un fait curieux se produit: pendant trois siècles la pensée de Parménide (et les citations qui l'auraient justifiée) est absente. Comme l'a remarqué Enzo Passa, qui a essayé d'expliquer ce phénomène, "il y a un vide supérieur à trois siècles, qui traverse toute l'âge hellénistique".[30] Le détail est curieux, car la physique stoïcienne, décidemment dualiste[31], aurait pu revendiquer, *mutatis mutandis,*

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[29] Voir notre travail Cordero (2021) .
[30] Voir E. Passa (2009) 22.
[31] "[Les stoïciens] croient que les principes de toutes choses sont deux, l'agent et le patient" (D.L. VIII.134)

l'antécédent d'un Parménide "dualiste", s'il avait existé. Nous n'avons pas la désinvolture de déduire qu'ils ne l'ont pas fait parce que, pour les stoïciens, Parménide n'était pas dualiste, mais il semble évident que, pour les écoles hellénistiques en général, le Parménide qui aurait pu s'intéresser aux "phénomènes" ne méritait pas la peine d'être étudié.

En revanche, le Parménide δίκρανος crée par Aristote réapparaît au premier siècle de notre ère et va s'imposer, chez les doxographes, jusqu'au VIe siècle, et chez les historiens de la philosophie, jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Comme nous l'avons déjà vu, ce Parménide, du fait de s'occuper aussi bien de l'être "intelligible", d'une part, et des principes du "sensible" (τὰ φαινόμενα), d'autre part, serait une sorte d'antécédent de Platon, surtout du Platon de la *République* et de sa ligne divisée: l'être parménidien se trouverait dans la section supérieure de la ligne, celle réservée au Formes, et la théorie des opinions dans la section inférieure, celle des "apparences".

Ce schéma se trouve déjà dans le premier auteur qui reprend des citations du Poème après le "vide" mentionné par Passa, Plutarque, qui n'a pas pu résister au chant des sirènes de la interprétation plato-aristotélicienne des opinions. En effet, avant de citer les derniers vers du fragment DK 1 du Poème, Plutarque dit: "Parménide place l'intelligible (τὸ νοητόν) sous la forme (ἰδέαν) de l'un et de l'être, et le sensible (τὸ αἰσθητόν) [sous la forme] du désordonné et de ce qui se meut". Il cite après le vers qui décrit le caractère imperturbable du coeur de la vérité (DK 1.29), qui représente "l'intelligible" (τὸ νοητόν), tandis que les vers suivants présentent les opinions des mortels, qui ne sont pas crédibles (DK 1.30-1), car "elles sont en rapport avec les choses qui changent, les affections, et les dissemblances" (*Adv.Colot.* 13p. 1114D).

Les effets tragiques de l'erreur d'Aristote sont déjà indéniables, et ils trouvent son apogée chez Simplicius, le dernier citateur de Parménide de l'Antiquité. Plusieurs citations du Poème se trouvent chez des auteurs qui séparent Plutarque de Simplicius, mais un traitement exhaustif de la question irait au-delà des limites de cet article. Nous en dirons quelques mots dans le cas où ces matériaux ajouteaient des nouveaux éléments

Simplicius, vers la fin du Ve-début VIe de notre ère est le citateur par excellence du Poème et dit être fier de posséder cet ouvrage car il est déjà "devenu rare" dans son époque (*Phys.* 144.28). Son interprétation se trouve surtout dans son commentaire à la *Physique* d'Aristote et dans quelques passages de son commentaire au *De Caelo,* dans lesquels il confirme et justifie la position d'Aristote sur Parménide, mais, comme nous verrons, sa démarche est très grave car, à la différence d'Aristote, il

appuie son commentaire sur des citations de Parménide, mais qui disent le contraire de ce qu'il commente. Dans un passage du *De Caelo,* que nous analyserons, lui-même avoue être embarrassé par une faute qu'il attribue…à Parménide. Or, si dans le cas d'Aristote il s'agissait d'une erreur concernant un texte que nous *supposons* qu'il avait sous ses yeux, dans le cas de Simplicius l'erreur est beaucoup plus grave[32], car il *cite* un texte et le commente d'une manière erronée .

Le passage du livre de Simplicius qui montre explicitement et de manière détaillée sa position est le commentaire des derniers vers du fragment DK 8, qu'il cite quand il s'occupe de la page 184b de la *Physique* d'Aristote. Dans cet endroit du Poème, Parménide a fini d'exposer son "discours convaincant" (πιστόν λόγον) (DK 8.50) et Simplicius commente: "Et après, en allant (μεθελθὼν) des choses intelligibles (τῶν νοητῶν) aux choses sensibles (τὰ αἰσθητὰ), ou, comme il dit lui-même, de l'αλήθεια à la δόξα, il affirme: 'Je termine ici le raisonnement convaincant el la pensée autour de la vérité. À partir d'ici, apprends les opinions mortelles (δόξας βροτείας), en écoutant la trompeuse série de mes paroles'. Et lui-même (αὐτός), comme principes (ἀρχάς) des choses générées, à la manière d'éléments, plaça la première opposition, qu'il appelle lumière et obscurité, <ou> feu et terre, ou dense et rare, ou même et autre, et dit tout de suite les mots suivants: 'Ils [=les mortels] ont établi (καθέτεντο) deux points de vue (γνώμας) pour nommer (ὀνομάζειν) les formes extérieures (μορφάς), dont ils n'ont pas fait une unité -en quoi ils se sont trompés (πεπλανημενοι εἰσίν, pluriel); ils [= les mortels] ont jugé (ἐκρίναντο) la présence de figures opposées [….Voir *supra* la suite du texte, déjà analysé]" (fragment DK 8.51-58) (Simplicius, *Phys.* 29.30).

Citateur fidèle, Simplicius n'a pas modifié le sujet des phrases qu'il cite, qui est "les mortels", (les verbes sont au pluriel) et semble ne pas remarquer que, dans le commentaire, il attribue ces théories a Parménide lui-même, au singulier. C'est certainement l'erreur d'Aristote qui l'a conduit à commettre, à son tour, une nouvelle erreur, cette fois-ci plus grave, parce que Simplicius ne tient pas compte du texte original qu'il vient de citer. Mais ce qui va rester pour toujours, à partir de ce commentaire, c'est le rapport entre les opinions et le sensible. L'enseignement principal qui surgit de ce texte est le suivant: si Parménide s'est occupé des opinions (soit pour exposer les idées des autres, soit pour son compte), c'est parce qu'il s'intéressait aussi aux apparences, c'est-à-dire au "sensible". Nous avons vu que Platon,

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[32] Ivan A. Licciardi n'hésite pas à parler de "trahison", au moins dans le titre de son ouvrage *Parmenide tràdito, Parmenide tradìto, nel Commetario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele*. Nous avons dit que la notion apparaît surtout dans le titre de l'ouvrage. Dans le *corpus* du livre la le verbe "trahir" est plus nuancée, mais le travail de Licciardi est remarquable.

le premier philosophe qu a commenté, sans la comprendre peut-être dans sa profondeur (cf. *supra,* Note 13), la pensée de Parménide, avait dit que, déjà *a priori* (étant donné qu'elles supposent l'existence du non-être), les "apparences" (τὸ δοκεῖν) n'existent pas, pour lui. Simplicius, en revanche, privilégie à tel point l'intérêt de Parménide pour justifier les apparences, que, grâce à lui, d'abord les doxographes et après les historiens de la philosophie ont réuni des citations isolées du Poème et ont appelle cet ensemble disparate "La Doxa *de* Parménide", qui est une étude des apparences.

Nous avons dit que le point central de l'interprétation de ce passage par Simplicius est l'assimilation des opinions au "sensible". Parménide ne dit pas un mot sur la question (et pour cause!), mais Aristote (que curieusement, n'utilise pas le mot "δόξα". Faut-il en tirer des éléments pour l'"innocenter"?) accuse Parménide d'être victime de τὰ φαινόμενα, c'est-à-dire, du "sensible", à tel point qu'il doit justifier leur existence. Dans le passage de Simplicius que nous venons de citer, pour Simplicius, héritier à la fois de Platon et d'Aristote, ça va soi que les apparences concernent "le sensible" (ainsi comme l'étude de l'être-Un concerne l' "intelligible"). L'assimilation des opinions au sensible est un lieu commun chez Simplicius. En *Phys.* 87.5 il dit que Parménide place "les corps" chez les "opinables" (ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς); en *Phys.* 38.26, il dit que Parménide appelle "opinable" (δοξαστόν) le sensible (τὸ αἰσθητόν); à la page 558 du Commentaire au *De Calo,* il dit qu'Alexandre d'Aphrodise[33] accepterait que les "principes" (feu et terre) concernent le sensible, qu'il appelle δοξαστόν; et à la page suivante il affirme qu'à partir du vers DK 8.52 Parménide va s'occuper "des choses sensibles" (τῶν αἰσθητῶν). Disons aussi que l'unité opinion/sensible apparaît encore une fois dans un passage du commentaire au *De Caelo,* sur lequel reviendrons, où Simplicius dit que "pour compléter son discours (λόγον) sur l'être réel (ὀντῶς ὄντος), [Parménide] dit ceci à propos des choses sensibles (τῶν αἰσθητῶν)..." (558.3). Dans tous les cas, pour Simplicius, c'est Parménide lui-même qui identifie δόξα et τὰ αἰσθητά.

Or, une lecture rigoureuse du Poème montre que, d'un point de vue ontologique, el n'y a pas chez Parménide -nous l'avons déjà dit- une dichotomie νοητά/αἰσθητά. On a fait de Parménide, notamment dans la modernité, "le père de l'ontologie", mais le but de son Poème *didactique* est -nous nous permettons d'utiliser un terme anachronique- "épistémologique". Parménide veut proposer une méthode capable de connaître la réalité tout court, τὰ ὄντα. Il sait qu'avant d'autres l'on fait, mais il est certain qu'ils ont échoué: au lieu d'atteindre la vérité ils n'ont proposé que des points de vue, d'opinions. Il propose d'aller en deçà de ces réponses:

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[33] Simplicius est très influencé par les commentaire d'Alexandre, qu'il cite abondamment: P. Golitsis a trouvé chez Simplicius plus de six cents citations de celui-ci (2008, 67).

s'ils ont essayé d'expliquer τὰ ὄντα c'est parce que τὰ ὄντα existaient, et, dans un dialogue imaginaire avec ses antécesseurs, Parménide les aurait dit: s'il y a τὰ όντα c'est parce qu'être est possible (ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, DK 6.1b).

Or, il n'y pas chez Parménide deux réalités à expliquer, d'une part l'ἐόν, qui se déploie en τὰ όντα, et, d'autre part, "les apparences". Il y a seulement une réalité, celle de "ce qui est", qui peut être expliqué *de deux manières*, d'où le regard que nous avons appelé "épistémologique".[34] Les prédécesseurs de Parménide n'ont pas réussi à l'expliquer (et Parménide en donne un exemple: la cohabitation simultanée de principes opposés); lui, en revanche, parce qu'il a suivi une méthode persuasive et convaincante, a trouvé le "cœur de la vérité": la notion d'être, qui donne de l'être à tout ce qui est. Pour Parménide, la distinction entre un être, parfois occulte ou inexistant, et la manière dont il "apparaîtrait", c'est-à-dire, les "apparences", n'existe pas. Parménide est antérieur à cette dichotomie.

Il est certain que c'est la propriété essentielle des apparences, leur caractère "sensible", qui, attribué rétroactivement à Parménide, avait invité, peut-être déjà à Aristote, à trouver chez lui une explication des apparences. Il y a chez Parménide, évidemment, des notions qui seront considérées *après* "sensibles", comme le corps humain, les astres, les sexes, qui, dans la reconstruction du Poème acceptée aujourd'hui ont été mises arbitrairement dans un ensemble appelé "la Doxa". Il suffit de regarder le texte DK 10, placé dans cet ensemble, pour réfuter cette démarche, car dans ce texte la porte-parole de Parménide, à la première personne (elle n'exprime pas des idées des mortels) exhorte son auditeur à "connaître" (εἴσῃ) la *phúsis* des astres. Pour Parménide, comme pour tous les "présocratiques", la *phúsis* c'est l'être (cf. *supra,* Note 1)

Parménide s'est occupé de la vérité et des opinions, mais il a opposé les deux notions, qui font partie d'une perspective épistémologique sur la réalité, qui est unique: d'une part, un *discours* convaincant; d'autre part, des *mots* trompeurs. Plus tard, surtout chez Platon, la notion de δόξα aura aussi une valeur ontologique[35], mais dans le cas de Parménide sa traduction par "opinion" -que nous avons utilisé jusqu'ici- s'impose. Une δόξα est un "point de vue", un "avis", un "jugement": elle ne signifie pas "ce qui apparaît" (donc, "apparence") mais "ce qui paraît", comme tous les mots de la famille de δοκέω.[36] C'est aussi le cas du participe pluriel τὰ δοκοῦντα, synonyme de δόξαι chez Parménide. C'était aussi la

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[34] Un auteur sur lequel nous dirons quelques mots vers la fin de ce travail, Georg G. Fülleborn, avait adopté la même perspective, mais nos conclusions sont opposées aux siennes.
[35] Pour une analyse complète de ce sujet , voir Y. Lafrance (1981) *passim*.
[36] La signification habituelle de "δοκεῖ μοι" est "il me semble".

signification chez Héraclite: le plus "renommé" (δοκιμῶτατος) -c'est-à-dire, celui sur lequel on a une grande δόξα, qui est "ce que l'on dit"-, ne connaît que des opinions (δοκέοντα) (fr. DK 28). Chez Xénophane, à propos des dieux, les hommes n'ont qu'une opinion (δόκος, synonyme de δόξα) (fr. DK 34). Comme l'a remarqué A.P.D. Mourelatos, "these δόξαι (= hallowed, much-acclaimed views) are completely unworthy of belief".[37] C'est exactement le cas de Parménide.

À la fin de ce travail nous reviendrons sur les conséquences tragiques d'attribuer à Parménide une théorie sur "les apparences", mais, avant de traiter ce sujet, nous voudrions dire deux mots sur deux passages de ses Commentaires dans lesquels, sans se rendre compte qu'il s'agit d'une "erreur" de lecture (de la part d'Aristote, d'abord, et de lui-même après), Simplicius trouve une certaine "inconséquence" dans la démarche parménidienne, maladresse qui, en réalité, découle d'attribuer à *un seul auteur,* Parménide, ce qui appartient à *deux auteurs,* Parménide *et* "les mortels".

Voyons ces exemples de l'"embarras" de Simplicius. Dans des nombreux passages de ses Commentaires, il dit que Parménide, après avoir exposé les fondements de son être-Un, suppose d'autres "principes" (ἀρξάς)[38] pour expliquer τὸν δοξαστόν. Mais cette interprétation, parfois, l'encombre. Dans le Commentaire à la *Physique* Simplicius essaie de justifier le mot "trompeuse" (ἀπατηλόν) qui accompagne la caractérisation des opinions, et il affirme que "[Parménide] appelle opinable (δοξαστόν) et trompeur (ἀπατηλόν)[39] ce discours (?) (λόγον), et non simplement (ἁπλῶς) faux, mais comme descendu de la vérité de l'intelligible (τοῦ νοητοῦ) au phénomène (τὸ φαινόμενον) et au sensible (τὸ αἰσθητόν) apparente (δοκοῦν)" (*Phys.* 39.10). Il cite après les vers DK 8.50-52, qui annoncent la présentation des "opinions", et par la suite ajoute qu' Alexandre se tromperait s'il croyait que, du fait d'être exprimé par des mots "trompeurs", ces principes seraient totalement faux, et ce n'est pas le cas. Et, pour finir son appréciation d'une structure cosmique (διακόσμησιν) basée sur les δόξαι, Simplicius ajoute, dans un passage de son Commentaire au *De Caelo*, cette citation authentique d Parménide: "Ainsi sont nées les choses selon l'opinion, et ainsi existent (ἔασι) maintenant; et

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[37] A.P.D. Mourelatos (2008², 202).

[38] *Mutatis mutandis,* on pourrait dire que Simplicius attribue déjà à Parménide la très connue phrase de Groucho Marx: "Voilà mes principes. Mais, s'ils ne vous plaisent pas, j'en ai d'autres".

[39] Évidemment ce mot dérange Simplicius, qui essaie de le relativiser. Dans notre post-modernité, K. Popper, dans un texte qu'il n'aurait jamais dû publier, dit que Parménide s'est trompé (!) et écrivit ἀπατηλόν lorsqu'en réalité il voulait écrire une autre chose (*The World of Parmenides,* Londres/New York, 131-3). Simplicius, plus prudent que Popper, propose simplement de nuancer la notion de "tromperie", mais il ne voit pas que cette notion est opposée d'une manière contradictoire à πιστόν (qui est en rapport avec πείθω), qui est la propriété du "chemin de la vérité".

après, une fois développées, elles mourront. Pour chacune *les hommes* ont établi un nom distinctif" (DK 19) (558.1)

L'embarras de Simplicius, conséquence de l'erreur qui consiste à attribuer la διακόσμησις doxique à Parménide lui-même, éclate d'une manière inattendue: "Comment Parménide a pu supposer (ὑπελαμβάνεν) que seulement (μόνον) existent les choses sensibles (τὰ αἰσθητα), précisément lui, qui a tant philosophé (φιλοσοφήσας) sur l'intelligible (περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ)? [...] Comment lui, qui avait rapporté, d'une part, d'une manière séparée, l'union de l'intelligible et de l'être qui est réellement, et, d'autre part, et de manière séparée, l'arrangement des choses sensibles, auxquelles dédaigna même de les appeler 'des êtres', transposa aux choses sensibles ce que l'on attribue aux choses intelligibles?" (*Commentaire au De Caelo,* 558.4).[40]

L'embarras disparaîtrait si, au lieu de suivre Aristote, Simplicius avait écouté Parménide, auteur du discours κατὰ τὸν λόγον sur l'être-Un, et qui attribue les mots sur τὰ αἰσθητα aux "mortels", qui ne savent rien. Comme bilan des pages précédentes nous pouvons dire que, pour la tradition -et jusqu'à aujourd'hui- (a) on a considéré qu'à partir d'Aristote (Platon ne dit pas un mot sur le sujet, car, pour lui, les "apparences" n'existent pas pour Parménide), Parménide avait proposé une explication du fait d'être, ainsi qu'une explication dualiste du sensible, et que (b) l'exposé des σήματα de l'être appartient à un recherche κατὰ τόν λόγον , tandis que l'étude du sensible propose un fondement de τὰ φαινόμενα, c'est à dire, des "apparences". Dans la tradition on ne dit pas un mot (a') sur les auteurs des opinions qui décrivent les "principes" du sensible, ni (b') sur l'erreur de lecture du Poème de la part d'Aristote, qui justifierait le caractère parménidien des opinions.

Mais quand nous avons mentionné, en plusieurs occasions, les conséquences tragiques de ce silence très douteux c'est parce que, en fonction de (a') et de (b') on a une mise en place un rangement des citations qui a "reconstruit" le Poème d'une façon totalement arbitraire.[41] Nous avons dit que nous ne saurons jamais dans quelle partie du Poème se trouvaient dix-huit des dix-neuf citations de Parménide. La logique de son raisonnement nous oblige à placer quelques-unes avant ou après les autres, mais ceci n'est valable que pour cinq ou six fragments. Concernant les autres citations, leur arrangement dépend d'une interprétation

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[40] Selon G.B. Kerferd (1991, 5), dans ce passage Simlicius critique,en réalité, ce qu'Aristote dit sur Parménide.

[41] Parménide est une exception car, depuis plus de deux siècles on lit son Poème comme s'il l'avait écrit de cette manière. Même les travaux les plus prestigieux font état d'une "première partie" du Poème et d'une "deuxième partie". Ce n'est pas le cas de tout les "présocratiques", notamment d'Héraclite. Chaque chercheur peut ranger les citations en fonction de leur interprétation.

générale de la pensée de Parménide. Or, l'arrangement accepté de manière unanime aujourd'hui (avec des changements minimes) s'appuie, comme nous l'avons dit, sur l'interprétation d'un Parménide *dikranos,* qui a su en même temps justifier les caractères d'un être Un et intelligible, sur lequel il a dit "la vérité", et des apparences sensibles, dont les "principes" sont exposées dans des "opinions". Cette interprétation fut proposé déjà dans le premier ouvrage consacré en entier à Parménide en 1795, ouvrage remarquable, mais basé sur une interprétation anachronique, victime d'un cercle vicieux: en fonction d'un critère qui n'existe pas dans les citations on a divisé le Poème en deux parties, et après on a expliqué chaque partie en fonction des citations qui avaient été mises *a priori* dans chacune d'elles.

La récupération des citations de Parménide commença vers la fin du XVIe siècle avec Henri Estienne (dans *Poesis Phlosophica,* 1573) et Joseph J. Scaliger (vers 1600)[42], et dans ses recueils les fragments étaient placés en fonction de leur source (par exemple,"Ex Clemente…." ou "Ex Proclo…."), sans ajouter aucun commentaire. Ce n'est que deux siècles après qu'un jeune philologue[43], Georg Gustav Fülleborn, née en Wroclaw, en Pologne[44], décida de proposer une étude *sur* la pensé de Parménide, appuyée par les citations littérales, et des nombreuses notes. Chercheur déjà chevronné, Fülleborn appuya son interprétation sur un rangement des citations selon un critère épistémologique (ce qui est tout à fait respectable) basée sur le thème à la mode chez les philosophes de son temps: la dichotomie kantienne entre l'entendement ou la raison, et la sensibilité (ce qui est, en revanche, regrettable).

Et, cela va de soi, Fülleborn trouve un antécédent de cette dichotomie dans la platonisation aristotélico-simplicienne de Parménide. À la page 54 de son livre il n'hésite pas à dire: "ita dividit carmen Parmenidis Simplicius".[45] Fülleborn fait allusion non seulement à l'interprétation générale de Simplicius, mais surtout à ce passage du Commentaire à la *Physique* : "Ensuite Parménide, en allant des choses intelligibles (τῶν νοητῶν) aux choses sensibles (τὰ αἰσθητὰ), ou, comme il [= Parménide] dit lui-même, de l'ἀλήθεια à la δόξα, affirme: 'Je termine ici le raisonnement convaincant el la pensée autour de la vérité. À partir

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[42] Il est impossible de proposer une date précise, car, comme on le sait, la version demeura inédite, dans un cahier manuscrit, dans la bibliothèque de l'Université de Leyde. Nous avons publié le texte dans *Hermes* (110, 1982).

[43] En 1795 il n'avait que vingt-six ans. Sur cet auteur, voire l'excellent article de Manfred Kraus (2009, 193-209).

[44] À l'époque de Fülleborn la ville avait été annexée à la Prusse sous le nom de Breslau, et la langue courante était l'allemand.

[45] B. L. Conte, avec raison, ne partage pas cet avis: "This widely accepted representation has a serious drawback: it does not seem to correspond to some important information we can glean from our doxographic sources, notably (but not only) from Simplicius" (2023, 3).

d'ici, apprends les opinions mortelles en écoutant la trompeuse série de mes paroles'" (Simplicius, *Phys*. 29.30). Fülleborn s'inspire de la notion de "division", qu'il attribue à Simplicius ("dividit"), et, à son tour, il "divise" les citations en fonction du type de connaissance (Erkenntniss) qu'elles supposent et qui correspondent au sensible et à l'intelligible, avec ses corrélats, la sensation et la pensée

Après avoir isolé l'actuel fragment DK 1 en tant que préface ou introduction, Fülleborn construit de toutes pièces une première section ou "partie", qui correspond à la connaissance "rationnelle" ("*Vernunfterkenntniss* vom Wesen der Dinge), et qu'il appelle "Περὶ τοῦ νοήτου ἢ τὰ πρός Ἀλήθειαν ", et une deuxième partie, qui s'occupe de la connaissance sensible (*Sinnliche* Erkenntniss vom Wessen der Dinge), section qu'il appelle Τὰ πρὸς Δόξαν, et les vers sont numérotés de 1 à 151. Hermann Diels, qui adopta cette division, découpa chaque ensemble en "fragments", en fonction de leur source, dans son ouvrage classique *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (1897).

Ce Parménide devenu "orthodoxe" ne résiste pas à une lecture sans préjugés des citations en elles mêmes. Évidemment Parménide s'est occupé de la vérité et a écrit quelques mots pour critiquer les "opinions" des mortels, mais ceci ne suppose pas que le Poème avait deux "parties". On pourrait dire, avec un zeste d'ironie, que *tout* le Poème s'occupe de la vérité, car démontrer que les opinions sont fausses, est vrai, et pour le montrer, Parménide n'a pas besoin d'un long discours; il suffit de dire que les mortels expliquent la réalité moyennant deux principes contraires, et que, par conséquent, ils se sont trompés. L'exposé des "opinions" n'occupe que vingt-deux vers dans les citations récupérées (DK 8.38-40 [3 vers][46], DK 8.52-57 [6 vers], DK 9 [4 vers], DK 12 [6 vers] et DK 19 [3 vers]). Chez le Parménide "orthodoxe" ce chiffre a été l'objet d'un gonflement démesuré, qui consacra à "la Doxa" onze citations (46 vers: DK 8.52-61, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 et 19). La cause de cette multiplication trouve son origine dans l'erreur d'attribuer les δόξαι à Parménide lui-même: partisan -à son insu- de la dichotomie sensible/intelligible, il a dû s' occuper *aussi* de τά αἴσθητα. Et comme τά αἴσθητα sont φυσικά (dans le sens aristotélicien du mot), toutes les références à τὰ φυσικά que l'on trouve dans le Poème (comme la terre, le soleil, etc., que nous avons mentionné *supra*), ont été considérées comme appartenantes à "la Doxa". Nous avons vu que dans une citation authentique, le fragment DK 10, la porte-parole de Parménide exhorte à "connaître" ces ὄντα, qui ne sont pas des φαινόμενα, et qui, même ἀπεόντα, sont

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[46] Ce passage, qui fait sans aucun doute partie des opinions des mortels, n' pas été mis dans la partie "la Doxa" par les partisans de la division du Poème en deux sections.

παρεόντα pour le νόος (fragment DK 4.1). Une fois connu "le cœur de la vérité" ("il y a de choses, "étants", parce qu'il y a être"), rien n'empêche de connaître ces ὄντα,

En effet, on ne trouve rien des principes propres aux δόξαι dans huit des fragments mis d'office dans le dossier "la Doxa": DK 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 et 18, qui offrent des "connaissances" vraies est convaincants. En réalité, Fülleborn est allé au-delà de Simplicius pour constituer cet ensemble, car il a mis dans le dossier "la Doxa" les fragments DK 14, 15, 16 17 et 18, qui n'ont pas été cités par Simplicius, dont certainement il était au courant, car dit posséder "le livre" de Parménide, mais qu'il n'avait pas considéré comme relevants pour son exposé.

L'erreur d'Aristote a commencé à mettre en place une boule de neige qui s'est enrichie d'une manière démesurée dès qu'elle a commencé à rouler. Le moment est venu de l'arrêter.

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Thrasymachus, the Sight-lover

Clifford M. Roberts

The aim of this paper is to explain why Thrasymachus, upon first appearing in *Republic* I, prohibits Socrates from defining justice as what is good. I argue that Thrasymachus views such definitions as equivocal, since he conceives of the good as relative: what is good must be good *for* someone. This relative conception of the good makes Thrasymachus similar to the sight-lovers, who believe in good things, which are relatively good, but deny the existence of the good itself, which is absolutely good. Understanding Thrasymachus as a sight-lover permits an illuminating reframing of his outlook and his significance for the larger project of the *Republic*.

I.

Thrasymachus bursts into the *Republic* by aggressively demanding that Socrates abandon his *elenctic* method and state what he thinks justice is (336b1-c6), but the demand comes with a prohibition:

And [a] don't tell me that [justice] is what is right, what is beneficial, what is profitable, what is gainful, or what is advantageous, but [b] tell me clearly and exactly what you are saying; for I won't accept such nonsense from you.[1] (336c6-d4)[2]

In [a] Thrasymachus prohibits a certain kind of definition; [b] explains why he does so: because the prohibited definitions are "unclear" and "inexact." Discussion of [a]-[b] among commentators has been rare and brief, despite the enormous attention paid to Thrasymachus and his dispute with Socrates.[3]

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[1] Translations in this paper largely derive from Grube, G. M. A. 1992. *Plato: The Republic*. Revised by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, to which I have occasionally made modifications for my own purposes.

[2] καὶ [a] ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν μηδ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ᾽ ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ᾽ ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ᾽ ὅτι τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ [b] σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι ἐὰν ὕθλους τοιούτους λέγῃς.

[3] The one exception to this general neglect is Welton, William A. 2006. "Thrasymachus vs. Socrates: What Counts as a Good Answer to the Question 'What is Justice?' (Republic 336b–9b)." *Apeiron* 39 (4): 293–317, who discusses the prohibition at much greater length. Though my own reading diverges from his, his article has helped sharpen my own views and on some points we are largely in agreement.

Thrasymachus appears to see a kind of unity among the prohibited terms, but what is it? An answer is provided at *Cratylus* 416e2-417a2, where Hermogenes mentions the very same terms and identifies them as "about what is good and fine [τὰ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν]." All of the terms pick out things by signifying some way in which they are good, hence Socrates and his interlocutors' homogenous treatment of them; they are, in effect, synonymous.[4] Moreover, while there is no explicit mention of "what is good" (τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ κάλον) in the prohibition, it is difficult to doubt that Thrasymachus intends it to be among the prohibited referents – indeed, what is good might stand in for any of the others.

The synonymy of the prohibited terms does not, however, explain why Thrasymachus finds them unclear and imprecise. On one quite popular reading of the prohibition, the terms all share a basic fault: they are just as unclear and controversial as 'justice' and so are unhelpful as *definentia*.[5] On this reading, Thrasymachus is objecting to any mention or use of these terms at all in a definition of justice. As popular as this reading is, it faces a significant problem in the form of Thrasymachus' own definition of justice, for he himself will define it as what is advantageous (338c2) as well as what is good (343c3-4). If Thrasymachus were banning mention of the terms, then his definition would be inconsistent with his own strictures – this is precisely what Socrates claims at 339a7-8, highlighting the apparent conflict but treating it all the same as a minor issue. This very desire to minimize the inconsistency suggests that Plato thinks it is not the most urgent problem with Thrasymachus' approach.

Certainly, Thrasymachus himself does not seem to suppose that there is any inconsistency between his critique and response – certainly not anything so obvious. He may well have good reason for this, for there is, after all, an important difference between his definitions and the prohibited ones, namely, that his definitions specify *whose* good justice is.[6] In fact, Thrasymachus treats this addition as quite important, ironically noting that Socrates presumably thinks the addition is "minor" (σμικρά: 339b1); once more, Plato's decision to alert the reader to Thrasymachus' modification of the term suggests that this is the source of his objection to Socrates. In other words, Thrasymachus objects to Socrates' definitions of justice because they refer to what is good *without* relativizing it to a beneficiary. In defining justice as

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[4] As Welton 2006, 297 notes the synonymy of these terms also appears to underly *Cleitophon* 409c-d.
[5] For versions of this reading of the prohibition, see Adam, James. 1905. *The Republic of Plato*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 24 (s. v. 336d20); Shorey, Paul. 1937. *The Republic of Plato*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 39 (n. d); Sparshott, F. E. 1966. "Socrates and Thrasymachus." *The Monist* 50, 456 and Sparshott, F. E. 1957. "Plato and Thrasymachus." *University of Toronto Quarterly* 27, 58; and Welton 2006, 296.
[6] Cross, R. C., and Woozley, A. D. (1964). *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary*. London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 24-5, are among the few who have noticed this. Welton 2006, 296 n. 6 notices it as well but appears to treat it as of minimal significance, relegating mention of it to a footnote.

what is good *simpliciter*, Socrates treats the good as something absolute, whereas Thrasymachus believes that what is good is relative.

There is a striking similarity between this view of the good and that offered by another much more famous sophist, Protagoras. In the eponymous dialogue Protagoras notes how "varied [ποικίλον] and many-sided [παντοδαπόν] a thing is the good" (334b6-c1), so that nothing is absolutely good, but only relatively so. In light of Plato's polemical tendency to treat sophists as unified by shared doctrinal commitments and to abstract from their differences, it is perhaps unsurprising if Thrasymachus is found to share Protagoras' view.

Like Protagoras, Thrasymachus regards what is good as fundamentally relative. As Rachel Barney notes[7], two assumptions inform this view. First is Thrasymachus' belief "that wealth and power, and the pleasures they provide, are *the* goods in relation to which our 'advantage' must be assessed"[8]; second is his belief that these goods are zero-sum: "for one member of a community to have more of them is for another to have less".[9] On this view there is no question of an absolute good, there is only the good of this or that sociopolitical group. Indeed, all that talk of absolute good does is obscure the true nature of justice as it operates in sociopolitical context.

II.

Whatever its basis, there is no small irony in Thrasymachus' charge that Socrates and his interlocutors are proceeding neither "clearly" (σαφῶς) nor "precisely" (ἀκριβῶς) in defining justice. For lack of clarity and precision is exactly what *Socrates* so often in Plato's dialogues faults interlocutors with when they provide definitions.[10] Nevertheless, Thrasymachus has a reason for his charge.

On the reading I am urging, Thrasymachus does not object to references to what is good in definitions of justice – indeed, he takes it as trivially true and uncontroversial that justice is what is good for *someone*; rather his prohibition is against defining justice without specifying

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[7] Barney, Rachel. 2017. "Callicles and Thrasymachus." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), §2.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid*.

[10] A point made with citations in Lesher, J. H. 2010. "The Meaning of "saphēneia" in Plato's Divided Line." In *Plato's Republic: A Critical Guide*, edited by Mark L. McPherran, 171-187. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179-180. I am thinking, specifically, of what Lesher calls "settings" 2) and 4) in which σαφής and cognates occur in Plato.

who it is good for. Thrasymachus objects that Socrates neither implicitly nor explicitly relativizes the good to which he refers. As a result, Socrates' definition is, by Thrasymachus' lights, vague and ambiguous. This is problematic because it enables Socrates either to equivocate about the human good or to refer only vaguely to it; in either case, this would permit specious inferences and give his arguments a superficial cogency.

Such a charge of equivocation is, in fact, more than a possibility. Not only does Thrasymachus quite generally claim that Socrates fails to argue in good faith, but only speciously and sophistically; he accuses Socrates specifically of "doing harm to or in arguments" (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις or τὸν λόγον κακουργῶν: 338d3-4, 341a7-8). This is not, I think, simply a vague or general accusation of dialectical malfeasance. Precisely the same charge is levelled by Callicles against Socrates in the *Gorgias*, a dialogue often paired with *Republic* I not least due to similarities in Callicles' and Thrasymachus' attacks on justice.[11] Callicles deploys the charge when accusing Socrates of fallacious argument by equivocation:

> This is in fact the clever trick you've thought of, with which you do harm in arguments [κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις]: if a person makes a statement [about justice] in terms of law, you slyly question him in terms of nature; if he makes it in terms of nature, you question him in terms of law.[12] (483a2-4)[13]

What enables Socrates to proceed thus is his reference to justice without explicitly relativizing it to natural justice or legal justice. Socrates' "imprecise" and "unclear" references to justice permit his sophistical equivocations in argument. If Thrasymachus is using the relevant phrase in the same way, then he must view Socrates as guilty of a similar move in *Republic* I.

On the two occasions when Thrasymachus explicitly uses the phrase in the *Republic*, there seems little doubt that he is accusing Socrates of equivocation. In the first case, Socrates is criticizing Thrasymachus' first definition of justice as the advantage of the stronger (338c4-d2). He mockingly asks whether Polydamas the pancratists' diet is just because it is good for the stronger; to this, Thrasymachus replies with his accusation (338d3-4). It seems clear that

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[11] Another dialogue thought by some (e.g., Welton 2006, 297) to be relevant here is the *Clitophon*, specifically 409c-d. I am dubious of this connection, for the central issue in that passage is not equivocation at all but a problematic vagueness that bespeaks a lack of knowledge (see 409d-end). It is, therefore, not merely the more measured nature of Clitophon that explains why the charge that Socrates ἐν τοῖς λόγοις or τὸν λόγον κακουργεῖν is nowhere present in that dialogue.

[12] This translation is based on Zeyl's in Cooper, John. 1997. *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, but I have modified it to hew more closely to the Greek.

[13] ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου.

the charge is that Socrates is equivocating between the sense of 'stronger' as *physically* stronger and the other sense that Thrasymachus has in mind, namely, more powerful socio-politically.

In the second case, Thrasymachus is responding to Socrates' argument that the rulers will sometimes do through ignorance what is disadvantageous to themselves; if justice is whatever the rulers prescribe, then justice is sometimes advantageous, but sometimes not (339b7-e8). To this, Thrasymachus draws a distinction between a ruler in the "precise sense" (κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον: 340e1-2), according to which a ruler never errs, and a looser sense of ruler, employed more generally; he then accuses Socrates of equivocation between the two (341a7-8).

The explicit charge of equivocation is not found in Thrasymachus' initial outburst when he institutes his prohibition; nevertheless, there is good reason to think that it is precisely what is bothering him. Thrasymachus' entry into Book I is preceded by the final portion (335a6-e5) of Socrates' discussion with Polemarchus. Plato clearly suggests that this discussion is what prompts Thrasymachus' entry. Not only does he burst into the text at the conclusion of that discussion, but Socrates makes plain, first, that "he had attempted many times to take over the discussion" (336b1-2) and, second, that Socrates observed him before he entered "just as [the] discussion began to make him savage [ἤρχετο…ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι]" (336d7-8).

More importantly, the substance of that argument, specifically its conclusion, amounts to a negation of the account of justice that Thrasymachus will give, for Socrates attacks the idea that justice might be bad for anyone. He insists that such a view belongs only to tyrants in history who mistakenly supposed themselves to have "great power [μέγα…δύνασθαι]" (336a5-7). Not only will Thrasymachus himself insist on the happiness and excellence of tyrants, but he will identify them as examples of his view that justice is the advantage of the stronger and injustice one's own benefit (344a4-344e8). For Thrasymachus, it is precisely "the person with great power" (note the similar phrasing: τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον, 344a1) who is happiest and best by practicing "complete" injustice (344a4-5).

The argument at issue is against part of Polemarchus' definition of justice, namely, that justice is (in part) harming one's enemies (335a7-b1). In criticizing this claim, Socrates argues roughly as follows (335b2–d13). To be harmed is to be made worse, therefore, less good. But goodness cannot make things less good and since justice is good, neither can justice make things less good. Therefore, it cannot be just to harm anyone (e.g., one's enemies).

To understand Thrasymachus' objection to this argument, we need first note the role that goodness (the good, what is good) plays in the argument. Socrates insists that goodness cannot make things bad and since justice is good, neither can it make things bad. This is a view

of goodness as absolute as opposed to relative; to see that this must be so, we need only consider the alternative and relativize the good. Consider a view of the goodness in question as the goodness *of the rulers*. On such a view, justice is good, but because the goodness is that *of the rulers* rather than absolute goodness, it is entirely possible that justice is simultaneously bad for the subjects. Indeed, we may go further, it may be that *through* being good for the rulers it is bad for the subjects – this, after all, is precisely Thrasymachus' position and it helps explain why the argument prompts his enraged entry into the discussion. Socrates obscures this possibility by treating goodness as absolute, but that is precisely the position that Thrasymachus rejects. No wonder, then, that Socrates' argument strikes Thrasymachus as sophistical.

III.

The distinction between relative and absolute forms of *F* (or *F*-ness), whether this is the good, the advantageous, or whatever, looms large in Plato's thought. It is important not to presume that its appearance in the dispute between Thrasymachus and Socrates is of merely parochial significance. In particular, the distinction is central to one sort of argument for the existence of Forms, instances of which appear throughout Plato's dialogues.[14] A particularly clear example of this kind of argument is provided in the famous "summoners" passage of *Republic* VII (523a1–526b4), where Socrates explains the importance of arithmetic for drawing one towards being (523a3, 524e1, 525c5-6), that is, towards the Forms.[15]

In the passage, Socrates identifies a class of "summoners" (τὰ παρακαλοῦντα: 523b9), perceptions that summon the understanding (ἡ νόησις) to reflect on the Forms. Though he provides an example with regard to the tallness/shortness of fingers, it is clear that the points apply equally to goodness/badness, piety/impiety, *inter alia*. One perceives one's ring finger

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[14] The distinction I make between relative and absolute forms of the *F* or *F*-ness is intimately related to one much discussed in the literature: that between "complete" and "incomplete" predicates, introduced by Owen, G. E. L. 1957. "A Proof in the Περὶ Ἰδεῶν." *The Journal of Hellenistic Studies* 77 (1), 108-9. Brentlinger, John. 1972. "Incomplete Predicates and the Two-World Theory of the *Phaedo*." *Phronesis* 17 (1), 70-1, provides a logically perspicuous analysis; for more recent discussions of this issue, see Silverman, Allan. 2002. *The Dialectic of Essence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 84-7, and Harte, Verity. 2019. "Plato's Metaphysics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*, 2nd ed., edited by Gail Fine, 455-480. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 465-478.

[15] For other examples, see *Euthyphro* 6e–8a, *Laches* 190e-191b, 192b-193c, *Hippias Major* 288c-289a, *Phaedo* 100d-101b, and even earlier in the *Republic* I.331c-d and 475d-480a. Nehamas, Alexander. 1973. "Predication and Forms of Opposites in the *Phaedo*." *The Review of Metaphysics* 26 (3): 461–491 provides detailed analysis of several different instances of this form of argument. See also Nehamas, Alexander. 1979. "Self–Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (2), 94-5, and Nehamas, Alexander. 1975. "Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (2), 108.

as simultaneously short (relative to the middle finger) and long (relative to the pinky finger); this is the phenomenon referred to as the "compresence of opposites".[16] "[T]he soul is puzzled as to what the sense signifies" longness or shortness to be (524a5-6), since what seem to be two opposed things are mixed together and indistinguishable. In consequence, the soul is forced to call upon the understanding, which can make sense of the confusion only by grasping what longness and shortness are. The nature, essence or being of the relevant property is what Plato identifies as the Form and what is picked-out in the definition of the relevant property as what causally explains sensible things possessing it. These Forms must be purely intelligible precisely because perceptions "produce no sound result" (523b3-4); in making sense of summoners, the soul must ascend from the perceptible realm of becoming to the intelligible realm of being, the realm of the Forms.

The compresence of opposites is a consequence of the fact that sensible things manifest properties in a relative way; in the case of the example, the longness/shortness in the finger is relative to the length of other fingers – it is an artifact of the participation relation between Forms and sensible things. The finger manifests longness in relation to one finger and shortness in relation to another; it is the relative nature of the manifestation of properties that makes them problematic and requires the positing of Forms. By contrast, the Forms are not thus qualified, a point Plato makes most explicitly perhaps in the *Symposium*, when speaking of the Form of the Beautiful:

it is not [1] beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor [2] beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor [3] beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it [4] beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others.[17] (211a2-5)[18]

Socrates here lists four different ways in which beauty/ugliness may be qualified, emphasizing that the Form of Beauty/the Beautiful is absolutely beautiful rather than merely relatively so. As noted, the same applies to the case of the other Forms, most saliently for our purposes, Goodness; in general, the Form of the *F* is treated by Plato as being *F* absolutely – this seems the force of Plato's claims that Forms are "always the same in all respects" or "always are" (484b4, 485b1-3).

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[16] Owen 1957, 110.
[17] From Nehamas and Woodruff's translation in Cooper 1997.
[18] οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ᾽ αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ᾽ ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν.

IV.

The distinction between relative and absolute *F*-ness, which informs the distinction between Forms and sensible things, provides a way of framing Thrasymachus' prohibition. Put simply, Thrasymachus' prohibition mandates an account of justice only in terms of relative rather than absolute goodness. To be sure, this is not how Thrasymachus himself understands it, for he views claims of absolute goodness as problematic. Either a) such claims are implicitly relative, in which case they should be made explicitly relative to avoid vagueness or equivocation; or b) such claims are not implicitly relative, in which case they are irremediably vague and equivocal, which makes them not well-formed; indeed, they are not claims at all. In the case of b), such claims are neither precise nor clear, which is exactly the charge levelled by Thrasymachus against Socrates' definitions.

Thrasymachus never defines justice as absolutely advantageous or good, but always specifies to whom it is advantageous or good, whether the stronger (338c1-2), the regime in power (338e1-339a4), or simply another (343c3-4). In each of these cases, what is good relative to one group or person is bad relative to another, so that the compresence of opposites is baked into his definitions. Even on those occasions where the relativization is not explicitly made, it is usually a small matter to make it explicit.

Once Thrasymachus' prohibition is framed in this way, it is possible to see him as being very similar to the "sight-lovers" (φιλοθεάμονες) introduced in Book V (475d1–476e2) by Glaucon; these "strange people" (ἄτοποι) will appear to count as philosophers according to Socrates' characterization of them as "lovers of learning" (φιλομαθεῖς). It is vital that Socrates distinguish true philosophers from those who merely appear to be so, especially in the context of 5th – 4th century Athens where confusion of the two was common and likely.[19] It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that Thrasymachus should share much in common with that group of individuals who, although "like" philosophers (475e2) and so mistaken for such by many, are in fact not.

Socrates describes the sight-lovers as those who believe in the existence of beautiful or just or good *things* – that is, *F* things – but do not believe in the existence of the *F* itself, the

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[19] See Halliwell, Stephen. 1993. *Plato: Republic 5*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 201 for discussion of the "highly contestable" nature of φιλόσοφος. For a more recent and thorough examination of the evidence about φιλόσοφος and its usage, one not inconsistent with Halliwell, see Moore, Christopher. 2020. *Calling Philosophers Names: On the Origins of a Discipline*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. especially chapters 5, 6 and 8. While Moore argues for continuity among the referents of the term, he does not deny that Plato is responsible for a controversial restriction of it.

Form of the *F* (476b4–8).[20] Philosophers, by contrast, believe in the existence of both the Form of *F*-ness and the *F* things that participate in it (476c9–d3). The upshot is that the sight-lovers possess only "opinion" (δόξα) while "knowledge" (γνώμη) is possessed by the true philosophers alone (476d5-6).

Thrasymachus' status as a sight-lover helps to explain his approach to the question of the nature of justice. As one recent line of interpretation of Thrasymachus' approach has it, he is "offering an empirical and descriptive account of the way justice is commonly practiced, as opposed to a normative or analytic definition".[21] Whether or not Thrasymachus is offering a normative definition – or at least a definition with normative implications – there is no doubt that empirical facts and description loom very large in his account. Thrasymachus conceives of goodness and justice, etc., as grounded in sensible things and abstracts his account of the nature of justice from empirical data.

Socrates notes the intense difficulty of convincing the sight-lovers of the existence of the Forms because of their confused dream-like state, which bespeaks a kind of psychic illness (476d8-e2); he notes this in terms that explicitly recall his difficult and ultimately unsuccessful interaction with Thrasymachus. The violence of that interaction is recalled too when Socrates imagines the sight-lovers becoming "angry" (χαλεπαίνῃ: 476d8) with those who try to persuade them of the existence and nature of the Forms – the same word and its cognates are used repeatedly in relation to Thrasymachus (336e2: χαλεπὸς, 337a1-2: χαλεπαίνεσθαι, 354a12-13: χαλεπαίνων). Indeed, the anger and frustration reflects an inability to grasp what is being argued and discussed. For Thrasymachus, Socrates' approach can be rendered intelligible only as sophistical trickery and specious argument, a classic case of "making the worse argument the stronger" (*Apology* 18b8–c1).

The final bit of evidence I want to consider in favor of reading Thrasymachus as a sight-lover is his reaction to Socrates' response to his prohibition. In his response, Socrates remarks:

You knew very well that if you ask someone how much twelve is, and, as you ask, you warn him by saying "Don't tell me, man, that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, four times

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[20] The following discussion relies on the reading of the sight-lovers passage put forth by Baltzly, Dirk. 1997. "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 79, 243-52. I agree that "the sight-lovers are people who do not share Plato's foundational presuppositions about what is required to answer a 'What is it?' question" (243); among these presuppositions is the ontology of Forms. However, I depart from Baltzly in thinking that the sight-lovers must include the sophists. For another discussion from which I have benefitted considerably, see Penner, Terry. 2006. "The Forms in the Republic." In *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic*, edited by Gerasimos Santas, 234-262. Oxford/Malden/Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 246-8.

[21] Anderson, Merrick E. 2016. "Thrasymachus' Sophistic Account of Justice in *Republic* I." *Ancient Philosophy* 36 (1), 156. Anderson cites a number of scholars who articulate and defend such an approach.

three, for I won't accept such nonsense," then you'll see clearly that no one could answer a question framed like that. (337a8-b6)[22]

Thrasymachus replies to this with a sarcastic retort suggesting that he thinks the mathematical example has little to do with the case of justice.[23]

But as readers of the *Republic*, we know that the mathematical example is deeply relevant.[24] Not only is arithmetic crucial to turning the soul from the world of perceptual becoming to the world of intelligible being, but arithmetical claims are grounded in and made true by the Forms.[25] This being so, it should be unsurprising if Plato portrays Thrasymachus balking at the mathematical example, since Thrasymachus balks at the very idea of explanation in terms of Forms, in particular, for our purposes, the Form of the Good.

V.

I have argued that Thrasymachus' view of the good as always relative indicates that he is intended by Plato to be a representative of the sight-lovers. Such a view explains various aspects of Thrasymachus' character and outlook: his indignant entry into Book I, his empirical methodology, his intense anger at what he views as Socrates' sophistical methods, his rejection of the mathematical example, and his prohibition of certain answers to the question "what is justice?"

This view also explains the dialectical stalemate between Socrates and Thrasymachus at the end of Book I, which underwrites the dissatisfaction of all the discussants with the argument thus far and which prompts the decision to start all over again in Book II. The heart of this stalemate is a fundamental disagreement about the nature of the good, which reflects a disagreement in theoretical approach. Thrasymachus, the sight-lover, conceives of the good in worldly terms as always and everywhere relative; Socrates, the partisan of the Forms, conceives of the good as absolute, a transcendent Form accessible only to the understanding. The resolution of this disagreement must wait for the epistemological and metaphysical reflections

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[22] εὖ οὖν ᾔδησθα ὅτι εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὁπόσα ἐστὶν τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ— "Ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἔστιν τὰ δώδεκα δὶς ἓξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς" —δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτως πυνθανομένῳ.

[23] Welton 2006, 297-8.

[24] This point has been rigorously argued and investigated by Welton 2006.

[25] The proof text here is the "summoner's passage" at *Rep.* VII.523a1-526b4. The issue of whether mathematical claims are "about" the Forms is a fraught one, which I have tried to avoid taking a stand on here. For a helpful discussion of this issue, with which I am largely in sympathy, see Franklin, Lee. 2012. "Inventing Intermediates: Mathematical Discourse and Its Objects in *Republic* VII." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 50 (4): 483-506.

of Books V-VII. Thus, Books V-VII function not as a mere digression, as is sometimes supposed, but as an integral part of Socrates' response to Thrasymachus.

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How Do the Eight Hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides* Come to Light? Chiasmus as a Method of Division[1]

Xin Liu

In this paper, I aim to explore the structure of the exercise in the second part of the *Parmenides*. In analyzing the transitional section, I claim that in addition to diairesis, there is another method of division, namely, cross-division, which Porphyry terms chiasmus. On this basis, I explain how Plato uses chiasmus to divide the exercise into eight hypotheses, in which the subjects of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same and those of the nonpaired hypotheses differ. In closing, I reconstruct the universal scheme of the exercise on the basis of Plato's use of chiasmus.

Introduction

This paper aims to articulate the structure of the dialectic exercise presented in the second part of the *Parmenides*. In this regard, two questions are discussed. First, how many hypotheses are included in the exercise? Most scholars have maintained the existence of eight

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hypotheses in this context[2], while others have argued for nine.[3] Second, how do these

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[2] Cherniss, H. F. (1932), "Parmenides and the *Parmenides* of Plato", *American Journal of Philology* 53 (2): 126; Walker, M. G. (1938), "The One and Many in Plato's Parmenides", *The Philosophical Review* 47 (5): 494; Cornford, F. M. (1939), *Plato and Parmenides, Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides*, London: Kegan Paul: 107; Chen Chung-hwan (1944a), "On the *Parmenides* of Plato", *Classical Quarterly* 38 (3/4): 105, 105-113; (1944b, Repr. 2013), *Plato's Parmenides*, Beijing: Shangwu Press: 118-9n157; Sayre, K. M. (1978), "Plato's Parmenides: Why the Eight Hypotheses Are Not Contradictory", *Phronesis* 23: 135, 140; (1983, Repr. 2005), *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 40-4; (1996), *Parmenides' Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato's Parmenides*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press: 108-9; Moravcsik, J. M. (1982), "Forms and dialectic in the second half of the *Parmenides*", In Schofield, M., Nussbaum, M. C. (eds.), *Language and Logos: Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 135-6; (1992), "Chapter 4: The Parmenides: Forms and Participation Reconsidered", In *Plato and Platonism: Plato's Conception of Appearance and Reality in Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics, and its Modern Echoes*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers: 142-3, 162; Miller, M. (1986), *Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul*, Princeton: Princeton University Press: 74; (1995), "Unwritten Teachings in the *Parmenides*", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48 (3): 601, 604-6; Halper, E. (1990), "A Note on the Unity of the Parmenides", *Hermes* 118: 36, 38; Meinwald, C. C. (1991), *Plato's Parmenides*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 36-9, 117-130; (2014), "How does Plato's Exercise Work?" *Dialogue* 53: 470; Halfwassen, J. (1992, Repr. 2006), *Der Aufstieg zum Einen. Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin*, Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner: 298-300; Horn, C. (1995), "Der Platonische Parmenides und die Möglichkeit seiner prinzipientheoretischen Interpretation", *Antike und Abendland* 41: 97; Kutschera, Franz von (1995), *Platons Parmenides*, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter: 46, 50-1; Peterson, S. (1996), "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Principle of Interpretation and Seven Arguments", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 34 (2): 168; (2003), "New Rounds of the Exercise of Plato's *Parmenides*", *The Modern Schoolman* 80 (3): 249; (2019), "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Reconsideration of Forms", In Fine, G. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Plato* (Second Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 249; Rickless, S. C. (1998), "How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms", *The Philosophical Review* 107: 540; (2007), *Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 109-111; (2020), "Plato's *Parmenides*", In *Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: 16-19; Turnbull, R. G. (1998), *The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy. Translation of and Commentary on the Parmenides with Interpretative Chapters on the Timaeus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Philebus*, Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press: 47-9; Coxon, A. H. (1999), *The Philosophy of Forms. An Analytical and Historical Commentary on Plato's Parmenides with a new English translation*, Assen: Van Gorcum: 115-127; Brisson, L. (2002), "'Is the World One?' A New Interpretation of Plato's Parmenides", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 22: 15-16; Scolnicov, S. (2003), *Plato's Parmenides*, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press: 25-9; Tabak, M. (2015), *Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 59-60; Fronterotta, F. (2019), "L'ipotesi di Parmenide in Parm. 137b1-4: cosmologia, enologia o ontologia?" *Études platoniciennes* 15: 8. Remarkably, Proclus enumerates either eight (1008.9-13, 1008.13-29, 1009.16-1010.2, 1010.2-14, 1010.23-1011.8, 1011.9-23, 1012.17-28, 1012.28-1013.11) or twenty-four hypotheses (622.24-623.12, 623.12-15, 624.9-16, 1000.26-1002.3, 1002.4-25, 1004.10-1006.13, 1016.4-1017.25). I explore this point elsewhere. I cite Proclus's text using Steel's edition (2007-2009), *Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria I-III*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[3] Proclus 1039.5-1040.17; Allen, R. E. (1997), *Plato's Parmenides*, New Haven, London: Yale University Press: 212-3, 213-4, n. 43, 216; Steel, C. (2003), "Beyond the Principle of Contradiction? Proclus' Parmenides and the Origin of Negative Theology", In Pickavé, M. (ed.) *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter: 587; Polansky, R. and Cimakasky, J. (2013), "Counting the Hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides*", *Apeiron* 46 (3): 231-2. Gill views the passage 155e4-157b5 as an appendix to the first two hypotheses, thereby identifying this passage as the third hypothesis and counting a total of nine hypotheses; see Gill, M. L. (2012), *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 48-50,

hypotheses differ from one another? Some scholars have suggested that they differ in subject[4], whereas others have claimed that they differ in the manner of predication.[5]

To engage with these questions and illuminate Plato's thinking, I delve into the transitional section of the *Parmenides* (136a4-c5). I agree with Meinwald that this contains crucial methodological remarks that play a key role in structuring the exercise. In analyzing this section, I begin by noting that in addition to diairesis (διαίρεσις), another method of division is used, namely, cross-division, which Porphyry terms chiasmus (χιαστή). In answer to the first question, I pursue an alternate proposal that Plato uses chiasmus to divide the exercise into eight hypotheses (Section 1). In answer to the second question, I disagree with Meinwald, who proposed that the eight hypotheses differ in terms of predication (Section 2). In her view, the qualification pair *pros heauto–pros ta alla* qualifies the predicates differently, resulting in two kinds of predication. I argue that the qualification pair should be articulated comprehensively and precisely as *pros to hen–pros ta alla*, which qualifies the subject instead of the predicate, thus constituting four subjects of eight hypotheses (Section 3). On this basis, I conclude that the eight hypotheses differ in that the subjects of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same, and those of the nonpaired hypotheses differ (Section 4). In the Appendix, I reconstruct the universal scheme of the exercise on the basis of Plato's use of chiasmus (Section 5). Chiasmus, as the universal scheme of the exercise, can be applied not only to the opposite Forms One–Many but also universally to those such as Similarity–

55-6; (2014), "Design of the Exercise in Plato's *Parmenides*", *Dialogue* 53: 499-502, 516. In an unpublished transcript of "Plato: Parmenides [Z]", Heidegger enumerates nine hypotheses and refers to the passage 155e4-157b5 as an appendix by stating that "Vorblick auf den Gang der Untersuchung: 9 Gänge: für die positive und die negative Hypothesis je zweimal These und Antithese; das sind 8 Gänge. Der 3. Gang scheint nicht recht underzubringen, er gilt als ein 'Anhang' (155e4-157b5). Aber dieser angebliche Anhang ist das Kernstück des ganzen Dialoges (schon an der gehobenen Sprache kenntlich!), der höchste Punkt, zu dem Plato positiv gelangt ist; hier gibt er die Bestimmung des Seins als μεταβολή." See Heidegger, M. (1930-31), "Plato: Parmenides [Z]", Marcuse H. Unpublished Transcript, Frankfurt am Main: Universitätsbibliothek Johann-Christian-Senckenberg Archivzentrum, Nr. 3,19 (0020.01): 8. Inspired by Heidegger, Gonzalez suggests that the third, τὸ τρίτον, plays a special role in the construction of the exercise by encompassing all the opposed hypotheses, i.e., I-II, III-IV, V-VI, VII-VIII. By giving the third the special constructive function, Gonzalez still recognizes eight hypotheses, i.e., eight deductions in his words; see Gonzalez, F. J. (2022), "'Let us say the third': The meaning of τὸ τρίτον in the Deductions of Plato's Parmenides", in L. Brisson, A. Macéet and O. Renaut (eds.) *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, Baden-Baden: Academia: 379-392.

[4] Proclus 1039.18-1040.17; Dodds, E. R. (1928), "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One", *Classical Quarterly* 22: 136-7; Cornford 1939: 107, 112-3; Halfwassen 1992: 300-1; Kutschera 1995: 51.

[5] Meinwald 1991: 78-9, 2014: 466-8; Peterson 1996: 171-2; Coxon 1999: 116-7. In addition, Gill offers an interpretation by maintaining that the hypotheses differ in terms of the perspective, from which the same subject, 'the One', is investigated; see Gill 2012: 50-1, 65-6; 2014: 503.

Dissimilarity, Motion–Rest, Generation–Destruction, and Being–Nonbeing. Thus, I ultimately show how the chiasmus, as the foundational schematic, structures the exercise of One–Many in the *Parmenides*; this approach also promises to illuminate the exercise of Being–Nonbeing in the *Sophist*.

1. *Plato's Division of the Exercise: An Application of Chiasmus*

After encountering many difficulties concerning the theory of Forms, in the transitional section of the *Parmenides*, Plato's character Parmenides notes that to understand Forms, gymnastic training (dialectic exercise) is required. The exercise consists of multiple hypotheses, deriving apparently contradictory consequences from two contradictory antecedents. Plato's character Parmenides explains the design of the exercise as follows:

(1) Οἷον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλι σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· (2) καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. (3) καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· (4) καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς σύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάντε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἄντε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. (*Parm.* 136a4-c5)[6]

(1) "Well," Parmenides said, "if you will take the hypothesis that Zeno hypothesizes as an example, if Many are, what must follow for the Many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the One and for the One in relation to itself and in relation to the Many. Conversely, if

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[6] I use the Greek text of the *Parmenides* edited by Burnet, I. (1901, Oxford: Oxford University Press) and refer to the English translation by Gill, M. L. and Ryan, P. (1997, In Cooper, J. M. [ed.] *Plato Complete Works*, Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company: 359-397) and the German translation by Schleiermacher, F. and Kurz, D. (2011, Darmstadt: WBG). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. In the previous passage (135d8-e4), Parmenides emphasizes that in the exercise one should not investigate the visible things, but should inquire about those things that one would most grasp by reason and take to be Forms ([...] ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι, 135e2-4). On this account, most scholars agree that the subject of inquiry is a Platonic Form; see Sayre (1996: 99, 103, 119-120), Allen (1997: 210-1), Peterson (2003: 250-1, 2019: 247), Rickless (2007: 99, 2020: 16), Gill (2014: 496n1, 502). Meinwald uses the capitalization 'the One' to refer to the Form of the One. While the above scholars take a logical-metaphysical approach to interpreting the One and the Many, Brisson (2002: 5-7, 13-14) and Fronterotta (2019: 3-5) take a cosmological approach, seeing the One as the whole world or cosmos and the Many as the sensible particulars. Due to space limitations, I will not enter this debate here. I take the logical-metaphysical approach and subscribe to the widely accepted view that the One and the Many are Platonic Forms. Thus, I use capitalization to refer to the Form, e.g., One, Many, Similarity, etc., both in my translations and throughout the paper.

Many are not, you must inquire what will follow for the One and for the Many both in relation to [itself/]themselves and in relation to each other. (2) And again, if you hypothesize, if Similarity is or if it is not, what will follow from each hypothesis for the things hypothesized themselves and for the Others both in relation to [itself/]themselves and in relation to each other. (3) And the same scheme is applied to Dissimilarity, to Motion, to Rest, to Generation and Destruction, and to Being itself and Nonbeing. (4) And in one word, in the case of whatever you hypothesize as Being or as Nonbeing or something that has another property, you must inquire about the consequences in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whatever you select, and it is likewise with several [of the Forms] and all [of the Forms]. And again, [you must inquire about] the Others in relation to themselves and in relation to another whatever you always select, whether you hypothesize that what you hypothesize is or is not. When you are completely trained, you will authoritatively see the truth."

This passage, which Meinwald calls 'methodological remarks', shows that Plato designs the exercise to feature four steps. (1) Plato invokes the Form of the Many as a paradigm and (2) takes the Form of Similarity as another example. (3) Plato generalizes the thesis by noting that the scheme that is applied to Many and Similarity is also applicable to Dissimilarity, Motion, Rest, Generation, Destruction, Being, and Nonbeing. (4) Plato ultimately establishes the universal scheme of the exercise, which can be used to hypothesize that each of the disjunctive Forms, namely, a Form and its Opposite, such as Similarity–Dissimilarity, Motion–Rest, Generation–Destruction, and Being–Nonbeing, is and is not (136b1-6). Since the scheme is used to hypothesize that the Many are and are not, it is equally applicable to hypothesizing that the opposite of the Many–the One–is and is not. Thus, the exercise of the One can be reconstructed as follows. If the One is, what follows for the One in relation to itself and to the Others, and what follows for the Others in relation to the One and to themselves? If the One is not, what follows for the One in relation to itself and to the Others, and what follows for the Others in relation to the One and to themselves?

As Meinwald aptly notes, the methodological remarks quoted above play a key role in structuring the exercise in the second part of the *Parmenides*.[7] Meinwald and other scholars have observed that these methodological remarks contain three pairs of opposites, which can be reconstructed as follows.[8] In the exercise of the One, (1) positive and negative antecedents are opposed to each other (if the One is–if the One is not). (2) Regarding the subject of the inquiry, the One and the Others are opposed to each other (τὸ ἓν–τὰ ἄλλα). (3) Regarding the subject's relations, e.g., the relations of the One to itself and to the Others, these relations are

[7] Meinwald 1991: 38-9, 48, 132; (1992), "Good-bye to the Third Man", In Kraut, R. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 369; 2014: 469-470. See also Sayre 1978: 136, 141; 1983: 37-41; 1996: 103-9.
[8] Meinwald: 1991: 38, 48; Sayre 1983: 41; 1996: 119; Horn 1995: 96-7.

opposed to each other (πρὸς ἑαυτὸ [i.e., πρὸς τὸ ἓν]–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα).[9] Meinwald noted that "by

the possible combinations of one member from each of these three pairs" (2014: 470), multiple

hypotheses are generated.[10] In my view, the combinations cannot simply be performed in any

manner whatsoever; rather, they must comply with a general method to ensure the universality

of the scheme.[11] The general method that Plato uses to construct the exercise is a special method

of division, that is, cross-division or chiasmus.

Chiasmus (χιαστή) is the technical term that Porphyry invents for designating cross-

division.[12] In commenting on Aristotle's *Cat.* 2, 1a20-b6, Porphyry declares that Aristotle

makes a fourfold division by means of chiasmus: "According to which method [order] did

Aristotle make the division? I say according to the chiasmus" (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κατὰ ποίαν τάξιν

τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐξέθετο; κατὰ τὴν χιαστὴν λέγω, 78.35-6).[13] Porphyry reconstructs the chiasmus

in two steps. First, Porphyry sets up two pairs of opposites according to Aristotle's dictum. He

identifies Aristotle's formulation, 'that which is in a substrate' with accident (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ

εἶναι = συμβεβηκός); correspondingly, 'that which is not in a substrate' refers to substance

(οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι = οὐσία).[14] Substance and accident are opposed in such a way that

the former is not in a substrate and the latter is in a substrate. Porphyry further identifies 'that

which is said of a subject' with the universal (καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι = καθόλου);

correspondingly, 'that which is not said of a subject' refers to the individual (οὐ καθ'

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[9] Meinwald supposes that πρὸς ἑαυτὸ–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα qualify the predicate, whereas Gill proposes that
the two relations qualify the subject. On this point, I follow Gill's interpretation that the two relations
qualify the subject, thereby referring to the relations of the subject to itself and to the others; see Gill
2012: 52-3, 53, n. 20, 164, 164, n. 62; 2014: 504-5, 505, n. 19. See also Sayre 1996: 113-4; Rickless
2007: 102-3. I provide the corresponding account in due course.

[10] See also Meinwald 1991: 38.

[11] Scholars have realized that a general schematic underlies these combinations. Given the presence of
two elements in each of the three pairs, the intersections among these three pairs form a 2 x 2 x 2
structure. Meinwald expresses these 2 x 2 x 2 combinations in an abstract way, and Scolnicov
improperly concretizes them into a dichotomy; see Scolnicov 2003: 28, Fig. 2; Meinwald 2014: 473;
Peterson 2019: 250.

[12] See Porphyry (1887), *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 78.34-79.11, Busse, A. (ed.), Berlin:
Reimer. See also Liu, X. (2020), *Sein, Logos und Veränderung – Eine systematische Untersuchung zu
Aristoteles' Metaphysik*, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter: 15-18, 16, n. 16, 16-17, n. 17, 17, n. 18.

[13] In Porphyry's dictum quoted above (78.35-6), diairesis refers to division in the general sense, while
chiasmus specifically refers to cross-division. These are not the same things. For the difference between
diairesis and chiasmus, see Liu, X. (2021), "On Diairesis, Parallel Division, and Chiasmus: Plato's and
Aristotle's Methods of Division", *Plato Journal* 22: 42-5.

[14] See Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 79.12-34; Liu 2020: 79-80, n. 90. In
particular, ὑποκείμενον is said in two different ways. In the ontological context, i.e., 'being in a
ὑποκείμενον', ὑποκείμενον refers to something that underlies the accident in reality, so I translate it as
substrate. In the logical context, i.e., 'said of a ὑποκείμενον', ὑποκείμενον refers to something that
underlies the predicate in the judgment, in which case I translate it as subject. See also Liu 2020: 80,
80-81, n. 91.

ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι = μερικόν).[15] Universal and individual are opposed in such a way that the former is said of a subject and the latter is not said of a subject. Thus, Porphyry establishes the two pairs of opposites by replacing Aristotle's own formulations 'not being in a substrate–being in a substrate' and 'said of a subject–not said of a subject' with his own terms, i.e., 'substance-accident' and 'universal-individual' (λέγω ὅτι ἡ οὐσία συμβεβηκὸς ἀντιδιαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐπὶ μέρους, 79.1-2). Then, these two pairs are cross-combined, thus constituting a 2 x 2 chiasmus. Although Porphyry does not include a diagram, his two successors, Ammonius and Philoponus, draw a diagram in their commentaries.[16] Boethius preserves a Latin version, which is exactly the same as the original diagram drawn by Ammonius and Philoponus.[17] I present the original below in Diagram 1*.

Diagram 1*

To clarify this issue, I also modify the original Diagram 1* and draw an alternative Diagram 1, as shown below.

Diagram 1

There are no essential differences between the two diagrams; nevertheless, the two exhibits certain differences, which warrants explanation. First, instead of using the term

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[15] See Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 80.1-27; Liu 2020: 81.

[16] See παραδείγμα presented in *Ammonii In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius* 25.13ff (1895, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer) and διάγραμμα presented in *Philoponii (olim Ammonii) In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 28.25ff (1898, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); see also Liu 2020: 16, n. 17.

[17] See *figuram* preserved in *Boethii In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor*, In *Manlii Severini Boethii Opera Omnia*, *Patrologia Latina* 64: 175B-C (1891, Migne, J.-P. [ed.], Paris: Garnier: 159A-294C).

μερικόν employed by Ammonius and Philoponus, I use Aristotle's term, the synonym καθ' ἕκαστόν, to signify the individual because καθ' ἕκαστόν and καθόλου (i.e., καθ' ὅλον) are similar in construction to κατὰ τινος and can be regarded as a prepositional pair. Second, I switch the positions of καθόλου and συμβεβηκὸς in Diagram 1* so that in Diagram 1, καθόλου is located in the position of συμβεβηκὸς and συμβεβηκὸς in the position of καθόλου. My reason for this switch is that I use Diagram 1 (which is concerned with the classification of things) to illuminate Diagram 2 (which is concerned with the exercise of the One). As Diagram 2 below shows, in the exercise of the One, it is more natural to arrange the pair of prepositional structures πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα vertically up and down than to place them left and right on the same horizontal line. The same reasoning holds for καθόλου–καθ' ἕκαστόν, which can be regarded as prepositional structures analogous to πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. As with the position of πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα (see Diagram 2 below), I arrange καθόλου–καθ' ἕκαστόν vertically up and down (see Diagram 1 above), thereby switching the positions of καθόλου and συμβεβηκὸς. Third, as Diagram 1* shows, Ammonius and Philoponus (as well as Boethius) draw six lines. A 2 x 2 chiasmus requires two pairs of opposites to cross each other. Two pairs of opposites are cross-combined, thus producing six possible combinations, which are represented by the six lines drawn in Diagram 1*. The cross-combination of two pairs of opposites generates six possible combinations, two of which are invalid because the opposites in each pair cannot be combined.[18] Given that an accident is in a substrate and a substance is not in a substrate, they cannot be combined. Given that the universal is said of a subject and the individual is not said of a subject, the two cannot be connected. Ammonius and Philoponus fully realize that two of the six combinations are invalid and thus append ἀσύστατον to the two horizontal lines that ostensibly combine substance with accident and the universal with the individual, which are marked in red in Diagram 1*. In Diagram 1, καθόλου and συμβεβηκὸς reverse their positions, so the ἀσύστατον-lines would have been two vertical lines, which are absent. To indicate that the opposites in a pair cannot be combined, I do not draw ἀσύστατον-lines in the chiasmus shown in Diagram 1, nor do I include ἀσύστατον-lines in other instances of the chiasmus.

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[18] Aristotle, *Gen. et Corr*. B3, 330a30-b1; Liu 2020: 254-5. See also Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 79.4-8; Ammonius, *In Porphyrii Isagogen sive quinque voces* 95.6-96.9 (1891, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Ammonius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius* 25.5-26.20; Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 44.1-45.32 (1907, Kalbfleich, K. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Philoponus (olim Ammonius), *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 28.1-29.13; Olympiodorus, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 43.3-44.34 (1902, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Elias (olim David), *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* 147.30-148.18 (1900, Busse, A. [ed.], Berlin: Reimer); Liu 2020: 17, 17, n. 18.

As Diagram 1 shows, the two pairs, 'substance–accident' and 'universal–individual', intersect each other, thereby producing four valid combinations. The four combinations characterize four kinds of things: the universal substance, the universal accident, the individual substance, and the individual accident.[19] Porphyry explicitly points out that in *Cat*. 2, Aristotle classifies things into four kinds using a 2 x 2 chiasmus; Ammonius and Philoponus take this step further by drawing a diagram for chiasmus. Following in the footsteps of Porphyry and the Alexanderian commentators, I propose that in the *Parmenides*, Plato uses the same kind of 2 x 2 chiasmus to divide the exercise of the One into eight hypotheses. The exercise of the One includes opposite antecedents. Regarding each antecedent, Plato performs a 2 x 2 chiasmus. The two subjects of the inquiry 'the One–the Others' (which appear as 'for the One–for the Others') and the two subjects' relations 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' cross each other, thus establishing a 2 x 2 chiasmus, as illustrated in Diagram 2:

Diagram 2

Under opposite antecedents, two chiasmata emerge. They are constructed in the same way and exhibit the same 2 x 2 structure. They differ in terms of their antecedents: one has a positive antecedent (see Table 1), and the other a negative antecedent (see Table 2).

Table 1 (If the One is)

	The One	The Others
In relation to the One	Hypothesis I	Hypothesis III
In relation to the Others	Hypothesis II	Hypothesis IV

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[19] See also Liu 2020: 79-81; 2021: 43.

Table 2 (If the One is not)

	The One	The Others
In relation to the One	Hypothesis VI	Hypothesis VII
In relation to the Others	Hypothesis V	Hypothesis VIII

Using the 2 x 2 chiasmus, Plato divides the exercise into eight hypotheses. Thus, the exercise of the One comprises eight hypotheses, as described below.

If the One is, what follows

    (I) for the One in relation to the One/itself (137c4-142a8);

    (II) for the One in relation to the Others (142b1-157b5);

    (III) for the Others in relation to the One (157b6-159b1);

    (IV) for the Others in relation to the Others/themselves (159b2-160b4).

If the One is not, what follows

    (V) for the One in relation to the Others (160b5-163b6);

    (VI) for the One in relation to the One/itself (163b7-164b4);

    (VII) for the Others in relation to the One (164b5-165e1);

    (VIII) for the Others in relation to the Others/themselves (165e2-166c5).

A thorough examination of whether and to what extent the development and unfolding of the exercise corresponds to the scheme is beyond the scope of this paper[20], so it must suffice to say that chiasmus determines the number of hypotheses and structures the exercise. Each chiasmus in this context is a fourfold division (2 x 2).[21] By performing two fourfold divisions,

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[20] Sayre has established a similar scheme; see Sayre 1978: 140; 1983: 44; 1996: 119. Doing so, Sayre does not consider chiasmus but rather analyses the text in detail. Sayre's detailed textual analysis fully proves that the content of the exercise matches the eightfold, chiastic structure that I propose; see Sayre 1978: 136-141; 1983: 42-9.

[21] A chiasmus does not have to be fourfold (2 x 2). A chiasmus emerges from two sequences of elements (called a 'tuple' in mathematics) that cross each other. When an m-tuple and an n-tuple cross each other, an m x n chiasmus occurs. In the *Statesman* (302c4-e8), Plato constructs a 3 x 2 chiasmus by cross-combining the triple 'one–few–many' with the pair 'lawful–unlawful', thereby identifying six types of

Plato establishes eight hypotheses (4 x 2); accordingly, the hypotheses cannot be counted as nine but must rather be regarded as eight. Furthermore, the chiasmus structures the exercise by establishing the subjects of the hypotheses. To draw this conclusion, I make a clear distinction between the subject of the hypothesis and the subject of the inquiry. By 'the subject of the inquiry', I refer to the subject matter of the inquiry comprising the eight hypotheses, that is, the One and the Others. By 'the subject of the hypothesis', I refer to the grammatical subject identified in the deduction and consequence of each hypothesis, which takes the form of a question and answer in each hypothesis. If the One is, e.g., the deduction of Hypothesis I is formulated as the question 'what follows for *the One in relation to itself*?' The consequence of Hypothesis I is expressed as the answer '*the One in relation to itself* is neither H nor con-H (abbreviation of the contrary of H) for many values of H'. Thus, the subject of Hypothesis I is *the One in relation to itself*. In general, the subject of the hypothesis as a whole is composed of a subject of the inquiry (namely, the One or the Others) and its relation to itself or to its opposite (namely, its relation to the One or to the Others). On this account, a 2 x 2 chiasmus constitutes the subjects of the hypotheses by cross-combining the two subjects of the inquiry 'the One–the Others' with those two subjects' relations, i.e., 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others'. Using the 2 x 2 chiasmus, the four subjects of the hypotheses are established: the One in relation to itself, the One in relation to the Others, the Others in relation to the One, and the Others in relation to themselves. These four subjects are distributed under opposite antecedents; thus, eight hypotheses are generated. In this manner, Hypotheses I and VI share the subject 'the One in relation to itself', Hypotheses II and V share the subject 'the One in relation to the Others', Hypotheses III and VII share the subject 'the Others in relation to the One', and Hypotheses IV and VIII share the subject 'the Others in relation to themselves'. According to the 2 x 2 chiasmus, therefore, the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same. Notably, some scholars, in their reconstructions of the structure of the exercise, have applied 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' to each of the hypotheses (as Rickless, Polansky, and Cimakasky have done) or applied them to the third hypothesis (as Gill has done). As said, 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' are cross-combined with 'the One–the Others' to establish four subjects for the eight hypotheses; thus, it is impossible for the two relations to be applied to each of the eight hypotheses.

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constitutions; see Liu 2021: 28-31. In *History of Animals* (487b34-488a2), similarly, Aristotle establishes a 3 x 2 chiasmus by cross-combining the triple 'walking–flying–swimming' with the pair 'gregarious–solitary', thus classifying animals into six classes; see Liu 2021: 41-2. Many thanks to George Rudebusch for suggesting the use of the mathematical terms *m*-tuple and *n*-tuple in this context, which express the meaning of the *m x n* chiasmus more precisely.

Chiasmus provides strong evidence to prove that in Plato's design of the exercise, each of the eight hypotheses examines the consequences of the One or those of the Others–either in relation to the One or in relation to the Others and that none of the hypotheses examines the consequences of the One or those of the Others–both in relation to the One and in relation to the Others.[22]

That the 2 x 2 chiasmus establishes four subjects of eight hypotheses is evident not only in the methodological remarks but also in the intermediate and final summaries. In these two summaries, the four subjects of the hypotheses are the grammatical subject of the consequence, formulated as '*the subject of the hypothesis* is negated or affirmed for many values of H', while in the methodological remarks, they appear to be the grammatical subject of the deduction, expressed as 'what follows for *the subject of the hypothesis*'. Echoing the methodological remarks that elucidate the eight deductions, the final summary summarizes the eight consequences as follows:

[…], ἓν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. (*Parm.* 166c3-5)

[…], whether [the] One is or is not, it and the Others in relation to [itself/]themselves and to each other are all things in all ways and are not as well as appear and appear not.

In the final summary, the four subjects of the hypotheses are distributed under opposite antecedents, appearing as the grammatical subjects of the eight consequences. Since the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses are the same (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII), the final summary can be reconstructed as follows. (a) Whether the One is or is not, the One in relation to itself (Hypotheses I–VI) and the Others in relation to themselves (Hypothesis IV) are nothing in the sense that they are neither H nor con-H (οὐκ ἔστι). (b) Whether the One is or is not, the One in relation to the Others (Hypotheses II–V) and the Others in relation to the One (Hypothesis III) are all things in all ways in the sense that they are both H and con-H (πάντα πάντως ἐστί). (c) If the One is not, the Others in relation to the One (Hypothesis VII) appear to be both H and con-H (φαίνεται). (d) If the One is not, the Others in relation to themselves (Hypothesis VIII) appear to be neither H nor con-H (οὐ φαίνεται).

The intermediate summary explicates the first four consequences, which are derived

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[22] Rickless 2007: 109-110; Polansky and Cimakasky 2013: 242; Gill 2014: 515. Rickless constructs an eightfold structure by answering "three separate and independent questions" (2007: 110). The eightfold structure that Rickless constructs seems to be similar to the chiastic structure that I propose. However, there is an essential difference between these two structures; that is, Rickless applies 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others' to each of the eight hypotheses. See also Rickless 2020: 16-18.

from the positive antecedent, as follows:

Οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα, καὶ **τἆλλα** ὡσαύτως. (*Parm*. 160b2-3)

Thus, if [the] One is, the One is all things and not one in relation to itself and to the Others, and the Others likewise.

Consistent with the final summary, the intermediate summary should appear as follows: if the One is, the One in relation to itself (Hypothesis I) and the Others in relation to themselves (Hypothesis IV) are nothing in the sense that they are neither H nor con-H, while the One in relation to the Others (Hypothesis II) and the Others in relation to the One (Hypothesis III) are all things in all ways in the sense that they are both H and con-H. On this basis, what Plato literally demonstrates in the intermediate summary can be reconstructed as follows: Since it is nothing, the One in relation to itself is not one, as Hypothesis I shows (τὸ ἓν […] οὐδὲ ἕν ἐστι […] πρὸς ἑαυτὸ); since it is all, the One in relation to the Others is all things, as Hypothesis II shows (πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν […] πρὸς τἆλλα). The same reasoning holds for the Others (τἆλλα ὡσαύτως): the Others in relation to the One are all things, as Hypothesis III shows; the Others in relation to themselves are nothing, as Hypothesis IV shows. As Meinwald properly notes, we should accept Heindorf's emendation.[23] The 2 x 2 chiasmus requires two pairs of opposites; thus, the two relations πρὸς τὸ ἓν–πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα alone are insufficient, and the two subjects τὸ ἓν–τὰ ἄλλα must be present. In Burnet's edition, however, τὰ ἄλλα, as one of the two subjects, is absent. To complete the two subjects, τἆλλα must be added.

To summarize this section, Plato divides the exercise into eight hypotheses using chiasmus, which establishes the four subjects of the hypotheses by cross-combining the two subjects with the two relations (2 x 2). The four subjects of the hypotheses are distributed under opposite antecedents to generate eight hypotheses (4 x 2), as observed in the methodological remarks (136a4-c5) and intermediate (160b2-3) and final summaries (166c3-5). Meinwald appropriately notes that these three passages echo one another and indicate the structure of the exercise[24]; she also properly maintains that the two relations play a crucial role in structuring the exercise.[25] However, she does not realize that the two relations contribute to the establishment of the subjects of the hypotheses and instead improperly identifies them with two kinds of predication.

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[23] Meinwald 1991: 48-9, 142-4, 178n4.
[24] Meinwald 1991: 47-9, 2014: 470-1; see also Miller 1986: 74; Allen 1997: 215.
[25] Meinwald 1991: 47-9, 152; 2014: 471-3.

2. Pros heauto–Pros ta alla*: Qualification of the Predicate*

Regarding my proposal that Plato uses chiasmus to generate eight hypotheses, it is reasonable to consider how these hypotheses differ from one another. Meinwald proposes that they differ in terms of predication and that the qualification pair *pros heauto–pros ta alla* qualifies the predicate differently, thereby referring to two kinds of predication. Meinwald regards the former as 'tree predication' and the latter as 'ordinary predication'.[26] Ordinary predication highlights the feature of the subject so that an individual as the subject is predicated by the feature that the individual has, e.g., 'Aristides is just'. Tree predication reveals the internal nature of the subject in such a way that a species as the subject is predicated by the genus to which the species belongs, e.g., 'Justice is a virtue'. Although scholars have criticized Meinwald, few have gone deep into her main arguments. I delve into the main arguments to explore how she improperly constructs *pros heauto–pros ta alla* as entailing two kinds of predication.

2.1. Pros heauto *Predication*

To identify *pros heauto* as tree predication, Meinwald gives attention to the argument concerning Difference and Identity in Hypothesis I (139b4-e6). From this argument, Plato draws four negative consequences step by step: The One is not different from itself (139b5-7), the One is not identical to another (139b7-c3), the One is not different from another (139c3-d1), and the One is not identical to itself (139d1-e6). Meinwald focuses on the third consequence.

Ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. […] Τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἕν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· […]. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὂν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον. (139c3-d1)[27]

[The One] will not be different from another, so long as it is one. For, to be different from something does not belong to one but [belongs] only to different-from-another and to nothing else. Thus, [the One] will not be different by being one. If [the One] is not [different] by being one, it will not be [different] by itself; if it is not [different] by itself, [the One] itself is not [different]. If [the One] itself is in no way different, it will be different from nothing.

According to Plato, the One cannot be different from another because to be different from another does not belong to one thing or anything else but rather belongs only to different-

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[26] Meinwald 1991: 47, 70-5, 78-9; 1992: 378-381; 2014: 466-9.
[27] I translate this passage by reference to the translations of Gill and Ryan as well as Cornford and make some modifications.

from-another. In my view, Gill and Ryan have translated ἕτερον ἑτέρου appropriately as 'different-from-another', which refers to one of the five greatest Kinds, namely, ἕτερον. In the *Parmenides* (146d1-2, 164c1-2), Plato identifies ἕτερον as ἕτερον ἑτέρου; he also elucidates the πρὸς τι structure that is inherent in ἕτερον. In the description of ἕτερον proposed by Plato in the *Sophist* (255d1), τὸ δέ γ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, the first ἕτερον refers to one, while the second refers to another that remains alongside and is opposed to the one. Ἕτερον always includes two elements, one and another, which are related to each other. Thus, ἕτερον signifies the relation of one to another, which is formulated as ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον in the *Sophist* and equivalently expressed as ἕτερον ἑτέρου in the *Parmenides*. Thus, the expression ἕτερον ἑτέρου is used to designate ἕτερον, namely, Difference. On this basis, I reconstruct the argument as follows. According to the principle of participation (P), the One is different from another not by participating in any other Form (ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί) but merely by participating in Difference (μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου). Therefore, the One cannot be different by being one (a), that is, by itself (b). Recall the antecedent of Hypothesis I: if One One (εἰ ἓν ἕν, 142c3), that is, if there is only the One, it cannot participate in any other Form, e.g., Difference. The One cannot be different by participating in Difference (according to the antecedent of Hypothesis I), nor can the One be different by being one (inconsistent with the principle of participation); thus, it cannot be different in any way (c).

 (P) The One is different only by participating in Difference.
 (a) The One cannot be different by being one (Τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον).
 (b) The One cannot be different by itself (Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται).
 (c) The One cannot be different (εἰ δὲ μὴ αὑτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό).

Despite interpreting (a) and (b) properly, Meinwald ignores the principle of participation (P), on which the whole argument is based. Moreover, Meinwald improperly adds πρὸς ἑαυτὸ to οὐδὲ αὐτό (1991: 66). Namely, if πρὸς ἑαυτὸ could be added to οὐδὲ αὐτό, the result would be 'the One is not different in relation to itself'; in other words, 'the One is not different from itself', which is the first consequence of the argument concerning Difference and Identity in Hypothesis I. The present topic, meanwhile, is the third consequence of the same argument, that is, 'the One is not different from another'. Meinwald constructs the *pros heauto* predication by adding πρὸς ἑαυτὸ to οὐδὲ αὐτό. Since the addition of πρὸς ἑαυτὸ to οὐδὲ αὐτό is improper, the construction of the *pros heauto* predication is also invalid.

Meinwald uses the *pros heauto* predication to interpret Hypothesis I. However, her

interpretation is problematic. In her view, the *pros heauto* predication, as a tree predication, explicates the nature of the subject in such a way that a species as the subject is predicated by the appropriate genus. In Hypothesis I, the tree predication appears in the negative form, such that no genera are predicated of the One. According to Meinwald, the negative formulation of the tree predication reflects the metaphysical fact that the One cannot be subordinate to any of the genera because the One is the principle of the genera and thus transcends all of them.[28] Viewing the One as the principle, Meinwald first puts the One that transcends all of the genera into the species-genus tree and then denies that the One belongs to the tree. Plato would acknowledge the One to be the principle; nevertheless, he would not locate the One in the species-genus tree because it, as the principle, does not belong to but rather remains beyond the tree and cannot be allocated to the species-genus tree initially or be explained by tree predication.

In applying the *pros heauto* predication in Hypothesis I, Meinwald has particular difficulty explaining the phrase 'the One is not one *pros heauto*'. The nature of the subject is supposed to be revealed by the *pros heauto* predication, according to which the nature of the One is not one. This conclusion is absurd. Peterson defends Meinwald's interpretation by explaining that 'the One is not one *pros heauto*' in the sense that "it is not the case that the One is by definition one" (1996: 190); put briefly, the One is not one by definition.[29] This claim is true, but it is not what Plato meant. Indeed, the Sophist is not Sophist by definition, and the Statesman is not Statesman by definition since Plato does not use self-predication to produce a definition. Rather, Plato defines the Sophist or Statesman by dividing a certain genus, expertise or knowledge, into multiple differentiae, so the Sophist or Statesman is ultimately defined as a combination of a genus with multiple differentiae. It is true that self-predication does not serve as a mode of definition; in the *Parmenides*, however, Plato is not concerned with definition. Peterson defends Meinwald's interpretation by eliciting a definition, which Plato does not consider here; Meinwald interprets 'the One is not one' by adding *pros heauto*, which does not exist in Plato's text (τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν [οὔτε ἔστιν], 141e12). Meinwald's interpretation and Peterson's defensive argument do not have any textual evidence, nor do they align with Plato's original meaning.[30]

Fundamentally, Meinwald's predicative interpretation of *pros heauto* is especially

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[28] Meinwald 1991: 131-142; 2014: 483-5.
[29] See also Peterson 1996: 188.
[30] Meinwald has responded to the question of how 'the One is not one *pros heauto*' should be understood; see 2014: 483-4. Her response does not seem as strong as Peterson's defensive argument, and so I do not mention it.

inappropriate for interpreting Hypothesis I, according to which the One is negated by multiple pairs of predicates, such as whole–part, static–moved, and identical–different. Plato not only negates multiple pairs of predicates but also completely rejects the possibility of predication, as seen in the radical consequence that 'the One is not one'. This radical consequence can be derived directly from the antecedent of Hypothesis I; that is, there is nothing other than the One, so it cannot participate in any other Form. In the corresponding logical sense, the One cannot be attached to any predicate even though the predicate is one itself, for the single, indivisible One cannot be split into subject and predicate. Given that Plato completely rejects the possibility of predication by deconstructing the structure of predication, how could one interpret Hypothesis I in terms of predication?

2.2. Pros ta alla *Predication*

In the passage selected from Hypothesis V, Meinwald distinguishes between two uses of *pros ti* (1991: 57-63). Based on the second use of *pros ti* (2), she constructs the *pros ta alla* predication.

> (2) Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι **ἀνομοίῳ** τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη. Δῆλον. Εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, **πρὸς ἣν** τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν. (161b1-4)
>
> If they are unlike the One, obviously, the unlike things would be unlike by Unlike[ness]. Obviously. Thus, if the One would have Unlikeness, in relation to which the Others are unlike it.

As Meinwald notes, Plato uses the dative to designate participation in the Form (2014: 476). In the *Phaedo*, Plato uses the dative τῷ καλῷ to reference participation in the Beautiful; accordingly, all beautiful things are beautiful by participating in the Beautiful (τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά, *Phaed.* 100d7-8). Similarly, unlike things are unlike by participating in Unlike[ness] (ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη, *Parm.* 161b1-2), with ἀνομοίῳ referring to participation in Unlikeness. To designate participation in the Form F-ness, Plato uses not only the dative of a term (which signifies F-ness) but also *pros* with the accusative of a term (which signifies F-ness). *Pros* with the accusative πρὸς ἣν, that is, πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα, is used in the same sense as the dative ἀνομοίῳ, so πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα refers to participation in Unlikeness. On this account, (2) can be formulated as follows: Unlike things are unlike by participating in Unlikeness (ἀνομοίῳ), so the Others are unlike the One by participating in Unlikeness (πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα). The same reasoning holds for the argument concerning Inequality. In Plato's dictum, "Aren't the unequal things unequal by the Unequal? How [are] they] not? Thus, the One participates in Inequality, in relation to which the Others are unequal

to it?" (τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ **τῷ ἀνίσῳ** ἄνισα; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, **πρὸς ἣν** τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα; 161c8-d1), *pros* with the accusative, πρὸς ἀνισότητα, is equivalent to the dative τῷ ἀνίσῳ and refers to participation in Inequality. Thus, the argument can be reconstructed: Unequal things are unequal by participating in the Unequal (τῷ ἀνίσῳ), so the Others are unequal to the One by participating in Inequality (πρὸς ἀνισότητα).

In my view, Meinwald is correct in noting that πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα and πρὸς ἀνισότητα are used to designate participation in Unlikeness and Inequality, respectively (1991: 56-63). She also properly notes that *pros ti* in this case is associated with predication because it refers to participation. According to the theory of Forms, participation points to the metaphysical fact that an individual participates in the Form; e.g., Socrates participates in Justice. The metaphysical fact–the participation of Socrates in Justice–can be articulated through the statement 'Socrates is just'. Thus, the theory of Forms highlights the correspondence of the statement 'Socrates is just' to the metaphysical fact that Socrates participates in Justice. Based on the correspondence of predication to participation, *pros ti* is associated with predication insomuch that it refers to participation. Thus, *pros ti*, that is, A *pros* F-ness, refers to the participation of A in F-ness, which is represented by the statement 'A is F'. Applying this scheme to the arguments concerning Unlikeness and Inequality, one can arrive at the same conclusion as Meinwald, namely, that *pros ti* is associated with participation and predication. The Others *pros* Unlikeness and *pros* Inequality refer to the participation of the Others in Unlikeness and Inequality, respectively, which are articulated by the statements 'the Others are unlike [the One]' and 'the Others are unequal [to the One]'. Meinwald properly notes that in the arguments concerning Unlikeness and Inequality, Plato uses πρὸς τι, that is, πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα at 161b3 and πρὸς ἀνισότητα at 161d1, to reference the metaphysical fact of participation and the logical correspondence of predication. Meinwald may be correct to regard the statements 'the Others are unlike [the One]' and 'the Others are unequal [to the One]' as ordinary predications in the sense that the Others exhibit the features of Unlikeness and Inequality. However, Meinwald errs when she mixes πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα and πρὸς ἀνισότητα, which appear in the arguments concerning Unlikeness and Inequality in Hypothesis V, with πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, which is presented in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII, and thereby improperly identifies πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα in these hypotheses as referring to ordinary predications. If πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα were used in the sense of πρὸς ἀνομοιότητα or πρὸς ἀνισότητα, τὸ ἕν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα in Hypotheses II and V would have referred to the participation of the One in the Others, which could be formulated as 'the One is the Others', and τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα in Hypotheses IV and VIII would have referred to the participation of the Others

in themselves, which could be expressed as 'the Others are the Others'. These statements are not in line with the text.

Let us return to (2) 'the Others are unlike the One *pros* Unlikeness' (πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν). In this sentence, 'the One' can be regarded as a complement to 'unlike' because only two entities, the One and the Others, can be compared in terms of Likeness and Unlikeness. Thus, (2) can be simplified and expressed as 'the Others are unlike *pros* Unlikeness'. Meinwald acknowledges this simplified formulation as proper while improperly generalizing it as 'A is B *pros* C' (1991: 70-1). Clearly, it is incorrect to generalize 'the Others are unlike *pros* Unlikeness' as 'A is B *pros* C'; instead, the generalization should be corrected to 'A is B *pros* B-ness' or 'A is F *pros* F-ness', that is, 'A is F by participating in F-ness' (2*). The sentence 'A is F by participating in F-ness' expresses two meanings, i.e., the predication 'A is F' and the cause of that predication, namely, the participation of A in F-ness. That is, 'A is F' because A participates in F-ness (2**).

 (2) The Others are unlike *pros* Unlikeness (A is F *pros* F-ness).

(2*) The Others are unlike by participating in Unlikeness (A is F by participating in F-ness).

(2**) 'The Others *are* unlike' because the Others participate in Unlikeness ('A *is* F' because A participates in F-ness).

In the sentence 'A is F *pros* F-ness', Plato establishes the predication 'A is F' and reveals the cause of the predication using A *pros* F-ness. A *pros* F-ness refers to the participation of A in F-ness, which establishes a metaphysical foundation for the predication 'A is F'. Given that *pros ti*, namely, A *pros* F-ness, reveals the cause of the predication, it does not contribute to constructing the predication. Thus, the predication concerned is 'A is F', which is not an instance of two-place predication but rather of one-place predication. Despite properly noting that *pros ti* is associated with predication, Meinwald improperly regards the predication as a case of two-place predication and invalidly identifies *pros ti* with *pros ta alla* in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII. In my estimation, *pros ta alla* in the deduction and consequence of these hypotheses should not be identified with *pros ti* in the second use mentioned above but should rather be equated with *pros ti* in the first use.

To illuminate the first use of *pros ti*, Meinwald quotes the sentence 'the One has Unlikeness *pros* the Others' (ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ **πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα**, 161a6). That is, 'the One is unlike *pros* the Others' (1), which is equivalent to 'the One *pros* the Others is unlike' (1*). In general, 'A is B *pros* C' is identical to 'A *pros* C is B'. What *pros ti* qualifies in this

context is not predicate B but rather subject A. *Pros ti* qualifies subject A by connecting A with C, so subject A and relation *pros* C constitute the subject of the sentence. Clearly, the use of *pros ta alla* at 161a6 corresponds to the common usage of *pros ta alla* presented in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII. Since it refers to connection, the relation (*pros*) can be signified using the word 'and'. Thus, (1*) 'the One *pros* the Others is unlike' can be equivalently formulated as 'the One and the Others are unlike'; in general, 'A and B are C' (1**).

(1) The One is unlike *pros* the Others (A is B *pros* C).

(1*) The One *pros* the Others is unlike (A *pros* C is B).

(1**) The One and the Others are unlike (A and C are B).

As shown, *pros ti* is used in two ways. In the construction of 'A is B *pros* C', *pros ti* qualifies subject A by connecting the two elements of the subject, A and C, with each other, so the relation (*pros*) refers to connection and can be expressed as 'and'. In the construction of 'A is F *pros* F-ness', *pros ti* is associated with participation and predication. The metaphysical relation of individual to Form (A *pros* F-ness) is reflected by the logical relation of subject to predicate ('A is F'), so the relation (*pros*) refers to predication and can be expressed using the copula 'is'. Thus, *pros ti* is used either in the sense of connection or in the sense of predication. Rickless referred to *pros ti* in the sense of predication as the 'Meinwald Reading' and to *pros ti* in the sense of connection as the 'Straightforward Reading'. Rickless endorsed the 'Straightforward Reading' while rejecting the 'Meinwald Reading' because in his view, Plato does not use *pros ti* in the sense of predication but rather merely in the sense of connection (2007: 102). According to Rickless, *pros ti* in the sense of connection is in accordance with its ordinary usage in the Greek language and the statements quoted from the *Parmenides*. As he properly noted, statements such as 'Simmias is taller *pros* Phaedo', 'Simmias is different *pros* Phaedo', 'Simmias is the same *pros* Phaedo', and 'Simmias is equal *pros* Phaedo' are equivalent to 'Simmias is taller *than* Phaedo', 'Simmias is different *from* Phaedo', 'Simmias is the same *as* Phaedo', and 'Simmias is equal *to* Phaedo'. *Pros* appears in different forms, namely, *than*, *from*, *as*, and *to*, because in English, different adjectives require different prepositions. In all cases, *pros* is used in the sense of connection and is used to connect the two elements of the subject with each other. The two subjects, Simmias and Phaedo, are combined using *pros* and compared in terms of height, substance (identity–difference), and quantity.[31] In

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[31] Rickless 2007: 102-3.

the *Parmenides*, similarly, two Forms, the One and the Other, are combined using *pros* and compared in substance (identity–difference), in quality (similar–dissimilar), in quantity (equal–unequal), and in time (older–younger–same age). In Hypotheses I and II, Plato examines whether the One is identical to (*pros*) or different from (*pros*) itself and the Other; whether the One is similar to (*pros*) or dissimilar to (*pros*) itself and the Other; whether the One is equal to (*pros*) or unequal to (*pros*) itself and the Other; and whether the One is older than (*pros*), younger than (*pros*), or the same age as (*pros*) itself and the Other.[32] Notably, in the statements that Rickless quotes from the *Parmenides*, Plato does not use *pros* with the accusative but instead uses the dative to designate the sense of connection.[33] Given that *pros* with the accusative is used interchangeably with the dative, Rickless's interpretation is proper and valid. I agree with Rickless that in all the cases mentioned above, *pros ti* (which appears as the equivalent dative) is used in the sense of connection. Nevertheless, I disagree with him regarding the claim that *pros ti* is used only in this sense. As analyzed, Meinwald is correct in claiming that *pros ti* in the two sentences (εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστιν, 161b1-4; καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, πρὸς ἣν τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα, 161c8-d1) is used in the sense of predication. Rickless and Rudebusch suggested that to understand these two sentences properly, one should omit the comma before *pros*, which does not exist in the original text.[34] This approach may be a solution, but the omission of the comma cannot change the fact that *pros ti* is not used in these two sentences to connect the two elements of the subject (as other cases show) but is rather used to indicate predication.

To summarize, a relation (*pros ti*) can refer either to the relation between the two elements of the subject, e.g., Simmias and Phaedo or the One and the Other[s], or to the relation between the subject and predicate, e.g., a predicative relationship such as 'Socrates is just' or 'the Others are unlike'. It is used not only in the sense of connection to connect the two elements of the subject but also in the sense of predication to connect the subject with the predicate. Thus, I believe that Meinwald is correct in noting that *pros ti* has a wider use than Rickless supposes. Meinwald appropriately distinguishes between the two uses of *pros ti* and properly notes that *pros ti* in its second use is associated with predication. However, she errs in identifying *pros ti*, used in the sense of predication, with *pros ta alla* as presented in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and VIII. In my view, *pros ti*, which appears either as *pros ta alla* in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses II, IV, V, and

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[32] Rickless 2007: 105-6.
[33] *Parm*. 139b4-5, 139e7-8, 140b6-7, 140e2-5, 146a9-b2, 147c1-2, 149d8-9.
[34] Rickless 2007: 104, n. 7.

VIII or as *pros to hen* in the deduction and consequence of Hypotheses I, III, VI, and VII, is used in the sense of connection. That is, *pros ti* qualifies the subject by connecting the subject with the subject's relation.

3. Pros to hen–Pros ta alla*: Qualification of the Subject*

Having argued with Meinwald in her philosophical context, in this section, I return to my own interpretation. With the help of chiasmus, I finally prove that *pros ti* qualifies the subject, and fundamentally argue that the qualification pair cannot be expressed one-sidedly as *pros heauto–pros ta alla* but must be articulated comprehensively and precisely as *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Accordingly, I note that *pros to hen–pros ta alla* qualify the subject by combining two subjects with those two subjects' relations in a chiastic way.

Let us return to the first four hypotheses: if the One is, (I) what is *to hen pros heauto*; (II) what is *to hen pros ta alla*; (III) what are *ta alla pros to hen*; and (IV) what are *ta alla pros heauta*? From I–II to III–IV, the subject shifts from *to hen* to *ta alla*; correspondingly, the qualification pair changes its form from *pros heauto–pros ta alla* to *pros heauta–pros to allo* (i.e., *pros to hen*). Meinwald appropriately notes that regarding the qualification pair, there is "a switch in singular and plural forms" (1991: 182n1) because "we have moved [from getting results for the One] on to get results for the [O]thers" (1991: 182n1). Meinwald's explanation cannot be correct, as she means that the qualification pair qualifies the predicate; if the qualification pair could have qualified the predicate, it would not change its form with the change of the subject.[35] The qualification pair changes from *pros heauto–pros ta alla* to *pros heauta–pros to allo* because it qualifies the subject, shifting from qualifying *to hen* to qualifying *ta alla*.

Furthermore, the qualification pair, *pros to hen–pros ta alla*, qualifies the subject by connecting the two subjects with the two subjects' relations in a chiastic way. *Pros to hen–pros ta alla* qualify *to hen* by connecting *to hen* with *to hen* and with *ta alla*, leading to the two combinations of *to hen pros to hen* and *to hen pros ta alla*. To avoid duplication, that is, the appearance of *to hen* twice in the combination *to hen pros to hen*, the reflexive pronoun *heauto* is used to replace *to hen* in *pros to hen*; thus, *to hen pros to hen–to hen pros ta alla* becomes *to*

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[35] Even if the qualification pair could have been used as a sentential operator to qualify the entire sentence (as someone might argue), it would still not change its form with the change of the subject. The fact that the qualification pair changes its form with the change of the subject obviously proves that it qualifies the subject.

hen pros heauto–to hen pros ta alla, abbreviated as *pros heauto–pros ta alla*. Again, *pros to hen–pros ta alla* qualify *ta alla* by connecting *ta alla* with *to hen* and with *ta alla*, resulting in the two combinations of *ta alla pros to hen* and *ta alla pros ta alla*. To avoid duplication, that is, the appearance of *ta alla* twice in the combination *ta alla pros ta alla*, the reflexive pronoun *heauta* is used to replace *ta alla* in *pros ta alla*; thus, *ta alla pros to hen–ta alla pros ta alla* becomes *ta alla pros to hen–ta alla pros heauta*, abbreviated as *pros heauta–pros to hen* (i.e., *pros to allo*). Thus, *pros ti* has the connective characteristic and connects the two subjects with the two subjects' relations in a chiastic way, as seen in Diagram 3:

Diagram 3

Crucially, *pros to hen–pros ta alla* has the 'in relation to' structure, which implies X in relation to Y, X *pros* Y. When subject X changes, the subject's relation, i.e., the relation of X to Y, must change correspondingly. Thus, one cannot consider the subject's relation without considering the subject. Depending on whether *to hen* or *ta alla* are taken as a subject, the subject's relation appears either as *pros heauto–pros ta alla* or as *pros heauta–pros to hen*. The form in which the subject's relation appears depends on which subject–*to hen* or *ta alla*–is qualified, but both forms are generated from the original pair *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Therefore, the qualification pair, as the subject's relation, cannot be expressed one-sidedly as *pros heauto–pros ta alla* but must be articulated comprehensively and precisely as *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Despite interpreting *pros heauto–pros ta alla* properly as the subjects' relations, Gill one-sidedly proposes that only *pros heauto–pros ta alla* designate the subject's relations and ignores the fact that the subjects' relations also appear in the form of *pros heauta–pros to hen*.[36] Meinwald appropriately notes that the qualification pair changes its form from *pros heauto–pros ta alla* to *pros heauta–pros to hen*; however, she does not realize that these two forms are derived from the original pair *pros to hen–pros ta alla*. Moreover, Meinwald incorrectly treats *pros heauto–pros ta alla* as two types of predication by identifying *pros*

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[36] Gill 2012: 52-3, 53, n. 20; 2014: 504-5.

heauto–pros ta alla in the *Parmenides* with *kath' hauto–pros allo* in the *Sophist*.[37] As analyzed, *pros heauto* cannot be identified with *kath' hauto* because *pros heauto*, which originates from *to hen pros to hen*, qualifies the subject *to hen* by connecting *to hen* with itself, whereas *kath' hauto* highlights the essential relationship of the predicate to the subject such that the subject (whatever it is) is characterized by a predicate that belongs to the subject's nature.

4. *Conclusion*

In the second part of the *Parmenides*, Plato constructs an exercise featuring two subjects and two relations. The two subjects, the One–the Others, and the two relations, in relation to the One–in relation to the Others, are cross-combined, thus constituting a 2 x 2 chiasmus. The 2 x 2 chiasmus constitutes four subjects of eight hypotheses: 'the One in relation to itself' is the subject of Hypotheses I and VI, 'the One in relation to the Others' is the subject of Hypotheses II and V, 'the Others in relation to the One' is the subject of Hypotheses III and VII, and 'the Others in relation to themselves' is the subject of Hypotheses IV and VIII. In conclusion, the eight hypotheses differ in subject such that the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same.

I draw the same conclusion as Sayre. We both focus on three pairs but treat them differently. These three pairs are (1) the pair of antecedents 'if the One is–if the One is not', (2) the pair of subjects 'the One–the Others', and (3) the pair of relations 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Others'. By combining (2) the pair of subjects with (3) the pair of relations, I address the fact that these two pairs are cross-combined, thus constructing a 2 x 2 chiasmus; in addition, the two 2 x 2 chiasmata are incorporated into the framework established by (1) the pair of antecedents. Sayre takes another approach by analyzing (1) the pair of antecedents and (2) the pair of subjects jointly and considering the consequences simultaneously. In this way, Sayre offers a tentative interpretation by positing that there are two subjects of eight hypotheses, that is, the One (I, II, V, VI) and the Others (III, IV, VII, VIII).[38] Sayre considers (3) the pair of relations 'in relation the One–in relation to the Others' by analyzing the eight hypotheses meticulously and fully considering their consequences. He thus discovers that the One is related to the One in Hypotheses I and VI, the One is related to the Others in Hypotheses II and V, the Others are related to the One in Hypotheses III and VII, and the Others are related

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[37] Meinwald 1991: 75; 1992: 381; 2014: 480-1.
[38] Sayre 1978: 134-6, especially the scheme at 135; 1983: 37-42, especially the scheme at 41-2.

to the Others in Hypotheses IV and VIII.[39] On this basis, Sayre corrects his tentative interpretation by maintaining that there are four subjects of eight hypotheses: the One in relation to the One (I–VI), the One in relation to the Others (II–V), the Others in relation to the One (III–VII), and the Others in relation to the Others (IV–VIII). In conclusion, the subjects in each of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same.[40] Sayre analyses the text, whereas I use the chiastic method. Although we take different approaches, we arrive at the same conclusion; this fact fully demonstrates the propriety and validity of this interpretation. Following in the footsteps of Porphyry and the Alexanderian commentators, I pursue an alternate proposal by discussing how Plato employs a special method of chiasmus to design the exercise as a complex of eight hypotheses and structure the eight hypotheses in a chiastic way. With the help of chiasmus, I finally show that Meinwald's predicative interpretation is incorrect, not only because *pros heauto–pros ta alla* does not qualify the predicate, but also fundamentally because the qualification pair does not appear in the form of *pros heauto–pros ta alla*, but rather in the form of *pros to hen–pros ta alla*.

To summarize the eight hypotheses, whether the One is or is not, the One in relation to itself or the Others in relation to themselves are neither H nor con-H for many values of H, whereas the One in relation to the Others or the Others in relation to the One are both H and con-H for many values of H.[41] Hypotheses II, III, V, and VII positively note that when the One and the Others are combined with each other, their combination is equipped with and predicated by contrary attributes, while Hypotheses I, IV, VI, and VIII show the negative results of separating the One and the Others from each other. If I set aside all of the hypotheses that have a negative consequence and focus on all of the hypotheses that have a positive consequence, I can further conclude that a Form and its Opposite cannot be related solely to themselves but must be combined with each other. 'The One–the Others' represent opposite Forms in the sense that they are equivalent to 'the One–the Many', with 'the Others' (*ta alla*) being equivalent to 'the Many' (*ta polla*).[42] 'The Others' differ from the One but cannot be anything other than the One. Rather, 'the Others' are identified with 'the Many', which can be clearly seen in the statement that "the Others that differ from the One is [the] Many" (τὰ δ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη, 158b2-3). In constructing the exercise, Plato is concerned with the opposite Forms 'the One–the Many'; this fact is most evident in the paradigm that Plato's character Parmenides

[39] Sayre 1978: 136-141, especially the scheme at 140; 1983: 42-9, especially the scheme at 44.
[40] Sayre 1978: 139-141, 147-8, especially the scheme at 140; 1983: 42-5, especially the scheme at 44; 1996: 116-9, 124-6, especially the scheme at 119. See also Kutschera 1995: 51; Scolnicov 2003: 25-9.
[41] See also Sayre 1978: 143-4; 1983: 46-7; 1996: 119, 126-133.
[42] See also Walker 1938: 493-7; Halfwassen 1992: 299-300; Scolnicov 2003: 26, Fig. 2 at 28.

invokes in the transitional section. Since Parmenides explicitly states that in the exercise of the Many, we investigate the consequences of the Many and those of the One (136a5-b1), in the exercise of the One, correspondingly, we should inquire into the consequences of the One and those of the Many.

In the first part of the *Parmenides*, Plato's character Socrates encounters the difficulty (*aporia*) posed by the question of whether the intelligible entities, that is, the opposite Forms, such as One–Multitude/Many (τὸ ἕν–πλῆθος), Similarity–Dissimilarity, and Motion–Rest, should be combined with or separated from each other (129d6-e4). In the second part, Plato's character Parmenides examines the combination and separation of the opposite Forms of 'the One–the Many'. Based on the conclusion drawn from the second part of the *Parmenides*, that is, that a Form and its Opposite cannot be related solely to themselves but must rather be combined with each other, the *aporia* presented in the first part can be solved as follows. The components of the opposite Forms 'the One–the Many' cannot be separated from each other (as the negative consequences of Hypotheses I, IV, VI, and VIII show) but must rather be connected with each other (as the positive consequences of Hypotheses II, III, V, and VII show). Moreover, the confusion regarding how it is possible for the Kinds and Forms in themselves to have contrary properties (εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν, 129c2-3) can ultimately be dispelled by the positive consequences of Hypotheses II, III, V, and VII such that the combination of the opposite Forms, the One and the Many, has contrary properties and is both H and con-H for many values of H.

5. *Appendix*

In the transitional section of the *Parmenides*, Plato designs a universal scheme for an exercise using chiasmus. Based on Plato's use of chiasmus, I reconstruct the universal scheme in the following way. Having assumed a Form, I identify 'the Form–its Opposite' as one pair of opposites and 'in relation to the Form–in relation to its Opposite' as another pair of opposites. These two pairs cross each other, thus establishing a 2 x 2 chiasmus that connects the Form or its Opposite with itself or with its Opposite in a chiastic way. As previously noted, *pros* in the sense of connection can be expressed by the word 'and'; visually, the relationship (*pros*) of the Form or its Opposite to itself or to its Opposite can be represented by a one-way arrow[43], as shown below:

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[43] Many thanks to Christoph Horn for correcting me by noting that the arrows (which signify the relation of the subject to itself or to its opposite) are not two-way but should rather be one-way.

Diagram 4

The universal scheme of the exercise is the 2 x 2 chiasmus, which can, according to Plato, be universally applied to each of the opposite Forms, such as One–Many, Similarity–Dissimilarity, Motion–Rest, Generation–Destruction, and Being–Nonbeing (*Parm*. 136b1-6). As Diagram 4 shows, the 2 x 2 chiasmus makes it possible to cross-combine opposite Forms. In the *Parmenides*, the 2 x 2 chiasmus cross-combines the opposite Forms 'the One–the Many' (which function as the two subjects of the inquiry) with the two relations 'in relation to the One–in relation to the Many', thus establishing four subjects of eight hypotheses. In the *Sophist*, the 2 x 2 chiasmus cross-combines the opposite Forms 'the Being–the Nonbeing' (which appear as the two grammatical subjects) with the two predicates 'is–is not', thereby establishing four statements, as illuminated as follows:

Diagram 5

The 2 x 2 chiasmus generates four statements. In addition to the two Parmenidean statements, 'the Being is' and 'the Nonbeing is not', two Platonic statements are included, 'the Being is not' and 'the Nonbeing is' ([…], καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ, *Soph*. 241d5-7). The two Platonic statements, each of which is composed of a subject and an opposite predicate, reflect the metaphysical fact that the Being is cross-combined with the Nonbeing ([…] πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι, *Soph*. 240c2-3).

Chiasmus, as a special method of division, makes cross-division possible; moreover, it makes the cross-combination of opposite Forms possible. By identifying the chiasmus as the fundamental schematic of the exercise, I ultimately reveal how it structures the exercise of

One–Many in the *Parmenides*. In addition, I reveal the appropriate approach to the task of investigating the exercise of Being–Nonbeing in the *Sophist*. More will be said on this topic.

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A new collation and text for *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8][1]

Victor Gonçalves de Sousa

In this paper, I attempt to explore a recent hypothesis about what the main mss. are for establishing the text of Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea* (henceforth *EN*). This hypothesis was recently advanced on the basis of evidence coming from *EN* I-II. In exploring this hypothesis, I confine myself to the text of *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], and, as a result, I propose a new text for *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] based on a fresh collation of nine mss—four of which were not taken into account in previous editions of the *EN*—and based on readings that can be gathered from the Arabic translation of the *EN* that was preserved in the Fez ms. The text proposed in this paper is accompanied by textual notes that justify my decisions regarding some difficult passages.

1. *Introduction*

'*Il n'existe pas encore d'édition critique du text grec de l'*Étique à Nicomaque.' It is

with this dramatic claim that Gauthier begins the chapter on the text of the *EN* in the second

edition of his monumental work with Jolif (Gauthier & Jolif, 1970, vol.1, p. 301). In the lines

that follow, Gauthier says there are two conditions necessary for a critical edition: first, all the

witnesses of the text must be recensed and examined; second, there is need for a *stemma* or, at

the very least, some classification on the basis of which one can judge the value of each of the

witnesses.

As Gauthier himself recognises, the first requirement began to be partially fulfilled al-

ready by his time.[2] Besides, his own contributions gave a first step in fulfilling the second

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[1] Thanks to Nataly Ianicelli Cruzeiro, Daniel Lopes, Dionatan Tissot, and Marco Zingano for comments on earlier versions of this paper and to Fernando Gazoni, the editor. I am also thankful to the detailed and helpful comments made by the two anonymous referees, which improved the quality of this paper in many respects and allowed me to correct some mistakes prior to its publication. My understanding of the text of *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] was widely improved by i) the translation and discussion of *EN* X.6-10 [=Bywater X.6-9] led by Professor Marco Zingano at the University of São Paulo (USP) throughout 2023 and by the discussions that took place then (for which I have to thank all participants), and ii) by the workshop 'Practical and contemplative virtue in Aristotle's conception of the human good: Nicomachean Ethics 10.6-8,' jointly organized by Princeton University (PU), Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Universidad Panamericana (UP), and Universidad de los Andes (UA) that took place in early 2024 at Princeton (in which I presented a translation and commentary to *EN* X.7 1177a12-1177b1 together with Irene Soudant, whom I thank here along with the other participants of the workshop). This paper is a result of a project funded by the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), grant 2019/05555-7.

[2] Gauthier mentions the work of Wartelle (1963).

requirement (although, as he recognizes [p. 312], his conclusions are indeed precarious and provisory).

With the recent publication of Pelagia-Vera Loungi's *Die Manuskripte und die Über-lieferung der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles (Buch I)* (2022), the situation has changed considerably. Loungi has not only freshly collated, for book I, all mss. of the *EN*,[3] and, for book II, what she concluded are the main mss., but she also provides us with a *stemma* that is carefully grounded on the evidence gathered from her collations.

The main results of Loungi's work seem to be that i) the two mss. families (namely α and β)[4] do not have the same value, since whilst the text transmitted by the α family derives from the late antiquity, the text transmitted by β derives from an intense reworking of the text of the *EN* by Byzantine scholars that took place in the 12th century; ii) that the improvements found in the text transmitted by the β family do not derive from ancient sources like papyri;[5] iii) most *recentiores* do not have any value in establishing the text of the *EN*.[6]

No doubt these results are still to some extent provisory in that they require further study to be fully confirmed. As Loungi herself emphasises, it is still an open question whether the transmission of the *EN* is unified for all its books. Since Rassow and Susemihl, it has been assumed that the mss. of the *EN* constitute two main families (for Susemihl, these are Π^1 and Π^2; Loungi calls these α and β). Yet it has been argued that, depending on the books from the *EN* one has in view, the members of these two families differ.[7] Accordingly, it may be argued that Loungi's results, if indeed correct, cannot be generalized to the whole *EN*, but can only be expanded to some books of the *EN*.[8]

A definitive answer to this issue depends on further studies on the transmission of books III, IV, V, VIII, and X. The present paper aims at giving a very small step in this direction in what concerns book X.

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[3] As Loungi herself reports (2022, p. 66), she did not collate all mss. in full, but did so for all of the more ancient mss., and for a large number of the *recentiores*.

[4] Below I shall indicate what mss. Loungi takes to be the most important for reconstructing the text of each of these families.

[5] There may be an exception to this in book VI: in *EN* VI.13 [=Bywater VI.12] 1144a6, the reading of some mss. from the β family (LL^{b}O^b), namely εὐδαιμονίαν, is confirmed by POxy 2402.(cf. *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, 1989-2023, I.1*, p. 263, IV.2 [I.1 & III], Tav. 185).

[6] See Loungi (2022, pp. 417-418) for brief summary of these claims.

[7] See, for instance, Susemihl (1887, pp. VIII, XX) and Gauthier and Jolif (1970, p. 312) for two slightly different versions of this claim. Similarly, see Loungi (2022, p. 61).

[8] In rough lines, it would seem that, if we follow Susemihl's division of the mss., Loungi's proposal (if correct) may hold for books I, II, VI, VII, IX, and X; but if we follow Gauthier's division of the mss., that it may hold for books I, II, VI, VII, and IX.

In this work, I focus on the text of *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], the chapters from the *EN* in which Aristotle presents his arguments for the superiority of contemplative life.[9] This text has been for long object of deep interpretative controversy, and, moreover, is part of books in which there would allegedly be a difference in how the two families of mss. are organized (on Gauthier version of this claim at least, see footnote 8).[10] In the face of this, with the objective of exploring Loungi's hypothesis, I freshly collated, for the text of *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8], the eight mss. Loungi takes to be (on the basis of her collations) the most important for determining the readings of the α and β families, namely Laur. Plut. 81.11 (K[b]), Vat. gr. 1342 (P[b]), Cant. gr. Ii.5.44 [=1879] (C[c]), Laur. Plut. 81.18 (L), Par. gr. 1854 (L[b]), Ricc. 46 (O[b]), Ambros. B 95 sup. [=Martini-Bassi 117] (B[95sup.]), and Vind. Phil. 315 (V).[11] In addition to these mss., I have also freshly collated the relevant part of ms. Marc. Gr. Z 213 (M[b]), which despite not having much stemmatic worth on Loungi's hypothesis[12], was central for previous editions of the *EN*.

Furthermore, I have checked the Arabic translation (in the edition by Akasoy and Fidora [2005] and taking into account the corrections proposed by Ullmann [2011-2012, vol. 2, pp. 123-274])[13] and the Latin version of Averroes's *Middle Commentary* (edited by Woerther [2018])[14] for all passages where their readings seemed relevant.[15] For a single passage (1176b26-27),

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[9] I recognise that this choice is arbitrary, and in making it I do not intend to take a stance regarding the unity of book X. I thank one of the anonymous referees for pressing me on this.

[10] Similarly, Rassow (1874, p. 6) thinks that, in book X, O[b] occupies an intermediate position between K[b]M[b] and L[b], different from how it behaves in other books.

[11] On Loungi's hypothesis, for determining the readings of the α family, the relevant mss. are K[b], P[b], and C[c] (together with the Arabic translation); whereas for determining the readings of the β family, the relevant mss. are L, L[b], O[b], and B[95sup.]. V, in turn, should be used with care, since although it is a mss. from the β family, it is in many places contaminated by readings of the α family.

[12] The importance of M[b] was already called into question after the work of Mioni (1958, pp. 85-87), who suggested that this ms. is closely related to G[a] (Marc. gr. Z 212) (Mioni suggests that M[b] is actually a copy of G[a]). Further study of M[b] and G[a] is required to clarify the relationship between these two mss. and their relationship with E[a] (Vat. gr. 506—M[b]'s exemplar according to Loungi's *stemma*) and with F (Vat. Barb. 75—which is a copy of V that contaminates M[b] according to Loungi's *stemma*). For a discussion of the relationship between E[a] and M[b], see Loungi (2022, pp. 359-361); for a discussion of the relationship between E[a] and G[a] on the basis of the evidence from book I of the *EN*, see Loungi (2022, pp. 367-376). For a collation of the text of F for *EN* X.6.1176a30-X.9.1179a32, see Oskvig (2018, pp. 347-348).

[13] I did not have access to Dorothy G. Axelroth's 1968 doctoral dissertation *An Analysis of the Arabic Translation of Book Ten of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, which contains an edition and English translation of the Arabic version of *EN* X.

[14] The relevance of Averroes *Middle Commentary* for establishing the text of the *EN* lies in the fact that it consists mostly of a paraphrase of the Arabic translation of the *EN*, and in some cases, as we shall see, it seems to be free of some corruptions found in the text preserved in the Fez ms. (and vice versa).

[15] The majority of the passages I have checked were already flagged by Akasoy and Fidora (2005) in their edition, and by Schmidt and Ullmann (2012), who list passages in which the Arabic translation

moreover, I have checked ms. Par. 1417, which is the only ms. Susemihl and Bywater mention in support of a reading that cannot be found in any other ms. they collated, but which is attested by L and by the Arabic translation.[16]

The Arabic translation and four of the nine mss. I collated (namely, C^c, L, B^95sup., and V) were not taken into account by previous editions of the text. This is perfectly expected in the case of the Arabic translation, since its only extant ms.[17] was only discovered in the fifties (by A.J. Arberry and by D.M. Dunlop)[18], and a series of misfortunes made it so that a *critical* edition of it only came to light in 2005.[19]

The fact that L, V, and B^95sup. were not taken into account by previous editions, in turn, is explained by the fact that the dating of these mss. has been revised only recently: L was for long regarded as belonging to the 14th century. This remained so until the work of Brockmann (1993, pp. 49-50), which showed that it belongs rather to the 12th century[20], and that it is the result

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departs from the text edited by Susemihl. There are, however, some other instances in which this translation proved to be decisive in establishing the text of *EN* X.6-9. All relevant readings are listed in the *apparatus*.

[16] As can be seen in the *apparatus*, this is 1176b27, and Susemihl and Bywater do not report the reading of Par. 1417 correctly for this passage, a mistake due to their depending on Zell's collation of this ms. (see Susemihl, 1887, p. VII). As noted in my *apparatus*, Par. 1417 has δὴ one line above this one, which is perhaps what led to this mistake. This particular mistake is committed by Zell on page 450 of the second volume of his edition (1820, vol. 2, p. 450).

[17] Although the Arabic translation dates from the ninth century (the translation of books I-IV is by *Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn* and dates from around 870 CE, whereas the translation of books V-X is by Eusthatius [*Usṭāṯ*] and dates from around 830 CE), the two parts of the Fez ms. date from 1222 CE (cf. Dunlop's introduction in Akasoy & Fidora, 2005, p. 1; and Ullmann, 2011-2012, vol. 1, p. 13). Furthermore, it is important to note that there are good reasons for thinking that this Arabic translation was made from a Greek ms. in majuscules without separation between the words, and which, besides being older than all extant Greek mss, is also free from many mistakes resulting from the transcription to the miniscule script (cf. Ullmann, 2011-2012, vol. 1, p. 12; Schmidt & Ullmann, 2012, pp. 99ff).

[18] See their reports in Arberry (1955) and in Dunlop (1962). Arberry's report of his discovery of the part of ms. containing the Arabic translation of *EN* VII-X is accompanied by a collation of *EN* IX.1. Dunlop's report of his discovery of the part of the ms. containing the Arabic translation of *EN* I-VI, in turn, is accompanied by a number of passages from these books he takes to be illustrative of the merits and defects of the Arabic translation of the *EN*.

[19] On this, see Akasoy and Fidora (2005, pp. vii-x). On the differences between the objectives of Abdurraḥmān Badawi's 1979 edition of this translation and those of Akasoy & Fidora's, see Akasoy and Fidora (2005, pp. ix, ixn1), Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 1, pp. 14-15), and Schmidt and Ullmann (2012, pp. 9-10). For a critical assessment of Akasoy & Fidora's edition, according to which it is as unreliable as Badawi's, see Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 1, pp. 15-21).

[20] Since the publication of this work, we have been provided with a collation of L for books I-III made by Vuillemin-Diem and Rashed (1997), and, more recently, with a full collation of the text of the *EN* in L made by Panegyres (2020). For my current purposes, it should be noted that Panegyres's collation of L proved to be quite reliable in what concerns the text of *EN* X.6-9. In comparing the part of his collation that covers *EN* X.6-9 with my own collation, I have found only two mistakes of his (at 1178b20, where he reports that L reads ἀφῃρημένον but it reads rather ἀφῃρημένῳ; and at 1178b28, where he reports that

of the work of Ioannikios and his *scriptorium*.[21] Similarly, V and B[95sup.] were both previously dated as belonging to the 14th century together with O[b], which despite being taken into account by previous editors, was not regarded as being of much importance.[22] However, it turns out that O[b] belongs to the 12th century[23], that V was produced between the 11-12th centuries[24], and that B[95sup.] comes from the end of the 12th century or from the beginning of the 13th century.[25]

The case of C[c] is slightly different. Since the work of Jackson (1876), it has been thought that C[c] was a copy of P[b]. Accordingly, although C[c] uniformly agrees with K[b]—as has been shown by Stewart (1882, p. 3) (who collated C[c] in full for book X and partially for the other books of the *EN*)—, C[c] was taken to be subordinate to P[b], which, in turn, was not taken as being of much value.[26] It was only after the work of Harlfinger (1971) on the transmission of the *EE*, and the work of Brockmann (1993) on the transmission of the *MM* that it became clear that C[c] was not a copy of P[b], but that these two mss. are copies of the same exemplar made by the same copyist (Nicolaus Damenus). Besides, as far as I can tell, Loungi (2022, pp. 113-126) was the first to provide us with reasons for thinking that although P[b] and C[c] are related to K[b] in what concerns the text of the *EN*, they are neither copies of K[b] nor of its exemplar (sub-hyperarchetype α1 on Loungi's *stemma*), for there is reason for thinking that P[b]'s and C[c]'s exemplar, on the one hand, and K[b]'s exemplar, on the other, stem from the same ancestor.[27]

L reads $o\vec{v}\delta\alpha\mu o\hat{v}$, but it reads rather $o\vec{v}\delta\alpha\mu\hat{\omega}\varsigma$) and just one imprecision (at 1179a30 he simply says that L omits $\check{\alpha}\rho\alpha$, but it actually writes $\epsilon\hat{\imath}\nu\alpha\imath$ in place of $\check{\alpha}\rho\alpha$).

[21] On Ioannikios and his *scriptorium*, see Wilson (1983).

[22] See, for instance, the judgment given by Jackson (1879, p. xi) about O[b]'s value for *EN* V in comparison to its value for other parts of the *EN*: 'O[b]. Riccardianus 46. More correct than M[b], O[b] contributes fewer peculiar readings to the text than that ms. In this book however it does not seem to be as decidedly inferior to M[b] as (according to the best authorities) it is elsewhere.' Similarly, Susemihl (1878, p. 630) ranks O[b] after M[b], which he takes to be inferior both to K[b] and L[b]. Busse (1883, p. 137), in turn, is a bit more pessimistic, and thinks that much of the authority attributed to O[b] (and to M[b]) by Rassow and Susemihl vanishes if one accepts that O[b] (and M[b] too) cannot be fully assigned to one of the two families (but may be taken as having a very close relationship to each of them in different places of the *EN*).

[23] As has been shown by Baldi (2011). More recently, see Martinelli Tempesta (2016).

[24] As suggested by Brockmann (1993, p. 49n27), who identifies the copyist of this ms. with that of Par. gr. 1808, a ms. important to the transmission of Plato's works that dates from 11-12 centuries.

[25] On this, see Loungi (2022, p. 154n204).

[26] Jackson (1879, p. xi), for instance, claims that, in regard to book V, P[b] 'contribute[s] to the text nothing which is not to be found in one or more of the remaining five codices [sc. K[b]L[b]M[b]N[b]O[b]].' Similarly, Susemihl (1878, p. 631) says that he compared the readings of P[b] for 1176a11-1177a30 with those of H[a] (Marc. gr. Z 214) and N[b] (Marc. gr. IV.53), and then says: '*der Gewinn aber ist beinahe gleich null.*'

[27] On the hypothesis advanced by Loungi (2022, pp. 113-126), sub-hyperarchetype γ (P[b]'s and C[c]'s exemplar) depends on sub-hyperarchetype α2, which, in turn, comes from the same ancestor as sub-hyperarchetype α1 (K[b]'s exemplar), namely hyperarchetype α. However, as we shall see, there is a caveat: as Loungi (2022, p. 114) observes, it is probable that the copyist of C[c] did not simply copied γ as he did in the case of P[b], but availed himself of a corrective exemplar. Besides, there are signs that both

Regarding $K^b L^b O^b M^b$, it should be noted, to begin with, that both Susemihl and Bywater rely on Schöll's collation of K^b (which can be found in Rassow [1874, pp. 10-14]). Besides, although Susemihl depends on Bekker's collations for many mss., he reports that he collated $M^b O^b$ for many passages and has relied on information provided to him by Charles Graux and by Henri Omont for many passages of L^b (cf. Susemihl in Ramsauer, 1878, p. 731; and Susemihl, 1887, pp. vi-vii).[28] Bywater, in turn, besides relying on Bekker, Schöll, and Susemihl, has also taken into account the collation of parts of K^b made by Girolamo Vitelli that can be found in Stewart (1882), and reports that he also examined the mss. himself for certain passages (cf. Bywater, 1894, pp. vi-vii).

In collating the relevant parts of $K^b P^b C^c L L^b O^b B^{95sup.} V M^b$ and in comparing their readings with those from the Arabic translation, I was led me to propose a tentative new text for *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8].

The resulting text differs from that printed by Bekker, Susemihl, and Bywater in nine instances; from that printed by both Bekker and Susemihl (disagreeing with Bywater) in three instances; and from that printed by both Bekker and Bywater (disagreeing with Susemihl) in one instance.

Moreover, it differs from the text printed only by Bekker (disagreeing with Susemihl and Bywater) in five passages; from that printed only by Susemihl (disagreeing with Bekker and Bywater) in five passages; and from that printed only by Bywater (disagreeing with Bekker and Susemihl) in seven passages.

All these instances are listed in the *apparatus*. Whenever the text I print departs from that printed by Bekker, Susemihl, or Bywater, there are indications about the text they print.

In addition to that, my collations also allowed me to correct some mistakes and imprecisions that can be found in the *apparatus critici* of the editions of Bekker, Susemihl, and Bywater.

In deciding between different readings, I have favoured those of the α family.[29] This is

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P^b and C^c adopt corrections found in the β family for some passages (most notably, from L), as Loungi (2022, p. 113) argues (more on this below in footnote 30).

[28] Moreover, for P^b, Susemihl depends on Jackson (1879) for book V, and, for book X, on a collation made by his '*collega coniunctissimus*' von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Besides, the fact that Susemihl does not give the readings of P^b in his apparatus after 1177a30 strongly suggests that the collation made by von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff that Susemihl is talking about (cf. Susemihl, 1887, p. vii) is just the collation of 1176a11-1177a30 (the part of book X that is missing in K^b) that Wilamowitz made on his behalf a couple of years earlier (cf. Susemihl, 1878, p. 631).

[29] Except, of course, in those cases in which the reading of the α family is clearly a corruption.

easy to determine when there is agreement between K^{b}P^{b}C^c and the Arabic translation.[30] When

P^b and C^c diverge from K^b, I have, as a rule, favoured their reading only if it agreed with the

Arabic translation and it is clear what the Arabic translation is translating or if the reading of

K^b can be clearly explained away as being due to a corruption.

It may be objected, however, that the temporal distance between the making of the Ara-

bic translation and the Fez ms. (see footnote 17) suggests that this translation and Averroes'

commentary (which paraphrases it) should be used with care. Yet, inasmuch as it may be ar-

gued that the corruptions this translation was subject to during this period are of a different

nature from that the Greek mss. were subject to, I think this translation may nevertheless be of

great value in establishing the text of the *EN* in those cases in which we can determine what it is

translating with some degree of plausibility.[31] Besides, Ullmann's (2011-2012) careful and de-

tailed work on the translation practices of *Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn* and Eusthatius (*Usṭāṯ*) are of great

help in effort of reconstructing its Greek exemplar in spite of idiosyncrasies of this translation.

In the final section of this paper (after the text of *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8]), I have

provided some notes on the text explaining my decisions for some difficult passages.

An important result of my collations is that they strengthen the suspicion that O^b and M^b

do indeed agree with K^b in more instances than one would expect in light of Loungi's *stemma*.

As a matter of fact, there are a couple of common mistakes that suggest that O^b is contaminated

either by K^b, by its exemplar or, at the very least, by some other non-extant mss. that preserves

some readings of K^b. However, the evidence from *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] is not enough for

settling this issue, which would certainly demand a full collation of *EN* X. Moreover, because

the text of the *EN* in O^b is the result of the work of two different hands (which appear to be from

the same period and from the same *scriptorium*)[32], perhaps a full collation of these nine mss.

for the text of *EN* III or IV will prove to be necessary to show with certainty that O^b's agreeing

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[30] Things are not so clear before 1177a30, since K^b omits 1176a11 (τέρπει) - 1177a30 (ἱκανῶς). In lines
1176a30-1177a30 one has to rely only on P^{b}C^c and on the Arabic translation to determine the readings of
α family. However, because in some cases the copyist of P^{b}C^c tends adopt corrections from the β family
(in particular, from L—on this, see Loungi [2022, p. 113]), it is hard to tell whether, in those passages
from 1176a30-1177a30 where i) P^{b}C^c agree with L and ii) the Arabic translation is not decisive, the
gemelli are giving the reading of the α family or a correction from L. A passage that is quite unclear in
this regard is 1176b17 (see my discussion of it below).

[31] I thank one of the anonymous referees for pressing me to take a position on this issue.

[32] The first original hand is responsible for ff.7r-33v (until 1129b11 περιέχει πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν [part of a
stretch of text also added by L^b and M^b after 1129b10-11 'τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν']), the second
original hand is responsible for ff.34r-90v (from 1129b11 καὶ κοινόν ἐστιν πάσης ἀδικίας until the end
of the *EN*). See Martinelli Tempesta (2016, pp. 209ff) on this.

with K[b] against other members of the *β* family is not something that happens only in the parts of O[b] copied by its second original hand, but also in parts of the text copied by its first original hand[33], and to confirm the results about its stemmatic value.

In any case, the evidence from *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] seems to suggest that, of the nine mss. I collated, only O[b] and M[b] exhibit this unexpected behaviour. In fact, although there is reason for thinking that, in regard to O[b] and M[b] at least, book X does not belong with books I, II, VI, VII, and IX—in which case Gauthier's division of the mss. would prove to be more accurate in this particular regard than Susemihl's (see footnote 8)—, the remaining mss. I collated exhibit the behaviour one would expect them to have in light of Loungi's *stemma*.

2. *The apparatus and collation method*

Below in section 3 I have provided an edition *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] with a positive *apparatus*. For the sake of clarity, I give indications about what is missing (due to physical damage) from the witnesses I collated above the *apparatus criticus*. This is especially relevant in the case of L, since a large section of the top left side of the *recti* and of the top right side of the *versi* of the folios of L containing *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] (i.e., ff. 81r-82v)[34] is missing due to physical damage.[35] When giving indications of what is missing in these mss., I have used brackets around parts of words to indicate that they are not missing (e.g., when in 1176b6-7 I say that L does not have '[εἶ]ναι ... ἀ[ρετήν]', I mean that 'εἶ-' and '-ρετήν' are not missing in L)

The relevant readings from the Arabic translation are reported in the *apparatus* with vocalizations (which are absent in the original), so as to make clear the meaning of the many isolated chunks of text that I quote in the *apparatus*. I also provide modified versions of Dunlop's English translation of the Arabic version (and also some translations of my own) in most cases I mention its readings in the *apparatus*.

K[b], P[b], C[c], L, L[b], O[b], B[95sup.], and V were all collated using digital colour images that are

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[33] There are good indications that this also happens in the parts of O[b] copied by its first original hand. On this, see Rassow (1874, pp. 3-4), who claims that, in regard to books III-IV, O[b] either stems from the same source as K[b] or is itself dependent upon K[b] directly and then provides some evidence in support of this claim.

[34] Although *EN* X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8] actually ends in f. 83r, only the last three lines of the text are located in this folio (i.e., 1179a31-33: 'θεοφιλέστατος ... εὐδαίμων').

[35] Besides, from 1178a33 onwards, the folios copied by V's original hand (the one that dates from XI-XII centuries) are missing. Thus, although a later hand (from the XV century) completes the missing parts of V, I have not taken it into account.

available online in the repositories of the Libraries in which they are located.[36] M^b, in turn, was collated using digital colour images provided by the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana.

To secure more accuracy to my collations, I collated the relevant the mss. in small sections of about 30 Bekker lines each. The mss. were collated in the following order: K^b, P^b, C^c, L, L^b, O^b, $B^{95sup.}$, V, and M^b. For every variant I found, I went back to the mss. I already collated to check them again. After this, I checked my results against previous collations[37] (checking all mss. again for every passage where I found a divergence between my results and those of the work of other scholars). Notwithstanding all these precautions, it is possible that the results presented in the *apparatus* can still be improved upon, and it is probable that further work may show that some corrections are necessary.

In the *apparatus*, I have not reported minor orthographical variants, and I have supplied iota subscripts in the *apparatus* when the mss. did not have them in all cases where their omission was not a source of textual problems.

I have strictly observed the lineation found in Immanuel Bekker's edition. To indicate the beginning of a new line, I have employed '|', with the exception of lines multiple of five and lines that correspond to the beginning of a new Bekker page or of a new Bekker column. For these, I have employed '‖'. In the *apparatus*, in turn, I have employed '‖' to separate entries for different lines or line intervals, and '|' to separate different entries for the same line or line interval.

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[36] For K^b and L, see <https://tecabml.contentdm.oclc.org/digital>; for P^b, see <https://digi.vatlib.it/>; for C^c, see <https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/>; for L^b, see <https://gallica.bnf.fr/>; for O^b, see <http://teca.riccardiana.firenze.sbn.it/>; for $B^{95sup.}$, see <https://ambrosiana.comperio.it/>; and, for V, see <https://www.onb.ac.at/>.

[37] I have checked my results against Stewart (1882), Susemihl (1887), Bywater (1892, 1894), Ashburner (1917), and Panegyres (2020). I have not checked my results against Susemihl and Apelt (1912). In fact, not only Apelt omits a series of readings reported by Susemihl (such as those of P^b), but also, as already observed by Ashburner (1917), in translating Susemihl's sigla for the mss. groupings, he ends up introducing some mistakes into the *apparatus*.

3.   *EN X.6-9 [=Bywater X.6-8]*

Sigla

K^b	(Laur. Plut. 81.11, saec. IX, ff. 121v-124v—1176a11 [τέρπει] ad 1177a30 [ἱκανῶς] om. K^b)
K^b2	(Corrections made by a later hand [saec. XIII])
P^b	(Vat. gr. 1342, saec. XIII, ff. 93r-95v)
C^c	(Cant. gr. Ii.5.44 [=1879], saec. XIII, ff. 98v-101r)
L	(Laur. Plut. 81.18, saec. XII, ff. 81r-83r)
L^1	(Corrections made Ioannikios himself or by his anonymous partner)
L^2	(Corrections made by a later hand [different from L^1])
L^b	(Par. gr. 1854, saec. XII-XIII, ff. 175r-182r)
O^b	(Ricc. 46, saec. XII, ff. 85v-88v)
B^95sup.	(Ambros. B 95 sup. [=Martini-Bassi 117], saec. XII-XIII, ff. 197r-205r)
B^95sup.1	(Corrections made by a later hand)
V	(Vind. Phil. 315, saec. XI-XII, ff. 204v-209r—1178a33 ([δὴ]λος) ad finem desunt V^1)
M^b	(Marc. gr. Z 213, 1565-1572, ff. 117v-120v)
Arab.	(Arabic translation—ed. Akasoy & Fidora [2005])
Aver.	(Averroes's [Latin version]—ed. Woerther [2018])

1176a30   **6.** ‖ εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ
| ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ
τέ|λος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ
προει|ρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν δ’ ὅτι
οὐκ | ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι
35   ἂν, φυ‖τοῦ ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ
1176b1   ταῦτα ‖ μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον,
καθά|περ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ’ ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μέν
εἰσιν | ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι’ ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ’ αὑτάς,
δῆλον | ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ’ αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινα
5   θετέον καὶ ‖ οὐ τῶν δι’ ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμο-
νία ἀλλ’ αὐτάρ|κης. καθ’ αὑτὰς δ’ εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ἀφ’ ὧν μηδὲν
ἐπιζητεῖται | παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ’ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν

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a30–31 εἰρημένων ... ἡδ[ονάς] desunt L
a35–b1 τὰ ... μὴ desunt L
b1–4 καθάπερ ... θετέον desunt L
b4–5 καὶ ... ἐν[δεὴς] desunt L
b6 δ’ ... μηδὲν desunt L
b7–8 [εἶ]ναι ... ἀ[ρετήν] desunt L

‖ **a30** τε P^bC^cLO^bB^95sup.VM^b: om. L^b   ‖ **a32** τίθεμεν
P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^95sup.V: ἀντιτίθεμεν M^b | δὴ P^bC^cLB^95sup.VM^b:
δὲ L^bO^b   ‖ **a33** δ’ P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^95sup.VM^b: δὴ Bywater   ‖
a34–35 φυτοῦ P^bC^cB^95sup.V: φθιτοῦ Arab. (553.9: ʾالْمَعْدُوم [al-
maʿdūmi]—literally 'of what is nonexistent/lacking,' but see
Arberry's conjecture [in Akasoy & Fidora, p. 552n131]): φυ-
τῶν LL^bO^bM^b Bekker Susemihl Bywater   **1176b1** ἀρέσκει
P^bC^cLL^bO^bV: ἀρέσκοι B^95sup.: ἀρέσκουσιν M^b ‖ **b5** post ἄλλο
add τι P^bC^c ‖ **b7** παρὰ P^bLL^bO^bB^95sup.VM^b: περὶ C^c

αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρε|τὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράτ-
τειν τῶν δι᾽ | αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ

10 γὰρ δι᾽ ‖ ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐ-
τῶν μᾶλλον | ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ
τῆς κτήσεως. | καταφεύγουσι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς
τῶν εὐδαιμο|νιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις
εὐδοκιμοῦσιν | οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι·

15 ὧν γὰρ ἐφίεν‖ται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς·
δέονται δὲ τοιού|των. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶ-
ναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν | δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀπασχολάζειν,
οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημεῖον | οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυ-
ναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ᾽ ὁ νοῦς,| ἀφ᾽ ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέρ-

20 γειαι· οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ‖ ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ
ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς κατα|φεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο
ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ | γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ
παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται | εἶναι. εὔλογον δή,
ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαί|νεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ

25 φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν ‖ πολλάκις εἴρηται,
καὶ τίμα καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ | τοιαῦτα ὄντα·
ἑκάστῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετω|τάτη ἐνέργεια,

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b8–9 *τῶν ... αἱρετῶν* desunt L
b10 *αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται* desunt L
b11 *σωμάτων καὶ τῆς* desunt L
b12–13 *[εὐ]δαιμονιζομένων* deest L
b14 *διαγωγαῖς* deest L
b15 *δέονται* deest L
b16–17 *ἐν δυναστείαις* desunt L
b18 *ἐν τ[ῷ]* desunt L
b19 *οὐδ᾽* deest L
b20 *[σω]μα[τικὰς]* deest L
b21–22 *καὶ γὰρ ο[ἱ]* desunt L
b23 *δή* deest L
b25 *κα[ὶ]* deest L

‖ **b8** καλὰ καὶ om. L^b ‖ **b12** διαγωγὰς mg.P^{b}s.l.C^{c}LL^{b}O^{b}B$^{95sup.}$VM^b: ἀγωγάς P^{b}C^c | ante τῶν add καὶ L   ‖ **b15–16** τοιούτων P^{b}C^{c}LB$^{95sup.}$VM^b: τούτων L^{b}O^b ‖ **b17** ante δυναστείαις add ταῖς P^{b}C^{c}B$^{95sup.}$V | ἀπασχολάζειν L^{b}O^{b}B$^{95sup.}$VM^{b}Arab. (555.6: يَشْتَغِلُونَ [yaš-taġilūna]): ἀποσχολάζειν P^{b}C^{c}L Bekker Susemihl Bywater   ‖ **b18** οὐδ᾽ ὁ LL^{b}B$^{95sup.}$V: οὐδὲ P^{b}C^c: ὁ δὲ O^{b}M^b ‖ **b20** ἐλευθερίου P^{b}C^{c}LL^{b}O^{b}B$^{95sup.}$V: ἐλευθέρας M^b ‖ **b22** αὐτοῖς P^{b}C^{c}LL^{b}O^{b}B$^{95sup.}$V: αὐτῶν M^b ‖ **b23–24** φαίνεται P^{b}C^{c}LO^{b}B$^{95sup.}$VM^b: φαίνονται L^b ‖ **b26** δὲ P^{b}C^{c}LL^{b}O^{b}B$^{95sup.}$VM^b: δὴ Par. 1417 (*pace* Susemihl and Bywater, who report that it gives δὴ for the following line)

καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ | ἐν παιδιᾷ
ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι | παιδιάν,
30 καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ‖ ἅπαντα τοῦ
παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου | ἕνεκα αἱρού-
μεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. | σπουδάζειν
δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ | λίαν παι-
δικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, | ὀρθῶς
35 ἔχειν δοκεῖ. ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνα‖τοῦν-
τες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ‖
1177a1 ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ |
εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, |
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν |
5 γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ ‖ μο-
ρίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ |
βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ |
τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον
οὐχ | ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ
μεταδίδω|σιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δια-
10 γωγαῖς ἡ ‖ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας,
καθάπερ | καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται. |

7. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον
| κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ

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b27 κα[τὰ] deest L
b28 [ἄτο]πον deest L
b30 πα[ίζειν] deest L
b31 [εὐδαι]μον[ίας] deest L
b34 παι[διά] deest L
1177a1 [ἀνά]π[αυσις] deest L
a2 δὲ μ[ετὰ] desunt L
a3 [σπ]ου[δ]αῖ[α] deest L
a3 τῶν deest L
a5 σπου[δαιοτέραν] deest L
a6 [ἀπο]λ[αυσειε] deest L
a8–9 μεταδίδωσιν ... ταῖς desunt L
a10 ἀλλ' ... κα[θάπερ] desunt L
a12 ἐστὶν ... ἐνέρ[γεια] desunt L
a13 ἂν ... νοῦς desunt L

‖ **b27** δὴ ἡ L Arab. (555.13: وَعِنْدَ ٱلْفَاضِلِ أَيْضًا ['*wa-'inda l-fāḍili ayḍan*]—'and in the case of the excellent person too,' cf. Akasoy & Fidora [2005, p. 554n139], compare 1178a21, where the δὴ from καὶ ... δὴ is rendered in the same way, and 1178a5 and 1178a30, where it is rendered as 'likewise'[كَذٰلِكَ]): δὲ ἡ Oᵇa.r. Par. 1417: δὲ PᵇCᶜLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ Bekker ‖ **b28** τὸ om. Mᵇ ‖ **b31** ἕνεκα PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇMᵇ: χάριν B⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V ‖ **b33** σπουδάζῃ PᵇCᶜLB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ: σπουδάζειν LᵇOᵇ **1177a2** μετὰ σπουδῆς PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: σπουδαῖος V ‖ **a3** ἀλλ' om. OᵇMᵇ ‖ **a4** ante μετὰ add. τῶν Lᵇ Susemihl ‖ **a5** σπουδαιοτέραν PᵇCᶜLOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: σπουδαιοτέρου Mᵇ: σπουδαιοτάτην Lᵇ ‖ **a9** οὐ PᵇCᶜLOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: οὐδὲ Mᵇ | γὰρ PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇMᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: ἄρ' ci. Susemihl

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νοῦς | τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ
15 ἡγεῖ‖σθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον
ὂν | καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέρ-
γεια | κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία.
ὅτι | δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν
δόξειεν | εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη
20 τε γὰρ ‖ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν,
καὶ τῶν | γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θε-
ωρεῖν τε γὰρ | δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτι-
οῦν. οἰόμεθά τε | δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ,
ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν | κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν
25 ὁμολογουμένως ‖ ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς
ἡδονὰς ἔχειν κα|θαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς
εἰδόσι τῶν ζη|τούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἥ τε λεγο-
μένη αὐτάρκεια | περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη· τῶν
μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ | ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος
30 καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, ‖ τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορη-
γημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται | πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει
καὶ μεθ᾽ ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώ|φρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς | καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ὢν δύνα-
ται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος | ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ᾽
1177b1 ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ‖ αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι

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a14–15 [ἄρχ]ειν ... ἔχειν desunt L
a16 [εἴ]τε ... τούτου desunt L
a17–18 [εὐ]δαίμονια ... θεω[ρητικὴ] desunt L
a19 πρότερον ... ἀληθεῖ desunt L
a20–21 καὶ² ... νοῦς desunt L
a22 πράττειν ... οἰόμε[θά] desunt L
a24 ἀρετὴν ... κα[τὰ] desunt L
a25 [θα]υμαστὰς ... ἔ[χειν] desunt L
a27 [ἡδ]ίω δια[γωγὴν] desunt L
a28 τῶν μὲν γὰρ desunt L
a30 τοιούτοις ἱ[κανῶς] desunt L
a31 ὁμοίως deest L
a33–b33 δύναται θεωρεῖν desunt L
a34 [ὅ]μως deest L

‖ **a15** ante περὶ add. καὶ Mᵇ ‖ **a18** δὲ om. Mᵇ ‖ **a19**
τε om. LOᵇMᵇ ‖ **a21** τε del. Bywater ‖ **a25** φιλοσοφία
LLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ Arab. (559.2: بِالْفَلْسَفَةِ [*bi-l-falsafati*]): σο-
φία PᵇCᶜ | θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς PᵇCᶜLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: θαυμα-
στὴν ἡδονὴν OᵇMᵇ ‖ **a25–26** καθαριότητι PᵇCᶜLB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V:
καθαρειότητι LᵇOᵇ Bywater: καθαρσιοτητι Mᵇ ‖ **a26** δὲ
PᵇCᶜLOᵇMᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: τε Lᵇ ‖ **a27** διαγωγὴν PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇVMᵇ:
ἀγωγὴν B⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· ‖ **a29** ante σοφὸς add. ὁ PᵇCᶜB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· ‖ **a30**
τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις PᵇCᶜLOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ: τῶν δὲ τοιούτων Lᵇ |
κεχορηγημένων KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇV: κεχορηγημένοις B⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ ‖
a34 ᾖ KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: εἴη Oᵇ | ἔχων KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V:
ἔχειν OᵇMᵇ **1177b1** δόξαι KᵇOᵇMᵇ: δόξειε PᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V

τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶ|σθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐ-
τῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ | δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ
πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν | πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ

5 τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχο‖λούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα
σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνην | ἄγωμεν. τῶν
μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς | ἢ ἐν τοῖς
πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια· αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις | δοκοῦσιν
ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς, | οὐδεὶς γὰρ

10 αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ πα‖ρασκευ-
άζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος | τις εἶναι,
εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ | φόνος γί-
νοιντο. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ | παρ' αὐτὸ
τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τι|μὰς ἢ τήν

15 γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν ‖ οὖσαν τῆς
πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. | εἰ δὴ
τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ | πο-
λεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἄσχο|λοι
καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν, |
ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρη-

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b2 οὐδ[ὲν] deest L
b3 [ἔλαττο]ν περι[ποιούμεθα] desunt L
b4 [εἶ]ναι deest L
b5–6 [εἰρή]νην ἄ[γωμεν] desunt L
b7 δὲ deest L
b10 [δόξ]αι deest L
b11 [ἵν]α μάχαι
b13 περιποιου[μένη] deest L
b14–15 ἑτέραν οὖσαν desunt L
b16 [π]ράξεων deest L
b19 τε δια[φέρειν] desunt L

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b1 τ' KᵇPᵇCᶜLB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V δ' LᵇOᵇMᵇ ‖ **b3** δὲ
KᵇPᵇCᶜLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ: γὰρ Oᵇ | πρακτικῶν KᵇPᵇCᶜMᵇArab.
(559.10: ʿمِنْ ذَوَاتِ ٱلْفِعْلِ' [*min ḏawāti l-fiʿli*]—cf. Schmidt&Ul-
mann [2011, p.92]): πρακτῶν LLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V | περιποιούμεθα
KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: περιπονούμεθα Mᵇ | παρὰ
KᵇPᵇCᶜL s.l.LᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: περὶ LᵇMᵇ ‖ **b5** σχολάζωμεν
KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: σπουδάζωμεν Mᵇ ‖ **b6** πρακτικῶν
KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: πρακτῶν Mᵇ ‖ **b7** ἢ ἐν τοῖς
πολεμικοῖςom. Mᵇ | ἐν om. LᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V | ἡ ἐνέργεια
KᵇPᵇCᶜLOᵇMᵇ: αἱ ἐνέργειαι LᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V ‖ **b9** αἱρεῖται τὸ
πολεμεῖν KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: πονεῖν αἱρεῖται Mᵇ ‖ **b9–10**
παρασκευάζει KᵇLOᵇ: παρασκευάζειν PᵇCᶜLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ ‖
b12 φόνος KᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇ Arab. (559.15: ʿحَتَّى تَكُونَ حُرُوبٌ وَقَتْلٌ'
[*ḥattā takūna ḥurūbun wa-qatlun*]—'so that there are battles and
slaughter'): φόνοι LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ Bekker Susemihl Bywater
| γίνοιντο PᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: γίνηται KᵇOᵇ: γίνωνται Mᵇ ‖ **b15**
καὶ om. LLᵇ ‖ **b17–18** ἄσχολοι καὶ PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ:
ἄσχολικαι (sic) Kᵇ (note that the accents in Kᵇ have been added
by a later hand) ‖ **b18** αἱρεταί εἰσιν KᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇMᵇ: εἰσιν
αἱρεταί LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V

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20   τικὴ οὖσα,‖ καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν
τε ἡδονὴν | οἰκείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ
αὔταρκες | δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ
καὶ ὅσα | ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται κατὰ ταύτην τὴν
ἐνέργειαν | φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν

25   εἴη ἀν‖θρώπῳ, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτε-
λές ἐστιν | τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος
κρείττων ἢ | κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕ-
τως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' | ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ
διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συν|θέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς

30   κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. ‖ εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄν-
θρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος | θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώ-
πινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραι|νοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα
φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνη|τόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ'
ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν | πρὸς τὸ ζῆν

1178a1   κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ‖ τῷ ὄγκῳ

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b20–21 ἡδονὴν οἰ[κείαν] desunt L

b22 ὡς ἀν[θρωπινον] desunt L

b23 ἐν[έργειαν] deest L

b24–25 ὄντα ... ἀνθρώ[που] (see critical note below) desunt L

b25–26 [οὐ]δὲν ... ὁ δὲ desunt L

b27 οὐ γὰρ ... ἀλλ' desunt L

b28–29 τοῦ ... κατὰ desunt L

b30–31 [κα]τὰ ... βίον desunt L

b32–33 ὄντα ... ἀ[λλ'] desunt L

b34 τὸ ζῆν ... κράτιστον desunt L

‖ **b20** ante ἔχειν add. καὶ Κᵇ | τε PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: τὴν Κᵇ Bywater: τε καὶ Μᵇ   ‖ **b21** ante οἰκείαν add. τελείαν ΚᵇOᵇΜᵇ Susemihl: om. PᵇCᶜLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V Arab. (561.5-6: 'وَأَنَّ لَهُ لَذَّةً خَاصِّيَّةً [*wa-anna lahu laḏḏatan ḫāṣṣiyyatan*]—'and that it has its own pleasure')   ‖ **b22** δὴ ΚᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: δὲ OᵇΜᵇ Susemihl | ἀνθρώπῳ ΚᵇOᵇ: ἀνθρώπινον PᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V   ‖ **b23** κατὰ PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: τὰ κατὰ ΚᵇΜᵇ Bywater   ‖ **b24–25** ἀνθρώπῳ ΚᵇPᵇCᶜ: ἀνθρώπου LLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V Bekker Susemihl Bywater   ‖ **b25** λαβοῦσα ΚᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: λαβοῦσαν Μᵇ | βίου τέλειον ΚᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VΜᵇ: τέλειον βίου Oᵇ   ‖ **b24–26** ἀνθρώπου ... ἂν εἴη mg. V   ‖ **b26** ἂν εἴη ΚᵇPᵇCᶜLOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VΜᵇ: εἴη ἂν Lᵇ | βίος κρείττων ΚᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇΜᵇ: κρείττων βίος LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V   ‖ **b28** ὅσον ΚᵇPᵇCᶜ: ὅσῳ s.l.CᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VΜᵇ Bekker Susemihl | δὲ ΚᵇPᵇCᶜLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: δὴ L   ‖ **b29** τοσοῦτον ΚᵇPᵇCᶜ: τοσούτῳ s.l.Cᶜ LᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VΜᵇ Bekker Susemihl   ‖ **b31** οὐ χρὴ δὲ ΚᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇ: χρὴ δὲ οὐ LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V   ‖ **a33** ἀθανατίζειν ΚᵇOᵇΜᵇ: ἀπαθανατίζειν PᵇCᶜ mg.OᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: ἀποθανατίζειν (sic) LLᵇ | πάντα ΚᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇ: ἅπαντα LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V

μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον | πάντων
ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ | τὸ
κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν | αὐ-
5 τοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότε‖ρον
ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κρά|τι-
στον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ
| τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα
καὶ | εὐδαιμονέστατος. |

10 **8**. δευτέρως δ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ‖
ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ
| τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν
ἐν | συναλλάγμασιν καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν
τε | τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ, ταῦτα δ᾽
εἶναι | φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν
15 ἀπὸ ‖ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς
πάθεσιν | ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνη-
σις τῇ τοῦ | ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ
μὲν τῆς φρο|νήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς,
τὸ δ᾽ ὀρθὸν | τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρτημέ-

1178a1-2 [τι]μιότητι ... πάν[των] desunt L
a3 [ἄ]μεινον ... γίνοι[τ] desunt L
a5 καὶ ... οἰ[κεῖον] desunt L
a9 τὴν ... ἀρ[ετήν] desunt L
a11 ἄλλα deest L
a12 καὶ πρά[ξεσι] desunt L
a13–14 εἶναι φαίνεται desunt L
a15 συν[ῳκειῶσθαι] dest L
a16 ἤ[θους] deest L
a18 [ε]ἰσιν deest L

1178a1 τιμιότητι P^bC^cLL^bB^95sup.VM^b Arab. (563.1: ʾبِٱلْقُوَّةِ وَٱلْكَرَمِ [*bi-l-quwwati wa-l-karami*]—'in power and honourableness'): ποιότητι K^b: τελειότητι O^b ‖ **a2** πάντων ὑπερέχει K^bLO^b: πάντων ὑπερέχειν M^b: ὑπερέχει πάντων P^bC^c: ὑπερέχει L^bB^95sup.V | δ᾽ om. K^bM^b | εἶναι ἕκαστος K^bO^b: εἶναι ἕκαστον M^b: ἕκαστος εἶναι P^bC^cLL^bB^95sup. ‖ **a3** post ἄμεινον add. μενον K^bP^bC^c ‖ **a7** τοῦτο μάλιστα K^bP^bC^cO^bM^b: μάλιστα τοῦτο LL^bB^95sup.V ‖ **a9–10** κατὰ ταύτην K^bP^bC^cO^bVM^b: κατ᾽ αὐτὴν LL^bB^95sup. ‖ **a11** prius τὰ om. K^bO^bM^b Bekker ‖ **a13** διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ K^bP^bC^cO^bM^b: τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ διατηροῦντες LL^bB^95sup.V ‖ **a14** καὶ om. L ‖ **a16–17** συνέζευκται ... ἀρετῇ om. Arab. (cf. Akasoy & Fidora [p. 562n171] and Ullmann [2011-2012, vol. 2, p. 266]) ‖ **a17** αὕτη P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^95sup.VM^b: αὐτὴ Arab. (563.10: بِعَيْنِهَا [*bi-ʾaynihā*]): αὐτῇ K^b | τῇ φρονήσει K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^95sup.VM^b: ἡ σωφρο-σύνη Arab. (563.10: ʾٱلْعِفَّةُ [*al-ʾiffatu*]—cf. Akasoy & Fidora [p. 562n172]) | ante εἴπερ add. καὶ L ‖ **a18–19** τὰς ἠθικάς ... κατὰ om. Arab. (cf. Akasoy & Fidora [p. 562n173]) ‖ **a19** συνηρτημέναι δ᾽ αὗται P^bC^cLL^bO^bV Arab.: συνηρτημένη δ᾽ αὐταῖς K^b

1178a19-1178b7

20 ναι δ' αὗται καὶ ‖ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ
δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρε|ταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ
ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαι|μονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· το-
σοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς | εἴρηται· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον
τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. | δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορη-
25 γίας ἢ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖ‖σθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν
μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία | καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ
μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ | πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοι-
αῦτα (μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι)· | πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας
πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ | δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς
30 τὸ πράττειν τά ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ ‖ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀν-
ταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, | προσποιοῦνται δὲ
καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), | τῷ ἀνδρείῳ
δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν | ἀρετήν, καὶ
τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας. πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ | οὗτος ἢ
35 τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτε‖ρον τῆς
1178b1 ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ‖ οὔσης·
τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ | τὰς
πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσιν καὶ | καλ-
λίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων
| πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά
5 ἐστιν ‖ πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ πλεί-
οσι συζῇ, | αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται
οὖν τῶν τοιού|των πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι.—ἡ δὲ τελεία

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a20 [πά]θεσι deest L
a21 κατὰ deest L
a33 [δῆ]λος ad finem desunt V¹(saec. XI-XII)
1178b1 [τ]ὸ deest L
b7 [ἀν]θ[ρωπεύεσθαι] deest L

‖ **a20** ante περὶ add. καὶ B⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ   ‖ **a21** κατὰ ταύτας
KᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇMᵇ: κατ' αὐτὰς LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V Bywater   ‖
a22 γὰρ KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: δὲ Mᵇ   ‖ **a23** εἴρηται
KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ Arab. (563.12: ‘وَٱلْقَوّلَ فِيهَا بِهَٰذَا ٱلْقَدْرِ‘
[*wa-l-quwwila fī-hā bi-hāḏā l-qadri*]—‘so much is said about
it’): εἰρήσθω Aretinus Bekker Bywater | διακριβῶσαι
LᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ: ἀκριβῶσαι KᵇPᵇCᶜ | post γὰρ add.
περὶ Lᵇ   ‖ **a24** prius ἢ KᵇPᵇCᶜMᵇ: om. LLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V
Bekker | post alterum ἢ add. ὡς B⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·   ‖ **a26** ἔστω KᵇPᵇ
s.l.CᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ: ἑκάστῳ Cᶜ | διαπονεῖ om. Mᵇ   ‖
a27 διαφέροι Mᵇ: διαφέρειν KᵇOᵇ: διαφέρει PᵇCᶜ: διαφέρη
LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V   ‖ **a28** διοίσει PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇVMᵇ: συνδιοίσει Kᵇ
‖ **a31** μὴ om. Mᵇ   ‖ **a32** τὴν om. LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ   ‖ **a33**
δῆλος ἔσται KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V: ἔσται δῆλος Mᵇ | ἢ
om. OᵇMᵇ   ‖ **a34** ἀμφισβητεῖταί KᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇMᵇ: ζητεῖται
LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· | τε KᵇOᵇMᵇ: δὲ PᵇCᶜLᵇ: δὲ τι LB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·   **1178b3**
καλλίους KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·V καλαὶ Mᵇ   ‖ **b3** τῷ δὲ
θεωροῦντι KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇi.r. OᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ: τῶν δὲ θεωρούντων
Lᵇa.r. | οὐδενὸς KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: οὐδὲν Mᵇ   ‖ **b5** συζῇ
KᵇPᵇCᶜLOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ: συζῆν Lᵇ   ‖ **b6** τὰ KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·:
τὸ Mᵇ | τὴν om. LᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ

εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρη|τική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐνθεῦθεν
ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς | γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακα-
10   ρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· ‖ πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι
χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δι|καίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται
συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακατα|θήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα
τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους; | ⟨ἢ⟩ ὑπομένοντες τὰ φο-
βερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντες ὅτι καλόν; ἢ | τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι
15   δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται ‖ αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι
τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; | ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαι-
νος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; | διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα
φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ | καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν | αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνερ-
20   γεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν ‖ Ἐνδυμίωμα.
τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ | μᾶλλον
τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ | ἐν-

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b12–13 καὶ ... ὑπο[μένοντας] desunt L
b13–14 [κινδυνεύ]οντας ... δώσουσιν desunt L
b15–16 τοιοῦτον ... φορτικὸς desunt L
b17 [διεξ]ιοῦσι ... περὶ desunt L
b18–19 πάντες ... αὐτούς desunt L
b20 τῷ ... ἀ[φηρημένῳ] desunt L
b21–22 [ὥστ]ε ... μα[καριότητι] desunt L

‖ **b8** τίς ἐστιν K^bLO^bB^{95sup.}M^b: ἐστιν τίς P^bC^cL^b   ‖
b8–9 τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ K^bP^bC^cLO^bB^{95sup.}M^b: τοὺς γὰρ θεοὺς
L^b   ‖ **b11** ἢ om. K^b   ‖ **b12** ante τοιαῦτα add. ἄλλα
L^bB^{95sup.} | τὰς K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}M^b: τοὺς Ald. | ἀνδρείους
K^bP^bO^bB^{95sup.}M^b: ἀνδρείας C^cL^bB^{95sup.1}: ἀνδρείου conj. By-
water (cf. *Contrib.* p. 69)   ‖ **b13** ⟨ἢ⟩ scripsi: om. codd.
| ὑπομένοντες K^b: ὑπομένοντας P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}M^b Bekker
Susemihl Bywater: ὑπομένοντος conj. Bywater: ὑπομενόντοις
conieci | κινδυνεύοντες conj. Burnet (p. 465): κινδυνεύοντας
K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}M^b Bekker Susemihl Bywater: κινδυνεύον-
τος conj. Bywater: κινδυνευόντοις conieci   ‖ **b15** αἱ P^bC^cL^b: εἰ
K^bO^bB^{95sup.}M^b Arab.? (565.15: ‘وَإِنْ نُسِبَ إِلَيْهِمْ اَلْأَفْعَالُ الْعَفِّيَّةُ’ [*wa-in
nusiba ilayhim al-afʿālu l-ʿaffyyatu*]—'and if temperate actions
are attributed to them,' see the discussion below in the next sec-
tion)   ‖ **b18** ζῆν τε K^bP^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup.}: ζῆν γε Coraes Bywa-
ter: ζῆν O^b: ζητεῖται M^b | πάντες K^bP^bC^cL^bO^b: πάντες γὰρ
M^b: πάλιν B^{95sup.}   ‖ **b19** ante αὐτούς add. εἶναι M^b | οὐ γὰρ
δὴ K^bP^bC^cL^bO^bM^b: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ L^b: οὐ δὴ γὰρ B^{95sup.}   ‖ **b20**
δὴ K^bP^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}VM^b: δὲ Susemihl | ἀφαιρουμένου
K^b Arab. (567.1: ‘إِذْ نُفِيَ عَنْهُمْ فِعْلُ اَلْأَحْيَاءِ’ [*iḏ nufiya ʿan-hum
fiʿlu l-aḥyāʾi*]—'since the action of the living is removed from
them'—although the ancient translator misconstrues the Greek,
as emphasised by Akasoy & Fidora [p. 566n187], this transla-
tion suggests that the original it is translating had the genitive
absolute): ἀφαιρουμένῳ P^bC^c: ἀφῃρημένῳ LL^bO^bB^{95sup.}: ἀφῃ-
ρημένου M^bi.r.   ‖ **b21** τοῦ P^bC^cLL^bO^bB^{95sup.}M^bArab. (567.1:
‘مِنَ اَلْفِعْلِ’ [*mina l-fiʿli*]—'of the activity'): τοῦτο K^b | θεωρία
K^bP^bC^cO^bM^b: θεωρίας LL^bB^{95sup.}

1178b22-1179a8

ἔργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ |
τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικω-
τάτη.—σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαι-
25 μονίας, ‖ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ | θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀνθρώποις,
ἐφ᾽ ὅσον | ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν
δ᾽ ἄλλων | ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ
θεωρίας. ἐφ᾽ | ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμο-
30 νία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλ‖λον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν,
οὐ κατὰ συμβε|βηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τι|μία. ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.|

9. Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι·
οὐ γὰρ | αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ
35 τὸ σῶμα ‖ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν
1179a1 ὑπάρχειν. ‖ οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσε-
σθαι τὸν εὐδαι|μονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς
ἀγαθῶν μα|κάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔ-
ταρκες οὐδ᾽ ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ᾽ αἱ πρά|ξεις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ
5 ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράτ‖τειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ
ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ᾽ ἄν τις πράττειν | κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν.
τοῦτο᾽ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶ|ται τῶν δυνα-
στῶν οὐκ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, | ἀλλὰ καὶ

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b23 δὴ ... συγγενεστά[τη] desunt L
b24–25 εὐδαιμονίας ... τοιαύτης desunt L
b26 τοιαύτης ... ἐνεργείας desunt L
b27–28 δ᾽ ... ζῴων desunt L
b29 [διατεί]νει ... θεω[ρία] desunt L
b30–31 κατὰ συμβε[βηκὸς] desunt L
b32 [ἂ]ν ... εὐ[δαιμονία] desunt L
b34 ἡ φύσις πρὸς desunt L
b35 [θεραπ]είαν deest L
1179a2 [ἐν]δέ[χεται] deest L
a3 ἡ κρίσι[ς] desunt L
a5 [κα]λά deest L
a6 ἐναργῶς deest L
a8 [ἀλ]λὰ καὶ desunt L

‖ **b23** ante ἡ add. ἂν εἴη Kᵇ | εὐδαιμονικωτάτη s.l. Pᵇ ‖
b26 post μακάριος add. τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας LOᵇMᵇ
‖ **b28** οὐδαμῇ KᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇMᵇ: οὐδαμῶς LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ. ‖ **b31** καθ᾽
αὑτὴν LLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ: κατ᾽ αὑτὴν KᵇPᵇCᶜ ‖ **b32** ἡ om.
Mᵇ   **1179a3** οὐ KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ. οὐδὲ Mᵇ ‖ **a3–4** οὐδ᾽
ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ᾽ αἱ πράξεις OᵇMᵇArab. (567.12: وَلَا ٱلْقَضَاءُ وَلَا
ٱلْأَعْمَالُ [wa-lā l-qaḍāʾu wa-lā l-aʿmālu]): οὐδ᾽ ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ᾽ ἡ
πρᾶξις PᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: οὐδ᾽ ἡ πρᾶξις Kᵇ Aver. (cf. Woerther,
p.219n335) Bekker Susemihl Bywater: οὐδ᾽ ἡ χρῆσις, οὐδ᾽ ἡ πρᾶ-
ξις Coraes ‖ **a4** ἄρχοντα KᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇ: ἄρχοντας LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ. |
θαλάττης KᵇPᵇCᶜLOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: θαλάσσης LᵇMᵇ ‖ **a6** ante κατὰ
add. τὰ OᵇMᵇ | οἱ KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇMᵇ: οὐ Oᵇ

1179a8-1179a26

μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γάρ | ὁ βίος εὐ-
10 δαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων ‖ δὲ
τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως |
τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ κάλλισθ᾽, ὡς |
ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια |
κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ |
πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν
15 ὅτι ‖ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολ-
λοῖς· οὗτοι | γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι
μόνον. συμφω|νεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν
δόξαι. πίστιν | μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ᾽ ἀλη-
θὲς ἐν τοῖς | πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται·
20 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ‖ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ
ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα | καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν
τοῖς ἔργοις | ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑπολη-
πτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ | νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ
διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ | θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν· εἰ γάρ τις
25 ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀν‖θρώπων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ,
καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλο|γον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγ-
γενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο | δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας

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a11 [κεχορηγη]μένους deest L
a14 [ὑπο]λαβεῖν deest L
a19 γὰρ deest L
a21 [ἐπιφέρον]τας deest L
a24 [θε]οφιλ[έστατος] deest L
a25 [ὥσπ]ερ deest L
a26 συγγενεσ[τά]τῳ deest L

‖ **a8** ἔσται KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: ἔστι Mᵇ ‖ **a9** κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν
KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν Mᵇ ‖ **a10** post εὐδαίμονας
add. εἶναι B⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· ‖ **a11** κεχορηγημένους PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇMᵇArab.
('ٱلَّذِينَ قَدَّ رُزِقُوا ٱلْقَصْدَ مِنَ ٱلْأَشْيَاءِ ٱلْخَارِجَةِ;' (569.1: [*allaḏīna qadda
ruziqū l-qaṣda mina l-ašyāʾi l-ḫāriǧati*]—'those provided with
a moderate quantity of the external things'): κεχορηγημένοις
KᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· | ante κάλλισθ᾽ add. τὰ LᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·VMᵇ Bekker
Susemihl Bywater | ὡς om. Kᵇ ‖ **a16** μόνον KᵇPᵇCᶜB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·:
μόνων LLᵇOᵇMᵇ ‖ **a17** δὴ KᵇPᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ: δὲ Oᵇ ‖
a18 τὰ s.l.Kᵇ²PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ: om. Kᵇ | τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς
KᵇPᵇCᶜOᵇLᵇMᵇ: τὸ ἀληθὲς δ᾽ LB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· ‖ **a19** πρακτοῖς
PᵇCᶜLLᵇ B⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· Arab. (569.5-6: 'فِي ٱلْأَعْمَالِ' [*fī l-aʿmāli*]—cf.
1179 a3-4, where 'ٱلْأَعْمَالُ' translates αἱ πράξεις): πρακτικοῖς
KᵇOᵇMᵇ | ἐκ om. Li.r. ‖ **a20** τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ PᵇCᶜ:
τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὲ LLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ: τὸ κύριον δὴ σκοπεῖν
Kᵇ ‖ **a21** φέροντας KᵇOᵇMᵇ: ἐπιφέροντας PᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·
Bekker ‖ **a24** post ἔοικεν add. εἶναι PᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ· Bekker
‖ **a24–25** ἀνθρώπων Kᵇ Arab. (569.9: 'لِلنَّاسِ' [*li-l-nāsi*]—cf.
Akasoy & Fidora [p. 568n200]) Aver. (*et si quidem cura sit
Deo de hominibus*): ἀνθρωπίνων PᵇCᶜLLᵇOᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·Mᵇ Bekker
Susemihl Bywater ‖ **a26** post καὶ add. τῷ PᵇCᶜLLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·
Bekker Susemihl | post τοῦτο add. ἤγουν τὸ χαίρειν τῷ ἀρίστῳ
καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ Mᵇ

μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τι|μῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων
αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους | καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράτ-
30 τοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ‖ τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπάρχει,
οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. | τὸν αὐτὸν δ᾽ εἰκὸς καὶ
εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη | ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ᾽
εὐδαίμων. |

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a27–28 τιμῶν[τας] deest L
a29 [κα]λῶς deest L
a30 ἄδ[ηλον] deest L

———————

‖ **a28** φίλων K^bL^bO^bM^b Arab. (569.11: ‘كَٱلْأَصْدِقَاءِ [*ka-l-aṣdiqāʾi*]
—'like friends'): φιλουμένων P^bC^c: φιλούντων L ‖ **a29** καὶ
om. M^b | πάντα ταῦτα K^bO^b: ταῦτα πάντα P^bC^cLL^bB^{95sup.}M^b
‖ **a30** θεοφιλέστατος P^bC^cL¹L^bO^bB^{95sup.} Arab. (569.12-13: مُحِبٌّ
لِلْإِلَهِ جِدًّا' [*muḥibbun li-l-ilāhi ǧiddan*]—cf. 1179a24 [569.9] where
the ancient translator gives the accusative ‘مُحِبًّا لِلَّهِ جِدًّا [*muḥib-
ban li-llāhi ǧiddan*]): θεοφιλέστατον K^bLM^b | ἄρα K^bP^bC^c
s.l.L²L^bO^b B^{95sup.}: εἶναι L ‖ **a31** δ᾽ om. K^bO^bM^b | post εὐ-
δαιμονέστατον add. εἶναι s.l.L | ante κἂν add. καὶ M^b

4. *Notes on the text*

1176b17: ἀπασχολάζειν

    I print here the text of L^{b}O^{b}B$^{95sup.}$VM^b, which is ἀπασχολάζειν; P^{b}C^{c}L, in turn, read ἀποσχολάζειν.

    The Arabic translation gives 'يَشْتَغِلُونَ' (*yaštaġilūna*), which may, at first, seem to be ambiguous between the idea of 'busying oneself completely with something' (i.e., being busy with something so as to be diverted from other things) and the idea of 'devoting oneself to something' (i.e., devoting one's free time to something). However, later on, in 1177b4-5, the Arabic version renders ἀσχολούμεθα with the same verb, i.e., 'نَشْتَغِلُ' (*naštaġilu*) (cf. 559.11), which makes a strong case for thinking that 'يَشْتَغِلُونَ' (*yaštaġilūna*) is translating ἀπασχολάζειν and not ἀποσχολάζειν.[38]

    Notwithstanding this, one may think that it is unclear whether ἀποσχολάζειν is a correction of the much rarer ἀπασχολάζειν or if ἀπασχολάζειν is the result of an error of copy. In fact, according to the entry on ἀπασχολάζω in the *DGE*, ἀπασχολάζοντι is reported as a variant in the *apparatus* of a passage from Gregory of Nyssa's *de vita Mosis*, where the editor prints ἀποσχολάζοντι instead.[39]

    In his commentary to 1177b17, Michelet (1848, vol. 2, p. 329) compares the variant readings we find here to those from 1177b33, a passage in which there are three variants: ἀθανατίζειν (attested in K^{b}O^{b}M^b), ἀπαθανατίζειν (attested in P^{b}C^{c}B$^{95sup.}$V and in the margin of O^b), and ἀποθανατίζειν (attested in LL^b). In 1177b33, ἀποθανατίζειν is clearly due to an error of copy by L and L^b. However, this is still not enough to decide whether we should accept ἀπασχολάζειν, for it would be a *hapax legomenon*.[40]

    Despite this difficulty, the agreement between the Arabic translation and the majority of the witnesses of the β family tells strongly in favour of ἀπασχολάζειν. The fact P^b and C^c have

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[38] Besides, Dunlop translates 'يَشْتَغِلُونَ' (*yaštaġilūna*) as 'are occupied with.' Similarly, see Lane and Lane-Poole (1863-1893, s.v. شغل, pp. 1567-1568) (يَشْتَغِلُونَ [*yaštaġilūna*] and نَشْتَغِلُ [*naštaġilu*] come from the Form VIII of this root) and the list of uses of words from the root شغل in the Arabic version of the *EN* made by Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 1, p. 190).

[39] However, according to the *apparatus* of Musurillo's edition, ἀπασχολάζοντι is the text printed by Migne in his 1863 edition and by Fronton le Duc in his edition from 1638, while all other relevant mss. for Musurillo's edition have ἀποσχολάζοντι. It is possible, however, that ἀπασχολάζοντι is a reading found in *recentiores* whose reading is not reported by Musurillo in his *apparatus*.

[40] Unless, of course, it turns out that this is the correct reading for the passage from Gregory of Nyssa I mentioned, in which case there would be at least two occurrences of the verb ἀπασχολάζω in the whole Greek *corpus*.

ἀποσχολάζειν, in turn, could explained as a correction they adopted from L (see footnote 30 on this). Moreover, it should be noted that there are no occurences of the verb ἀποσχολάζω in the extant Greek *corpus* before Aristotle. As a result, although ἀποσχολάζω is also used in some instances indicate that one is devoting oneself to something in a way that implies abandoning some serious pursuit,[41] this use of the verb comes from quite late Greek,[42] and is inconclusive about how Aristotle could be using the word. For these reasons, I have opted for printing ἀπα-σχολάζειν.[43]

1177b3: *πρακτικῶν*

Rassow (1874, p. 70) proposes that one should read *πρακτῶν* here, which is clearly the reading of the *β* family. There is of course some plausibility in reading *πρακτῶν*, for Aristotle's idea in this passage is certainly not that, from practical matters (ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν), something is produced beyond the action, but rather that when we act, we produce something over and above our own action, an idea that can indeed be made explicit by reading *πρακτῶν*. However, not only *πρακτικῶν* is indisputably the reading of the *α* family, but also it can be made sense of very easily if one supplies ἐνεργειῶν with 'ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν,' so that Aristotle would not be talking in general of practical matters, but more specifically about *practical activities*.

Moreover, supplying ἐνεργειῶν here is perfectly justified, since Aristotle was talking about the theoretical activity two lines above, in 'δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθα.' As Rassow himself acknowledges, the referent of αὐτή and αὑτήν in this phrase is something

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[41] I thank one of the anonymous referees for this objection.

[42] According to a search in the LSJ, ἀποσχολάζω is used in this way by Claudius Aelianus, who, according to a search in the TLG, would be the first author to use this verb after Aristotle.

[43] A further consideration that should be made in this discussion, but which I cannot get into here, concerns Aristotle's conception of leisure and his use of the verb σχολάζειν. If it turns out that pastimes such as pleasant amusements are not leisurely on Aristotle's account (that they are not leisurely is suggested by the fact that pastimes consist in ἀνάπαυσις, which is not an end—cf. 1176b35ff), and if Aristotle is consistent in using the verb σχολάζειν to convey the idea that one is not only devoting one's free time to something (in which case the same could be said of ἀποσχολάζειν), but is also engaging in an activity that is leisurely, then ἀπασχολάζειν would seem to give the better reading due to philosophical reasons as well. As a matter of fact, on this scenario, in saying ἀπασχολάζειν, Aristotle would be making a pun. He would be saying that the reason why pastimes such as pleasant amusements are thought (presumably by the many) to be productive of happiness (εὐδαιμονικά) is the fact that people in positions of power spend all their time in activities that turn out to be unleisurely. In other words, Aristotle would be saying that the many think that pastimes such as pleasant amusements are productive of happiness because people in positions of power are unleisurely occupied (ἀπασχολάζειν) with such things (and as Aristotle will go on to say in 1177b4: happiness seems to depend on leisure [δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι]).

like '$\dot{\eta}$ $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\dot{\eta}$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$.'

As a result, supplying $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\hat{\omega}\nu$ with '$\dot{\alpha}\pi\dot{o}$ $\delta\dot{\epsilon}$ $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu$ $\pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\hat{\omega}\nu$' marks a neat contrast between the activity Aristotle was just talking about, which is loved for its own sake alone in that it does not produce anything beyond itself, and the practical activities, which produce something beyond themselves, and thus are not loved for their own sakes alone.

1177b12: $\phi\acute{o}\nu o\varsigma$

The reading of the α family here is undisputedly the singular $\phi\acute{o}\nu o\varsigma$, which is the *lectio difficilior*. One can make sense of the singular if it is not taken as making reference to the killing of a particular person, but as having the more general sense of bloodshed or slaughter, which works well in the context.

1177b20-21: $\check{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\dot{\eta}\nu$ $o\dot{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$

I print here the text transmitted by members of the β family and by P^b and C^c: $\check{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\dot{\eta}\nu$ $o\dot{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$. It is reasonable to assume that this is also the text the Arabic version of the *EN* translates. As a matter of fact, the Arabic translation has the indefinite 'لَذَّةً' (*laḏḏatan*) rendering '$\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\acute{\eta}\nu$.'[44] In that case, the reading we find in K^b could be a corruption.

The addition of $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ (that is found in K^{b}O^{b}M^b)[45] can be easily explained as a gloss that got into the text: the reference to *EN* X.5 1175a30-31 makes it clear that what Aristotle

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[44] I am following here the proposal made by Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 2, p. 265), according to which, in 561.5-6, we should read 'وَأَنَّ لَهُ لَذَّةً' ('*wa-anna lahu laḏḏatan*') instead of 'وَإِنَ لَهُ لَذَّةً' ('*wa-ina lahu laḏḏatun*'), which is the reading printed in Akasoy and Fidora (2005) (they print: 'وإن له لذة'). Although on both readings we have here a nominal phrase (a pleasure <is> proper to them), reading the conjunction 'أَنَّ' (that) instead of 'إِنَ' (if), makes the Arabic version more accurate in that it would be correctly interpreting '$\check{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\dot{\eta}\nu$ $o\dot{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$' as an infinitive clause that depends on $\delta o\kappa\epsilon\hat{\iota}$ (if one reads 'اِنَ' instead, '$\check{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\dot{\eta}\nu$ $o\dot{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$' would be translated as a conditional). Now, although Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 2, p. 265) does indeed give '$\kappa\alpha\grave{\iota}$ $\check{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$ $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\dot{\eta}\nu$ $\kappa\tau\lambda$.' as the lemma 'وَأَنَّ لَهُ لَذَّةً' would be translating, a quick look at his vocabulary of the Arabic translation (cf. Ullmann, 2011-2012, s.v. لَذ, p. 355) shows that, in general, both Eusthatius (*Usṭāṯ*) and *Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn* employ the definite 'اللَذَّة' to translate occurrences of $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\acute{\eta}$ with the definite article and the indefinite 'لَذَّة' to translate occurrences of $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\acute{\eta}$ without the definite article, which is further reason for thinking that the Arabic version is translating here $\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\acute{\eta}$ *without the definite article*.

[45] One could argue that, given that the relevant part of the text here is missing in L due to physical damage, it could also have had $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$. Yet note that the damage begins immediately after '$\check{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$', and that the next line in the ms. begins with '$-\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$' from $o\dot{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$. Besides, while '$\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\dot{\eta}\nu$ $o\dot{\iota}-$' is roughtly the same size of the text that is missing in other lines in which we have about the same amount of damage, '$\dot{\eta}\delta o\nu\dot{\eta}\nu$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ $o\dot{\iota}-$' is perhaps too long for the part of L that is missing, unless, of course, $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ was written above the line. As I take it, all this makes it plausible to assume that L did not have $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$ originally. I thank one of the anonymous referees for pressing me on this issue.

has in mind here is the pleasure proper to an activity that enhances that activity. Yet, because it would be reasonable to assume that the pleasure proper to perfect happiness is perfect as well, it is reasonable that a gloss qualifying the proper pleasure Aristotle is talking about here as 'τελείαν' got into the text at some point. No doubt Aristotle admits the possibility of describing a pleasure as complete or perfect, as is made clear by *EN* X.3 [=Bywater X.4] 1174a14-17. Yet, as the following lines of this passage make clear, Aristotle is not distinguishing between different sorts of pleasure in regard to their completeness or perfectness, but is only pointing out that *every pleasure* is complete in that it is a whole and is not made complete in a strech of time, so that it is not a κίνησις. Accordingly, in the context of 1177b20-21, it would be unclear why Aristotle would be stressing that the pleasure proper to perfect happiness is complete in the sense of 1174a14-17, for every pleasure, even those that are actually base, are also complete in this sense As a result, we have no instance in which Aristotle calls a pleasure τελεία meaning to contrast it with other pleasures that fail to be perfect in that they are not proper to activities that are perfect.[46]

To conclude, although 'τε ... καὶ ... τε' is rare in prose (cf. Kühner-Gerth, 2. T., 2. Bd., §522 Anm. 1, p. 251), it is by no means impossible, and the fact that this is rare adds further plausibility to the hypothesis that the version of the text we find in K^b is corrupted. Perhaps a copyist bothered by the 'τε ... καὶ ... τε' and by the absence of the article with ἡδονήν added a καί before ἔχειν (so that we would have 'τε ... καὶ ... καί,' which is much more common) and changed the τε in 'ἔχειν τε ἡδονήν' into the article τήν that ἡδονήν was allegedly missing.

1178a23: *εἴρηται*

There is no palaeographical justification for printing εἰρήσθω instead of εἴρηται as Bekker and Bywater do. The reasons for emending εἴρηται into εἰρήσθω are purely interpretative: its plausibility is derived from the fact that nowhere in the *EN* Aristotle has talked about the fact that the virtue of νοῦς is separate.[47] But if εἴρηται is taken as making reference to something

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[46] I thank one of the anonymous referees for pressing me about *EN* X.3 [=Bywater X.4] 1174a14-17.

[47] This is not the only way of construing the phrase 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ.' It is also possible to supply ἐνέργεια (as is done by Broadie and Rowe in their translation, for instance) or εὐδαιμονία (as is done by the Arabic translation, and, more recently, by Rackham in his translation). The latter expression (i.e., 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ⟨εὐδαιμονία⟩') is unheard of. Nowhere Aristotle talks of the happiness of νοῦς. The closest he comes to that is in 1178a6-7, in which he talks of 'ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος', and in 1178a21-22 (immediately before Aristotle says 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ'), in which he talks about the life and the happiness on the basis of the human virtues (καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία). Alternatively, one could take their cue from Michael of Ephesus, who paraphrases 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ' as 'ἡ νοερὰ ζωή' (*CAG.* XX, p. 595.21ff), and argue

that Aristotle says in another work, then this reading becomes perfectly justifiable from the interpretative point of view.

Earlier in *EN* X, in 1177a18, Aristotle says that 'it was said [εἴρηται] that <this activity> [sc. the activity with which perfect happiness is identified] is theoretical,' but nowhere in the *EN* one can find an explicit claim to this effect—although of course *EN* VI.13 may give one some elements necessary to draw this conclusion. A way out of this difficulty consists in taking the εἴρηται from 1177a18 as also making reference to some work different from the *EN* (and the most plausible candidate here is the *Protrepticus*, where Aristotle does indeed offer us an argument in defence of contemplation as our best and most authoritative activity).

If this is correct, when in 1178a23 Aristotle justifies the explanation he gave to the claim that the virtue of νοῦς is separate (which explanation consisted in saying that 'so much was said about it [sc. about the virtue of νοῦς]') by saying that 'διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν,' he means that it suffices to say here that this claim was established elsewhere because grounding this claim lies outside the scope of the present treatise. In other words, he would not be explaining why so much was said elsewhere about the virtue of νοῦς, but would be providing us with an explanation for why *this* (sc. the claim that so much was said elsewhere about the virtue of νοῦς) is all he has to say here to justify the claim that the virtue of νοῦς is separate.[48] To put it differently, the γάρ here is not explaining what has been said, but is conveying 'the motive for saying that which has just been said' (cf. Denniston, 1954, s.v. γάρ, III.(1), p. 60).

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that one should rather supply ζωή with 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ'. Now, although I concede this would make better sense (since there is nothing weird in talking of a life of the νοῦς), nothing in the context suggests that ζωή should be supplied here. As I take it, 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ <ἀρετή>' works better. Now, one may still argue that supplying ἐνέργεια (which is indeed possible given the context) has the advantage of establishing a clear contrast with the activities Aristotle was talking about at the beginning of the chapter: the activities on the basis of the other virtue, which were said to be human in 1178a9-10 (αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί). In that case, Aristotle would be contrasting merely human activities, which are necessarily connected to the body, with the activity of νοῦς, which is separate. However, if we supply ἀρετή with 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ', we have an even clearer contrast: 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ <ἀρετή>' would be contrasted with 'αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταί' from 1178a20-21. Moreover, supplying ἀρετή allows us to understand without difficulties the contrast made in 1178a24-25, a passage in which 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ' [which must be supplied] is said to need external goods to a smaller extent than 'τῆς ἠθικῆς,' which is presumably 'τῆς ἠθικῆς <ἀρετῆς>.'

[48] In the face of this, one may argue that it is after all better to supply ἐνέργεια with 'ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ,' since Aristotle never talks explicitly of the virtue of νοῦς as being separate from the body in other places. However, if it is uncontroversial that νοῦς and its activity are separate from the body, it is reasonable to assume that its virtue too would be separate. Accordingly, the claim that the virtue of νοῦς is separate may count as something that was said elsewhere in that it is a corollary of things Aristotle says elsewhere about νοῦς and its activity.

1178a23: διακριβῶσαι

The agreement between Kᵇ, Pᵇ, and Cᶜ suggests that the reading of the α family is ἀκρι-
βῶσαι. However, as was already made clear by Stewart (1892, vol. 2, p. 453), it is probable that
Kᵇ (and thus also Pᵇ and Cᶜ) omit 'ΔI-' (from διακριβῶσαι) due to the immediately preceding
'-AI' from εἴρηται, which, as we saw, is attested by all extant mss. Accordingly, here we have
a clear case in which the text from witnesses of the α family is corrupt, and in which Pᵇ and Cᶜ
share an error with Kᵇ.[49]

1178b12-13: ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους ... ὅτι καλόν;

These lines have for long caused discomfort.

A first source of worry is the adjective ἀνδρείους (nom. sg. ἀνδρεῖος), which is not clearly
attested as a two ending adjective, but only as a three ending adjective. It is used as a two
ending adjective in the anonymous scholia to *EN* III.11 [=Bywater III.8] 1116b30ff, in which
one reads 'εἰπὼν ὅτι καί αἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς κτλ.' (*CAG.* XX, p. 166.13), which seems to be
a claim about courageous actions. Yet this could be a mistake in Hayduck's edition, since in the
sequence it seems clear that Michael of Ephesus is explaining how exaclty θυμός is involved
when courageou agents act (their performance of courageous actions is not motivated by θυμός),
in which case one could think that 'εἰπὼν ὅτι καί αἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς κτλ.' should be rather
'εἰπὼν ὅτι καί **οἱ** ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς κτλ.' In any case, the fact that in the lines following
1178b12-13 Aristotle uses the adjective ἐλευθερίους (nom. sg. ἐλευθέριος), which is well attested
as a two ending adjective, makes it plausible that Aristotle is using the adjective ἀνδρείους as a
two ending adjective here.

A second, and more concerning, source of worry are the participles in the masculine
accusative plural that are attested by almost all mss., with the exception of Kᵇ (which gives
the first participle in the nominative, and the second one in the accusative, which clearly does
not make much sense). If we read the participles in the accusative, then it seems that the only
explanation one could give is to say that they were attracted from the dative to the accusative.
In that case, Aristotle would mean something like: 'ἀλλὰ ⟨ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς⟩ τὰς ἀν-

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[49] What the Arabic translation is translating here is unclear. It reads 'to examine' (اَلْفَحَص), which could be
translating either ἀκριβῶσαι or διακριβῶσαι (for the uses of words from the root فحص by the translators
of the Arabic version to render words from the same semantic field—such as σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον,
ἐπισκεψώμεθα, ἐπιβλέψειε etc.—, see Ullmann [2011-2012, vol. 1, s.v. فحص, pp. 271-272]). In any
case, it is probable that the omission of 'ΔI-' only took place when the majuscule was transcribed into
miniscule, in which case the original the Arabic version is translating would be free of this error.

δρείους, ὑπομενόντοις τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνευόντοις ὅτι καλόν;' but the participles ended up the accusative due to some sort of case attraction (ἀλλὰ ⟨ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς⟩ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν;). This could make good sense of the text if the participles are read as conveying the false assumption that may lead one to attribute courageous actions to the gods (so read, the text could be rendered as 'or <should we assign them> courageous actions, under the assumption that they withstand fearful things and face danger because it is fine?')

No doubt cases of attraction of the participle are somewhat common with copulative verbs (cf. Kühner-Gerth , 2. T., 1. Bd., §369 3.b), pp. 75-76) and occur a couple of times in Aristotle.[50] However, not only ἀπονέμω is not being used here as a copulative verb, but also the participles in this phrase would be attracted in case only, something different from what we see in cases where a participle is attracted by a predicate of its subject (where it is attracted in gender as well).

In the face of this, there seem to be three reasonable alternatives:

The first one is to follow Bywater (1892, p. 69) and to emend the whole passage. Bywater proposes changing ἀνδρείους into the genitive ἀνδρείου, and then changing the participles to the genitive accordingly. In that case, Aristotle would be giving another unsatisfactory answer to the question about what actions we should attribute to the gods by asking: 'should we attribute to them the actions of the courageous person, who withstands fearful things and faces danger because it is fine to do so?' (ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείου ὑπομενόντου τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντος ὅτι καλόν;).

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[50] The clearest case of this is perhaps *Pol.* II.5 1263b36-37, a passage in which Aristotle writes 'ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὂν ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν κοινήν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν' and the subject of the participle 'ὂν' that is being here identified with a multitude is clearly πόλιν, which is also object of the infinitive ποιεῖν. In fact, earlier, in *Pol.* II.2 1261a18, Aristotle said that the city is, in its nature, a sort of multitude. As a result, Aristotle is here saying that, because the city is a multitude, it must be made common and one by means of education (on this use of διά + acc., see Eucken [1868, p. 39]). A more controversial example of this sort of attraction is *EE* II.6 1222b18, where (reading the text of the mss.) Aristotle writes 'καὶ ζῷον ὂν ὅλως ζῷα,' and the context makes clear that the subject of the neuter participle ὂν must be ἄνθρωπος. Albeit this passage is emended by all editors of the *EE*, it can be made sense of without any emendation if ὂν is in the neuter due to being attracted by ζῷον, which would be a predicate of the subject ἄνθρωπος (*pace* Rowe [2023, p. 41], who thinks that '[t]he MSS' ὂν has no observable function'). Accordingly, in its context, the text could be rendered as: 'a man <begets> men (and in so far as <man> is, in general [i.e., in regard to its genus], an animal, <he begets> animals) and a plant <beget> plants' (ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷον ὂν ὅλως ζῷα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά). Although this is a bit harsh in that 'καὶ ζῷον ὂν ὅλως ζῷα' would be somehow interrupting the argument (since 'καὶ φυτὸν φυτά' could hardly be taken as saying that 'in so far as <man> is a plant <he begets> plants'), I would like to argue that this reading is nevertheless gramatically possible. I thank one of the anonymous referees for pressing me on this.

The problem with this first alternative is that it construes Aristotle's claim in such a way that he would be offering us no reason for rejecting this answer. Yet all other possible answers Aristotle gives us in his argument are accompanied by the reasons for rejecting them.[51]

The second alternative would be to change the participles to the dative and to understand them in the same way I proposed above (i.e., as conveying the false assumption that may motivate one to attribute courageous actions to the gods). This makes perfect sense of the text and is justifiable if indeed we got the accusatives due to assimilation with the accusative $\dot{a}\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}ous$ (which a copyist may have taken as a masculine accusative). However, this does not explain how we got the text from K[b], which has a nominative participle and an accusative participle.

This leads me to my third alternative, which is the one I favoured. It consists in reading the nominative $\dot{\upsilon}\pi o\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu o\nu\tau\epsilon s$ that is attested in K[b] (instead of $\dot{\upsilon}\pi o\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu o\nu\tau as$, which is attested by all other mss.) and emending $\kappa\iota\nu\delta\upsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}o\nu\tau as$ into $\kappa\iota\nu\delta\upsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}o\nu\tau\epsilon s$ (cf. Burnet, 1900, p. 450). In that case, if one reads what Aristotle is saying here in light of what he just said about just actions, it seems that there is clearly something missing between '$\dot{a}\lambda\lambda\grave{a}$ $\tau\grave{a}s$ $\dot{a}\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}ous$' and '$\dot{\upsilon}\pi o\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu o\nu\tau\epsilon s$ $\tau\grave{a}$ $\phi o\beta\epsilon\rho\grave{a}$ $\kappa a\grave{\iota}$ $\kappa\iota\nu\delta\upsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}o\nu\tau\epsilon s$ $\ddot{o}\tau\iota$ $\kappa a\lambda\acute{o}\nu$;'. Whether we should insert '$\mathring{\eta}$ $\gamma\epsilon\lambda o\hat{\iota}o\iota$ $\phi a\nu o\hat{\upsilon}\nu\tau a\iota$' or merely '$\mathring{\eta}$' (in which case one could easily supply '$\gamma\epsilon\lambda o\hat{\iota}o\iota$ $\phi a\nu o\hat{\upsilon}\nu\tau a\iota$') is not so clear at first. However, the latter alternative (inserting '$\mathring{\eta}$') is not only more economical, but also quite easy to explain. In fact, not only K[b] omitted the '$\mathring{\eta}$' before '$\gamma\epsilon\lambda o\hat{\iota}o\iota$ $\phi a\nu o\hat{\upsilon}\nu\tau a\iota$' in Aristotle's previous example (the one concerning just actions), but also '$\mathring{\eta}$' and the '$\dot{\upsilon}$-' from $\dot{\upsilon}\pi o\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu o\nu\tau\epsilon s$ would be pronounced in the same way as a result of iotacism, which makes it even more plausible to think that a '$\mathring{\eta}$' between '$\dot{a}\lambda\lambda\grave{a}$ $\tau\grave{a}s$ $\dot{a}\nu\delta\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}ous$' and '$\dot{\upsilon}\pi o\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu o\nu\tau\epsilon s$ ... $\ddot{o}\tau\iota$ $\kappa a\lambda\acute{o}\nu$;' was omitted, and that we must emend the text adding it back (as I did).

In that case, just like he did in the case of just actions, Aristotle would be first asking whether we should assign courageous actions to the gods, and would then give us a reason for rejecting this: the gods would appear ridiculous withstanding fearful things and facing danger because it is fine to do so.

1178b15: $a\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho o\nu\epsilon s$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\mathring{a}\nu$ $\epsilon\mathring{\iota}\epsilon\nu$;

K[b], which reads $\epsilon\mathring{\iota}$ here, seemingly agrees with the Arabic translation, which is perhaps reason for thinking that $\epsilon\mathring{\iota}$ is the reading of the a family. With this text, Aristotle would mean

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[51] The only exception to this pattern would be 1178b15 '$a\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho o\nu\epsilon s$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\mathring{a}\nu$ $\epsilon\mathring{\iota}\epsilon\nu$;', where, on my reading, Aristotle is just giving us a reason for not attributing temperate actions to the gods, without first asking whether we should attribute temperate actions to them. See below the discussion of 1178b15.

something like: '*εἰ δὲ σώφρονες* ⟨*πράξεις ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς*⟩ *τί ἂν εἶεν*;', which could be rendered as 'and if one must assign them temperate actions, what would ⟨these actions⟩ be?,' which is reasonably intelligible, despite breaking the pattern set by the previous answers, in which Aristotle always used definite articles (cf. 1178b10-11 '*τὰς δικαίας*'; 1178b12 '*τὰς ἀνδρείους*'; and 1178b14 '*τὰς ἐλευθερίους*').

However, although it is true that the Arabic translation does render this sentence from 1178b15 as a conditional—it renders it as 'and if temperate actions are attributed to them' (565.15: وَإِنْ نُسِبَ إِلَيْهِمُ الْأَفْعَالُ الْعَفِّيَّةُ)—, it not only has a definite article with 'temperate actions' (الْأَفْعَالُ الْعَفِّيَّةُ), but it also rendered the other answers Aristotle gave previously in the form of conditional clauses. In 1178b10-11, '*πότερα τὰς δικαίας*;' is rendered as 'if just acts are attributed to them' (565.11: إِنْ نُسِبَ إِلَيْهِمُ الْعَدْلِيَّةُ); and in 1178b12, '*ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους*' is rendered as 'and if courageous actions are attributed to them' (565.12-13: وَإِنْ نُسِبَ إِلَيْهِمُ الْأَفْعَالُ النَّجْدِيَّةُ).[52] Thus, it would also be plausible to think that the original that the Arabic version is translating has rather '*αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν*;' and that this is being read in light of Aristotle's previous examples, so that although we have a nominative here (and not an accusative), this phrase is understood as conveying the same thought as Aristotle's previous answers.[53]

Now, given that the Arabic translation cannot be decisive here, and that, if we read '*εἰ δὲ σώφρονες κτλ*.,' the absence of the definite article may indeed cause some concern, I chose to print '*αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν*;.' With this text, Aristotle would be using a construction different from the ones he used in his previous answers. He would not be explicitly considering the option according to which one should assign to the gods temperate actions, but would be directly asking what their temperate actions would be (the nominative here would be an 'independent nominative,' which is expected given that it functions as the theme of the sentence).

Alternatively, one could follow Michelet (1848, vol. 2, p. 334) and argue that '*εἰ δὲ σώφρονες κτλ*.' is talking about the gods themselves, and not about their actions. This gains some plausibility if one also follows the *editio Aldina* in changing the feminine accusative plural article *τάς* from 1178b12 (*ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους*) into the masculine accusative plural *τούς* (as Michelet himself does). Albeit this reading would make better sense of the absence of the article

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[52] The Arabic translation does not translate '*ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους*' in the same way because it misconstrues '*ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν*;', taking '*ὅτι καλόν ... δώσουσιν*' as a single frase (on this, see Akasoy & Fidora [p. 564n186]). Yet even so it construes this phrase as a conditional: 'and if it is good that etc.' (565.13: وَإِنْ كَانَ جَيِّدًا أَنْ).

[53] The fact that the Arabic translation renders all Aristotle's answers here in the passive voice may be taken as adding further plausibility to this alternative.

with σώφρονες, it is far from clear, in the context, what should be supplied with '*εἰ δὲ σώφρονες κτλ.*,', since Aristotle has been talking of attributing actions to the gods in all his previous answers (the only exception would be 1178b12 read as Michelet wants to read it). The only plausible candidate is the verb *ὑπειλήφαμεν*, which appears in 1178b8-9, right before Aristotle introduces his question about what sorts of actions we should attribute to the gods. In that case, '*εἰ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν;*' could be construed as asking: 'But if <we consider the gods to be> temperate, why would they be <so>?'

Notwithstanding this, unless one emends the whole passage from 1178b10-16—so that Aristotle would be talking of considering the gods to be just, courageous, generous, and, finally, temperate[54], in which case it would be natural to supply *ὑπειλήφαμεν* in all his questions—, it seems much more plausible to think that, throughout lines 1178b10-16, Aristotle is testing possible answers to the question he raised in 1178b10 (*πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς;*), and that, in doing so, he is showing that all these answers turn out to be unsatisfactory (as the generalization from lines 1178b17-18 suggests).

1179a3-4: *οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις*

The text printed by Bekker, Susemihl and Bywater here is the one attested by Kᵇ: '*οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις.*' Similarly, in Averroes's *Middle Commentary*, one reads something that supposes the original '*οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις*'[55], also without '*οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις.*' The text I printed, in turn, is '*οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις,*' which is attested by OᵇMᵇ and by the Arabic translation. There is another variant here, attested by PᵇCᶜ and by LLᵇB⁹⁵ˢᵘᵖ·: '*οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις.*' There are two separate questions to be addressed here, then. First, whether we should read '*ἡ κρίσις*' or not. Second, whether we should read the plural '*αἱ πράξεις*' or the singular '*ἡ πρᾶξις.*'

Let me begin with the first question.

Now, '*ἡ κρίσις*' is clearly the *lectio difficilior*, since it is far from clear what it means, and

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[54] As the *editio Aldina* seems happy to do, since, as a matter of fact, it changes all feminine accusative plural articles in this argument into masculine accusative plural articles.

[55] *Pace* Woerther (2018, p. 219n335), who considers the possibility that Averroes '*ait dépendu d'une version arabe qui traduisant uniquement la leçon πρᾶξις (dépourvue de la mention d'une ou des actions)*,' despite the fact that *in operationibus* seems to translate a plural. Perhaps Woerther was lead to say this because the text of Averroes agrees with the manuscript tradition that has the singular '*οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις*' in that his text also does not mention '*οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις.*' However, if, as I shall suggest bellow (cf. footnote 62), we take Averroes's text as either depending on a copy of the same Arabic translation we have in the Fez ms., but which has a corruption here or as being itself corrupted here (so that the version that was translated into Latin was already corrupted), there is no need to assume that the Arabic version of Aristotle's text Averroes's depends on had something equivalent to the singular '*οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις.*'

it could hardly be explained as gloss that got into the text.[56] Michael of Ephesus understands this as spelling out the sense in which self-sufficiency ('τὸ αὔταρκες') does not depend on excess. On his reading, the idea is that it does not depend on excess in that neither the judgment to the effect that one is self-sufficient nor the actions expressive of self-sufficiency depend on excess (*CAG.* XX, p. 601.16-20). But this is perhaps a bit far-fetched.[57]

A more plausible alternative would be to take 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις' or 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις' as covering two domains in which self-sufficiency does not depend on excess. Yet the question concerning the meaning of 'ἡ κρίσις' remains.

A first way of making sense of 'ἡ κρίσις' on this reading is to say that it refers to theoretical thinking[58], in which case it is being contrasted with 'ἡ πρᾶξις' or 'αἱ πράξεις,' which clearly makes reference to the practical domain. Yet I think it would be somewhat surprising if 'ἡ κρίσις' is picking up only theoretical judgments. In fact, if this were the point Aristotle wants to make, one would expect him to have written 'ἡ γνῶσις' instead, like in 1095a5-6, where he says that the end of ethics is not knowledge, but action (τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις).

A second way of making sense 'ἡ κρίσις' is suggested by *EE* VII.12 1244b19-20, where Aristotle says that 'we have better judgment when we are self-sufficient than when we are in need' (ἀμείνω δ' ἔχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετ' ἐνδείας). In the context of this passage, Aristotle clearly has practical judgment in mind, since the idea is that when we are self-sufficient our judgments about the choiceworthiness of our friends are not distorted.

Accordingly, a better way of making sense of 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις' or 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις, οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις' would be to say that Aristotle's claim is that self-sufficiency does not depend on excess, and thus that neither our judgment (presumably our *right* judgment *in practical matters*)[59] nor our action(s) (presumably our *right* action[s]) depend on excess, which would be something expected if self-sufficiency depended on excess, since the rightness of both

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[56] *Pace* Woerther (2018, p. 219n335), who considers the possibility that the fact that the Arabic version found in the Fez ms. has something translating 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις' may be due to contamination from a gloss.
[57] No doubt Aristotle will talk of 'judging by means of the external goods' below in 1179a15-16. Yet not only this is meant as a critique of the many, but also the point in this passage is that, to the many, the person who is happy according to Anaxagoras's standards would seem to be strange because the many judge what people are like by reference to their external goods, which is the only thing they see. Accordingly, 1179a15-16 seems to strengthen the assumption that the kind of judgment Aristotle has in mind in the argument from lines 1179a1ff is a judgment about practical matters, as I shall suggest below.
[58] On this reading, it 'ἡ κρίσις' would be picking up 'τὸ θεωρεῖν' from 1178b34.
[59] Alternatively, one could argue that 'ἡ κρίσις' can refer to judgments that are either practical or theoretical. However, given that Aristotle contrasts the claim he makes about self-sufficiency here with a claim about the possibility of doing fine things without ruling the land and the seas, there is good reason for thinking that with 'ἡ κρίσις' he has in mind judgments about practical matters.

our practical judgment and of our action(s) is dependent upon self-sufficiency.

It may be objected that there is no room for practical or theoretical judgment in the argument from 1179a3-5 in so far as Aristotle's point here is merely that one does not need to rule over land and sea in order to perform fine actions.[60] Yet not only, as we saw, there are strong textual reasons for reading the text with 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις' (which could hardly be explained away as a gloss, and is thus the *lectio difficilior*), but also if 'ἡ κρίσις' is taken as making reference to practical judgment, its mention may not be out of place after all. Aristotle explains the claim that it is possible perform fine actions without ruling land and sea by saying that one can act on the basis of virtue (κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν) with moderate resources. Accordingly, although he is not talking explicitly about right judgment (be it practical or theoretical), it may nevertheless be the case that practical judgment is also in question in his argument, since acting on the basis of virtue depends on right reason.

Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις' is absent from the text of K^b either due to homeoteleuton or due to homeoarcton. Similarly, one could argue that the Arabic version of the *EN* Averroes is using (or that the original Arabic text of Averroes that his Medieval translators had access to) did not have something translating 'οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις' due to the latter phenomenon: i.e., the original 'وَلَا ٱلْقَضَاءُ وَلَا ٱلْأَعْمَالُ' (*wa-lā l-qaḍāʾu wa-lā l-aʿmālu*) was corrupted into 'وَلَا ٱلْأَعْمَالُ' (*wa-lā l-aʿmālu*).[61] Besides, the absence of vocalizations probably led what was meant to be the nominative 'وَلَا ٱلْأَعْمَالُ' (*wa-lā l-aʿmālu*) translating 'αἱ πράξεις' to be read as a genitive (i.e., 'وَلَا ٱلْأَعْمَالِ' [*wa-lā l-aʿmāli*]) governed by the preposition 'فِي' (*fī*) from 'فِي ٱلْإِشْرَافِ' (*fī l-isrāfi*), which immediately precedes 'وَلَا ٱلْقَضَاءُ وَلَا ٱلْأَعْمَالُ' (cf. 567.12) in the Arabic translation (which would explain why the Latin version of Averroes's text has '*in operationibus*').[62]

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[60] I thank one of the anonymous referees for this objection.

[61] On omissions as the most frequent errors in Arabic mss., see Gacek (2007, p. 222).

[62] This suggests that Averroes may perhaps be using a different version of the same text we have in the Fez ms. or that Averroes's own text was corrupted before being translated. As a matter of fact, as Woerther (2018, p. 319n335) shows, Averroes paraphrases what we would expect to be 'ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ' as '*in honoribus*,' which supposes the original 'فِي ٱلْأَشْرَافِ' (*fī l-ašrāfi*), which, as she argues, can be easily explained as being due to a mistake in reading 'فِي ٱلْإِشْرَافِ' (*fī l-isrāfi*). Besides, although Akasoy & Fidora print 'فِي ٱلْإِشْرَافِ' (*fī l-isrāfi*) in 567.12 (which would be an accurate translation for 'ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ'), this is, as their *apparatus* makes clear, a correction due to Badawi and that can be supported on the basis of Dunlop's translation. In fact, according to the *apparatus* from Akasoy & Fidora, the Fez ms. actually reads 'فِي ٱلْإِشْرَافِ' (*fī l-išrāfi*) (see Ullmann [vol. 1, p. 187] for other occurrences of words from the root شرف), which is even easier to mistake for 'فِي ٱلْأَشْرَافِ' (*fī l-ašrāfi*). Moreover, as Woerther (2018, p. 97) observes, there are instances in which it seems that Averroes is using a version of the Arabic translation that preserves things that are absent from the text in the Fez ms. (as in 1155a16-20, where the Arabic

The second question, namely whether we should read 'ἡ πρᾶξις' or 'αἱ πράξεις,' is not as pressing. In any case, it is hard to decide which one is the original here, since corruption would be possible in either direction.[63] But because the plural 'αἱ πράξεις' makes better sense of the argument, I have given preference to this reading. However, the argument can be construed in the same way if one reads the singular 'ἡ πρᾶξις.'

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version does not have anything translating 'καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων,' while Averroes's text has '*sed etiam in pluribus animalium*'). On the *lacunae* of the exemplar of the Fez ms., see also Ullmann (2011-2012, vol. 2, p. 124). Thus, nothing hinders the possibility that the Arabic version of the text used by Averroes has corruptions that are absent from the text of the Fez ms. (and vice versa), or maybe also that the original Arabic of Averroes commentary was corrupted before being translated (which would also explain why its Hebrew translation commits the same mistake as its Latin version in translating 'ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ', as Woerther reports).

[63] According to Allen (1987, pp. 69-75, 78–79), after the 3th century CE, both 'η' and the diphthong 'ει' were pronounced as iota (i.e., [i]), and the diphthong 'αι' was pronounced as a close-mid 'e' (i.e., [e]). In that case, it seems that it would not be difficult to mistake 'ἡ πρᾶξις' for 'αἱ πράξεις' or to mistake 'αἱ πράξεις' for 'ἡ πρᾶξις' when these words were read aloud, since they would only differ in how the definite article was pronounced.

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The Appeal to Nature in Cicero's *De finibus*

Kelsey Ward

This article argues that Cicero uses two connected strategies to reject the fundamental appeal to nature (or "cradle argument") used by Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians in *De finibus*. The first strategy is his direct criticism of the different cradle arguments. Cicero's criticisms of the Epicurean cradle argument imply two criteria that any strong appeal to nature must meet. On the basis of these criteria, Cicero rejects Epicurean and Stoic cradle arguments but not necessarily the Antiochian one. The second strategy utilizes a strong education theme over the course of the text to emphasize a telic sense of "nature" over a biological or given sense of "nature". This shift both allows Cicero to make an appeal to nature that meets the two criteria set out by his first strategy and allows him to reject *any* cradle argument, including the Antiochian one. The two strategies together allow Cicero to make an appeal to "nature" that, in avoiding the "cradle", is more sound than those of his philosophical rivals.

Introduction

When Cicero examines the varied versions of cradle arguments that appear in *De finibus*, he finds much to criticize. Though he rejects these attempts to discern our proper ethical ends from the earliest inclinations of newborn animals, he nevertheless accepts that human beings should adopt ends for themselves that are consistent with, and perfections of, human nature. I argue that Cicero uses two connected argumentative strategies to create an appeal to nature that overcomes some basic problems he finds in the cradle arguments used by Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians. The first strategy criticizes the different cradle arguments directly, by which Cicero establishes two negative criteria for any appeal to nature. These criteria indicate what to avoid in arguing for a highest moral end or *summum bonum*. The first criterion is that an appeal to nature must select a *summum bonum* appropriate for human adults, which is implied when Cicero critiques the cradle arguments for selecting ends that do not suit human beings.[1] On Cicero's reading, cradle arguments fail because a *summum bonum* worthy

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[1] Cradle arguments refer to newborn animals, i.e., they are not limited to human beings. That Cicero emphasizes human beings and ignores nonhuman nature indicates that he is not merely reporting cradle arguments but rather is using them to serve some purpose. Because Cicero focuses on human beings when he discusses cradle arguments in *De finibus*, this paper does as well. For clarity, I use the term "newborn" to describe human and nonhuman animals that have just come to be and "infant" to refer to human newborns in particular.

of human beings cannot be appropriately derived from a newborn's inclinations. From this critique, the second criterion becomes clear: the point of origin to which the appeal is made must have a plausible connection to the *summum bonum*. That is, Cicero presents his Epicurean and Stoic rivals as missing a crucial connection between "nature" as what is necessary, given, and an origin with "nature" as a fulfillment, a telos, and end. This first strategy clearly eliminates the Epicurean and Stoic cradle arguments. The Antiochian one is also criticized more subtly than the others. As a result, it may seem plausible that Cicero either adopts this position himself or that he at least considers it to be a strong position that is worthy of further consideration, particularly in contrast with his categorical rejection of the other schools.[2]

Cicero's second strategy, however, leads us away from accepting any established cradle argument, including the Antiochian one. This strategy develops a rich theme of education and emphasizes an appeal to the telic sense of "nature". In sum, the strength of the arguments presented correlates directly with the emphasis on education in each dialogue: the seemingly weakest cradle argument is the least invested in education; the second best cradle argument takes education seriously but is nevertheless misguided; the strongest cradle argument is completely centered on education and nearly meets Cicero's criticisms. Rather than seek ethical direction in some biological origin as cradle arguments do, Cicero appeals to human nature and its *summum bonum* as it appears during philosophical education. This education facilitates the selection of suitable ends for living well, and it plausibly connects one's ethical origins in education with one's *summum bonum*. Cicero's appeal to education, then, is the best way to meet both criteria for a strong appeal to nature. Whereas the cradle arguments rely too much on given nature and too little on telic nature, Cicero's own emphasis on education and telic nature amounts to a new appeal to "nature" that, in avoiding the "cradle", is more sound than those of his philosophical rivals.

I. *Cicero's First Strategy, or How Not to Appeal to Nature*

Cicero implies that appeals to nature ought to meet two main criteria through his critique of the Epicurean, Stoic, and Antiochian (or Old Academic) cradle arguments. The first is that an appeal to nature must choose an end or *summum bonum* suitable for human beings;

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[2] The philosophical depth and respectability of the theories presented increases over the course of *De finibus*, the interpretation of which continues to be the subject of much debate: Cicero could be agreeing with Antiochus (Tsouni 2012, 32), agreeing with Piso (Schofield 2012, 246), agreeing with the Academic tradition (Long 2015, 195), or synthesizing his own position through Piso (Inwood 2014, 72).

the second is that this appropriate end must adequately and plausibly connect to the origins identified in the nature to which one appeals. In this section, I argue that Cicero finds all three schools presented in *De finibus* lacking in one or both criteria. I first show in some detail how Cicero might derive these criteria through his criticism of the Epicurean position. I then argue that Cicero's application of these criteria to the Stoic and Antiochian positions show that these schools fare better than the Epicurean one but nevertheless fail to meet those criteria to different degrees.

I.1 *Making an example of the Epicurean cradle argument*

According to Lucius Torquatus, who presents the Epicurean position in book 1, the Epicurean cradle argument claims that "Every animal as soon as it is born seeks pleasure and rejoices in it, while shunning pain and avoiding it as much as possible" (i 30). Because pleasure is the observed *summum bonum* for newborns and because newborn natures are considered uncorrupted, the argument goes, pleasure is also the proper end for humans in maturity. Yet there are two senses of "pleasure" at play in the argument.[3] Torquatus, initially unaware that articulating the distinction between them would be necessary, explains the two are completely different kinds (*immo alio genere*): "A quenched thirst is a 'static' pleasure, whereas the pleasure of having one's thirst quenched is 'kinetic' (*restincta enim sitis stabilitatem voluputatis habet…illa autem voluptas ipsius restinctionis in motu est*)" (ii 9). In short, "static" pleasure is the absence of pain and *summum bonum* for Epicureans, whereas "kinetic" pleasure reflects the commonly held view of pleasure, namely sensory delight.[4]

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[3] Torquatus notes in i 38 that "Epicurus did not hold that there was some halfway state between pain and pleasure. Rather, that very state which some deem halfway, namely the absence of pain, he held to be not only true pleasure, but the highest pleasure. Now whoever is to any degree conscious of how he is feeling must to that extent be either in pleasure or pain. But Epicurus thinks that the absence of all pain constitutes the upper limit of pleasure. Beyond that limit pleasure can vary and be of different kinds, but it cannot be increased or expanded" (*Itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum quod quibusdam medium videretur, cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse verum etiam summam voluptatem. Quisquis enim sentit quem ad modum sit adfectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. Omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit*). Though the distinction between static and kinetic pleasures is implied here and used in Torquatus' exposition, he does not make the distinction explicit with specialized vocabulary until he is pressed by Cicero's character at ii 5-9.

[4] Torquatus also briefly distinguishes between desires that are (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural but not necessary, and (3) neither natural nor necessary in order to clarify the compatibility of pursuing pleasure and living in accordance with nature (i 45). Though this categorization of desire is important for Epicureanism—and Torquatus sticks closely to the *Principal Doctrines* through i 40-46—its role in the cradle argument is not emphasized in *De finibus*.

Cicero's objections to the Epicurean cradle argument return to the Epicurean understanding of pleasure and the connection between static and kinetic pleasures. On his view, the Epicureans observe inclinations for kinetic pleasures in young animals and newborns. From these observations they conclude that "pleasure" is the proper end for them—but in the case of humans and perhaps other mature animals, that pleasure is purported to be static, not kinetic (ii 31).[5] Cicero introduces two main arguments against this position. First, he argues that the Epicureans do not really understand pleasure without reference to the body, i.e. without kinetic pleasure.[6] This means that the *summum bonum* is dependent on, and perhaps nothing more than, kinetic pleasure. The common, kinetic understanding of "pleasure" amounts to sensory delight through the body, most often in the form of some discernible action or event like quenching one's thirst.[7] Cicero maintains that taking this sense of pleasure to be the *summum bonum* could never build a strong ethical system because it undervalues virtue. If pleasure is the ultimate good, then we have no reason to endure hardship or suffer for a greater cause or purpose like preserving the freedom of one's fellow citizens—for there is no greater cause or purpose than the sensory delight we perceive through our bodies (ii 113-118). Second, Cicero

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[5] Rist 1972 notes that Cicero gives the Epicurean argument an absurd form: "since the natural impulses of children and animals are directed towards kinetic pleasure, therefore *katastematic* pleasure is the *summum bonum*" (106). Cicero does not always aim to be accurate or fair in his presentation of his rivals. He has a well-documented habit of misrepresenting them: Rist 1972 argues that Cicero completely misrepresents Epicureanism; Gosling and Taylor 1982 argue for the softer position that Cicero underestimates Epicurus and his followers; Stokes 1995 allows that Cicero misrepresents Epicurus' position but emphasizes that "one ought to characterize as justly as possible Cicero's way of arriving at such an interpretation" (147); Warren 2016 and Frede 2016 both admit Cicero's treatment of Epicureanism is unfair but maintain that his criticisms focus on important problems in their philosophy; Morel 2016 also admits unfairness and interestingly argues that Cicero's portrayal of Epicureanism is a carefully engineered foil to his own concept of virtue as intrinsically good. Following these analyses, I suppose that Cicero's misrepresentation of Epicureanism serves a further purpose. In the context of this article, I maintain that this purpose is to reveal the negative criteria for a good appeal to nature.

[6] Cicero introduces this criticism at the beginning of book 1, noting that for Epicureans "happiness— that is, pleasure—consists in performing right and moral actions for their own sake. These good people fail to realize that if this were so then the whole theory is undermined. For once it is conceded that such activities are immediately pleasant in themselves, without reference to the body, then virtue and knowledge will turn out to be desirable in themselves, and that is something which Epicurus would utterly reject" (i 25). From the beginning, then, there are two problems to anticipate: (1) Epicureans cannot reconcile moral actions for their own sake with pleasure as their *summum bonum*, and (2) Epicureans do not accept pleasure without reference to the body. Both are reflected in Cicero's criticism of the cradle argument Torquatus presents.

[7] This is a misrepresentation on Cicero's part. as the Epicureans do not say that pleasure—even kinetic pleasure—is delight of the body. Rist 1972, 105-110 and 122-6 provides a helpful summary of the *kinetic* and *katastematic* (static) pleasure as presented by Epicurus and Cicero. In particular, he argues Cicero overlooks the distinction between *aponia* and *ataraxia* which characterize freedom from pain with respect to the body and mind, respectively (105).

objects to static pleasure because it seems not to be "pleasure" in the full sense. Epicurus maintains that absence of pain (*nihil dolendi*) is a special kind of pleasure, "static" pleasure (*stabilitatem voluptatem*), and this is the kind of pleasure humans should take for their ends over the kinetic delight in the senses. This kind of pleasure is more independent than the kinetic sort of pleasure and is consistent with intellectual pleasure that human beings uniquely enjoy.[8] It is unclear, however, how this kind of pleasure could be meaningfully pleasant. Static pleasure is, Cicero claims, an obscure sense of a commonly used term. What the Epicureans mean by static pleasure, he suggests, might be better expressed by the term "self-preservation". Cicero himself admits that he would accept static pleasure as a viable or at least defensible end for human beings, though not as strong as virtue, because static pleasures likely derive from self-preservation rather than sensory delight (ii 31). The desire to preserve oneself entails a desire to preserve what is good about oneself which, in humans, entails reason and virtue. That is, self-preservation could at least in some cases give painful but virtuous action the respect Cicero thinks it deserves. Cicero openly defends virtue as a necessary—or at least a very important—component to live one's life well. Self-preservation, it seems, would keep us from over-indulging in frivolous or harmful pleasures and help us focus on virtuous action as well. The problem for Cicero is that the Epicurean cradle argument doesn't emphasize these high, static pleasures that could support self-preservation and virtue.

We can infer from Cicero's critique of the Epicurean cradle argument two key criteria for any strong appeal to nature. First, any appeal to nature that draws a conclusion about human ends must adopt a *summum bonum* that is fitting for human beings. Pleasure is an inappropriate end as far as Cicero is concerned. In the case of kinetic pleasures, Cicero makes clear, human beings are reduced to their bodies and the sensory delights they provide. Though static pleasure makes a slightly more defensible *summum bonum* for Cicero, it nevertheless fails because it seems either to be tethered to kinetic pleasures or it isn't really "pleasure" at all for most people. Second, there must be a plausible connection between the origin and the end.[9] Should an

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[8] Torquatus seems not to notice the problem in Epicurus' system, which could be Cicero's design to highlight Torquatus' inadequate argumentative training. Cicero has Torquatus rely on the difference between the kinds of pleasure without ever formally establishing that difference (see n. 3).

[9] The relationship between the origin and end have been analyzed in several ways. Annas 1993, for example, considers these two senses of nature to indicate a clear difference between the Epicureans, Stoics, and Antiochians. I accept the two senses she identifies but my treatment of them differs from hers in emphasis. Annas is interested in understanding the use of "nature" as what is given and unavoidable in contrast with that which comes to be as a result of development and virtue, whereas I, given my emphasis on the cradle arguments of *De finibus* in particular, add the time in life to which one appeals, i.e., infancy contrasted with young adulthood. Holmes 2014, 570 argues for these two senses of nature: that which is given and that which is a goal. She argues moreover that the Stoics attempt to

Epicurean attempt to reconcile the earliest inclinations for kinetic pleasures with the mature inclinations for static ones, they might need a rigorous argument about the development of animals over time. Young animals often need guidance to choose objects and actions that sustain static pleasure over the objects and actions that provide quick sensory delight. Without that guidance, animals rush into dangerous situations in pursuit of some exciting object or overindulge in food and become ill. If, however, development over time is a necessary consideration for the Epicurean argument to work, then the "cradle" argument as Torquatus conveys it is deeply misguided because the cradle provides neither reliable nor sufficient evidence for that development. In addition, this kind of support would imply that static pleasure is grounded in kinetic pleasure. That is, unless the Epicurean concept of pleasure is revised, the highest pleasure would become dependent on the lesser pleasure. Such an end would be highly inconsistent with the general expectations of an ethical end typically associated with freedom from distress and disturbance (Long and Sedley 1987, 114). Cicero's treatment of the Epicurean cradle argument demonstrates that a strong appeal to nature must identify a stable, self-sustaining end that can be discerned at the starting point of the argument as much as at the end.

I.2 *Applying the criteria to Stoic and Antiochian cradle arguments*

Cicero's criticism of the Stoic cradle argument suggests the Stoics identify an acceptable end for newborns, but they interpret that end inappropriately for adult humans. In explaining the position, Cato makes it clear the Stoics observe newborns' immediate concern for their own well-being. From birth, an animal "favours its constitution and whatever preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever appears to promote its destruction…babies seek out what is good for them and avoid the opposite before they ever fear pleasure or pain" (iii 16). Though it might look like the infant, for example, chooses the pleasant object and avoids the painful one, the Stoics maintain that the pleasure or pain would be accidental to the primary motive of self-love (*principium ductum esse a se diligendo*). In adults this self-love produces the diligent pursuit and maintenance of virtue. Concerning the first criterion, the Stoics seem to be on the right track. Self-preservation is not in itself an unacceptable end to Cicero, and the Stoic *summum bonum* for human adults, developing and sustaining virtue, is a very suitable end to him. Cicero has his own character

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bridge the gap between the two senses of nature through *oikeiosis* but does extent this treatment to the other schools.

use the priority of virtue over pleasure that is consistent with Stoicism as a key argumentative point against Epicureanism throughout book 2. Nevertheless, he disagrees with the way that the Stoics derive the concern for virtue from self-preservation and considers their *summmum bonum* misguided in practice.[10] In short, Cicero claims that Stoic *summmum bonum* of virtue requires human adults to transform self-preservation into securing the wellbeing of the mind and all *rational* aspects of oneself. As Cicero sees it, this is not self-preservation as such, but rather preservation of *only the best parts* of oneself. If our first natural desire is for self-preservation, it should therefore encompass care for both mind (*animo*) and body (*corpore*). Stoic self-love, Cicero asserts, requires that humans minimize an essential component of the human self—the parts that pertain to our bodies—for the sake of the things that pertain to our minds, most emphatically virtue. Cicero maintains that if the Stoics would emphasize preservation of the best part of oneself, then the conflict would be resolved (iv 34). They could then minimize the need for sound body and maximize concern for developing virtue and wisdom that they extol as the human telos. That is, the Stoic cradle argument cannot plausibly connect its ethical origin for humans, the preservation of the whole infant, with its end, the preservation of reason and virtue alone. Though the Stoics might meet the first criterion of a strong appeal to nature in the case of newborns, their application of that end in the case of adults does not meet the first criterion. They also fail to meet the second criterion of plausibly connecting the first inclination of newborns with the *summmum bonum*. As far as Cicero is concerned, the way the Stoics emphasize virtue above all else even goes so far as to undermine this first inclination of self-preservation.

In order to meet the second criterion, they would need a rigorous argument that shows the development of one sense of self-preservation as a development of the self-preservation present at the origin. The Stoics do offer this in the form of *oikeiosis*, a process by which pre-rational humans develop rational capacities and recognize their role and position in relation to other living beings. Whereas children might be concerned mostly about themselves, they will come to be concerned with their broader community and, eventually, all of humanity, as we

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[10] My reading of Cicero's critique is consistent with Brad Inwood 2012, who claims Cicero's criticism of the Stoics is that "their conception of *telos* ignores important aspects of our complex nature", and that "any conception of the *telos* which does not correspond to our full set of natural powers will be to that extent defective" (192). Inwood in effect points to the same problem that I identify in criterion 1. Inwood does not develop any further significance of this alleged failure of the Stoics because he is more concerned with the intersection of physics and ethics in Antiochus than he is in the general interpretive framework of *De finibus*.

become familiar with what is suited to our nature.[11] Cato describes *oikeiosis* in his version of the cradle argument, yet Cicero does not engage it as he should. At this point it might be useful to acknowledge explicitly that Cicero is not often fair in his representations of the Stoics and Epicureans. He tends to exaggerate their problems and minimize their solutions. The point here, however, is not whether Cicero is accurate or fair; the point here is that he is crafting negative criteria for strong appeals to nature. He does not include a fair assessment of *oikeiosis* in this criticism because he wants to show how weak an appeal to nature is if it lacks that key connection from origin to end. Thus Cicero finds the Stoic-identified origin in self-preservation to be inconsistent with the stark prioritization of virtue over all else, including even basic care for the body. If the origin of the argument is grounded in self-preservation and the "self" includes mind and body, then the end of the argument must allow for the preservation of all the parts of self. The Stoics, then, adopt a suitable end for humans, but they fail to find a plausible connection between the origin and the end. As such, their appeal to nature is weak, though a significant improvement over the Epicurean position.

Like the Stoics, Antiochus and the Old Academy identify self-preservation as the earliest inclination of animals (v 23).[12] When Marcus Piso, who represents the Antiochian position, recounts his version of the cradle argument, he makes it clear that, as the animal develops, it becomes more aware of its own nature and understands its relation to others. The end that it strives for is "to live in accordance with nature in the best and most suitable natural condition possible," by securing the objects that are "adapted to its nature" (v 24). Piso maintains that we ought to pursue virtue because it is suitable to our nature and obtain other material goods that are necessary for the flourishing of human beings as beings with both mind

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[11] *Oikeiosis* and cradle arguments are closely related, but I take them to differ in that cradle arguments emphasize the *first* object of preference among newborns, before an organism is influenced by others, whereas *oikeiosis* provides a developmental account for the shift from a first object of preference to a mature one (i.e., the *summum bonum*). Within Stoicism there are many ways of using cradle arguments, with some (but not all) utilizing *oikeiosis* directly. Brunschwig 1986 argues that Cicero's presentation of the Stoic cradle argument in *DF* iii 16 excludes any consideration for the sovereign good that is characteristic of *oikeiosis* (128 ff.), whereas Hierocles emphasizes *oikeiosis* and links the first preferred object with the *summum bonum* (139 ff.; Engberg-Pederson 1986).

[12] I claim only slight differences between them in this paper because Cicero presents them as such and, as I argue, they represent a progression in philosophical strength over the Epicurean position. In truth there are many differences between the Stoic and Antiochian cradle arguments, and the extent to which the two are compatible is up for debate. Carneades, for example, alleges that the Stoics and Peripatos differ onto in terms, not in content (Schofield 2012). Irwin 2012 claims of Antiochus' account of "*oikeiosis*, attachment to the primary natural advantages," and of his "account of the growth of one's awareness of the right ('*honestum*')" that "all this sounds similar to the Stoic view" (152-153). Yet in the same volume, Inwood 2012, 194 notes the Antiochian argument has a more comprehensive teleological framework than the Stoics such that "we may embrace the whole living world under a single heading" (*De finibus* v 26).

and body. That is, Piso asserts "we all by nature think of ourselves desirable in our entirety…[and] it must be the case where a whole is desired on its own account, its parts are too" (v 46). Virtue and bodily goods are not equal components of a happy life, however. Piso notes, "the mind's virtue will rank more highly than that of the body, and…the volitional virtues of the mind will come in ahead of the non-volitional" (v 38). Virtue is extremely valuable in its own right and is the most important component of the human end on this view. All of this is to say that the Antiochian position appears to meet both criteria. Since Cicero accepts self-preservation and virtue as suitable ends, let us consider the second criterion more closely. Piso's presentation emphasizes the need for human beings to care for their whole selves, mind and body. This repeats Cicero's criticism of the Stoic cradle argument exactly— the Antiochian position is stronger than the Stoic one because it does not require that we discard our concerns for bodily and material goods while we prioritize virtue.

In addition to this advantage over Stoicism, the Antiochian cradle argument may also satisfy the second requirement. Self-preservation lends itself to the development of virtue, particularly when Antiochus adds the qualification mentioned above, that an animal ought to "to live in accordance with nature in the best and most suitable natural condition possible," by securing the objects that are "adapted to its nature" (v 24). Virtue is the object best suited for human nature, and material goods that are adapted to human nature are also important or valuable. Especially interesting is the emphasis on "the best and most suitable natural condition possible". This phrase suggests that human beings ought to develop their capacities in accordance with what is adapted to human nature. In other words, living well requires that we cultivate ourselves as much as possible. Consider this alongside Piso's argument that humans willingly endure hardship for the sake of fulfilling work. He concludes, "we are born to act" (v 57-58). Action in public office, private business, or intellectual life is not something that we are born *with* but something we are born *for*. We live well when we develop the parts of ourselves that allow us to act virtuously in these roles. The cradle argument that the Old Academy espouses, then, is context sensitive enough to meet the second criterion as well. Because it identifies the pursuit of objects adapted to one's nature as the earliest inclination, it plausibly identifies a motivation that could apply to the self-preservation of young animals as much as it does to mature adults living virtuously. The Antiochian position, then, has a plausible connection between the origin of self-preservation in newborns and the *summum bonum* of adult humans.

Cicero need not attack the Antiochian cradle argument as he does the others because it does, at first glance, meet the two criteria for a strong appeal to nature. This is perhaps one

reason why book 5 contains both the Antiochian position and Cicero's refutation of it, whereas the entirety of books 2 and 4 are refutations of the Epicurean and Stoic ethical systems, respectively—and compared to Cicero's categorical rejection of Epicureanism there is relatively little to critique of the Antiochian position. There is, however, a criticism relevant to the cradle argument in book 5. Cicero's main objection is that Piso draws a distinction between the "happy" life and the "happiest" one.[13] Virtue is necessary for the happy life and any virtuous person would be happy, according to Piso, but the happiest life is one that is grounded in virtue and also has the other, i.e., material, goods. This distinction has a clear advantage over the Stoics: while the Stoics insist that the virtuous person is happy even when being tortured unjustly, the Old Academy would say that this person is happy, but not as happy as a virtuous person who is not being tortured unjustly. Whereas conditions such as slavery, disease, and death should not affect the happiness of the virtuous person on the Stoic account, the Antiochian one allows that those conditions make the happiest life impossible. Unfortunately for Piso, he has made the claim that nothing is better than virtue.[14] If this were so, then he should also advocate that the virtuous life is the happiest one—but he doesn't. The virtuous person living in bad circumstances cannot be as happy as those who are virtuous and have material goods. This, Cicero claims, puts Piso in the position of having to say that the material goods that make the difference between "happy" and "happiest" are just as, or more, important for living well than virtue. The Antiochian position thus fails to meet the same consistency that the Stoic position does. Though it borrows from Stoicism, it fails to provide a similarly consistent and rigorous system. The Antiochian cradle argument, then, does not necessarily demonstrate an appeal to nature from which it derives a *summum bonum*. It derives a very important good but not the highest end because the happiest life depends on goods outside of human beings and thus not present for the newborn. The Antiochian cradle argument gets close

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[13] This amounts to a charge of inconsistency. In Cicero's mind, Antiochus as made changes to Stoicism that are in some ways more sensible than what the Stoics develop, but he sacrifices rigor and consistency to do so. Annas 1993, 180 n. 3 points out that Piso does not have a good reply to this charge and correctly notes "it is clear that Cicero thinks the theory is basically weak". Despite the major problem of consistency that emerges in the implications of their appeal to nature, the Antiochian appeal to nature is nevertheless better than the other schools'. I suggest the problems with the Antiochian appeal are a statement of just how problematic the other appeals are than it is an endorsement of Antiochianism.

[14] This is perhaps importantly ambiguous. Antiochus maintains that living according to nature implies a life cognizant of the goods of body and soul, which includes the development of virtue. This implies that one ought to live virtuously but that virtue does not surpass other kinds of goods so much that one can be happy without them. In other words, he reduces the distance between the value of virtue and the value of other goods that the Stoics seek to widen (cf. Annas 1993, 185-187).

but ultimately does not work well as an appeal to nature. Though it is best position of the three schools, it is not one to be adopted uncritically.

II. *Cicero's Second Strategy, or How to Appeal to Nature*

Many assessments of *De finibus* examine the contents of the cradle arguments Cicero presents, either assessing the fairness of their presentation or analyzing the likelihood that Cicero endorses the Antiochian position as his own. These efforts tend to undervalue a fundamental difference between the cradle arguments of all three schools on the one hand and the kind of appeal to nature that Cicero makes on the other. Cicero is not making an appeal to nature and youth in quite the same way that cradle arguments do because he appeals to a different aspect of human nature than the others. He does not discern the human end from a formative *biological* moment in one's life, let alone infancy, but rather from a formative *educational* moment. This is a significant choice because it suggests that in ethics the telic sense of nature is more important than our congenital abilities. The development of human nature becomes the origin of living well instead of our condition as neonates. As such, education is at the core of our human end. It follows that, for Cicero, any appeal to nature that applies to human beings must be grounded in academic development. The appeal to "nature" that he has in mind, then, is an appeal to our telic nature. This makes Cicero's appeal to nature completely different from that of the cradle arguments at its foundation.

I argue for this position in two main steps. First, I first show that education is developed as a theme with increasing intensity and depth from book 1 to book 5. This reframes the grounding of an appeal to nature from "nature" in the biological sense to "nature" in the telic sense. In other words, Cicero likens an appeal to nature to an appeal to education. Second, I argue that Cicero's appeal to nature more easily reconciles the origin and end of human nature and meets Cicero's two criteria than the other accounts he examines.

II.1 *Education and the Appeal to Nature*

Cicero begins his attack on cradle arguments with what he pejoratively claims is the simplest of philosophical schools, Epicureanism. This alleged simplicity is due in part to what Cicero perceives to be a general failure on the part of Epicureans to educate themselves. For example, as Cicero and Lucius Torquatus (the representative of the Epicurean school) begin their conversation in book 1, Cicero alleges that Epicurus lacks a basic understanding of

scientific explanation. He charges that the notion of swerve, which Epicurus introduces into his physics to account for freedom, chance, and variation, is an arbitrary invention that is posited without a discernible cause (i 13-26). He emphasizes the gravity of the error, noting "when the most unprincipled move that any physicist can make is to adduce effects without causes" (i 19). He even accuses Epicurus of causing learned people to "unlearn" what they know (i 20). This skewering of Epicurus for his alleged disregard for any education may be overstated, but it serves a purpose for Cicero's theme of education. While the education theme remains fairly thin in book 1, this early riff establishes that education is critically important to avoid logical pitfalls and gross misjudgments.[15] This one small, negative allusion to education alleges that the Epicureans make egregious errors because they do not value education.

In addition to the general shortcomings of Epicureanism to endorse education, Torquatus makes missteps in his argument that demonstrate precisely what Cicero is talking about. Consider, for example, Torquatus' insistence that he need not make a full argument for pleasure as the first inclination of newborn animals. As he indicates, no further argument is truly necessary because perceptions convey truth: "as fire is perceived to be hot, snow white, and honey sweet" (i 30). He also does not clearly define the Epicurean senses of pleasure until prompted to do so by Cicero, indicating a lack of priority for conceptual clarity and argument. This is important in two ways. First, it highlights that Epicureans did not insist on argument, and thus do not insist on education or training in good judgment—perceptions, common to adults and infants, humans and nonhumans, are enough. Second, it shows Torquatus deferring to the dogma of Epicurus without bolstering such claims with justification. While Torquatus' interest in philosophy might be commended, he seems to miss the mark to engaging it adequately. This is perhaps because he is a keen student of literature and not philosophy (i 14). Though Torquatus is educating himself, he may not be focusing on the right things.

The theme of education is introduced in book 1 to construe Epicurus' mistakes as results of ignorance. The necessary conditions of learning are introduced but fairly undeveloped, as the reader does not have much opportunity to observe the power of a strong education in action. As the reader progresses from the "easiest", Epicurean position to the more technical Stoic one, the theme becomes explicit in the interlocutor's roles as learners and educators. The reader compares the Epicurean position to the Stoic one and should notice Cato's superior method,

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[15] This criticism extends beyond this one point. He also gives significant criticism of the Epicurean approach to argument and logic at i 10, which is dramatically reflected in some of Torquatus' assumptions; for example, claiming that truth does not need argument because it can be "pointed out" for observation.

argumentation, and precision. After the Epicurean dialogue ends, book 3 opens when Marcus Cato, who represents the Stoic school, happens to be at young Lucullus' library when Cicero arrives and the dialogue begins. Though both men have held public office, they are at leisure here. What's more, they are presented as actively engage in philosophy during their free time (iii 7-10).[16] Their presentation here suggests that one's education does not end when formal schooling has been completed. In mature adulthood they continue to read, learn new ideas, and philosophize. They are, for lack of a better phrase, lifelong learners. In addition to expanding their own knowledge, they are concerned with the education of young Lucullus, whose library serves as the setting. They agree to take joint responsibility for his intellectual development (iii 8-9). The dramatic components of this section allow for Cicero and Cato to serve as learners and as educators.

This scholarly framing anticipates the more technical discussion of books 3 and 4. The Stoics are better trained in argument than are the Epicureans, and Cato's presentation of Stoic philosophy lives up to that reputation. The philosophical engagement of Cato is more impressive than that of Torquatus, both with respect to his carefully chosen words and to his defense of Stoicism broadly. Whereas Torquatus seems initially unaware of the need to clarify his terms, for example, Cato shows great care for precise language and clear mastery of both Greek and Latin. He outlines the many fine distinctions of Stoic ethical theory and selects Latin words for technical Greek Stoic terms, including *axia*, *homologia*, and *kathêkon*. Cicero congratulates Cato for speaking precisely and clearly about Stoic philosophy at iii 40, even "committing to memory all of the vocabulary you are using to express your themes". Stoicism, presented as more rigorous than Epicureanism, consists of a better understanding of argument and the history of philosophy and represents a more advanced stage in education and rational development.

Cicero treats the Antiochian position more favorably than the others, and the dramatic context of book 5 emphasizes education the most directly and completely of them all. This dialogue takes place when Cicero and his interlocutors are in Athens completing their youthful philosophical studies—that is, decades before the other dialogues of *De finibus*. Prior to any involvement in politics, oratory, war, or statesmanship, and prior to the arguments of the rest of the text, they are students of philosophy wandering the ruins of the Academy, where Plato himself educated young men just like them. The emphasis on philosophical education is not

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[16] In addition, Cicero is there to borrow some of Aristotle's notebooks from Lucullus' library, which indicates that he is committed not only to enjoying philosophical conversation but also to broadening his philosophical knowledge.

subtle, and the relation of the characters underscores the point even further. Lucius, Cicero's cousin, is new to philosophy and trying to decide if he should learn more about Antiochus and the Old Academy on the one hand or Carneades and the New Academy on the other (v 6). The framework of this section of the text, then, is a debate about the relative merits and drawbacks of Antiochianism in the interest of persuading Lucius (esp. at v 86 and 95). In addition to the education-intensive framing, Marcus Piso's presentation of Antiochus appears to offer the most sophisticated of the theories examined in *De finibus* (even though Cicero is not convinced).[17] This is in part because mastering the philosophy of the Antiochus requires some understanding of Plato, Aristotle and the Peripatetics, and Stoicism alike.[18] In addition, Piso is the most rhetorically polished interlocutor in *De finibus* except, perhaps, for Cicero himself. His presentation is clear, direct, and eloquent. Cicero thinks eloquence is not a requirement for good philosophy but good philosophy that is presented well is best of all, and it proves effective here.[19] Lucius, whose philosophical allegiance is at stake, is won over immediately by Piso's speech (v 76). The dialogue draws to a close when Cicero claims Piso must strengthen his argument, but the other interlocutors are deeply impressed by Piso's exceptional speech. Cicero's reply matches the strength of Piso's presentation, yet he does not prevail over his interlocutor here as he does in the first two dialogues.[20] While there are suggestions that Piso depends too much on eloquence and not enough on philosophical might, the readers are left with the impression that they have just witnessed an excellent philosophical discussion.[21]

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[17] Annas 1993 maintains that the position Piso presents is not actually the strongest of the three on the grounds that Cicero's response completely undermines its core ideas. Antiochus' position is appealing, she argues, because it is the most intuitively viable (Annas 1993, 180-187). Even if we allow that Antiochus' position is weak, it is nevertheless an improvement over the other, weaker positions.

[18] The New Academy, to which Cicero states his allegiance in *Academica*, is born out of the Academy under the leadership of Arcesilaus and his radical skepticism. The Old Academy develops later when Philo of Larissa's student Antiochus breaks away from the radical skeptical interpretation of Plato and reincorporates Stoicism with Peripatetic ideas in what he claims is a unified tradition. While the other schools might encourage understanding these philosophers (or not), it seems as though this knowledge is a prerequisite to study Antiochus well.

[19] At i 14-15 Torquatus states that Cicero and Triarius dislike Epicurus because he is less eloquent than other philosophers, but Cicero insists that he does not demand the eloquence of philosophers. Elsewhere he praises the union of eloquence and good philosophical argument (see *Ac.* i 8-10, *De fin.* iv 6, 24, v 1).

[20] By contrast, the first dialogue ends when Torquatus expresses the ability or perhaps need to refer Cicero to other "authorities" and "more experienced practitioners" (ii 118). Though he seems confident that better philosophers can come up with answers to Cicero's challenges, he is not himself capable. The second dialogue ends with Cato asking Cicero to promise to hear his refutation soon, but Cicero has the final word (iv 80).

[21] Cicero at v 85 says that the conversation is "wandering from the point" and attempts to bring Piso back to the philosophical question at hand. Pomponius' approval of Piso's exposition at v 96 is entirely on the basis of presentation and excellence in speaking.

II.2 *The benefits of an appeal to telic nature*

Despite their respect for and modeling of good education, Cato and Piso nevertheless appeal to newborns in their versions of the cradle argument. The strengths of Stoicism—its consistency, its emphasis on virtue—depend on good education and yet the Stoic position is given its grounding in an appeal to human nature's pre-rational state. Antiochus' theory also requires that we have virtue, which implies education, in order to be happy, but he too appeals to human beings before they are fully rational to ground his argument. All three schools examined seem to agree that newborns are a good source to discern human nature because they are uncorrupted by society or other influences that get in the way of their choosing what is "good" for them. I propose that Cicero rejects this and uses education to highlight human "nature" in its fullest sense, i.e., in opposition to the "nature" that newborns embody and express. In short, I argue that Cicero finds the telic sense of nature more useful and accurate than he does the congenital sense of nature. Ultimately this means Cicero can provide an alternative to the varied cradle arguments that better meets the implicit criteria he posed in his criticism of them.

Recall that Cicero critiques Stoic and Epicurean cradle arguments because they allegedly place too much value in "mere" or biological nature when determining our proper "telic" end. He considers an appeal to young animals (human or nonhuman) means that we are relying on creatures that lack good judgment at ii 33:

in truth I have no faith in the judgment of animals. Their instincts can be corrupt without being corrupted. One stick may deliberately be bent and distorted, another grow that way. So too an animal's nature may not have been corrupted by bad upbringing but of its own nature be corrupt. In fact the young are not moved by nature to seek pleasure but simply to love themselves and to wish to keep themselves safe and sound. Every living creature, as soon as it is born, loves both itself and all its parts. It cherishes above all its two major components, namely mind and body, and then the parts of each. Both mind and body possess certain excellences. At first these are dimly perceived, then incipiently distinguished, with the result that nature's primary attributes are sought and their contraries rejected.

Bestiarum vero nullum iudicium puto. Quamvis enim depravatae non sint, pravae tamen esse possunt. Ut bacillum aliud est inflexum et incurvatum de industria, aliud ita natum, sic ferarum natura non est illa quidem depravata mala disciplina, sed natura sua. Nec vero ut voluptatem expetat natura movet infantem, sed tantum ut se ipse diligat, ut integrum se salvumque velit. Omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit duasque quae maximae sunt in primis amplectitur, animum et corpus, deinde utriusque partes. Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tum discernere incipit, ut ea quae prima data sint natura appetat asperneturque contraria.

This passage supports an appeal to telic nature rather than congenital nature in two ways. First, it introduces a natural source of "corruption" in animals. Humans manipulate the judgment of nonhuman animals whenever they train them, which can either improve those animals or make them worse. Cicero allows that bad upbringing and bad education can corrupt or "bend" an organism away from what is truly good. Yet Cicero here considers what his rivals seem not to consider—that animals may be "corrupt" at birth. This does not imply some animals are born evil but rather that some animals (and certainly humans) are "bent" away from what is actually good. These organisms need correction and instruction before they reliably select truly good objects and actions. Second, Cicero's identification of an organism's nature in "its two major components, namely mind and body, and then the parts of each" is important. He notes that awareness of these parts and their excellences grow over time. This means that biological development or education, or both, seem to have some necessary role in perceiving these parts. In addition, each organism must perceive these excellences clearly in order to love oneself and support its own excellences by seeking and rejecting the right things. For the organisms "corrupt" from birth, however, this self-love is only possible with intervention in the form of correction or education. Though Cicero does not specify how often animals are "corrupt" in this way, it is nevertheless reasonable to say that many animals need some correction to keep away from harm. In other words, loving oneself means requires correction or education. In claiming this, Cicero implies the superiority of one's telic nature, which results from development and education, over one's biological nature. Biological nature in itself does not reliably point animals toward developing excellence. This is why it is an unreliable indicator of the human *summum bonum* and human nature in its full sense.

As an alternative to grounding an ethical system on one's biological origins, Cicero prefers we appeal to trustworthy human judgment, the product of formal or technical education, which represents our completed, telic nature. Through education students come to understand the principles and causes of their areas of study. It is only in having received good education that they understand these and are able to consistently and responsibly make the correct judgments about theoretical topics, such as mathematics, and about technical applications, such as carpentry or any other art in which they specialize. The shift Cicero makes here signals an important restriction on the varied cradle arguments in that he limits himself to human beings strictly, whereas the cradle arguments in the text appeal to young animals that are not necessarily human. Since Cicero seems entirely focused on humans, he is concerned with finding the origins of what he considers our best and specifically human inclinations. In a thoroughly human context, biological origins are less important than the natural gifts or talents

that humans possess prior to any training. Thus the reliability that comes with a educated, well-considered judgment is not taken as the counterpoint to newborn infants; rather it is the counterpoint to variability of the knack (or lack thereof) that someone could have for some task. The frame that Cicero uses for his own appeal to nature has nothing whatsoever to do with newborn animals or human infants. Thus his argument is not really a "cradle" argument because he does not seek an answer there. Cicero's suggestion that we ground ethics in well-developed human judgment instead of early inclinations makes his position is nevertheless analogous to those cradle arguments because they share a few key features. First, both the cradle arguments and Cicero's alternative involve an appeal to the young. While the origin of the kind of judgment Cicero appeals to would not be available to us from infancy, it is nevertheless available to us in "youth"—that is, in late adolescence or early adulthood. In addition, both the cradle arguments and Cicero's alternative aim to find some uncorrupted expression of our human nature. Though his rivals seek this uncorrupted state prior in time to experience of social structures and influences, Cicero seeks it in philosophical immersion that is prior in importance to those influences.

One benefit of Cicero's appeal to nature is that it appeals to something that is much more reliable than what is provided to us at birth. Cicero unambiguously establishes that proper training in an art produces better results more consistently than does untrained talent. He notes, "art is a safer guide than nature. To pour out words like a poet is one thing. To arrange what one says in a methodical and organized manner is quite another." (iv 10) He suggests regular and repeatable success is more likely to follow from the well-trained speaker than the talented one who receives no training. This reliability is a significant advantage over the relative variability in what is present or absent in an animal immediately upon birth. For Cicero, there are at least two good reasons for this. First, training in an art through education and experience provide a more stable foundation for action than natural talent. This is because, as discussed above, it provides some certainty on account of understanding the relevant principles and causes of the subject in question. Second, education and training make progress possible. Indeed, progress is inherent in any educational program. Complete beginners might approach a new subject for the first time with no understanding whatsoever. Even without understanding, the beginners learn the practices of their subject and with a guiding hand, often an expert in the area to teach them, they begin to understand patterns of cause and effect. With repetition, correction, and adjustment, they make progress toward mastery over time. In other words, education provides the individual with a passageway from what is given by nature, natural talents and weaknesses, to what is possible from those innate capabilities. True in intellectual

and technical areas, Cicero plausibly implies that this applies equally in the context of ethics. Ethical training, through education, practice, and correction, can propel human beings from what is given and necessary from their circumstances to what is chosen through virtue.

Centering an appeal to nature on education has plausible benefits at the individual level because it gives an ethical system a more stable ground than what is given at birth. Education builds reliability in ethics because it is the thing that transforms immature humans that might follow their inclinations without critical assessment or reflection into mature humans that consider their choices alongside their values and goals. There is a further benefit to this proposal at the community level, however. Eventually the students that receive guidance in education are themselves able to give guidance. Educated individuals can positively shape the education of those younger than themselves.[22] Every generation is able to learn from the previous and perhaps even make progress beyond what their teachers had known. This is how art makes progress over time. Engineering, technology, or medicine, for example, has benefitted tremendously from the accumulation of education over generations of good teachers and learners. When individual students make individual progress, they learn from and build upon the foundation established by those who have come before, and they contribute to the field collectively. The art becomes more refined, comprehensive, and, often, useful as a result of this process. An ethical system grounded in intellectual curiosity and study might similarly be able to make progress, though it might be more difficult to quantify or track. The end and benefit of human society is mirrored by the end and benefit of the individual.

II.3 *The criteria applied to the appeal to education*

An education-grounded ethics meets the first criterion of a strong appeal to nature because it would support the adoption of proper human ends, including virtue and self-preservation, both at the individual and community level. While Cicero shows a willingness to accept a few candidates as *summum bonum* (including virtue, self-preservation, or preservation of the best parts of oneself) education leads us to and supports them all. Let us consider virtue as the *summum bonum*. Learning about the world helps individuals understand their own roles within it and this, properly appreciated, should imbue them with some perspective about which kinds of problems are concerned with right and wrong—and thus, are worthy of attention— and which are not. This encourages the development of virtue, as courage or wisdom or

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[22] As Cicero and Cato intend to do for Lucullus in books 3 and 4, and as Cicero and Piso intend to do for Lucius in book 5.

moderation or any other sort, and even facilitates its practice. The specific virtue one chooses is not identified, and may be less important than the perspective that brings someone to choose virtue and act accordingly as an end. So, too, preservation of the whole self or the best part of oneself, could be the *summum bonum*. A good education supports self-preservation in several ways. A basic understanding of care of the mind and body would help one preserve their health. A clear understanding of one's values and the consequences of different courses of action could help that person choose actions that will bring the least damage to themselves or others. In every case, a good education prepares the individual to choose good ends and good means to those ends.

The second criterion, that there be a plausible connection from the appeal to the *summum bonum*, is also met in Cicero's telic appeal. Cicero's appeal assumes that human beings develop their given nature through education. Education is that process by which humans beings (and some nonhuman animals) are transformed beings that could have good judgment into beings whose judgment can be trusted. Prior to education or training, it is plainly observable that human beings less consistently choose what is in their best interest, or with what Cicero identifies as a proper end (self-preservation or virtue). Small children, for example, will often choose that which brings immediate satisfaction over an option that delays satisfaction. They need guidance from a community of adults to help them learn why one choice is better than another and help them practice making those choices. That is, they must be educated well. If Cicero's appeal to nature originates in a stage of development in which education has taken hold and the individual is able to engage thoughtfully with the object of their attention, then the origin and end are easily reconciled with the ends Cicero would accept. In other words, education is *itself* that connection that the other schools seem to lack. When Cicero appeals to his youthful philosophical studies, he appeals to the part of human nature that is curious and engaged with subtle ideas and arguments. Our desire for learning as our primary inclination persists throughout one's education and perhaps even throughout one's adult life. While Cicero always foregrounds philosophical activity as important for its *application*—as when educations transforms curiosity into a stable foundation for decision making—it nevertheless has no terminus. Cicero and Cato continue to study philosophy in their free time, and Cicero's character demonstrates a continued commitment to philosophical discussion even as the Republic is on the brink of civil war.

Conclusion

Cicero's treatment of the different cradle arguments makes it clear that the Epicureans and Stoics fail to live up to his standards, though the standards themselves are not explicit. I have shown that Cicero's criticism of the Epicurean cradle argument implies that there are two criteria any good appeal to nature must meet: it must select a suitable *summum bonum* for humans, and it must have a plausible connection from the point of appeal to the end selected. The Epicureans fail to meet both criteria; the Stoics select a better end, though they misapply it, and fail to meet the second criterion. The Antiochian position gets close but still fails to meet Cicero's proposed criteria. When taken in the context of the text-long development of education as a theme, the relative failures of the cradle arguments are inversely correlated with Cicero's thematic emphasis on education. The Epicureans, Cicero makes clear, miss the mark on education entirely. The Stoics do better in education and have better technical arguments, but they have missed something crucial to dogmatically maintain the absolute value of virtue alone. The Antiochians, again, get closer than the other two. Yet despite the pervasive presence of education in book 5, the Antiochian position does not appreciate the significant flaw it has in maintaining both that virtue is both the most important good and that it is insufficient for the happiest life.

Where the other positions have failed to make a strong appeal to nature, Cicero offers an alternative. Rather than appeal to "nature" evident in neonates, Cicero appeals to our "nature" in a telic sense, with an emphasis on our ends rather than our origins. His own appeal to his youthful philosophical studies successfully meets his two criteria for a good appeal to nature. Education is the very thing that propels us from one sense of nature, the given sense, to the other, telic one, as the Stoic and Epicurean cradle arguments were unable to do.

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Resolving Hermotimus' Paradox: Reading Lucian's *Hermotimus* in Light of Plato's *Republic*

Matthew Sharpe

"Meeting such a one, call him a good man, a true and an honest [man]; nay, call him philosopher, if you will; to my mind, the name is his or no one's…" (Lucian, *Hermotimus*, §75)

This paper argues that Lucian's *Hermotimus* is less a critical attack on philosophy, than a defence of a critical mode of philosophising awake to how readily this pursuit can devolve into a hybristic sectarianisms, in which pupils identify uncritically with instructors who do not match their fine words with noble deeds. In part i, we examine the metaphilosophical framing of the *Hermotimus*'s exchange between the eponymous hero, aged about 60 (§48) and Lucian's favored interlocutor, Lycinus. We show that Lucian accepts that philosophy is intended to be an elevated way of life cultivating wisdom and virtue. In part ii., we address the central elenchus and the action of the *Hermotimus*, the patient work by Lycinus to undermine Hermotimus' dogmatic self-conceit, by refuting the different solutions he offers to the paradox involved in his having chosen a particular philosophical orientation, Stoicism, as a novice without philosophical training. Part iii. excavates the positive vision of philosophy that the action of the dialogue shows, highlighting the five key places in *Hermotimus* wherein Lycinus offers us entirely unironic visions of what philosophy at it best could be, in contrast to what it has become in Hermotimus or his teachers: or, as Lycinus heralds it, a kind of Ariadne's thread out of the maze of Hermotimus' paradox (§68).

We know that to philosophize, etymologically, is to seek wisdom, as a lover seeks their beloved. Socrates is depicted in the Platonic *Symposium* as a near-daemonic figure, like *erôs* himself, born of *penia,* "deficiency" or even "poverty", as well as *poros*, plenty (Plato, *Symp.* 203b-204a). This paper argues that Lucian of Samosata, in his dialogue *Hermotimus*[1], presents a searching, too-often overlooked examination of the challenges and risks associated with this zetetic, inquiring calling of philosophy. These challenges and risks include what might be called ironically today the 'startup problem': namely, how does anyone who is not yet wise or instructed choose a philosophical orientation, at the very start (§§25-29)? If she were already wise, she would have no need to choose or do any philosophy. But, if she is as yet unwise, as

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[1] Lucian, *Hermotimus*, translation by K. Kilburn, in *Lucian* vol. VI (London: Harvard University Press, 1959). In what follows we will use references to the standardized sections. In some cases, translations have been amended by the author.

we all begin by being, how can she know which philosophical orientation shows the path to wisdom? With a nod to Plato's *Meno* 80d-e, this 'startup problem' might also be called 'Hermotimus' paradox'.

The *Hermotimus*, and its dialogical addressing of this paradox, arguably deserves a good deal more scholarly consideration than it has received. Lucian has often been treated as a representative of the Second Sophistic, a "sophist's sophist" who wished to subordinate philosophy to rhetoric.[2] He has been charged with presenting an inconsistent understanding of philosophy and philosophers, or else as being a "nihilistic" sceptic or Cynic wholly hostile to philosophy and its charms.[3] In English-language scholarship, several monographs on Lucian's *oeuvre* give *Hermotimus* some consideration, but focus upon its literary and historical values, treating Lucian as a literary artist.[4] There are several critical articles on the text, which likewise give *Hermotimus* short shrift *qua* philosophy, as against a piece of literature whose metaphors merit more attention than its arguments.[5] In a piece in *L'antiquité classique* on "Lucian and the Rhetoric of Philosophy", we are told that, on top of being "tedious":

> In Lucian's longest dialogue, the *Hermotimus*, his mouthpiece Lycinus evinces little interest in the dogmas of the schools, which he dismisses with the comprehensive sophistry that one cannot judge of any before acquiring a thorough mastery of all (see esp. §§25-70).[6]

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[2] Bryan Reardon, *Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C.* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1971), 39; Emily Jane Putnam, "Lucian the Sophist", *Classical Philology* 4, no. 2 (1909): 162-177; Matthew Keil, "Rhetorical and Philosophical *Paideia* in Lucian", *J. Humanities (Zomba)* 26 (2018), esp.1-2, 8-13; Graham Anderson, "Lucian: A Sophist's Sophist", *YCIS* 27 (1982): 61-99; Alice Alexiou, *Philosophers in Lucian* (Diss. Fordham. New York, 1990): 75, 149; Karin Schlapbach, "The *logoi* of Philosophers in Lucian of Samosata", *Classical Antiquity* 29, no. 2 (October 2010): 251-252.

[3] Jennifer Hall, *Lucian's Satire* (New York: Arno Press, 1981), 151-93; R. Bracht Branham, *Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 13, 24-25, 52, 55; cf. Jonas Grethlein, "Lucian and the Spell of Philosophy", in *The Ancient Rhetoric of Deception: the Ethics of Enchantment from Gorgias to Heliodorus*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 166-198.

[4] See for example Jacques Bompaire, *Lucien ecrivain, imitation et creation* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1958); Hall, *Lucian's Satire*; and Richard Hunter, *Plato and the Traditions of Ancient Literature: The Silent Stream* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Branham, *Unruly Eloquence*, esp. "The Rhetoric of Laughter".

[5] Cf. Mark Edwards, "Lucian and the Rhetoric of Philosophy: The *Hermotimus*", *L'antiquité classique* 62 (1993): 195-202; cf. Grethlein, "Lucian and the Spell of Philosophy", 189-195.

[6] Edwards, "Lucian and the Rhetoric of Philosophy", 195. George Brague's "The Market for Philosophers: An Interpretation of Lucian's Satire on Philosophy", *The Independent Review* 9, no. 2 (2004): 227-251, likewise stands against taking Lucian's text to be philosophically serious. Brague applies behavioral economics to Lucian's text. This positions *Hermotimus* as a reflection upon philosophy's status in the later ancient world as "a risky investment in human capital with high information costs. In making such investments, consumers irrationally take excessive risk" (Bragues 2004, 229). The question which Brague prejudges is whether Lucian thinks that some forms of philosophy may involve more than such "investments" in "human capital" but attempts to seek wisdom.

Our contention here is that such approaches to Lucian's *Hermotimus* miss the reverence for philosophy in this Lucianic text, so different in form from the other satires in which philosophers are lampooned.[7] Lucian's *Hermotimus*, despite its first appearances of being a merely skeptical, even sophistical discrediting of philosophy[8], is better read as a protreptic defense of the endeavor.[9] To be sure, the central sections of the dialogue's elenchus stage Lycinus' successive refutations of Hermotimus' proposed justifications for his opting for Stoicism: hence, it is easy to read the dialogue as wholly a skeptical, even anti-philosophical performance. However, just as in several ancient protreptic texts, led by Cicero's *Hortensius*, present their exhortations to philosophy exactly in response to staged "apotreptic" arguments against it[10], we should not miss the no less than *five* key moments within the *Hermotimus* proffer a post-Socratic vision of philosophy as a form of zetetic inquiry which both resolves Hermotimus' paradox, and has enduring worth (§24, §§29-30, §§64-65, §§68-69, §75). In line with Lucian's self-defenses in *The Fisherman* (§§32-37) and *The Double Indictment* (§§7-8, 32-33), that is, we read the *Hermotimus* as aiming to "expose and distinguish" false from true forms of philosophizing, and to both stage and affirm the possibility of the latter, rather than collapsing philosophy into sophistry.[11]

In support of this contention, the paper will highlight how Lucian, from start to finish, pointedly positions the *Hermotimus* within the lineage of Plato's dialogues[12]: and not simply the *Phaedrus*, as has often been noted[13], but preeminently the famous pedagogical books of the *Republic,* VI and VII. The *Hermotimus'* distinguishing of true from false forms of philosophizing demonstrably recurs to the central Platonic distinction from *Republic* VI between mathematical *dianoia*, which cannot critically assess its own hypotheses, and

[7] Cf. Alexiou, *Philosophers in Lucian*, 55-57; cf. Keil, "Rhetorical and Philosophical", 12.
[8] Edwards, "Lucian and the Rhetoric of Philosophy", 195; cf. Alexiou, *Philosophers in Lucian*, 56-57.
[9] Cf. the more positive assessments of Lucian's relationship to philosophy at Maurice Croiset, *Essai sur la vie et les oeuvres de Lucian* (Paris: Librairie Hachet & Co., 1882), 8-12; Branham, *Unruly Eloquence*, 33, 36-37, 112; Keil, "Rhetorical and Philosophical", 12; and with particular reference to Jacques Derrida's conception of philosophy, R.G.T. Silva, "Luciano leitor de Derrida", *Clássica* 35, no. 1 (2022): 1-16.
[10] Douglas S. Hutchinson & Monte Ransome Johnstone, "Protreptic and Apotreptic: Aristotle's Dialogue *Protrepticus*", in O. Alieva et al eds., *When Wisdom Calls: Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity* (Brussels: Brepols, 2018): 113-118.
[11] Cf. Graham Anderson, *Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 68-84.
[12] Cf. for Lucian's frequent use of Platonic intertexts and literary practices (notably, personae), Karen Mheallaigh, "'Plato Alone Was Not There …': Platonic Presences in Lucian", *Hermathena* 179 (2005): 89-103.
[13] Hunter, *Silent Stream*, 1-3.

philosophical dialectic, which sets out to do just this (*Rep.* 509c-511e).[14]   Students like
Hermotimus, who accept the hypotheses presented them by the masters of dogmatic schools
on trust, are like the mathematicians of the central books of the *Republic* (§§74-75; Plato, *Rep.*
526c-527c). Philosophy proper, as instantiated by Lycinus in the *Hermotimus*, is by contrast
characterized by the dialectical ability to call such assumptions critically and reflectively into
question, striving cautiously towards a reasoned, more comprehensive vision considering all
available evidences.

   To make these arguments, the paper involves three parts. In part i, we examine the
metaphilosophical framing of the *Hermotimus*'s exchange between the eponymous hero, aged
about 60 (§48) and Lucian's favored interlocutor, Lycinus. We show that Lucian accepts that
philosophy is intended to be an elevated way of life cultivating wisdom and virtue, at the same
time as he is concerned at how readily this pursuit can devolve into a hybristic, sectarian
endeavor, in which pupils identify uncritically with instructors who do not match their words
with their deeds. In part ii., we address the central elenchus and the action of the *Hermotimus*,
the patient work by Lycinus to undermine Hermotimus' dogmatic self-conceit, by refuting the
different solutions he offers to the paradox involved in his having chosen a particular
philosophical orientation, Stoicism, as a novice without philosophical training.   Part iii.
excavates the positive vision of philosophy that the action of the dialogue shows, highlighting
the five key places in *Hermotimus* wherein Lycinus offers us entirely unironic visions of what
philosophy at it best could be, in contrast to what it has become in Hermotimus or his teachers:
or, as Lycinus heralds it, a kind of Ariadne's thread out of the maze of Hermotimus' paradox
(§68).

i. *Metaphilosophical beginnings: the frame and the goal*

When we first meet him, Hermotimus is a member of the Stoic school, a *prokopton* making his
way over the course of some decades, with significant monetary cost (§§1-2; cf. 9-10), towards
wisdom as conceived on the Porch. As commentators led by Richard Hunter have noted[15],
Hermotimus is initially framed for us by Lycinus, his interlocutor (and, seemingly here,

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[14] Cf. William H. F. Altman, *Plato the Teacher: The Crisis of the Republic* (Lanham, MD: Lexington,
  2012) & iii. below.
[15] Hunter, *Silent Stream*, 1-3.

Lucian's avatar[16]) in a close verbal parallel to the opening depiction of Phaedrus in Plato's dialogue bearing that youth's name:

To judge from your book, Hermotimus, and the speed of your walk, you seem to be hurrying to your teacher. You were certainly thinking something over as you went along; you were twitching your lips and muttering quietly, waving your hand this way and that as though you were arranging a speech to yourself, composing one of your crooked problems or thinking out some sophistical question; even when you are walking along you must not take it easy, but be always busy with some serious matter which is likely to help your studies … (§1)

But whereas Phaedrus in the Platonic text is coming from his teacher, Hermotimus is on his way to class. Whereas Phaedrus has left the city in search of peace, which could be read as metaphorical for philosophy's questioning distance from established conventions, Hermotimus is clearly rushing around, probably in town. This intertextual recourse to Plato thus not only announces a Platonic intellectual lineage for reading the dialogue, but sets up its central preoccupation:

The dialogue's broader argument that problematic students such as Hermotimus are the result of the institutionalization of philosophy, which no longer allows for the kind of serious interrogation of societal assumptions and conventions that Socrates once demanded, and that Plato's dialogues dramatized ...[17]

Nevertheless, Hermotimus is aiming as high as any student in earlier or later generations of philosophers has aimed. If *ars longis, vita brevis* (*brachês men ô bios, makrê de ê technê*) is a proverbial thought applied to medicine, he tells us, philosophy is a far more difficult and elevated craft again (§1).[18] Hermotimus has taken at least this much from his Stoic teacher of twenty years: the Socratic notion of philosophy as a way of life[19]; one in which, presumably, philosophers would match elevated words to elevated actions, and might be

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[16] I will not insist on this, noting that Lucian's relationship to his characters is a subject of scholarly dispute. Lucian uses his own name only three times (*The Passing of Peregrinus*, *Alexander the False Prophet* and *Nigrinus*) and flags his authorship in the *True History*, when the narrator inscribes 'Loukianos' on a plaque in Hades (2.28). See Karen N. Mheallaigh, "'Plato alone …'".

[17] Anna Peterson, "Pushing Forty: The Platonic Significance of References to Age in Lucian's *Double Indictment* and *Hermotimus*." *The Classical Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (2018), [online first doi:10.1017/S0009838818000587]: 12. See Hunter, *Silent Stream*, 1-3.

[18] Noting the standard therapeutic metaphor for philosophy in antiquity, see Martha Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire* (),1994.

[19] See Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*; Ilsetraut Hadot, *Sénèque: direction spirituelle et pratique de la philosophie* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2014); John Sellars, "What Is Philosophy as a Way of Life?", *Parrhesia* 28 (2017): 40-56; Grimm & Cohoe, "What is Philosophy as a Way of Life? Why Philosophy as a Way of Life?" *European Journal of Philosophy* (2020): 1-16; Matthew Sharpe & Michael Ure, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021); Branham, *Unruly Eloquence*, 112; Keil, "Rhetorical and Philosophical", 12.

judged on this basis.[20] Indeed, just as in the Stoic teaching, philosophy is a way of life which promises to deliver its votary the very highest things:

the stake is so tremendous, too—whether to perish miserably with the vulgar herd (*tô pollô tôn idiotôn surphetô*), or be counted among philosophers and reach Happiness… I am only just beginning to get an inkling of the right way. Very far off dwells Virtue, as Hesiod says, and long (*makros*) and steep (*orthios*) and rough (*trêchus)* is the way thither, and travelers must bedew it with sweat. (§2-3)

Along with Hesiod, we hence immediately encounter a second important Platonic intertext in *Hermotimus* §2, then again at §3[21], which we want to argue is indeed determinative for fully understanding the text. This is the rough ascent (*tracheias tês anabaseôs*) of Plato's *Republic VII* (515e), that attends the philosopher's climb towards true Ideas (cf. *Thea.* 175b-c).[22]

Nevertheless, with Hermotimus' "perishing" with "the vulgar herd", the opening sections of *Hermotimus* introduce a scornful tone towards non-philosophers which, not always absent in Plato, is foregrounded in Lucian's text. This suggests a second Lucianic concern of the dialogue: the propensity of certain ways of philosophizing to fill all but their most self-aware votaries with a pride, even a false sense of their own nigh divinity, which can verge into a blithe, anti-demotic scorn.[23] It is Lycinus who introduces the theme, which looms large of course in Lucian's other texts, comparing Hermotimus' master with Zeus himself:

Well, your master can give you that; from his station on the summit, like Zeus in Homer with his golden cord, he can let you down his discourse, and therewith haul and heave you up to himself and to the Virtue which he has himself attained this long time … (§3)

Many ancient texts of course contain passages which suggest the apotheosis of the philosopher, and his eventual state as akin to that of living in the blessed isles (Plato, *Rep.* 540b-c; Aristotle, *NE* X, 7). Yet Lycinus's mock-naive irony in his comparison of his teacher

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[20] Marcel Caster, *Lucien et la pensée religieuse de son temps* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1938), 373-376.

[21] Hermotimus laments he is still in the foothills, in his philosophical ascent. "It is slippery and rough (*tracheia*), and it needs a hand to help." One can almost see the representations of Plato's cave (esp. 515e).

[22] One should also mention in this connection the significance of Hermotimus' "almost forty" years (§48): this would be the age that Plato specifies his beginning of philosophy in the Seventh Letter (Peterson, "Pushing Forty", 3) and which Lucian himself specifies as the age he begun to learn philosophy in The Double Indictment (§29; cf. Alexiou, *Philosophers in Lucian*, 73-74; Anderson, *Lucian: Theme and Variations*, 81; Hall, *Lucian's Satire*, 35-36). It would also place Hermotimus, in the educational scheme of the *Republic*, at that age when he should have been back down in the city, toiling for the public good, not still scurrying to philosophy classes with his head buried in his books (cf. *Rep*. 537a-539e).

[23] Cf. Branham, *Unruly Eloquence*, 42.

with Zeus is lost on the star-struck Hermotimus. In reply, the latter can only think "bid up" Lycinus' divine parallel for philosophy, placing its goal, theoretical wisdom, far above even the political conquests of Alexander the Great: "there is no resemblance, Lycinus; this is not a thing, as you conceive it, to be won and captured in a short time, though myriad Alexanders were to assault it. Many would climb it, if it could [be so conquered]." (§5) It is this great contemplative elevation that Hermotimus evidently hopes to achieve that explains his fidelity to his master, who has frankly advised him that even two Olympiads is far too short a time to achieve such a goal (§4). Once attained, a heroic, godlike happiness will be delivered to the aspirant, as Hermotimus explains with passion:

> Wisdom, courage, true beauty, justice, full and firm knowledge of all things as they are; but wealth and glory and pleasure and all bodily things—these a man strips off and abandons before he mounts up, like Heracles burning on Mount Oeta before deification; he too cast off whatever of the human he had from his mother, and soared up to the Gods with his divine part pure and unalloyed, sifted by the fire. Even so those I speak of are purged by the philosophic fire of all that deluded men count admirable, and reaching the summit have Happiness with never a thought of wealth and glory and pleasure—except to smile at any who count them more than phantoms. (§7)

From such a height, the philosopher can "look down … upon the ants which are the rest of mankind" (§5). This is a Lucianic recitation of the ancient philosophical theme of the view from above which French scholar Pierre Hadot has highlighted, and which of course is central to the *Icaromenippus*.[24] Lycinus, however, is clearly concerned in the *Hermotimus* that this elevation may be too much for mortals to hope for.[25] As he comments, with a concern which is again lost on his interlocutor: "[d]ear me, what tiny things you make us out—not so big as the Pygmies even, but positively groveling on the face of the earth" (§5).[26] In another clear echo of the cave *eikon* in Plato's *Republic*, Lycinus next asks how exactly such a heroic, divine philosopher could ever be expected to engage with his miserable fellows, or to go back down (*katabainô*) into the worldly cave he has transcended, as Socrates advises that his philosopher-guardians must (Plato, *Rep.* 519c-520e, 539e; Lucian, *Herm.* §8). But Hermotimus' Stoic syllabus clearly has not included the Platonic *Politeia*. For he has not a moment's doubt:

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[24] Cf. Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 238-250; Anderson, *Lucian, Theme and Variation*, 16.

[25] Cf. Grethlein, "Lucian and the Spell", 193.

[26] Further on, at §13, the concern is underscored, when Lycinus expresses his wish to become Stoic like Hermotimus and receives the impassioned reply that: "If only you would, Lycinus! You will soon find out how much you are superior to the rest of men. I do assure you; you will think them all children, you will be so much wiser …"

Lycinus. By Heracles[27] (and his death on Oeta), you tell a brave and manly tale about them [philosophers]. But there is one thing I should like to know: are they allowed to come down (*katerchontai*) from their elevation sometimes, and have a taste of what they left behind them? Or when they have once got up, must they stay there, conversing with Virtue, and smiling at wealth and glory and pleasure?
Hermotimus. The latter, assuredly; more than that, a man once admitted of Virtue's company will never be subject to wrath or fear or desire anymore; no, nor can he feel pain, nor any such sensation. (§8)

However, from near the beginning, Lucian goes out of his way to indicate more and more clearly the hilarious gap that exists between this exciting philosophical ideal, and the actual conduct of Hermotimus' own heroized *didaskalos* or teacher.[28] The central discussion of Hermotimus' paradox, to which we will come momentarily, is in fact framed on both sides by portraits of Hermotimus' teacher behaving in all-too-human ways, despite his god-like discourse (§§9-10).[29] It seems that Hermotimus' teacher lacks self-control, when it comes to both avarice and anger management. At §§9-10, we learn of him acting up when a student has not paid his fees. Lycinus alerts him to the problem here. "Not so fast," he interjects to Hermotimus' defense of his master, referring to the earlier Heraclean parallel, "does it matter to him [if the students do not pay up], when he is now already purified by philosophy, and no longer needs what he left behind on Oeta?" (§10)

To the teacher's irascibility and greed, intemperance and an eristic desire for argumentative glory must be added (cf. *Dial. §*20).[30] We next hear from Lycinus of a drunken brawl (a favorite Lucianic vignette of philosophers (cf. Lucian, *Symp.* §§43-47)) with an Aristotelian about "the old Peripatetic objections to the Porch":

> His long vocal exertions (for it was midnight before they broke up) gave him a bad headache, with violent perspiration. I fancy he had also drunk a little too much, toasts being the order of the day, and eaten more than an old man should… [His rival, Euthydemus] was pretentious, insisted on proving his point, would not give in, and proved a hard nut to crack; so your excellent professor, who had a goblet as big as Nestor's in his hand, brought this down on him as he lay within easy reach, and the victory was his. (§12)[31]

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[27] Lucian highlights his point by making the student whom Hermotimus' teacher thrashes for not paying his bills on time come from "Heraclea".

[28] Cf. Alexiou, *Philosophers in Lucian*, 56-57.

[29] It is above all the *ad hominem* depictions of his teacher's seemingly-very-apparent vices that finally overthrow Hermotimus and allow Lycinus to direct him to "reconcile yourself now to living like an ordinary man" (§86). See below.

[30] Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, "Philosophers and *Philotimia* in Lucian's Perspective", in G. Roskam, M. De Pourcq & L. Van der Stockdt eds., *The Lash of Ambition: Plutarch, Imperial Greek Literature and the Dynamics of Philotimia* (Louvain: Éditions Peeters/Société des études classiques 2012), 153-68.

[31] Nesselrath, "Philosophers and *Philotimia* in Lucian's Perspective", 158-159.

On the other side of Lucian's ring construction in the *Hermotimus*, at the end of the dialogue (§§79-82), a further pedagogical episode of anger at a student for not paying his tuition fees is presented. This time, we also learn that this student's morals have not been improved by his extensive philosophical education: for in addition to not paying his fees, "he carried off my neighbor's Echecrates' daughter, and raped her" (cf. Lucian, *Symp.* 46-47)[32] as well as, echoing Aristophanes' *Clouds*, that he "thrashed his own mother" when she caught him stealing (§81)! For Lycinus, as for Lucian his creator elsewhere, there seems to be a basic mismatch between the ethical goal philosophy promises, and the means that it provides to achieve it, certainly when it comes to the imperial-era Stoics. We stress therefore that Lucian's Stoicism is not that of Musonius, Epictetus, or his contemporary, the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius. It is the philosophy of the Imperial school, wherein one learns to resolve frivolous paradoxes, "how to find and compose your wretched texts and syllogisms and problems" (§79, cf. *Lives*, §§22-23; §§81-82).[33] Such means cannot inculcate virtue, as Hermotimus' teacher and his student prove in the flesh, and as we can also find acknowledged in both Seneca and Epictetus (Seneca, *Letters* 1.1-4, 45.8, 48.9, 48.12, 88.2, 88.7,108.24-28; Epictetus, *Disc*. I.4.4-14; III.21).[34]

Certainly, readers can find no extensive dogmatic expositions of any philosophical system in Lucian's *Hermotimus*.[35] Yet, we can hardly infer from this premise that Lucian cared or knew nothing of the systematic teachings of the different schools of his day. Instead, his concern in this dialogue, as the repeated intertextual references to the Platonic *Republic* make clear, is with questions of pedagogy, as against dogmatics: of how one can teach, and learn, to be a true philosopher, as against a *philologos* or acolyte of some master whose morals would remain untouched, or even be worsened by, one's false 'philosophy'. The problem with presupposing that to be a philosopher is to know a complex theoretical system, and then to identify with this system or one's master, is the problem of the Hermotimus paradox, towards which we now must turn in due detail.

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[32] One might suppose an intended, pointed reference here to Plato's *Phaedo*, wherein Echecrates is the Pythagorean philosopher who asks the eponymous Phaedo to recount the last hours and death of Socrates. Cf. Mheallaigh, " 'Plato alone …'", 95-96.

[33] Alexiou, *Philosophers in Lucian*, 127-130.

[34] Cf. Robert Wagoner, "Seneca on Moral Theory and Moral Improvement". *Classical Philology* 109, no. 3 (2014): 241-26; Matthew Sharpe, "How it's not the Chrysippus you Read: On Cooper, Hadot, Epictetus, and Stoicism as a Way of Life", *Philosophy Today* 58, no. 3 (2014): 367-392.

[35] Edwards, "Lucian and the Rhetoric of Philosophy", 195.

ii.   *The elenchus and the action of the dialogue: the humbling of Hermotimus' self-conceit*

We are now ready to turn directly to the *Hermotimus'* core paradox, and the failed attempts of the eponymous, hapless hero of Lucian's dialogue to resolve it. To cite Lycinus' clear statement of the issues:

Lycinus. Then, as you love me, answer this: when you first went in pursuit of philosophy, you found many gates wide open; what induced you to pass the others by, and go in at the Stoic gate? Why did you assume that that was the only true one, which would set you on the straight road to Virtue, while the rest all opened on blind alleys? What was the test you applied then? … this must be my first lesson from you—how one can decide out of hand which is the best and the true philosophy to be taken, leaving aside the others (§15-16).

The paradox, also explored in ancient skeptical literature, is that such an initial choice seems to presuppose a wisdom that could only be achieved at (and as) the end of a person's philosophizing. We seem to need to already be wise, to know which dogmatic approach to philosophy could lead us to wisdom (§§25-29)—but then, we would hardly need philosophy at such a point at all. In the *Hermotimus'* framing of this paradox, the key Platonic intertext is evidently the *Meno* (80d-e), as we have commented. Far from being dated or affected, Lycinus (we would contend) poses in this passage a real, hard and continuing problem we all face, firstly as students, if we are sufficiently self-aware to not just uncritically accept what sanctioned authorities teach us as being authoritative or true; and secondly, as teachers, whose task it is to convey the inherited knowledges of established texts and authorities to our students, at the same time as we presumably hope that this process will intellectually and normatively benefit them.

Hermotimus is doubtlessly not the most astute of inquirers. But he has a rustic honesty (see §77) which allows Lucian to stage directly what are the principal, mundane motivators students have for adopting a philosophical system before they have had anything like the time or education to make a well-informed choice. Firstly, Hermotimus says that it was the popularity of the Porch that attracted him (§16). Next, when Lucian Socratically gets him to admit that not all popular beliefs are true, Hermotimus recurs to hearsay (§§16-17). He had heard that Stoicism was the best philosophy, although his stress on the received idea that the school could make students "the only king, the only rich man, the only wise man, and everything rolled into one" gently suggests further doubts as to his starting motives, and the place of vanity within them (§16). Yet, if he had been exposed by his teacher to the Stoics' hero, Socrates, Hermotimus would have known that Lycinus is not about to accept any appeal

to hearsay. For, as Hermotimus should have agreed based on his haughty disdain for most people (cf. i. above), most non-philosophers are unwise:

Lycinus. There you are again, cheating me with your irony; you take me for a blockhead, who will believe that an intelligent person like Hermotimus, at the age of forty, would accept the word of laymen about philosophy and philosophers, and make his own selection on the strength of what they said (§§17-18).

Thirdly, Hermotimus tries telling Lycinus that he was attracted to the Porch due to the outwardly noble appearance of the Stoics, topped off with a further recourse to "what everyone admits":

> I saw the Stoics going about with dignity, decently dressed and groomed, ever with a thoughtful air and a manly countenance, as far from effeminacy as from the utter repulsive negligence of the Cynics, bearing themselves, in fact, like moderate men; and everyone admits that moderation is right (§18).

The evident Socratic objection is once more that such outer appearances are hardly a dependable guide to actual virtue or wisdom, as the facts we learn about Hermotimus' teacher of course underline. To be wise, one needs more than to have grown a beard or shaved one's head, and donned a khiton or black skivvy, etc. (§18).[36]

At this point of the *Hermotimus*, §20, we get the first of five points where Hermotimus tries to shut the dialogue down, which are so redolent of like protests by Socrates' interlocutors within the Platonic dialogues. The other episodes come in §50, §52, §61 and §71. Together, these episodes inscribe the arc of the principal dramatic action of the dialogue: the removal by Socratic elenchus of Hermotimus' opening, dogmatic self-certainty and sense of arrogant superiority over the motley herd. To re-sound the echo of the *Republic* we noted above, this process of being refuted should be read as Hermotimus' own "rough ascent", or his philosophical purification by fire (cf. §7; iii below). It is just that here, as in some of Plato's early dialogues[37], it is an ascent *out of* his dogmatic stance towards his own beliefs and supercilious sense of the wrong-headedness or inferiority of others.

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[36] Intriguingly, Lycinus makes an aside at this point about the blind also being excluded, if appearances are the best guide to choosing a philosophy (§19). Hermotimus' learned, affected arrogance is again evident, when he by contrast says "[m]y argument (*logos*) is not addressed to the blind, Lycinus; I have no interest in them" (§19). Lycinus' larger point is again Socratic. Whatever wisdom is, it will be physically invisible, a quality of soul: "[i]t is not the way of such qualities to come out like that; they are hidden and secret; they are revealed only under long and patient observation, in talk and debate and the conduct they inspire" (§19).

[37] Again, we note that this notion of early-middle-late dialogues is the subject of scholarly debate. We refer to it only as accepted *endoxa*.

In Socratic fashion[38], Lycinus takes the lead of the inquiry from Hermotimus at §20. Without apparent irony, he presents the vision of the republic of sages as the goal of philosophy mentioned above (§§22-25; cf. iii below). This vision provides the occasion for a second reformulation of the Hermotimus paradox. Now the issue is how we might get to such a utopian republic, having not seen it ourselves, when there are many paths proposed towards it by the different philosophical schools:

Indeed, it is not one and the same road that appears, but they are many and various and most unlike one another. For one seems to lead to the west, another to the east, that to the north and this straight to the south; and one through meadows, gardens and shades, a way well-watered and sweet with neither obstacle nor difficulty, while another is rocky and harsh, proffering sun, thirst and fatigue (§25).

Moreover, there are no fewer teachers at the entrances of these different dogmatic paths, each of whom claims exclusive authority as the sole true guide (§26).[39] Nevertheless, each of these teachers too has only travelled their own paths, and not those of their competitors (§27, §29). Lycinus hence protests that the problem for anyone who has only been instructed within one philosophical school is akin to that of a person who has never travelled outside their own country. (Ethiopia is Lycinus' example, but one can also hear another Platonic cave echo (*Rep.* 515a-c)). Naturally, they will suppose that all human beings are like their own country-people, for lack of experience of anything else (§§31-32). If one protests that nevertheless a student within any one dogmatic sect can readily learn about other doctrines, Lycinus responds that instructors belonging within each school have many incentives to misrepresent the views of opponents, with whom they are competing for students' adulation and fees:

> the business is too like the sand houses which children, having built them weak, have no difficulty in overturning, or, to change the figure, like people practicing archery; they make a straw target, hang it to a post, plant it a little way off, and then let fly at it; if they hit and get through the straw, they burst into a shout, as if it were a great triumph to have driven through the dry stuff (§33).

The dialogue hence reaches a further moment of aporia at §34. Hermotimus' motives for initially choosing Stoicism (popularity, hearsay, appearances) have been Socratically undermined. By now, it also seems clear that opting for any philosophical system pushes one inescapably towards theoretical parochialism. Hermotimus next volunteers bravely that the two of them should therefore inquire together, putting aside appeal to accepted authorities—which is an interesting advance in his intellectual position, compared to the opening, and

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[38] Cf. Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 152-54.
[39] Cf. Nesselrath, "Philosophers and *Philotimia*", 155-156.

arguably as far as he gets in the entire dialogue. At §35, in a way which we will see in iii. is significant, Hermotimus asks Lycinus to compare philosophy to mathematics, where there is one clear and decidable solution to problem (eg: 2+2=4). Once this solution is found by any single approach, we have no need to look into other methods. Alas, Lycinus is not convinced that this is a sound analogy for philosophizing, whose questions and answers are less definable and decidable. Several other analogies are ventured by Hermotimus, which likewise fall down in the elenchus. If one sacred golden cup has been stolen from a Temple where only two people were present, we could know one of them must have stolen it, Hermotimus observes.[40] Likewise, if we found that one person, say a Stoic, has the treasure (wisdom), there would again be no need to question anyone else. The problem with this as an analogical defense for sticking to a single philosophical system, as Lycinus responds, is that when it comes to a search for wisdom:

> It is not certain that the thing was a cup. And even if that is generally admitted, they [philosophers] do not all agree that it was gold; and if it is well known that a gold cup is missing, and you find a gold cup on your first man, even so you are not quit of searching the others; [for] it is not clear that this is the sacred cup; do you suppose there is only one gold cup in the world? (§38)

The only seeming way forwards, Lycinus hence famously proposes, would be to accumulate an encyclopaedic knowledge of all the disputing philosophical systems, before committing to any one perspective:

If I am to take any one's advice upon the right philosophy to choose, I insist upon his knowing what they all say; everyone else I disqualify; I will not trust him while there is one philosophy he is unacquainted with; that one may possibly be the best of all (§45).[41]

However, this proposition brings with it at least two other problems. First, there is what we might call the "inertial problem". "When we once have committed ourselves and set sail, it is not easy to return" or to investigate competing philosophers, Hermotimus now acknowledges (§47).[42] This is especially important: to become an expert in any complex theoretical system, or interpreting the work of any difficult textual authority, takes time and

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[40] See Lucian, *Symposium*, §§46-47, where it is the rhetorician Dionydorus caught red-handed stealing a gilded drinking-vessel, when the lights come on.

[41] Edwards, "Lucian and the Rhetoric of Philosophy", 195.

[42] This has emerged earlier, at §28: "And as to the perils of blundering into one of the wrong roads instead of the right one, misled by a belief in the discretion of Fortune, here is an illustration:—it is no easy matter to turn back and get safe into port when you have once cast loose your moorings and committed yourself to the breeze; you are at the mercy of the sea, frightened, sick and sorry with your tossing about, most likely."

energy. Having 'sunk that cost', as the economists say, then to reject this system, even for very good reasons, is psychologically and perhaps professionally damaging for the inquirer, especially when others have looked to them for direction—we will return to this issue in iii below.[43]

Secondly, there is what we might call the "longevity problem". Hermotimus admits that, given the state of theoretical contest even in the 2nd century CE, and assuming about twenty to thirty years to attain full mastery of any one philosophical school's dogmata (§48), it would take far more than one human lifetime to examine all philosophical systems impartially, in order to make an informed choice between them (§§48-50). This *reductio ad absurdum* occasions Hermotimus' second disgruntled moment at §50, which sees him launch an irritated *ad hominem* attack on Lycinus' "detailed examination and unnecessary precision", as well as his alleged "hatred" and "mockery" for the poor philosophers (§53).

Hermotimus' final, increasingly fraught attempt to defend the rationality of his choice for Stoicism, despite what the elenchus is suggesting, once more proceeds by way of two arguments from analogy (§54-69). As Phidias could discern the size of a lion, having seen just its claw, so surely the student can discern the quality of a whole philosophical system from, say, an introductory lecture (§54). Yet, Lycinus retorts, if Phidias had never seen a complete lion before, he could never draw an entire lion from seeing only its claw. The problem remains precisely that no one has seemingly seen the final goal of philosophy, wisdom (§54). But is not hearing or reading a philosopher not like drinking a draft of wine, from which one is readily able to tell the quality of the whole cask (§58)? No, Lycinus retorts, for all we know, philosophical learning may be far more like a cask of asserted seeds, "on the top is wheat, next beans, then barley, below that lentils, then peas—and other kinds yet" (§59). So, when someone hears a particular philosophical proposition, just as if they were to take a scoop of seeds from the top of such a cask, they can tell little about the quality of the whole—just as, in an avowedly "blasphemous" nod to the *Phaedo*, Lycinus comments that one cannot tell the finally lethal effects of taking hemlock from only a small dose (§62).[44] We are compelled at

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[43] As John Locke would write in *The Essay on Human Understanding* (IV, xx, 11): "Can anyone expect that he should be made to confess, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate. What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? … All the arguments that can be used will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster."

[44] Cf. Grethlein, "Lucian and the Spell", 192-194.

this point to confront the final possibility that all extant philosophies may be false paths to truth, and that we have no sure way of deciding the matter:

> Do you think it impossible they may all be deluded, and the truth be something which none of them has yet found? … In the same way, all philosophers are investigating the nature of Happiness; they get different answers, one Pleasure, another Goodness, and so on through the list. It is probable that Happiness is one of these; but it is also not improbable that it is something else altogether … (§66)

The dialectical argumentation of the *Hermotimus* concludes by showing that the problems cannot ostensibly be avoided if we reframe the paradox around the idea that it should be the choice of a good teacher, not a theoretical system, that could guarantee the path to the goal.[45] After one more *ad hominem* outburst from Hermotimus ("how unkindly you treat me!" (§71)), Lycinus is ready to return to his opening themes of the putative philosophers Hermotimus has idolised 'speaking high but acting low'. This time, he openly presents the philosophical aspiration towards divinity as nothing more than a fond, hybristic fantasy:

At least your chagrin will be considerably lessened by the thought that you are not alone in your disappointment; practically all who pursue philosophy do no more than disquiet themselves in vain … As to your present mood, it is that of the man who cries and curses his luck because he cannot climb the sky, or plunge into the depths of the sea at Sicily and come up at Cyprus, or soar on wings and fly within the day from Greece to India; what is responsible for his discontent is his basing of hopes on a dream-vision or his own wild fancy, without ever asking whether his aspirations were realizable or according to human nature (*kata tên anthôpou phusin*). (§71)[46]

At the end of the dialogue, as we mentioned above, Hermotimus is encouraged to accept the life of the ordinary man (*ô idiôtês*) as better than that of the philosophising he has for so long pursued (§79, §84). We rejoin here the seemingly entirely anti-philosophical advice of Teirisias to Menippus in the *Icaromenippus* (§21), as commentators have observed.[47] But whether this conclusion of the exchange between Lycinus and Hermotimus, and assessment of the latter's specific prospects, are to be taken as definitive of Lucian's wider vision of philosophy is another question, to which we turn now.

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[45] For one would then need to know how to decide which teacher is good; or else find some trustworthy second judge to certify the quality of the first teacher; which judge would in turn need to be certified by a yet third person, and so on *ad infinitum.*

[46] The action closes with Hermotimus finally admitting defeat. Far from reaching the pinnacle of Mount Oeta, Hermotimus ends in anguish at the time and money he has wasted and resolved to live an ordinary life. And "if in future I meet a philosopher while I am walking on the road, even by chance, I will turn around to get out of the way as if he were a mad dog (*hôsper tous luttôntos tôn kunôn*)." (§86)

[47] Reardon, *Courants litteraires grecs des IIe et IIIe sie`cles apres J.-C.,* 39; Alexiou, *Philosophers in Lucian*, 75, 149; Schlapbach, "The *logoi* of Philosophers", 251-252.

iii.   *From dianoia to dialectic, the true Lucianic philosopher*

It is very easy to see why any dialogue concerning the possibility of philosophy ending with such a terminus has been read as a wholly sceptical performance, and testimony to its author's anti-philosophical credentials.   Faced with the growing prominence of students like Hermotimus in the imperial schools of his day—remembering that Marcus Aurelius had set about re-founding the four dogmatic schools in Athens—Lucian's goal was clearly to show that 'philosophy' in such institutionalised formats too often cannot be really distinguished from sophistry or close-minded sectarianism.[48] Its claim to wisdom, and to guiding students towards better lives, too often proves to be nothing more elevated than a prop for insecure young men's vanity and desire for distinction. Its epistemic bases, in the absence of certifiable rational grounding, rest on forms of uncritical faith in the authority of teachers and sanctified dogmata which are in no strong sense distinguishable from the most common superstitions or choosing a dogma by lot and then sticking to it (cf. §57).

However, to read the *Hermotimus* this way is to read it incompletely, we now want to contend. For there are clear moments in the dialogue which suggest, in line with Lucian's protestations in *The Fisherman* (§§32-33) and *Lives for Sale* (§§33-37), that what is at stake here is a purifying critique of established, fallen modes of philosophising, *within* the Socratic paradigm, not the complete skeptical undermining of philosophy as such. We might compare the logic here to Socrates' denunciation of false suitors for philosophy in *Republic* VI, which in no way prevent him from presenting an alternative model of true, admirable philosophers and philosophy (*Rep.* 495d-496d). Telling here is Lycinus' completely anironic description of the city of philosophy at *Hermotimus* §§24-25, which we have skirted several times (and one can wonder about the identity of the old man he narrates):

I remember hearing a description of it all once before from an old man, who urged me to go there with him. He would show me the way, enrol me when I got there, introduce me to his own circles, and promise me a share in the universal Happiness … Among the noteworthy things he told me, I seem to remember these: all the citizens are aliens and foreigners, not a native among them; they include numbers of barbarians, slaves, cripples, dwarfs, and poor; in fact any one is admitted; for their law does not associate the franchise with income, with shape, size, or beauty, with old or brilliant ancestry; these things are not considered at all … Such distinctions as superior and inferior, noble and common, bond and free, simply do not exist there, even in name. (§24)

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[48] Peterson, "Pushing Forty", 12; Branham, *Unruly Eloquence*, 121.

When Hermotimus takes this as confirming the very elevated sense of philosophy's goal which he has been enthused by, however naively, Lycinus again replies without any of his characteristic irony:

Lycinus. Why, your desire (*erô*) is mine too; there is nothing I would sooner pray for. If the city had been near at hand and plain for all to see, be assured I would never have doubted, nor needed prompting; I would have gone thither and had my franchise long ago; but as you tell me—you and your bard Hesiod—that it is set exceeding far off, one must find out the way to it, and the best guide. (§25)

This highly Platonic exchange, early in the *Hermotimus*, should put us on our guard against supposing that Lycinus' ensuing undermining of Hermotimus' dogmatic stance is an attack on the worth of philosophising *per se*. Instead, it primes us to the possibility that the destructive elenctic work of the *Hermotimus* itself, despite appearances, represents its own small contribution to finding a way to the exceedingly distant pedagogical goal of true philosophy. To find this way, we must surely first remove ourselves from the false paths we almost certainly will find ourselves upon, as well as the conceited sense that we have already arrived at the goal, without need of any correction. A further Platonic text, the *Sophist*'s famous depiction of the work of *elenchus* in the mouth of the Eleatic stranger is hence apposite to invoke here:

> *Str.* But … some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he thinks himself to be clever (*oioito peri deinos einai*), and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good.
>
> *Theaet.* There they are quite right.
>
> *Str.* Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate this conceit (*dozês* [of cleverness-Fowler]) in another way … They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. (Plato, *Soph.* 230b-d)

It would be difficult to find a better description for the humbling of Hermotimus' conceit in Lucian's *Hermotimus* than this account of the humanising effects of the elenchus from Plato's *Sophist*. Hermotimus is able by the end of our text to compare Lycinus to a Euripidean "god in the machine (*theos ek mêchanês*)", who has "come and pulled me out when I was being carried away by a rough (*tracheos*), turbid current, giving myself to it and going with the stream" (§86). In place of a supercilious would-be philosopher-deity looking down

from Olympian heights on antlike mortals, we arrive at Hermotimus as a repentant, in "anguish" at himself (*oduromai*) for "the time I have wasted like a fool" pursuing a single dogmatic approach (§83). His fate can hence be compared by Lucian now, for the first time, to the actual founder of the Stoics, Zeno of Kition, of whom he professes himself a follower: "I think I might well shave my head *like free men who are saved from shipwreck*, to give thanks for salvation today now that I have had so heavy a mist shaken off my eyes" (§86 [our italics]).[49]

With this much said, let us now examine what we contend are no fewer than five openings, at §24, §§29-30, §64, §§68-69, and §§74-75, wherein Lycinus allows us to glimpse what he calls an "Ariadne's thread" out of the labyrinths of competing closed dogmatisms in which Hermotimus has found himself lost within, resolving the Hermotimus paradox by reframing what philosophy is or ought to be (§68). The key, Socratic shift Lycinus prompts Hermotimus to consider is to transfer his focus from the goal of philosophy, wisdom, to *the ways* in which we could search for it. The republic of sages passage has alerted us to this shift, when it tells us before the major elenctic work of the dialogue has begun, that "anyone who would be a citizen needs only understanding (*sunesin*) and desire for noble things (*epithymian tôn kalôn*), energy, perseverance, fortitude and resolution *in facing all the trials of the road*; whoever proves his possession of these by persisting till he reaches the city is *ipso facto* a full citizen, regardless of his antecedents" (§24 [our italics]).

When Hermotimus, in frustration, defaults to a decisionistic assertion that, all quibbling aside, the Stoics are just *clearly* the best choice for a philosophical way of life at §29, Lycinus gives us a second positive recommendation as to how we might alternatively proceed, facing these "trials of the philosophical road." It is a matter of what the sceptics called *epochê*:

> Do you see, Hermotimus, how common (*koinon*) is that assertion you made? Plato's fellow-traveller, Epicurus' follower, and the rest of them would say the same, every one of them … so I must either believe all of them or disbelieve impartially. The latter is much the safest, until we have found out the truth (§29).

By way of this suspension of judgment, the Lucianic philosopher who does not know which theoretical perspective is right in advance needs to expose themselves to as many competing perspectives as possible, as if she were a juror in a lawcourt:

> These are not the instructions issued to juries, Lycinus; they are not to hear one party, and, refuse the other permission to say what he deems advisable; they are to hear both sides alike,

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[49] Cf. Edwards, "Lucian and the Rhetoric of Philosophy", 199-200; i.e. remembering that Zeno of Kition, the Stoic founder, was shipwrecked outside of Athens before turning to philosophy.

with a view to the better sifting of truth from falsehood by comparison of the arguments; if they fail in these duties, the law allows an appeal to another court (§30).[50]

Philosophy in these passages is hence emerging not as a systematic dogmatic orientation or set of answers. It is as a way of assessing competing claims to truth; a way which presupposes no identification with any system, and which, as such, can begin to be taught and modelled even to novices. The third, much fuller positive description of the Lucianic true philosopher's epistemic virtues however comes in §64—after the breakdown of Hermotimus' proposed analogies for philosophical learning, of the lion's claw, the stolen cup, and the draft of wine (see ii. above). A "greatest thing (*tou megistou*)" is needed by the aspiring philosopher, even once one he has examined many views. And this greatest thing turns out to be a set of epistemic virtues to enable the skilful seeking out and assessing of the range of competing evidences, arguments, and perspectives before leaping to final judgment or sectarian identification:

Lycinus. Why (bear with me), a critical (*kritikês*) investigating (*ezetastikês*) faculty, mental acumen (*nou ozeos*), a precise (*akribous*) and impartial (*adekaston*) understanding (*dianoias*); without this, the completest inspection will be useless … the owner of [these attributes] must further be allowed not a little time (*to toiouto chronon ouk oligon*); he will collect the rival candidates together, and make his choice with long, lingering, repeated deliberation; he will give no heed to the candidate's age, appearance, or repute for wisdom, but perform his functions like the Areopagites, who judge in the darkness of night, so that they must regard not the pleaders, but the pleadings. Then and not until then will you be able to make a sound choice and philosophise (*philosophein*). (§64)

Hermotimus, unfortunately, entirely misses the significance of this decisive moment in Lycinus' discourse and its clear link, via the juridical model, back to the recommendations at §§29-30. In reply, he laments without cause (and perhaps in a further ironic aside to the *Phaedo*[51]) that such a practice of inquiry could only emerge "after death". In case we missed it, in any event, Lucian has Lycinus at §§68-69 give us yet a fourth, confirming formulation concerning the epistemic virtues of a true philosopher, as against any dogmatic sectarians:

For the discovery of truth (*tên alêtheian*), your one and only sure or well-founded hope is the possession of this power: you must be able to judge (*krinein*) and separate (*chôrizein*) truth from falsehood; you must have the assayer's sense for sound and true or forged coin; if you could have come to your examination of doctrines equipped with a power (*dunamin*) and craft

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[50] As Lycinus emphasises, somewhat later, when asked to depict the Ariadne's thread he has hinted must exist to resolve Hermotimus' paradox: "It is not original; I borrow it from one of the wise men: 'Be sober and doubt all things,' says he. If we do not believe everything we are told but behave like jurymen who suspend judgment till they have heard the other side, we may have no difficulty in getting out of the labyrinths." (§68)

[51] Cf. also §84, where an Aesopian fable is introduced, with *Phaedo*, 60c, and the significance of the name Echecrates, as above.

(*technên*) like that, I should have nothing to say; but without it there is nothing to prevent [others] severally leading you by the nose … (§68)[52]

The fifth and final passage in which Lucian lets us glimpse the attributes of the true philosopher comes at §74. The key background text here is again *Republic VI-VII*, but this time not the cave *eikon* (see i. above), but the division of intellectual powers pictured in the famous "divided line" (*Rep.* 509d-511e). In this famous image, we recall that philosophy and dialectic, as its distinctive Socratic-Platonic method, are situated as both ideally pedagogically conditioned by, and qualitatively beyond, the kind of understanding (*dianoia*) characteristic of mathematical studies like geometry (esp. *Rep.* 526c-527c).[53]

The problem with the kind of systematising philosophy Hermotimus has long ago embarked upon, Lycinus tells us, is that it is like to a poetic mythology—and we might reflect on Hermotimus' propensity for arguments from analogy at this point (cf. *Rep.* 510b-d). When the poet tells us that there is a three-headed, six-handed man, we take her word for it and read along for the sake of the story (§74).[54] The poet-author is in this way just like the Platonic geometer of *Republic VII*, who "make[s] use of the visible forms (*tois orômenois*)" to base their demonstrations (*Rep.* 510b, d-e), and reason about them, without ever calling these *hypotheseis* into question (*Rep.* 510c). If anyone doubts the validity of claiming a conscious Lucian intertextual nod to the *Republic* here[55], what follows gives its confirmation. "This is the way that wonderful (*thaumastê*) geometry proceeds", Lycinus tells us:

it sets before beginners certain strange assumptions (*archê allokota tina*) and insists on their granting the existence of inconceivable things, such as points having no parts, lines without breadth, and so on, builds on these rotten foundations a superstructure equally rotten, and pretends to go on to a demonstration which is true, though it starts from premises which are false. *Just so you, when you have*

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[52] What is required therefore is that the pupil finds a teacher "who understands demonstration (*apodeizeôs*) and the art of distinguishing (*diakriseôs*) matters in dispute (*tôn amphisbêtoumenôn*)", who could teach these powers. If Hermotimus could find such a teacher, Lycinus now declares: "you would be quit of your troubles; the best and the true would straightway be revealed to you, at the bidding of this art of demonstration (*apodiktikê*), while falsehood would stand convicted; you would make your choice with confidence; judgment would be followed by philosophy; you would reach your long-desired Happiness, and live in its company, which sums up all good things." (§§68-69)

[53] Cf. Lucian, *Nigrinus*, §2 and Putnam, "Lucian the Sophist", 172.

[54] Significantly and amusingly, it is a heavily-"mathematicised" depiction of what we would next be asked to accept by this Lucianic poet: "six eyes, six ears, three voices coming from three mouths, and thirty fingers … and if he had to go to war, three hands held three shields—light, oblong, and round [sic.]—and three brandished axe, spear, and sword." Even the reference to war here can be read as a play upon Socrates' attempt to "sell" mathematical studies to the thymotic Glaucon in *Republic* VII by advertising their uses in war (*Rep.* 522c-523b, 525b, 526c-d).

[55] And one notes the recourse of Hermotimus to a mathematical analogy, when he begins to think things through for himself, at §35 (see ii. above).

granted the principles of any school, believe in the deductions from them, and take their consistency, false as it is, for a guarantee of truth. (§§74-75 [italics mine])

Now, readers of Plato will know that geometry and the other mathematical subjects are stations on the pedagogic way in the education of the guardians. They are "helpmates" (*sunerithois*) to dialectic, which is the distinct method of philosophy (cf. *Rep.* 521c-531b, 532b-533d). Geometry, and the other mathematical pursuits, assist in training students to "employ pure thought (*noêsei*)" (*Rep.* 526b), with ideas separated from sensible materiality (*Rep.* 524c, 525a, 525c-d, 526b). However, dialectic transcends this kind of *dianoia*. For it, exactly, does not "leave the hypotheses which [it] use[s] unexamined, … unable to give an account of them" (*Rep.* 533c). Dialectic involves a dimension of self-reflection about its own starting points which mathematical, hypothetical modes of inquiry cannot allow. As Lycinus protests: "it was there [with the first postulations] that you ought to have seen whether it [Stoic philosophy] was credible or acceptable … once you admit the premises, the rest comes flooding in" (§74).[56] In this light, Lycinus' continuation of his critique of dogmatic philosophising in the *Hermotimus*, which concerns exactly the incapacity of systems-building philosophers to call their basic assumptions into question, especially given the reputational costs of admitting they were wrong, is telling:

Then with some of you, hope travels through, and you die before you have seen the truth and detected your deceivers, while the rest, disillusioned too late, will not turn back for shame (*oknousin anastrephein aidoumenoi*): what, confess at their age that they have been abused with toys all this time? So, they hold on desperately, putting the best face upon it and making all the converts they can, to have the consolation of good company in their deception; they are well aware that to speak the truth means they will no longer be revered above the many as now (*ôsper nun kai uper tous pollous dozousin*) nor receive the same honour (*oude timêsontai omoiôs*). No, they would not be ready to speak the truth, knowing the heights from which they will fall to the state of ordinary mortals … (§75)

In this way, a final, crowning philosophical virtue is enucleated by the end of Lucian's *Hermotimus*, to be added to those other epistemic virtues we have seen that he repeatedly positively identifies with philosophy. At issue is indeed nothing less than the capacity to *anastrephein*, to be moved to turn one's soul around, letting previously-held opinions go if the evidence suggest this; a capacity which we know is also a definitively Platonic or Socratic

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[56] Cf. *Rep.* 533c: '[f]or where the starting point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known, what possibility is there that assent in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?' 'None,' said he." With Lucian, *Herm.* §28: "Your mistake was at the beginning: before leaving, you should have gone up to some high point, and observed whether the wind was in the right quarter, and of the right strength for a crossing to Corinth, not neglecting, by the way, to secure the very best pilot obtainable, and a seaworthy craft equal to so high a sea."

concern, not simply in *Republic VII*, but including in the decisive cave *eikon*.[57] Unlike the sectarian, whose name is tied to a particular set of dogmata, the true Lucianic philosopher would be unafraid to admit critically that they were wrong, and reconsider their starting points and endpoints dialectically. Then, and perhaps only then, can we talk of a true philosopher, Lycinus stridently affirms:

> Just a few are found with the courage to say they were deluded and warn other aspirants. Meeting such a one, call him a good man, a true and an honest; nay, call him philosopher, if you will; to my mind, the name is his or no one's; the rest either have no knowledge of the truth, though they think they have, or else have knowledge and hide it, shamefaced cowards clinging to reputation … (§§75-76)

Conclusion

We have now argued that the widespread reading of Lucian's *Hermotimus* as a tendentious, if not sophistical, undermining of the possibility of true philosophy, is a partial, and finally erroneous assessment of this rich dialogue. In fact, Lucian's text is profoundly Socratic and post-Platonic, as the text's frequent echoes of Platonic dialogues, including centrally books VI-VII of the *Republic*, alert us. Lucian's target is not philosophising as such, as the search for wisdom, but the ways that philosophising tends to be carried out, through students' early adoption of dogmatic systems conveyed by charismatic teachers or masters. As Hermotimus' inability to provide any good answer as to why he chose to be a Stoic (popularity, hearsay, the appearance of wisdom of Stoics, admiration for his teacher) shows, Lucian recognises that too often we adopt philosophical systems on less than genuinely philosophical or rational grounds, before becoming reputation-bound to defend those systems from critical assessments and countervailing evidences.

Nevertheless, as we have now contended, this does not reflect a sceptical Lucianic denial of the possibility of any more genuine forms of philosophising, any more than Plato's refutations of the sophists would commit him to a radical scepticism about the life of the mind *per se.* In fact, laced in and out of the refutation and humbling of Hermotimus by Lycinus (see ii. above), we have seen that Lucian gives us in at least five places glimpses of a more positive, Socratic vision of philosophy—the same vision which is of course being played out in the dialogue itself (iii. Above). The philosopher who would be not become a sectarian will need

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[57] See Pierre Hadot, "Conversio", in *Discours et mode de vie philosophique* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2010), 133 on the significance of words derived from *strephein* in Plato. In our text, see §28: "For still to turn around (*anastrepsai*) and come back again in safety is no easy matter once a man casts himself to the wind ..."

to cultivate, as we saw, firstly, a "desire for noble things (*epithymian tôn kalôn*), energy, perseverance, fortitude and resolution in facing all the trials of the road" leading to the true city of philosophy (§24). Secondly, they will need by themselves and with the aid of a true teacher to foster in themselves a critical (*kritikês*) investigating ability (*ezetastikês*), sharp mental acumen (*nou ozeos*), a precise (*akribous*) and impartial (*adekaston*) understanding (*dianoias*) able to distinguish true from false (§64, §§68-69), and the open-minded patience to consider all sides of any issue, like a juror or judge facing competing testimony and disputed facts, before committing to judgment (§64, §69). Thirdly and above all, given the human propensity to pre-emptively identify with a dogmatic stance which Hermotimus personifies for us in the dialogue, the true philosopher will need to cultivate the intellectual humility and indifference to public reputation to be able to acknowledge, when the evidence warrants, that they have been mistaken, to be able to *anastrephein*, turn themselves around.

This is, it seems to us, a profoundly post-Socratic, post-Platonic vision of philosophy as an approach to seeking wisdom, rather than identification with any reified intellectual system or doctrine. And the implications of this vision are wide-ranging, not least when it comes to considering philosophical pedagogy. To the extent that we teach philosophy as a sequence of competing systems, headlined by status-conferring textual authorities, Hermotimus' paradox will always apply. Or rather, students will continue to become doctrinaire followers of competing sects on bases which cannot be philosophically defended, but which reflect their pre-philosophical concerns for popularity, reputation, appearances, hearsay, and reverence for social and institutional authorities. It is only by following something like Lycinus' metaphilosophical lead in the *Hermotimus*—that Ariadne's thread he several times advertises, fruitlessly, to Hermotimus in the dialogue—and in doing so, teaching students to philosophise as an art or craft of thinking critically and independently, *before* they adopt some doctrinal identification, that Hermotimus' paradox can be resolved or short-circuited.

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Aristóteles, *Primeiros Analíticos* II, 1-4: tradução e notas[*]

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This is an annotated translation of the first four chapters of the second book of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. I aim to offer Portuguese-speaking readers a clear text with complementary materials to elucidate and contextualize Aristotle's work, fulfilling a significant gap in the Lusophone bibliographical universe. To do this, I have taken Ross's edition of the Aristotelian text as a basis – in which I have made some small changes – and compared my work with a series of existing translations and commentaries on the text.

Apresentação

Na introdução de sua recente tradução para o italiano, Milena Bontempi descreveu os *Primeiros Analíticos* não só como "o primeiro texto de lógica formal", mas também como a obra que "exerceu a influência mais decisiva na história da lógica pós-aristotélica".[i] Por outro lado, no prefácio de sua tradução francesa, Michel Crubellier destaca que os *Primeiros Analíticos* foram historicamente tratados como um livro cuja leitura não seria *obrigatória*. Prova disso seriam os inúmeros manuais e comentários – escritos ao longo de mais de dois mil anos após a redação do texto do filósofo grego – que reconstruíram, complementaram e reformularam o conteúdo da obra, como se tais livros pudessem substituir o estudo do texto original. Se é verdade que, durante séculos, a filosofia da lógica "foi como um conjunto de

notas de rodapé dos *Analíticos*"[ii], também é certo que sua fonte primária nem sempre recebeu a devida atenção.

O objetivo desta tradução – que é a primeira de uma série de traduções dos textos dos *Primeiros Analíticos* que planejo fazer – é preencher uma lacuna significativa no universo bibliográfico em língua portuguesa[iii], oferecendo aos leitores lusófonos um texto claro e com materiais complementares para elucidar e contextualizar a obra de Aristóteles. Acompanhada do texto grego editado por Ross (com poucas intervenções, que foram sempre destacadas), minha tradução e as notas pretendem falar por si mesmas.

Sobre o conteúdo dos quatro primeiros capítulos do segundo livro dos *Primeiros Analíticos*, o capítulo que abre a série se dedica a apresentar os casos nos quais é possível extrair mais de uma conclusão a partir de um par de premissas, tanto pela conversão da conclusão original, quanto pela substituição de alguma premissa, explorando outro termo contido em um dos termos da dedução original. O grupo dos três capítulos seguintes examina os casos nos quais é possível deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de premissas falsas – sendo a primeira figura objeto do capítulo 2, a segunda, do capítulo 3, e a terceira, do capítulo 4. No início do capítulo 2, também encontramos uma exposição sobre a impossibilidade de se deduzir uma conclusão falsa de premissas verdadeiras e, nas últimas linhas do capítulo 4, uma apresentação sobre a impossibilidade de se deduzir uma mesma conclusão de um fato e de sua negação. Não menos digno de nota é que, despretensiosamente, Aristóteles apresenta *en passant* alguns argumentos proposicionais, como *modus tollens* e *silogismo hipotético*.

[ii] Crubellier, 2014, p. 7.

[iii] Embora existam duas traduções para o português dos *Primeiros Analíticos* – publicadas por Pinharanda Gomes, em 1986, e Edson Bini, em 2005 –, nenhuma delas foi feita diretamente da língua original (Gomes assume que se valeu da tradução francesa de Tricot; e Bini, ainda que afirme ter traduzido a obra do grego, fez adaptações literais e absorveu sem grande cerimônia várias notas da versão inglesa de Tredennick). Além disso, ambas oferecem pouquíssimos recursos adicionais para a compreensão do texto.

Capítulo 1 (52b38-53b3)

[Existem pares de premissas dos quais é possível extrair mais de uma conclusão]

[52b38] Ἐν πόσοις μὲν οὖν σχήμασι καὶ διὰ ποίων καὶ πόσων προτάσεων καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, [40] ἔτι δ᾽ εἰς ποῖα βλεπτέον ἀνασκευάζοντι καὶ κατασκευάζοντι, [53a1] καὶ πῶς δεῖ ζητεῖν περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου καθ᾽ ὁποιανοῦν μέθοδον, ἔτι δὲ διὰ ποίας ὁδοῦ ληψόμεθα τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς, ἤδη διεληλύθαμεν.

[52b38] Já examinamos, então, em quantas figuras, e por meio de que tipo e de quantas premissas, e quando e como ocorre uma dedução.[1] [40] Examinamos também os tipos de coisas para as quais é preciso atentar ao se refutar ou estabelecer uma proposição[2] [53a1] e como se deve buscar premissas para o que foi proposto[3] em qualquer investigação.[4] Além disso, examinamos por qual caminho apreenderemos os princípios de cada investigação.[5]

[53a3] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οἱ μὲν καθόλου τῶν συλλογισμῶν εἰσὶν οἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος, οἱ μὲν καθόλου [5] πάντες αἰεὶ πλείω συλλογίζονται, τῶν δ᾽ ἐν μέρει οἱ μὲν κατηγορικοὶ πλείω, οἱ δ᾽ ἀποφατικοὶ

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[1] Assim como Smith, escolhi traduzir "συλλογισμός" por "dedução", por este corresponder a um conceito mais amplo e condizente com o objeto de estudo de Aristóteles do que a noção de "silogismo", consagrada pela filosofia escolástica. Como resume Candel, enquanto o συλλογισμός aristotélico seria "ainda um vocábulo de uso comum que aponta a um uso especializado", o silogismo escolástico acabou se tornando "um tecnicismo já totalmente alheio a qualquer uso comum" (p. 12).

[2] Subentendendo a ocorrência de "proposição" em "ἀνασκευάζοντι καὶ κατασκευάζοντι". Crubellier e Mignucci, entre outros, optaram por "tese" e, Tricot, por "conclusões" (nunca é demais lembrar que a conclusão de uma dedução é uma proposição).

[3] Aristóteles não usa expressamente a palavra "premissas", mas, considerando alguém que se propõe a provar uma determinada conclusão, é natural que ele busque *premissas* que proporcionem tal prova e produzam um argumento que deduza a conclusão proposta. De maneira mais literal, seria possível traduzir "πῶς δεῖ ζητεῖν περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου" por "como se deve pesquisar sobre o que foi proposto".

[4] Traduzindo aqui "μέθοδον" por "investigação" (que também poderia ser "disciplina") – e não por "método", como fazem, por exemplo, Tricot e Tredennick. Uma vez que Aristóteles está falando sobre "*como* se deve buscar..." (premissas para provar uma determinada tese ou conclusão), não faria muito sentido referir-se a outro método, já que o próprio "como" parece designar alguma espécie de procedimento. Vale lembrar da ocorrência do termo "μέθοδος" no exórdio da *Ética Nicomaqueia*, onde tampouco faria tanto sentido que Aristóteles se referisse a "todo *método*": "Toda arte e toda **investigação** [...] parecem tender a algum bem" – "Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα **μέθοδος** [...] ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ" (1094a1-2).

[5] A maior parte dos tradutores concorda que a primeira frase deste parágrafo seria uma síntese temática dos capítulos 1 a 26 do livro I dos *Primeiros Analíticos*. Porém, se, para Mignucci e Ross, a continuação do parágrafo seria um resumo de *todo* o restante do livro I, Smith e Crubellier discordam que os capítulos 32 a 46 teriam como objeto o caminho relativo aos princípios (na página XIV da introdução de sua tradução, Smith afirma que o objetivo dos capítulos 32 a 45 seria "explicar como transformar uma dedução qualquer em uma dedução 'nas figuras'" – objetivo este que Aristóteles teria declarado como alcançado no início do capítulo 46). De todo modo, é praticamente consensual que, neste parágrafo inicial, Aristóteles faz um sumário pelo menos do conteúdo dos capítulos 1 a 31 do livro I.

τὸ συμπέρασμα μόνον. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι προτάσεις ἀντιστρέφουσιν, ἡ δὲ στερητικὴ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τὶ κατά τινός ἐστιν, ὥσθ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι συλλογισμοὶ πλείω συλλογίζονται, [10] οἷον εἰ τὸ Α δέδεικται παντὶ τῷ Β ἢ τινί, καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Α ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ εἰ μηδενὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α, οὐδὲ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἕτερον τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν· εἰ δὲ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Α μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν.

[53a3] Considerando que algumas deduções são universais e outras são parciais[6], [5] todas as universais deduzem sempre várias conclusões, ao passo que, entre as parciais, as categóricas[7] deduzem várias conclusões e as negativas uma única conclusão. Isso porque as outras proposições convertem, mas a proposição parcial privativa[8] não. E a conclusão diz algo a respeito de algo, de modo que as outras deduções deduzem várias conclusões.[9] [10] Por exemplo: se se mostrou que A se atribui a todo ou a algum B, é necessário que B se atribua a algum A[10]; e, se se mostrou que A não se atribui a nenhum B, tampouco B se atribui a nenhum

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[6] Embora a grande maioria dos tradutores se habituaram a verter as expressões "κατὰ μέρος" (aqui presente) e "ἐν μέρει" como "particular", optei pelo termo "parcial", tal como Taylor o fez em sua tradução inglesa de 1807. Ora, literalmente, ambas as expressões significam "em parte". Aristóteles as usa para designar um tipo específico de proposição (ou conclusão de uma dedução), que é aquele que se "atribui a algum" sujeito de um determinado tipo, "não se atribui a algum" ou "não se atribui a todo". Ao apresentar esse tipo de proposição (*Pr. An.* I, 1, 24a18-19), o filósofo o distingue de outros dois tipos: *universal* ou "καθόλου" – cujo predicado se atribui a todo ou a nenhum determinado sujeito – e *indefinido* ou "ἀδιόριστος" – que se atribui a um determinado sujeito sem referência explícita ao todo ou à parte, como no caso de "prazer não ser um bem". Além da confusão criada com outro tipo completamente diferente de seres "particulares" – os "καθ᾽ ἕκαστα", também traduzidos como "singulares" ou "individuais", por exemplo, "Sócrates" ou "Cálias" –, traduzir "ἐν μέρει" como "particular" também ocultaria a relação de subalternância que uma proposição de tal tipo possui em relação à sua universal correspondente.

[7] Em grego, "κατηγορικοί" – usado aqui como sinônimo de "afirmativas" (ou "καταφατικοί"). Também seria possível traduzir "κατηγορικοί" literalmente, como "predicativas" ou "acusativas", ou "positivas", como optou Smith.

[8] Em grego, "στερητική" – usado aqui como um sinônimo de "negativa" ou "ἀποφατική", ou seja, que declara que determinado sujeito *não possui* ou *é privado* de certo predicado.

[9] Evidentemente, o "de modo que" ("ὥσθ᾽") se refere ao fato de as outras proposições serem convertíveis – e não ao fato de a conclusão dizer "algo a respeito de algo" ("τὶ κατά τινός"). Quer dizer, não é porque uma conclusão *diz algo a respeito de algo* que as outras deduções (que têm uma conclusão universal afirmativa, universal negativa ou parcial afirmativa) deduzem mais de uma conclusão, mas sim porque as conclusões dessas outras deduções são passíveis de conversão.

[10] Lembrando que, no capítulo 2 do livro I, Aristóteles mostra que proposições afirmativas são sempre convertíveis. A partir de uma proposição como "A se atribui a algum B" sempre se pode inferir que "B se atribui a algum A" (ou se "algum B é A", logo, "algum A é B"); e, de "A se atribui a todo B", é sempre possível inferir que "B se atribui a algum A" (ou se "todo B é A", logo, "algum A é B") (conversão por limitação) – por exemplo: se "todo *triângulo* é *polígono*" é possível inferir que "algum *polígono* é *triângulo*".

A – sendo isso diferente do que foi colocado anteriormente.[11] Mas se A[12] não se atribui a algum B, não é necessário que B também não se atribua a algum A – pois é possível que B se atribua a todo A.[13]

[53a15] Αὕτη μὲν οὖν κοινὴ πάντων αἰτία, τῶν τε καθόλου καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ περὶ τῶν καθόλου καὶ ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. ὅσα γὰρ ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ μέσον ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστιν, ἁπάντων ἔσται ὁ αὐτὸς συλλογισμός, ἐὰν τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι τεθῇ, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α Β [20] συμπέρασμα διὰ τοῦ Γ, ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ Β ἢ τὸ Γ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη κατὰ πάντων λέγεσθαι τὸ Α· εἰ γὰρ τὸ Δ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β ἐν τῷ Α, καὶ τὸ Δ ἔσται ἐν τῷ Α· πάλιν εἰ τὸ Ε ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ ἐν τῷ Α, καὶ τὸ Ε ἐν τῷ Α ἔσται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ στερητικὸς ὁ συλλογισμός.

[53a15] Essa causa, então, é comum a todas as deduções que fornecem várias conclusões, tanto as universais quanto as parciais.[14] Há, no entanto, outra coisa[15] que se pode dizer sobre as universais.[16] Com efeito, para todos os termos que estiverem sob o termo médio ou sob termo da conclusão[17], haverá a mesma dedução de todos eles, caso sejam colocados uns no termo

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[11] Quer dizer, concluir que "A não se atribui a nenhum B" é diferente de concluir que "B não se atribui a nenhum A" e, portanto, se se conclui uma proposição desse tipo (universal negativa), é possível dizer que tal dedução propicia mais de uma conclusão – e, consequentemente, tal dedução propicia diferentes conclusões. O mesmo se pode dizer de conclusões como "A se atribui a todo B" e "A se atribui a algum B".

[12] Com o objetivo de facilitar a compreensão do texto, acrescentei (ocorrências explícitas de alguns) termos que estão subentendidos.

[13] Tome-se como exemplo "*zebra* [A] não se atribui a algum *animal* [B]" (ou "algum *animal* [B] não é *zebra* [A]"), cuja conversão seria "*animal* [B] não se atribui a alguma *zebra* [A]" (ou "alguma *zebra* [A] não é *animal* [B]") – quando, na verdade, *animal* [B] se atribui a toda *zebra* [A] (ou seja, toda *zebra* [A] é *animal* [B]).

[14] Quer dizer, se a conclusão de uma dedução é convertível, então, tal convertibilidade seria a causa da pluralidade de conclusões dessa dedução, independentemente de ela ser universal ou parcial.

[15] Literalmente, aqui Aristóteles não diz que há "outra *coisa*", mas sim "outro *modo*" ("ἄλλως") de se falar sobre a pluralidade de conclusões das deduções universais. No entanto, como se vê na sequência do capítulo, trata-se de uma outra *razão* pela qual as deduções universais produzem mais de uma conclusão. Vale a pena citar um trecho do comentário de Smith sobre a passagem 53a3-53b3: "Em 53a3-14, Aristóteles mostra que uma conclusão adicional pode ser derivada de diversas formas dedutivas por conversão. Por outro lado, em 53a15-b3, ele está interessado nas conclusões que são deduzidas de uma dedução original com o acréscimo de uma outra premissa. É difícil entender como essas afirmações se relacionam com quaisquer outros projetos dos *Primeiros Analíticos*, ou como exatamente elas se relacionam uma com a outra. É possível conceber que ele esteja tentando explorar como uma coleção de deduções se encaixaria na estrutura de toda uma ciência demonstrativa" (p. 183).

[16] Vale destacar que, para Aristóteles, existem basicamente quatro deduções universais: AAA-1 (*Barbara*), EAE-1 (*Celarent*), EAE-2 (*Cesare*) e AEE-2 (*Camestres*). Ao mencionar, logo a seguir, as deduções que podem ser obtidas com "termos que estiverem sob o *termo médio*", ele claramente se refere às duas deduções universais da *primeira* figura (*Barbara* e *Celarent*) – já que, no próximo parágrafo, ele destaca que a mesma operação só funciona na segunda figura com termos que estão sob o termo da conclusão.

[17] Embora Aristóteles use aqui apenas "conclusão" (e não "termo da conclusão"), como bem observou Waitz (*apud* Tricot), o filósofo não se refere à conclusão em si mesma, mas sim ao termo ao qual se

médio e os outros no termo da conclusão.[18] Por exemplo[19]: se AB [20] é uma conclusão por meio de C, para todos os termos que estiverem sob B ou sob C, necessariamente A será dito deles. Pois se D estiver inteiramente em B, e B em A, também D estará em A. Novamente, se E estiver inteiramente em C, e C em A, também E estará em A. E de modo similar também ocorre se a dedução for privativa.[20]

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atribui o predicado da conclusão, quer dizer, o termo menor. Adotei a solução de Smith, que traduz "συμπέρασμα" nesta passagem por "conclusion-term".

[18] Por "uns... e os outros..." ("τὰ μὲν... τὰ δ᾽...""), Aristóteles simplesmente se refere aos mesmos termos logo antes mencionados, que se encontram, respectivamente, sob o termo médio e sob o termo da conclusão (e não que os termos que se encontram sob o termo médio sejam colocados no termo da conclusão e vice-versa).

[19] O exemplo oferecido por Aristóteles é construído na forma AAA-1 (ou *Barbara*). Se uma dedução tem como conclusão AB – "A se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é A") –, que é alcançada através do termo médio C – ou seja, através das premissas (i) "A se atribui a todo C" (ou "todo C é A") e (ii) "C se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é C") –, logo, todos os termos que estiverem sob B ou C também terão A como predicado. Ora, "se D estiver inteiramente em B", podemos deduzir que "A se atribui a todo D" (ou "todo D é A"), com base nas premissas (iii) "A se atribui a todo B" (conclusão da dedução original, obtida a partir de i e ii) e (iv) "B se atribui a todo D" (ou "todo D é B"). Por exemplo: tomemos A como *animal*, C, *mamífero*, B, *cão*, e D, *rottweiler*; tendo concluído que (iii) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cão* [B]" (ou "todo *cão* é *animal*") (por intermédio do termo C, *mamífero*) e assumindo (iv) "*cão* [B] se atribui a todo *rottweiler* [D]" (ou "todo *rottweiler* é *cão*"), podemos concluir (v) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *rottweiler* [D]" (ou "todo *rottweiler* é *animal*").

Já "se E estiver inteiramente em C", então, é possível concluir que "A se atribui a todo E" (ou "todo E é A"), com base nas premissas (i) "A se atribui a todo C" (ou "todo C é A") (premissa maior da dedução original) e (vi) "C se atribui a todo E" (ou "todo E é C"). Por exemplo: tomemos A como *animal*, C, *mamífero*, e E, *gato*; partindo de (i) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *mamífero* [C]" (ou "todo *mamífero* é *animal*") e assumindo também (vi) "*mamífero* [C] se atribui a todo *gato* [E]" (ou "todo *gato* é *mamífero*"), concluímos (vii) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *gato* [E]" (ou "todo *gato* é *animal*").

Embora Aristóteles tenha dito logo antes que, em casos como esses, "haverá a *mesma* dedução", considerando que os termos são outros, a dedução não seria exatamente a mesma, ainda que tenha a mesma *forma* dedutiva.

[20] Aristóteles se refere a EAE-1 (ou *Celarent*). Para ilustrar o que o filósofo diz, tomemos como base a seguinte dedução: (i) "A não se atribui a nenhum C" (ou "nenhum C é A") e (ii) "C se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é C"), tendo como conclusão (iii) "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A"). Ora, se um termo E estiver inteiramente contido em C, também se conclui que "A não se atribui a nenhum E", com base nas premissas (i) "A não se atribui a nenhum C" e (iv) "C se atribui a todo E" (ou "todo E é C"). Por exemplo: tomemos A como *sapato*, C, *mamífero*, e E, *gato*; partindo de (i) "*sapato* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *mamífero* [C]" (ou "nenhum *mamífero* é *sapato*") e assumindo também (iv) "*mamífero* [C] se atribui a todo *gato* [E]" (ou "todo *gato* é *mamífero*"), concluímos (v) "*sapato* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *gato* [E]" (ou "nenhum *gato* é *sapato*").

Por outro lado, se um termo D estiver inteiramente em B, logo, é possível concluir que "A não se atribui a nenhum D", a partir de "A não se atribui a nenhum B" e "B se atribui a todo D". Por exemplo: tomemos A como *sapato*, C, *mamífero*, B, *cão*, e D, *rottweiler*; tendo concluído (iii) "*sapato* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *cão* [B]" (ou "nenhum *cão* é *sapato*") (por intermédio do termo *mamífero* – quer dizer, com base nas premissas i e ii) e assumindo (vi) "*cão* [B] se atribui a todo *rottweiler* [D]" (ou "todo *rottweiler* é *cão*"), podemos concluir (vii) "*sapato* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *rottweiler* [D]" (ou "nenhum *rottweiler* é *sapato*").

[53a25] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ συμπέρασμα μόνον ἔσται συλλογίσασθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β μηδενί, τῷ δὲ Γ παντί· συμπέρασμα ὅτι οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Β. εἰ δὴ τὸ Δ ὑπὸ τὸ Γ ἐστί, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ τὸ Β· τοῖς δ᾽ ὑπὸ τὸ Α ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει, οὐ δῆλον διὰ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ. [30] καίτοι οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῷ Ε, εἰ ἔστιν ὑπὸ τὸ Α· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ Γ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Β διὰ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ δέδεικται, τὸ δὲ τῷ Α μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀναπόδεικτον εἴληπται, ὥστ᾽ οὐ διὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν συμβαίνει τὸ Β τῷ Ε μὴ ὑπάρχειν.

[53a25] Na segunda figura, porém, será possível deduzir mais conclusões apenas dos termos que estiverem sob o termo da conclusão.[21] Por exemplo: se A não se atribui a nenhum B, mas A se atribui a todo C, conclui-se que B não se atribui a nenhum C.[22] Ora, se D está sob C, é evidente que B não se atribui a nenhum D.[23] Porém, que B não se atribua aos termos que estão sob A, isso não é evidente pela dedução. [30] No entanto, se E está sob A, B não se atribui a nenhum E. Mas antes se mostrou por dedução que B não se atribui a nenhum C, ao passo que agora se apreende sem demonstração que B não se atribui a nenhum A, de modo que não é pela dedução que se segue[24] que B não se atribui a nenhum E.[25]

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[21] Aqui, o que o Aristóteles diz poderia ser traduzido de modo mais literal como: "será possível deduzir apenas o que estiver sob a conclusão". Novamente, traduzi como "termo da conclusão" o que Aristóteles designa simplesmente pela palavra "conclusão" ("συμπέρασμα"). O mesmo ocorre nos próximos parágrafos.

[22] Trata-se de EAE-2 (ou *Cesare*), que Aristóteles apresenta no início de I, 5, convertendo esta dedução a *Celarent* (ou EAE-1): "seja, pois, M predicado de nenhum N e de todo O; uma vez que a premissa privativa ["M não se atribui a nenhum N"] é convertível [ou seja, uma vez que "N não se atribui a nenhum M"], N não se atribuirá a nenhum O" (27a5-7). Exemplificando: se (i) "*mamífero* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *sapato* [B]" (ou "nenhum *sapato* é *mamífero*") – consequentemente, (i') "*sapato* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *mamífero* [A]" (ou "nenhum *mamífero* é *sapato*") – e (ii) "*mamífero* [A] se atribui a todo *cão* [C]" (ou "todo *cão* é *mamífero*"), portanto, (iii) "*sapato* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *cão* [C]" (ou "nenhum *cão* é *sapato*").

[23] O ponto de partida é EAE-2: (i) "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A") e (ii) "A se atribui a todo C" (ou "todo C é A"), portanto, (iii) "B não se atribui a nenhum C" (ou "nenhum C é B"). Ora, se é certo que (ii) "A se atribui a todo C" e existe um termo D inteiramente contido em C – ou seja, se é verdade que (iv) "C se atribui a todo D" (ou "todo D é C") –, logo, também é certo que (v) "A se atribui a todo D" (ou "todo D é A"). Consequentemente, também é possível concluir (vi) "B não se atribui a nenhum D" (ou "nenhum D é B"), simplesmente substituindo C por D na dedução. Por exemplo: se (i) "*mamífero* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *sapato* [B]" (ou "nenhum *sapato* é *mamífero*") e (v) "*mamífero* [A] se atribui a todo *rottweiler* [D]" (ou "todo *rottweiler* é *mamífero*"), portanto, (vi) "*sapato* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *rottweiler* [D]" (ou "nenhum *rottweiler* é *sapato*").

[24] Esta ocorrência de "συμβαίνει" ("se segue") também poderia ser traduzida como "se conclui".

[25] Em seu comentário, Ross argumenta que o ponto destacado por Aristóteles aqui é que "B não se atribui a nenhum E" (ou "nenhum E é B") não é uma consequência da dedução original, mas sim de sua premissa maior – a saber, que "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A"), acrescentando-se o fato de que "A se atribui a todo E" (ou "todo E é A"). Por outro lado, o ponto que Aristóteles parece querer destacar aqui é que, se substituirmos A por E – sendo que E está inteiramente contido em A (ou seja, que "A se atribui a todo E" ou "todo E é A") –, é possível que, com tal substituição, obtenhamos a seguinte premissa (menor) falsa: "E se atribui a todo C" (ou "todo C é E"). Por exemplo: tomemos as premissas de EAE-2: (i) "*polígono* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *círculo* [B]" (ou "nenhum *círculo* [B] é *polígono* [A]") e (ii) "*polígono* [A] se atribui a todo *pentágono* [C]" (ou "todo *pentágono* [C] é *polígono*

[53a34] ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν μέρει τῶν μὲν ὑπὸ [35] τὸ συμπέρασμα οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (οὐ γὰρ γίνεται συλλογισμός, ὅταν αὕτη ληφθῇ ἐν μέρει), τῶν δ᾽ ὑπὸ τὸ μέσον ἔσται πάντων, πλὴν οὐ διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν· οἷον εἰ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸ Γ τεθέντος οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, τοῦ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τὸ Β ἔσται, [40] ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ τὸν προγεγενημένον.

[53a34] Nas deduções parciais, não haverá outra [35] conclusão necessária dos termos que estiverem sob o termo da conclusão (pois não ocorre dedução quando a conclusão [26] é apreendida parcialmente), mas haverá outra conclusão necessária de todos os termos que estiverem sob o termo médio, só que não pela dedução. Por exemplo: se A se atribui a todo B e B a algum C, não haverá dedução daquilo que for colocado sob C[27], mas haverá dedução daquilo que estiver sob B, [40] só que não graças à dedução anterior.[28]

[A]"); ora, substituindo *polígono* [A] por *triângulo* [E] – sabendo que "todo *triângulo* [E] é *polígono* [A] –, teremos: (i') "*triângulo* [E] não se atribui a nenhum *círculo* [B]" (ou "nenhum *círculo* [B] é *triângulo* [E]") e (ii') "*triângulo* [E] se atribui a todo *pentágono* [C]" (ou "todo *pentágono* [C] é *triângulo* [E]"), sendo esta premissa (ii') falsa. Portanto, na segunda figura, a substituição de A por E não funcionaria para obter uma nova dedução, ou, pelo menos, não funcionaria mantendo ambas premissas verdadeiras.

[26] Literalmente, o texto diz: "quando *esta* é apreendida parcialmente" ("ὅταν αὕτη ληφθῇ ἐν μέρει"). Mignucci e Tricot (entre outros) seguem a interpretação de Waitz, para quem "esta" (ou "αὕτη") deve ser interpretada aqui como "a conclusão parcial que será usada como premissa maior" (de um argumento que não consistiria em uma dedução).

[27] Para ilustrar o que diz o filósofo, tomemos como exemplo o seguinte argumento: (i) "*cachorro* [A] se atribui a todo *vira-lata* [B]" (ou "todo *vira-lata* é *cachorro*"), (ii) "*vira-lata* [B] se atribui a algum *macho* [C]" (ou "algum *vira-lata* é *macho*") e, portanto, (iii) "*cachorro* [A] se atribui a algum *macho* [B]" (ou "algum *macho* é *cachorro*"). Ora, se considerarmos que (iv) "*macho* [C] se atribui a todo *canarinho macho* [D]" (ou "todo *canarinho macho* é *macho*"), não é possível inferir – a partir das proposições colocadas – nem que "*cachorro* [A] se atribui a **todo** *canarinho macho* [D]" (ou "todo *canarinho macho* é *cachorro*") nem que "*cachorro* [A] se atribui a **algum** *canarinho macho* [D]" (ou "algum *canarinho macho* é *cachorro*").

[28] Quer dizer, se tomarmos como premissa "A se atribui a todo B" e soubermos que há um termo D inteiramente contido em B (ou seja, que "B se atribui a todo D"), necessariamente, concluiremos que "A se atribui a todo D" – mas isso constituiria uma ocorrência de *Barbara* (ou AAA-1) – e não de *Darii* (ou AII-1), que foi a dedução parcial apresentada logo antes. Para ilustrar, tomemos A como "*cachorro*", B, "*vira-lata*", C, "*macho*" e D, "*vira-lata caramelo*". Nesse caso, um argumento na forma AII-1 (ou *Darii*) seria: (i) "*cachorro* [A] se atribui a todo *vira-lata* [B]" (ou "todo *vira-lata* é *cachorro*"), (ii) "*vira-lata* [B] se atribui a algum *macho* [C]" (ou "algum *macho* é *vira-lata*") e, portanto, (iii) "*cachorro* [A] se atribui a algum *macho* [C]" (ou "algum *macho* é *cachorro*"). Porém, se assumirmos como segunda premissa (ii') "*vira-lata* [B] se atribui a todo *vira-lata caramelo* [D]", então, teríamos a seguinte versão de *Barbara* (ou AAA-1): (i) "*cachorro* [A] se atribui a todo *vira-lata* [B]" (ou "todo *vira-lata* é *cachorro*") e (ii) "*vira-lata* se atribui a todo *vira-lata caramelo*" (ou "todo *vira-lata caramelo* é *vira-lata*"), portanto, (iii') "*cachorro* se atribui a todo *vira-lata caramelo*" (ou "todo *vira-lata caramelo* é *cachorro*").

[53a40] ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸ συμπέρασμα οὐκ ἔσται, [b1] θατέρου δ᾽ ἔσται, πλὴν οὐ διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν, ᾗ καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἐξ ἀναποδείκτου τῆς προτάσεως τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ μέσον ἐδείκνυτο· ὥστ᾽ ἢ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖ ἔσται ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων.

[53a40] E o mesmo também se dá com as demais figuras[29], pois não haverá outra conclusão dos termos que estiverem sob o termo da conclusão[30], [b1] mas haverá outra conclusão dos termos que estiverem sob o termo médio[31], só que não pela dedução original – e sim do modo como também nas deduções universais, a partir de uma premissa não demonstrada, provou-se outra conclusão dos termos que estão sob o termo médio.[32] De modo que (i) ou tampouco haverá mais de uma conclusão no primeiro caso (ii) ou haverá mais de uma conclusão também no outro.[33]

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[29] Não sem alguma razão, Robin Smith observa que é "intrigante" ("puzzling") o fato de Aristóteles se referir a *outras figuras* (no plural), sendo que ele já havia tratado de deduções da primeira e da segunda figura (restando, portanto, apenas a terceira). Smith supõe, então, que o filósofo esteja se referindo às deduções *parciais* da segunda e da terceira figura, já que, no parágrafo anterior, ele havia dado como exemplo uma dedução parcial apenas da primeira figura. A essa referência a *outras figuras*, também podemos acrescentar o fato de que não há dedução universal na terceira figura.

[30] Como se vê, a suposição de Smith mencionada na nota anterior se mostra correta, já que na segunda figura, Aristóteles destacou que é possível – ao menos em *Cesare* (EAE-2) – deduzir outra conclusão que esteja sob o termo da conclusão (e não sob o termo médio).

[31] Literalmente, Aristóteles diz aqui apenas "do outro" ("θατέρου") – e não "outra conclusão dos termos que estiverem sob o termo médio" (como é natural entender a passagem).

[32] Cf. acima 53a29-34. Em relação à ocorrência de "a partir de uma premissa não demonstrada" ("ἐξ ἀναποδείκτου τῆς προτάσεως"), vale citar o comentário de Crubellier sobre a presente passagem: "Aristóteles aparentemente pretende falar de inferências imediatas que podem ser extraídas de uma só proposição, por conversão (ver os capítulos 2 e 3 do livro I) ou por subalternância. Por exemplo, de *A é o caso para todo B*, pode-se inferir que *A é o caso para algum B*. Mas tais inferências não são deduções em sentido estrito, uma vez que a definição da dedução implica que há várias premissas".

[33] Quer dizer, considerando essas provas "a partir de uma premissa não demonstrada", das duas, uma: ou (i) não podemos dizer que há outra conclusão dos termos sob o termo médio no caso de uma dedução universal na segunda figura (e tampouco haveria em deduções parciais); ou (ii) também deveremos dizer que há mais de uma conclusão dos termos sob o termo médio de deduções particulares (e o mesmo se dá no caso de uma dedução universal na segunda figura).

Capítulo 2 (53b4-55b2)

[Não é possível deduzir uma conclusão falsa de premissas verdadeiras; casos na primeira figura nos quais se deduz uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de premissas falsas]

[53b4] Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς προτάσεις [5] δι' ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ἔστι δ' ὥστε ψευδεῖς, ἔστι δ' ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἢ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἐξ ἀληθῶν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος συλλογίσασθαι, ἐκ ψευδῶν δ' ἔστιν ἀληθές, πλὴν οὐ διότι ἀλλ' ὅτι· τοῦ γὰρ διότι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ ψευδῶν συλλογισμός· [10] δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν, ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις λεχθήσεται.

[53b4] É possível, então, que as premissas [5] pelas quais se dá a dedução sejam verdadeiras, falsas, ou que uma seja verdadeira e a outra falsa.[34] Já a conclusão de uma dedução é ou verdadeira, ou falsa – necessariamente.[35] De premissas verdadeiras não se deduz uma conclusão falsa, mas é possível deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira de premissas falsas – só que não o porquê, mas apenas algo que é[36]: pois do porquê não há dedução a partir de premissas falsas. [10] A razão pela qual isso se dá será dita a seguir.

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[34] Nesta frase inicial do capítulo, adotei quase integralmente a excelente sugestão feita pelo parecerista deste trabalho.

[35] Aristóteles parece aqui simplesmente aludir ao fato – decorrente do princípio de não contradição – de que a conclusão de uma dedução não pode ser simultaneamente verdadeira e falsa (ou parcialmente verdadeira e parcialmente falsa).

[36] Traduzi "διότι" por "porquê" e "ὅτι" por "algo que é". Em sua paráfrase, Ross traduziu "διότι" por "causa" ("reason") e "ὅτι" por "fato" ("fact") – e, assim, Aristóteles estaria dizendo aqui que, *de premissas falsas, é possível deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira de um fato, mas não de uma causa*. Nunca é demais lembrar que, para Aristóteles, uma *dedução do porquê* equivale a uma *demonstração*, que é definida por ele da seguinte maneira: "chamo de *demonstração* a dedução científica e, de *científica*, aquela dedução em virtude da qual, por tê-la, conhecemos cientificamente" (*Seg. An.* I, 2, 71b17-19); além disso, na sequência, o filósofo diz que as premissas das quais parte a demonstração devem ser "verdadeiras, primeiras, imediatas, mais conhecidas, anteriores e causas da conclusão" (*Seg. An.* I, 2, 71b20-22) – caso contrário, não haverá ciência em uma dedução. Logo, se uma dedução *formalmente* válida conclui algo verdadeiro a partir de premissas falsas, é evidente que tal dedução não apresentará a causa ou o porquê de tal conclusão, mas apenas terá como conclusão uma proposição *acidentalmente* verdadeira – já que uma dedução válida com premissas falsas também pode levar a uma conclusão falsa. Eis um exemplo de uma dedução com premissas falsas e conclusão verdadeira: "se (i) *todo rubi é veloz* e (ii) *tudo o que é veloz é pedra*, portanto, (iii) *todo rubi é pedra*" (ou, dito de outro modo, "se (ii) *pedra se atribui a tudo o que é veloz* e (i) *veloz se atribui a todo rubi*, portanto, (iii) *pedra se atribui a todo rubi*"). Mantendo exatamente a mesma forma argumentativa e, novamente, partindo de premissas falsas, também é possível inferir uma conclusão falsa – como neste exemplo: "se (i) *todo rubi é veloz* e (ii') *tudo o que é veloz é líquido*, portanto, (iii') *todo rubi é líquido*" (ou, dito de outro modo, "se (ii') *líquido se atribui a tudo o que é veloz* e (i) *veloz se atribui a todo rubi*, portanto, (iii') *líquido se atribui a todo rubi*"). Como se vê a partir desses dois exemplos, em uma dedução formalmente válida com premissas falsas, a verdade da conclusão é totalmente contingente. E eis um exemplo aristotélico de uma demonstração ou dedução do porquê: "(iv) *os planetas estão próximos* e (v) *toda fonte de luz que está próxima não oscila*, portanto, (vi) *a luz dos planetas não oscila*" (ou, dito de outro modo, (v) "*não oscilar é uma característica que se atribui às fontes de luz que estão próximas*

[53b11] Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐξ ἀληθῶν οὐχ οἷόν τε ψεῦδος συλλογίσασθαι, ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ Α ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ Β εἶναι, τοῦ Β μὴ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ Α μὴ εἶναι. εἰ οὖν ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ Α, ἀνάγκη τὸ Β ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἢ συμβήσεται [15] τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον.

[53b11] Em primeiro lugar, então, é evidente que não é possível deduzir uma conclusão falsa de premissas verdadeiras pela seguinte razão: se, sendo A o caso, é necessário que B também seja o caso, então, B não sendo o caso, é necessário que A também não seja o caso.[37] Então, se A é verdadeiro, é necessário que B seja verdadeiro, ou [15] a mesma coisa resultará ser e não ser ao mesmo tempo[38] – o que é impossível.

[53b16] μὴ ὅτι δὲ κεῖται τὸ Α εἷς ὅρος, ὑποληφθήτω ἐνδέχεσθαι ἑνός τινος ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης τι συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι, δι' ὧν δὲ τοῦτο γίνεται ἐλαχίστων, τρεῖς ὅροι, [20] δύο δὲ διαστήματα καὶ προτάσεις. εἰ οὖν ἀληθές, ᾧ τὸ Β ὑπάρχει, τὸ Α παντί, ᾧ δὲ τὸ Γ, τὸ Β, ᾧ τὸ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ψεῦδος εἶναι· ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρξει ταὐτὸ καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρξει. τὸ οὖν Α ὥσπερ ἓν κεῖται, δύο προτάσεις συλληφθεῖσαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν [25] στερητικῶν ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀληθῶν δεῖξαι ψεῦδος.

[53b16] Mas não se deve supor – porque A foi posto como um único termo – que seja possível que algo se siga[39] necessariamente pelo fato de uma única coisa ser o caso – pois isso não é

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e (iv) *estar próximo é algo que se atribui aos planetas que observamos no céu*; portanto, (vi) *não oscilar é algo que se atribui à luz dos planetas que observamos no céu*") (adaptado de *Seg. An.* I, 13, 78a30-b2). Também vale lembrar que, nas linhas inaugurais dos *Primeiros Analíticos* (24a10-11), Aristóteles deixa explícito que o objetivo de sua investigação é a *demonstração* – tratada com maior profundidade apenas nos *Segundos Analíticos* –; por isso, não é de se surpreender que ele aqui chame a atenção para as condições necessárias para uma dedução do porquê.

[37] Aristóteles apresenta aqui uma espécie de *modus tollens* (argumento proposicional também conhecido como *negação do consequente*): "(i) se A, então B; (ii) não B; portanto, (iii) não A" (ou "(i) A → B; (ii) ~B; ∴ (iii) ~A"). Por exemplo: "(i) se *Serafim é humano*, então, *Serafim é animal*; mas (ii) *Serafim não é animal*; portanto, (iii) *Serafim não é humano*"; ou então: "(i) se *chove, o chão fica molhado*; (ii) *o chão não ficou molhado*; portanto, (iii) *não choveu*". Como o filósofo dirá no próximo parágrafo, para que de fato produza uma conclusão necessária, "A" deve ser compreendido como um par de proposições ou premissas – já que não é possível que algo seja necessariamente inferido a partir de um único termo isolado.

[38] Por "a mesma coisa resultará ser e não ser ao mesmo tempo", Aristóteles se refere ao fato de que – se assumíssemos como verdade: (i) "A é necessariamente acompanhado de B"; (ii) "não B"; e (iii) "A" – nós cairíamos em contradição – já que (i) e (iii) implicam (iv) "B", que é a negação de (ii). Outra tradução possível para "ἢ συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι" é "ou *se seguirá* que a mesma coisa é e não é ao mesmo tempo".

[39] Outra tradução possível para esta ocorrência de "συμβαίνειν" é "seja inferido" (ou "resulte").

possível –, já que aquilo que se segue necessariamente é a conclusão, que, por sua vez, ocorre por meio de no mínimo três termos [20] e dois intervalos ou premissas. Então, se é verdade que A se atribui a tudo aquilo a que B se atribui, e que B se atribui a tudo aquilo a que C se atribui, é necessário que A se atribua a tudo aquilo a que C se atribui[40] – e não é possível que isso seja falso, pois assim a mesma coisa ao mesmo tempo se atribuiria e não se atribuiria.[41] Seja A, então, posto como algo uno, mas compreendendo duas premissas.[42] E o mesmo se dá com deduções [25] privativas[43] – pois não se prova uma conclusão falsa a partir de premissas verdadeiras.

[53b26] Ἐκ ψευδῶν δ’ ἀληθὲς ἔστι συλλογίσασθαι καὶ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτάσεων ψευδῶν οὐσῶν καὶ τῆς μιᾶς, ταύτης δ’ οὐχ ὁποτέρας ἔτυχεν ἀλλὰ τῆς δευτέρας, ἐάνπερ ὅλην λαμβάνῃ ψευδῆ· μὴ ὅλης δὲ λαμβανομένης ἔστιν [30] ὁποτερασοῦν.

[53b26] De premissas falsas, no entanto, é possível deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira, seja quando ambas forem falsas, sejam quando apenas uma o for – embora esta não possa ser senão

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[40] Dito de outro modo, “se (i) *A é predicado de tudo aquilo que pertence a B* e (ii) *B é predicado de tudo aquilo que pertence a C*, então, necessariamente, (iii) *A é predicado de tudo aquilo que pertence a C*” (ou, dito de outro modo, “se (ii) *todo C é B* e (i) *todo B é A*, então, necessariamente, (iii) *todo C é A*”).

[41] De modo similar ao do argumento do parágrafo anterior, por “a mesma coisa ao mesmo tempo se atribuiria e não se atribuiria”, Aristóteles se refere ao fato de que – se assumíssemos como verdade: (i) “A se atribui a tudo aquilo que é B”; (ii) “B se atribui a tudo aquilo que é C” e (iii) “A **não** se atribui a tudo aquilo que é C” – cairíamos em contradição, já que (i) e (ii) implicam (iv) “A se atribui a tudo aquilo que é C”, que é a negação de (iii).

[42] Aristóteles parece dizer aqui que, para que seu “*modus tollens*” de fato tenha uma consequência necessária, é preciso que A seja entendido como o conjunto de duas premissas – e não como um termo isolado, do qual, como ele destacara no início do parágrafo, nunca se poderia inferir uma conclusão necessária.

[43] Quer dizer, em deduções que tenham uma premissa e a conclusão negativas – como “se (i) *A não é predicado de nenhum B* e (ii) *B é predicado de todo C*, então, (iii) *A não é predicado de nenhum C*” (ou “se (ii) *todo C é B* e (i) *nenhum B é A*, então, (iii) *nenhum C é A*”) –, tampouco será possível que as premissas sejam verdadeiras e a conclusão seja falsa.

a segunda premissa[44], caso ela seja tomada como inteiramente falsa[45]; caso não seja, é possível que [30] qualquer uma das duas premissas seja falsa.[46]

[53b30] ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχον, τῷ δὲ Β μηδενί, μηδὲ τὸ Β τῷ Γ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λίθῳ οὐδενὶ ζῷον, οὐδὲ λίθος οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ψευδῶν ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα· [35] πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον.

[53b30] Tomemos o seguinte caso: A se atribui a C como um todo, mas não se atribui a nenhum B, e B não se atribui a nenhum C. Isso é possível, por exemplo, com *animal* [A][47] não se atribuindo a nenhuma *pedra* [B], e *pedra* [B] não se atribuindo a nenhum *humano*[48] [C]. Então, se se assume que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*pedra*], e B [*pedra*] se atribui a todo C

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[44] Como bem sugeriu o parecerista deste trabalho, uma tradução mais fiel para "ταύτης δ' οὐχ ὁποτέρας ἔτυχεν ἀλλὰ τῆς δευτέρας" (que traduzi como: "embora esta não possa ser senão a segunda premissa") poderia ser: "no entanto, [...] esta não é qualquer premissa, mas a segunda".

[45] Como fica claro na continuação do texto (explicitamente em 54a4-6), por "inteiramente falsa", Aristóteles se refere a uma premissa ou proposição *universal* – falsa – que é *contrária* a uma proposição universal verdadeira. Quer dizer, se "A se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é A") é uma proposição verdadeira, a proposição universal contrária "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A") será considerada *inteiramente falsa*. E o contrário também: se "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A") é uma proposição verdadeira, a proposição universal contrária "A se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é A") será inteiramente falsa. Por exemplo: se é verdadeiro que (i) "*mamífero* se atribui a toda *ariranha*" (ou "toda *ariranha* é *mamífero*"), a proposição universal contrária (ii) "*mamífero* não se atribui a nenhuma *ariranha*" (ou "nenhuma *ariranha* é *mamífero*") será considerada inteiramente falsa. Porém, a proposição *contraditória* a (i) – "*mamífero* não se atribui a **alguma** *ariranha*" (ou "**alguma** *ariranha* não é *mamífero*") –, ainda que seja falsa, não seria *inteiramente* falsa, mas apenas *parcialmente* falsa. O mesmo ocorre se se toma como verdadeira a proposição (ii') "*amorosa* não se atribui a nenhuma *bomba*" (ou "nenhuma *bomba* é *amorosa*"), a proposição universal contrária (i') "*amorosa* se atribui a toda *bomba*" (ou "toda *bomba* é *amorosa*") será inteiramente falsa, diferentemente da contraditória de (ii') – "*amorosa* se atribui a **alguma** *bomba*" (ou "**alguma** *bomba* é *amorosa*") –, que será falsa, mas não inteiramente.

[46] Dito de outro modo, um argumento não poderá proporcionar uma conclusão verdadeira se ele for criado com *todas* as seguintes condições: (i) conter apenas *uma* premissa falsa; (ii) tal premissa ser a *primeira* premissa; e (iii) tal premissa ser *inteiramente* falsa. Nos casos em que qualquer uma (ou mais de uma) dessas condições não for satisfeita, será possível criar argumentos que deduzam conclusões verdadeiras a partir de uma ou duas premissas falsas.

[47] Acrescentei entre colchetes os termos e os exemplos empregados por Aristóteles, a fim de facilitar a compreensão do texto.

[48] Não é raro encontrar edições que optem traduzir "ἄνθρωπος" por "homem" – em vez de "humano". No entanto, nunca é demais lembrar que "ἄνθρωπος" é um termo que inclui homens e mulheres, ao passo que os gregos tinham a palavra "ἀνήρ" (ou "ἀνδρός", no genitivo) para se referir especificamente a "homem" enquanto "macho da espécie humana".

[*humano*], A [*animal*] se atribuirá a todo C [*humano*], de modo que, partindo de duas premissas falsas[49], obter-se-á uma conclusão verdadeira – [35] pois todo *humano* é *animal*.[50]

[53b35] ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ στερητικόν. ἔστι γὰρ τῷ Γ μήτε τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν μηδενὶ μήτε τὸ Β, τὸ μέντοι Α τῷ Β παντί, οἶον ἐὰν τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ληφθέντων μέσον τεθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· λίθῳ γὰρ οὔτε ζῷον οὔτε ἄνθρωπος οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ παντὶ ζῷον. ὥστ᾿ ἐὰν [40] ᾧ μὲν ὑπάρχει, λάβῃ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ᾧ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει, παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἐκ ψευδῶν ἀμφοῖν ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα. [54a1] ὁμοίως δὲ δειχθήσεται καὶ ἐὰν ἐπί τι ψευδὴς ἑκατέρα ληφθῇ.

[53b35] O mesmo se dá também no caso privativo. Com efeito, é possível que nem A nem B se atribuam a nenhum C, e que A se atribua a todo B, como quando se coloca *humano* [B] como termo médio dos mesmos termos tomados no exemplo anterior, pois nem *humano* [B] nem *animal* [A] se atribuem a *pedra* [C], e *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [B]. De modo que, se [40] assumirmos que aquilo que de fato se atribui não se atribui a nenhum[51], e assumirmos que aquilo que não se atribui se atribui a todo[52], então, partindo de duas premissas falsas, obter-se-á uma conclusão verdadeira.[53] [54a1] E o mesmo também poderá ser feito[54] se cada uma das premissas for tomada como parcialmente falsa.[55]

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[49] A saber, que (i) "*animal* se atribui a toda *pedra*" (ou "toda *pedra* é *animal*") e que (ii) "*pedra* se atribui a todo *humano*" (ou "todo *humano* é *pedra*").

[50] Dito de outro modo, aceitemos como fatos: (i) "todo *humano* [C] é *animal* [A]", (ii) "nenhuma *pedra* [B] é *animal* [A]" e (iii) "nenhum *humano* [C] é *pedra* [B]". Em seguida, se assumirmos que (iii') "todo *humano* [C] é *pedra* [B]" e (ii') "toda *pedra* [B] é *animal* [A]", concluiremos necessariamente – partindo de duas premissas inteiramente falsas – que (i) "todo *humano* [C] é *animal* [A]" – que é uma proposição verdadeira.

[51] Por "assumirmos que aquilo que de fato se atribui não se atribui a nenhum", Aristóteles se refere ao fato de se assumir como premissa – inteiramente falsa – "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *humano* [B]" (ou "nenhum *humano* [B] é *animal* [A]").

[52] Por "assumirmos que aquilo que não se atribui se atribui a todo", o filósofo tem em mente tomar como premissa – inteiramente falsa – "*humano* [B] se atribui a toda *pedra* [C]" (ou "toda *pedra* [C] é *humana* [B]").

[53] Em síntese, se construirmos uma versão de *Celarent* (EAE-1) tendo como premissas: (i) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *humano* [B]" (ou "nenhum *humano* é *animal*") e (ii) "*humano* [B] se atribui a toda *pedra* [C]" (ou "toda *pedra* é humana"), obteremos uma conclusão verdadeira – (iii) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhuma *pedra* [C]" (ou "nenhuma *pedra* é *animal*" – partindo de duas premissas inteiramente falsas.

[54] Outra tradução possível para "ὁμοίως δὲ δειχθήσεται": "e também se poderá mostrar a mesma coisa".

[55] Sigo a tradução mais usual para a expressão "ἐπί τι ψευδὴς" (literalmente, "em algo falsa" ou "em alguma [medida] falsa"), utilizada por Aristóteles para se referir a uma premissa que é falsa, mas não *inteiramente* falsa (cf. acima nota 45). Crubellier encontrou uma solução engenhosa para traduzir a expressão: "falsa até certo ponto" (ou "fausse jusqu'à un certain point").

[54a2] Ἐὰν δ' ἡ ἑτέρα τεθῇ ψευδής, τῆς μὲν πρώτης ὅλης ψευδοῦς οὔσης, οἶον τῆς Α Β, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, τῆς δὲ Β Γ ἔσται. λέγω δ' ὅλην ψευδῆ τὴν [5] ἐναντίαν, οἶον εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχον παντὶ εἴληπται ἢ εἰ παντὶ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν.

[54a2] Se, porém, apenas uma das duas premissas colocadas for falsa, sendo a primeira inteiramente falsa, por exemplo, AB, não haverá conclusão verdadeira, mas haverá se a premissa inteiramente falsa for BC.[56] Chamo de *inteiramente falsa* a [5] proposição contrária, como se aquela que não se atribui a nenhum fosse tomada como atribuída a todo, ou se aquela que se atribui a todo fosse tomada como não atribuída a nenhum.[57]

[54a6] ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχον, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Γ παντί. ἂν δὴ τὴν μὲν Β Γ πρότασιν λάβω ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ τὸ Α Β ψευδῆ ὅλην, καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ Β τὸ Α, ἀδύνατον τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι· οὐδενὶ γὰρ [10] ὑπῆρχε τῶν Γ, εἴπερ ᾧ τὸ Β, μηδενὶ τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ.

[54a6] Tomemos o seguinte caso: A não se atribui a nenhum B, e B se atribui a todo C.[58] Ora, se a premissa BC for tomada como verdadeira, e a premissa AB como inteiramente falsa – sendo A atribuído a todo B –, será impossível que a conclusão seja verdadeira.[59] Pois [10] A

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[56] Como o filósofo havia dito em 53b26-30, uma dedução não poderá obter uma conclusão verdadeira caso apenas a primeira premissa – AB, no caso – seja falsa e, para além disso, seja *inteiramente* falsa. Mas, caso uma dedução seja construída com a primeira premissa verdadeira e a segunda inteiramente falsa, será possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira. Para ilustrar o que Aristóteles diz aqui – e nos próximos dois parágrafos –, tomemos como verdade: (i) "*animal* [A] se atribui a toda *ave* [B]" (ou "toda *ave* é *animal*") e (ii) "*ave* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]" (ou "todo *cisne* é *ave*"). Ora, assumindo a premissa maior – inteiramente falsa – (i') "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhuma *ave* [B]" (ou "nenhuma *ave* é *animal*") e a premissa (ii), conclui-se – por EAE-1 ou *Celarent* – que "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *cisne* [C]" (ou "nenhum *cisne* é *animal*"). Já no outro caso, tomemos como verdade: (iii) "*mineral* [A] não se atribui a nenhuma *ave* [B]" (ou "nenhuma *ave* é *mineral*") e (iv) "*ave* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]" (ou "todo *cisne* é *ave*"). Ora, assumindo a premissa maior – inteiramente falsa – (iii') "*mineral* [A] se atribui a toda *ave* [B]" (ou "toda *ave* é *mineral*") e a premissa (iv), conclui-se – por AAA-1 ou *Barbara* – que "*mineral* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]" (ou "todo *cisne* é *mineral*"). Por outro lado, se a premissa menor (v) for inteiramente falsa – como no caso: (i) "*animal* se atribui a toda *ave*" (ou "toda *ave* é *animal*") e (v) "*ave* se atribui a todo *lagarto*" (ou "todo *lagarto* é *ave*") –, é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira, como "*animal* se atribui a todo *lagarto*" (ou "todo *lagarto* é *animal*").

[57] Dito de outro modo, apenas as proposições universais podem ser *inteiramente falsas*. Se é verdadeiro que "A se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é A"), então, é inteiramente falso que "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A"); se é verdadeiro que "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A"), então, é inteiramente falso que "A se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é A"). Cf. acima nota 45.

[58] São as premissas de *Celarent* (ou EAE-1), das quais se deduz que "A não se atribui a nenhum C" (ou "nenhum C é A") – conclusão essa que Aristóteles reafirmará logo a seguir.

[59] Ou seja, se é inteiramente falso que (i) "A se atribui a todo B" (ou "todo B é A") – sabendo-se que "A não se atribui a nenhum B" (ou "nenhum B é A") – e é verdade que (ii) "B se atribui a todo C" (ou "todo C é B"), será impossível deduzir como verdade que (iii) "todo C é A" (ou "A se atribui a todo C"). Cf. acima nota 56.

não foi atribuído a nenhum dos elementos de C, uma vez que A não se atribui a nenhum dos elementos de B, e B se atribui a todo C.[60]

[54a11] ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β παντὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ, ἐλήφθη δ' ἡ μὲν τὸ Β Γ ἀληθὴς πρότασις, ἡ δὲ τὸ Α Β ψευδὴς ὅλη, καὶ μηδενὶ ᾧ τὸ Β, τὸ Α – τὸ συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος ἔσται· παντὶ γὰρ ὑπάρξει τῷ Γ τὸ Α, [15] εἴπερ ᾧ τὸ Β, παντὶ τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ὅλης λαμβανομένης ψευδοῦς, ἐάν τε καταφατικῆς ἐάν τε στερητικῆς, τῆς δ' ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς, οὐ γίνεται ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα.

[54a11] O mesmo se dá caso A se atribua a todo B, e B se atribua a todo C[61], tomando-se BC como uma premissa verdadeira, e AB como uma premissa inteiramente falsa – ou seja, A não sendo atribuído a nenhum B –; nesse caso, a conclusão será falsa. Pois A se atribuirá a C, [15] uma vez que A se atribui a todos os elementos de B, e B se atribui a todo C. É evidente, então, que, tomando a primeira premissa como inteiramente falsa – seja ela afirmativa ou privativa – e a segunda premissa como verdadeira, a conclusão não será verdadeira.[62]

[54a18] Μὴ ὅλης δὲ λαμβανομένης ψευδοῦς ἔσται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Γ παντὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ [20] δὲ Β τινί, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ζῷον κύκνῳ μὲν παντὶ λευκῷ δὲ τινί, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν παντὶ κύκνῳ, ἐὰν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει ἀληθῶς· πᾶς γὰρ κύκνος ζῷον.

[54a18] Mas, se tomarmos uma premissa que não seja inteiramente falsa, haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois, se A se atribui a todo C e a [20] algum B, e B se atribui a todo C – por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C] e a algo *branco* [B], e *branco* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne*[63] [C] –, se se assume que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B[64] [*branco*], e B [*branco*]

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[60] Via de regra, Aristóteles não costuma dar exemplos quando um argumento é impossível. Para ilustrar o que diz o filósofo, no entanto, podemos construir o seguinte exemplo, com a primeira premissa inteiramente falsa e a segunda premissa verdadeira: (i) "*ave* [A] se atribui a todo *lagarto* [B]" (ou "todo *lagarto* é *ave*") e (ii) "*lagarto* [B] se atribui a todo *camaleão* [C]" (ou "todo *camaleão* é *lagarto*"), de onde se concluiria que (iii) "*ave* [A] se atribui a todo *camaleão* [C]" (ou "todo *camaleão* é *ave*"). Como se vê, diferentemente dos casos ilustrados pelo filósofo, o argumento acima não consegue deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira partindo de uma primeira premissa inteiramente falsa e uma segunda premissa verdadeira.

[61] São as premissas de *Barbara* (ou AAA-1), das quais se deduz que "A se atribui a todo C" (ou "todo C é A").

[62] Cf. acima nota 56.

[63] Nunca é demais lembrar que Aristóteles não tinha ciência da espécie de cisne-negro existente na Austrália. Para o filósofo, portanto, a proposição "todo *cisne* é *branco*" era considerada uma proposição verdadeira.

[64] Eis a premissa falsa – porém não *inteiramente* falsa – do argumento: "*animal* se atribui a tudo o que é *branco*" (ou "tudo que é *branco* é *animal*").

a todo C [*cisne*], A [*animal*] se atribuirá verdadeiramente a todo C [*cisne*] – pois todo *cisne* é *animal*.

[54a23] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ στερητικὸν εἴη τὸ Α Β· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β τινὶ ὑπάρχειν [25] τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενί, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ζῷον τινὶ λευκῷ χίονι δ’ οὐδεμιᾷ, λευκὸν δὲ πάσῃ χίονι. εἰ οὖν ληφθείη τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.

[54a23] O mesmo também se dá caso a premissa AB seja privativa. Pois é possível que A se atribua a algum B [25] e a nenhum C, e B se atribua a todo C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a algo *branco* [B] e a nenhuma *neve* [C], e *branco* [B] se atribui a toda *neve* [C]. Então, se se assume que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B[65] [*branco*], e B [*branco*] se atribui a todo C [*neve*], A [*animal*] não se atribuirá a nenhum C [*neve*].

[54a28] Ἐὰν δ’ ἡ μὲν Α Β πρότασις ὅλη ληφθῇ ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ὅλη ψευδής, ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἀληθής· [30] οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ὅσα τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους εἴδη μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει, ἵππος δ’ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα, [35] ψευδοῦς ὅλης οὔσης τῆς Β Γ προτάσεως.

[54a28] No entanto, se se assumir uma premissa AB como inteiramente verdadeira, e uma premissa BC como inteiramente falsa, haverá a dedução de uma conclusão verdadeira. [30] Pois nada impede que A se atribua a todo B e a todo C, ao passo que B não se atribui a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, as espécies [B e C] de um mesmo gênero [A] que não estão uma sob a outra.[66] Pois *animal* [A] se atribui a *cavalo* [B] e a *humano* [C], mas *cavalo* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *humano* [C]. Portanto, se se assume que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*cavalo*] e B [*cavalo*] a todo C[67] [*humano*], a conclusão será verdadeira[68], [35] sendo a premissa BC inteiramente falsa.

[54a35] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς οὔσης τῆς Α Β προτάσεως. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ Α μήτε τῷ Β μήτε τῷ Γ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, μηδὲ τὸ Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τοῖς ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἴδεσι τὸ γένος·

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[65] Eis a premissa falsa – porém não *inteiramente* falsa – do argumento: “*animal* não se atribui a nada que é *branco*” (ou “nada que é *branco* é *animal*”).

[66] Quer dizer, no caso em que nem B pertence a C nem C pertence a B – embora B e C pertençam a A. O exemplo da sequência do texto esclarece o ponto em questão.

[67] Eis a premissa inteiramente falsa do argumento: “*cavalo* se atribui a todo *humano*” (ou “todo *humano* é *cavalo*”).

[68] A saber, “*animal* se atribui a todo *humano*” (ou “todo *humano* é *animal*”).

τὸ γὰρ ζῷον οὔτε μουσικῇ οὔτ' ἰατρικῇ ὑπάρχει, οὐδ' [b1] ἡ μουσικὴ ἰατρικῇ. ληφθέντος οὖν τοῦ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τοῦ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα.

[54a35] O mesmo também se dá sendo a premissa AB privativa.[69] Pois é possível que A não se atribua a nenhum B e a nenhum C, e B não se atribua a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, um gênero [A] não se atribui às espécies [B e C] de outro gênero. Pois *animal* [A] não se atribui nem à *música* [B] nem à *medicina* [C], e tampouco [b1] a *música* [B] se atribui à *medicina* [C]. Assumindo-se, então, que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B [*música*], e B [*música*] se atribui a todo C[70] [*medicina*], haverá uma conclusão verdadeira.[71]

[54b2] καὶ εἰ μὴ ὅλη ψευδὴς ἡ Β Γ ἀλλ' ἐπί τι, καὶ οὕτως ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α καὶ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ [5] Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τὸ γένος τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ παντὶ πεζῷ, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος τινὶ πεζῷ καὶ οὐ παντί. εἰ οὖν τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ληφθείη, τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει· ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές.

[54b2] E se a premissa BC[72] não for inteiramente falsa, mas apenas parcialmente falsa, também nesse caso haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois nada impede que A se atribua inteiramente a B e a [5] C, ao passo que B se atribui a algum C – como, por exemplo, o gênero [A] se atribui à espécie [B] e à diferença[73] [C]. Pois *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [B] e a todo *bípede*[74] [C], ao passo que *humano* [B] se atribui a alguns *bípedes* [C], mas não a todos. Se se assume, então, que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*humano*] e B [*humano*] a todo C[75] [*bípede*], A [*animal*] se atribuirá a todo C [*bípede*] – o que era verdade.

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[69] Quer dizer, se a premissa maior AB for negativa (ou seja, assumindo-se que "A não se atribui a nenhum B" ou "nenhum B é A"), também será possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira partindo de AB verdadeira e BC inteiramente falsa.

[70] Eis a premissa inteiramente falsa do argumento: "*música* se atribui a toda *medicina*" (ou "toda *medicina* é *música*").

[71] A saber, que "*animal* não se atribui a nenhuma *medicina*" (ou "nenhuma *medicina* é *animal*").

[72] Como o leitor já deve ter percebido, por "premissa BC", Aristóteles se refere à premissa menor ou segunda premissa, ao passo que, por "premissa AB", o filósofo se refere à primeira premissa ou premissa maior de um argumento.

[73] Sobre a noção de "diferença" ou "διαφορά" ("*diaphora*"), Ricardo Santos (2016, p. 134) sintetiza: "Aristóteles chama *diferenças* de um gênero às propriedades que distinguem as diversas espécies desse gênero (por exemplo, *bípede* é a diferença do gênero *animal* que distingue a espécie *homem* das outras espécies desse mesmo gênero). Em [*Categorias*] 1b16-24, argumenta que dois gêneros podem ter uma mesma diferença somente se um deles for um subgênero do outro".

[74] A bem da verdade, Aristóteles usa o termo "πεζός" ("*pezos*"), que significa literalmente "dotado de pés" – e também é traduzido como "pedestre" ou "terrestre". Cometi essa pequena infidelidade com o propósito de deixar o exemplo mais claro em português.

[75] Eis a premissa parcialmente falsa do argumento: "*humano* se atribui a todo *bípede*" (ou "todo *bípede* é *humano*"). Não é uma proposição *inteiramente* falsa, porque algum *bípede* é *humano*, embora nem

[54b9] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς [10] οὔσης τῆς Α Β προτάσεως. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ Α μήτε τῷ Β μήτε τῷ Γ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, οἶον τὸ γένος τῷ ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἴδει καὶ διαφορᾷ· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον οὔτε φρονήσει οὐδεμιᾷ ὑπάρχει οὔτε θεωρητικῇ, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τινὶ θεωρητικῇ. εἰ οὖν ληφθείη τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ [15] Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Α ὑπάρξει· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ἀληθές.

[54b9] O mesmo também se dá [10] sendo a premissa AB privativa.[76] Pois é possível que A não se atribua a nenhum B e a nenhum C, ao passo que B se atribui a algum C – como, por exemplo, um gênero [A] em relação à espécie [B] e à diferença [C] de outro gênero. Pois *animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhuma *sabedoria*[77] [B] e a nenhuma *disposição teórica*[78] [C], mas *sabedoria* [B] se atribui a alguma *disposição teórica* [C]. Se se assume, então, que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum [15] B [*sabedoria*] e que B [*sabedoria*] se atribui a todo C[79] [*disposição teórica*], A [*animal*] não se atribuirá a nenhum C [*disposição teórica*] – isso que já era verdade.

[54b17] Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν μέρει συλλογισμῶν ἐνδέχεται καὶ τῆς πρώτης προτάσεως ὅλης οὔσης ψευδοῦς τῆς δ᾽ ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ συμπέρασμα, καὶ ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς οὔσης τῆς [20] πρώτης τῆς δ᾽ ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς, καὶ τῆς μὲν ἀληθοῦς τῆς δ᾽ ἐν μέρει ψευδοῦς, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ψευδῶν.

[54b17] Em relação às deduções parciais, também é possível haver uma conclusão verdadeira quando (i) a primeira premissa for inteiramente falsa e a segunda premissa for verdadeira, (ii)

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todo *bípede* seja *humano* – ou seja, existem *bípedes* que não são *humanos*.

[76] Quer dizer, se a premissa maior AB for negativa (ou seja, assumindo-se que "A não se atribui a nenhum B" ou "nenhum B é A"), também será possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira partindo de AB verdadeira e BC parcialmente falsa.

[77] Aristóteles usa o termo "φρόνησις" – examinado minuciosamente no livro VI da *Ética Nicomaqueia* –, também traduzido amiúde como "prudência" ou "sabedoria prática".

[78] Aristóteles usa apenas o adjetivo "θεωρητική", e, relação ao qual uma grande parte dos tradutores subentendem o substantivo "conhecimento" ou "ciência" ("ἐπιστήμη"). Para justificar o acréscimo que fiz do termo "disposição", cito a seguinte passagem da *Ética Nicomaqueia*: "Comecemos, então, por essas [virtudes ou disposições] de que antes falamos. Sejam, assim, aquelas pelas quais a alma articula a verdade – afirmando ou negando – cinco em número; são elas: arte, ciência, prudência, sabedoria e inteligência [...]. Assim, a ciência é uma *disposição demonstrativa* [ἕξις ἀποδεικτική] com todos os demais traços que determinamos nos *Analíticos*" (*EN* VI, 3, 1139 b 14-33). Nesse sentido, embora o filósofo não o diga explicitamente neste trecho dos *Primeiros Analíticos*, o gênero do qual a φρόνησις (ou sabedoria) seria uma espécie é a *disposição* (ἕξις ou διάθεσις), sendo um de seus tipos (ou diferenças) a disposição *teórica* – em contraposição, por exemplo, com as disposições *práticas*.

[79] Eis a premissa parcialmente falsa do argumento: "*sabedoria* se atribui a toda *disposição teórica*" (ou "toda *disposição teórica* é *sabedoria*") – que não é *inteiramente* falsa, porque alguma *disposição teórica* é *sabedoria*, embora nem toda *disposição teórica* o seja.

a [20] primeira premissa for parcialmente falsa e a segunda premissa for verdadeira, (iii) a primeira premissa for verdadeira e a premissa parcial[80] for falsa, e (iv) ambas as premissas forem falsas.

[54b21] οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ τινί, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ τινί, οἷον ζῷον οὐδεμιᾷ χιόνι λευκῷ δὲ τινὶ ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἡ χιὼν λευκῷ τινί. εἰ οὖν μέσον τεθείη ἡ χιών, [25] πρῶτον δὲ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ληφθείη τὸ μὲν Α ὅλῳ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἡ μὲν Α Β ὅλη ψευδής, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[54b21] Pois nada impede que A não se atribua a nenhum B e se atribua a algum C, e B se atribua a algum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhuma *neve* [B], mas se atribui a algo *branco* [C], e *neve* [B] se atribui a algo *branco* [C]. Se se coloca, então, *neve* como termo médio [25] e *animal* como primeiro termo[81], e se assume que A [*animal*] se atribui inteiramente a B[82] [*neve*], e B [*neve*] se atribui a algum C [*branco*], sendo a premissa AB inteiramente falsa e a premissa BC verdadeira, a conclusão também será verdadeira.[83]

[54b27] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς οὔσης τῆς Α Β προτάσεως· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι [30] Β τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν παντὶ ὑπάρχει, λευκῷ δὲ τινὶ οὐχ ἕπεται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος τινὶ λευκῷ ὑπάρχει, ὥστ' εἰ μέσου τεθέντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ληφθείη τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδοῦς οὔσης ὅλης τῆς Α Β [35] προτάσεως.

[54b27] O mesmo também se dá se a premissa AB for privativa. Pois é possível que A se atribua inteiramente a B e não se atribua a algum C, ao passo que [30] B se atribui a algum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [B], mas não acompanha algo *branco* [C], e *humano* [B] se atribui a algo *branco* [C], de modo que, se se coloca *humano* como termo médio e se assume que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B [*humano*] e que B [*humano*] se atribui a algum C [*branco*], haverá uma conclusão verdadeira[84] partindo de [35] uma premissa AB inteiramente falsa.

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[80] Considerando que Aristóteles trata aqui das deduções parciais da primeira figura – ou seja *Darii* (ou AII-1) e *Ferio* (ou EIO-1) –, por "premissa parcial", então, ele se refere à *segunda premissa* ou *premissa menor* de tais deduções – que será uma premissa parcial afirmativa (como "algum A é B" ou "B se atribui a algum A").

[81] Por "primeiro termo", entenda-se "termo maior".

[82] Quer dizer, se se assume que "A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*neve*]" (ou "todo B [*neve*] é A [*animal*]") – que é uma premissa inteiramente falsa.

[83] A saber, que "*animal* se atribui a algo *branco*" (ou "algo *branco* é *animal*").

[84] A saber, que "*animal* não se atribui a algo *branco*" (ou "algo *branco* não é *animal*").

[54b35] καὶ εἰ ἐπί τι ψευδὴς ἡ Α Β πρότασις, ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α καὶ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον τινὶ καλῷ καὶ τινὶ μεγάλῳ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν τινὶ μεγάλῳ ὑπάρχειν. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, **[55a1]** ἡ μὲν Α Β πρότασις ἐπί τι ψευδὴς ἔσται, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς οὔσης τῆς Α Β προτάσεως· οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὅροι ἔσονται καὶ ὡσαύτως κείμενοι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

[54b35] E se a premissa AB for parcialmente falsa, também haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois nada impede que A se atribua a algum B e a algum C, e B se atribua a algum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a algo *belo* [B] e a algo *grande* [C], e *belo* [B] se atribui a algo *grande* [C]. Se se assume, então, que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*belo*] e que B [*belo*] se atribui a algum C [*grande*], **[55a1]** a premissa AB será parcialmente falsa, a premissa BC será verdadeira, e a conclusão será verdadeira.[85] O mesmo também se dá se a premissa AB for privativa – já que, com os mesmos termos e a mesma disposição, pode-se fazer tal demonstração.[86]

[55a4] Πάλιν εἰ ἡ μὲν Α Β [5] ἀληθὴς ἡ δὲ Β Γ ψευδής, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ τινί, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ζῷον κύκνῳ μὲν παντὶ μέλανι δὲ τινί, κύκνος δὲ οὐδενὶ μέλανι. ὥστ' εἰ ληφθείη παντὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἀληθὲς [10] ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδοῦς ὄντος τοῦ Β Γ.

[55a4] Novamente[87], se a premissa AB for [5] verdadeira e BC for falsa, haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois nada impede que A se atribua a B como um todo e a algum C, e B não se atribua a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [B] e a algo *negro* [C], e *cisne* [B] não se atribui a nada *negro*[88] [C]. De modo que, se se assume que A [*animal*]

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[85] A saber, que "*animal* se atribui a algo *grande*" (ou "algo *grande* é *animal*").

[86] Quer dizer, para mostrar que é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira em *Ferio* (ou EIO-1) com a primeira premissa parcialmente falsa e a segunda premissa verdadeira, pode-se assumir que: (i) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nada *belo* [B]" (ou "nada *belo* [B] é *animal* [A]") e (ii) "*belo* [B] se atribui a algo *grande* [C]" (ou "algo *grande* [C] é *belo* [B]"), deduzindo-se que (iii) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *grande* [C]" (ou "algo *grande* [C] não é *animal* [A]"). No texto, operei uma paráfrase, já que, literalmente, o que o filósofo diz é: "os termos serão os mesmos e estarão dispostos do mesmo modo para a demonstração".

[87] Quer dizer, invertendo *o valor de verdade das premissas* – e, assim, assumindo uma premissa maior verdadeira e uma premissa menor falsa.

[88] Novamente, vale lembrar que, para o filósofo, a proposição "nenhum *cisne* é *negro*" era considerada uma proposição verdadeira.

se atribui a todo B [*cisne*] e B [*cisne*] a algo *negro* [C], [10] haverá uma conclusão verdadeira[89], sendo falsa a premissa BC.

[55a10] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς λαμβανομένης τῆς Α Β προτάσεως. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τὸ γένος τῷ ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἴδει καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι τοῖς αὐτοῦ εἴδεσι· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον [15] ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει λευκῷ δὲ τινί, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς οὐδενὶ λευκῷ· ἐὰν οὖν μέσον τεθῇ ὁ ἀριθμός, καὶ ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ οὐχ ὑπάρξει, ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές· καὶ ἡ μὲν Α Β πρότασις ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ψευδής.

[55a10] O mesmo também se dá se se toma uma premissa AB privativa. Pois é possível que A não se atribua a nenhum B e não se atribua a algum C, ao passo que B não se atribui a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, um gênero [A] não se atribui a nenhuma espécie [B] de outro gênero e não se atribui a algum acidente [C] de suas próprias espécies. Pois *animal* [A] não se atribui [15] a nenhum *número* [B] e se atribui a algo *branco*[90] [C], ao passo que *número* [B] não se atribui a nada *branco* [C]. Se se coloca, então, *número* como termo médio, e se assume que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B [*número*], e que B [*número*] se atribui a algum C [*branco*], A [*animal*] não se atribuirá a algum C[91] [*branco*], o que era verdade – sendo a premissa AB verdadeira e a premissa BC falsa.

[55a19] καὶ εἰ ἐπί τι ψευδὴς ἡ Α Β, [20] ψευδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡ Β Γ, ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ Β τινὶ καὶ τῷ Γ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν ἑκατέρῳ, τὸ δὲ Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον εἰ ἐναντίον τὸ Β τῷ Γ, ἄμφω δὲ συμβεβηκότα τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τινὶ λευκῷ καὶ τινὶ μέλανι ὑπάρχει, λευκὸν δ' οὐδενὶ μέλανι. [25] ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα. καὶ στερητικῆς δὲ λαμβανομένης τῆς Α Β ὡσαύτως· οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὅροι καὶ ὡσαύτως τεθήσονται πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

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[89] A saber, que "*animal* se atribui a algo *negro*" (ou "algo *negro* é *animal*").

[90] Seria natural esperar que, aqui, Aristóteles dissesse "*animal* **não** se atribui a algo *branco*", já que, logo antes, havia dito que "um *gênero* [A] [...] **não** se atribui a algum acidente [C]". No entanto, tratando-se de um acidente, é natural que um gênero – como *animal* – se atribua a alguns entes com tal acidente e não se atribua a outros, ou seja, que *animal* se atribua a algo *branco* e também **não** se atribua a algo *branco*. Aqui e nos próximos capítulos, Aristóteles eventualmente usa uma proposição parcial com o sentido implícito de que tanto a parcial afirmativa quanto a negativa são verdadeiras – confira, por exemplo, 56a14-18 e 56a35-36.

[91] Entendendo que, na ocorrência acima de "*animal* se atribui a algo *branco*", Aristóteles quis dizer que "*animal* **se atribui** a algo *branco* e *animal* **não se atribui** a algo *branco*" (ou, dito de outro modo, "*animal* se atribui a algo – mas não tudo – que é *branco*").

[55a19] E se a premissa AB for parcialmente falsa [20] e a premissa BC também for falsa, haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois nada impede que A se atribua a algum B e a algum C, e B não se atribua a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, se B for contrário a C, sendo ambos acidentes de um mesmo gênero [A]. Pois *animal* [A] se atribui tanto a algo *branco* [B] quanto a algo *negro* [C], mas *branco* [B] não se atribui a nada *negro* [C]. [25] Se se assume, então, que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*branco*] e B [*branco*] a algum C [*negro*], haverá uma conclusão verdadeira.[92] O mesmo também ocorre se se toma uma premissa AB privativa – já que, com os mesmos termos e a mesma disposição, pode-se fazer tal demonstração.[93]

[55a28] καὶ ἀμφοτέρων δὲ ψευδῶν οὐσῶν ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ [30] μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τὸ γένος τῷ ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἴδει καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ· ζῷον γὰρ ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐδενὶ λευκῷ δὲ τινὶ ὑπάρχει, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὐδενὶ λευκῷ. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ [35] μὲν συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, αἱ δὲ προτάσεις ἄμφω ψευδεῖς.

[55a28] E se ambas as premissas forem falsas, também haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois é possível que A não se atribua a [30] nenhum B e se atribua a algum C, ao passo que B não se atribui a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, um gênero [A] em relação à espécie [B] de outro gênero e a um acidente [C] de suas próprias espécies. Pois *animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *número* [B] mas se atribui a algo *branco* [C], e *número* [B] não se atribui a nada *branco* [C]. Se se assume, então, que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*número*] e B [*número*] se atribui a algum C [*branco*], a [35] conclusão será verdadeira[94], embora ambas as premissas sejam falsas.

[55a36] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερητικῆς οὔσης τῆς Α Β. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, μηδὲ τὸ Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ζῷον κύκνῳ μὲν παντὶ μέλανι δὲ τινὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει, κύκνος δ᾽ οὐδενὶ μέλανι. ὥστ᾽ εἰ [40] ληφθείη τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β

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[92] A saber, que "*animal* se atribui a algo *negro*" (ou "algo *negro* é *animal*").

[93] Operei uma paráfrase no texto. Literalmente, o que Aristóteles diz é: "os termos serão os mesmos e estarão dispostos do mesmo modo para a demonstração". Quer dizer, para mostrar que é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira em *Ferio* (ou EIO-1) com a primeira premissa parcialmente falsa e a segunda premissa falsa, pode-se assumir que: (i) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nada *branco* [B]" (ou "nada *branco* [B] é *animal* [A]") e (ii) "*branco* [B] se atribui a algo *negro* [C]" (ou "algo *negro* [C] é *branco* [B]"), deduzindo-se que (iii) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *negro* [C]" (ou "algo *negro* [C] não é *animal* [A]").

[94] A saber, que "*animal* se atribui a algo *branco*" (ou "algo *branco* é *animal*") – conclusão obtida por *Darii* (ou AII-1).

τινὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Α τινὶ [b1] τῷ Γ οὐχ ὑπάρξει. τὸ μὲν οὖν συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, αἱ δὲ προτάσεις ψευδεῖς.

[55a36] O mesmo também se dá se a premissa AB for privativa. Pois nada impede que A se atribua inteiramente a B e não se atribua a algum C, e B não se atribua a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [B] e não se atribui a algo *negro* [C], e *cisne* [B] não se atribui a nada *negro* [C]. De modo que, se [40] se assume que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B [*cisne*] e que B [*cisne*] se atribui a algum C [*negro*], A [*animal*] não se atribuirá [b1] a algum C [*negro*]. A conclusão, portanto, será verdadeira, ainda que as premissas sejam falsas.

Capítulo 3 (55b3-56b3)

[Casos na segunda figura nos quais se deduz uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de premissas falsas]

[55b3] Ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ σχήματι πάντως ἐγχωρεῖ διὰ ψευδῶν ἀληθὲς συλλογίσασθαι, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτάσεων [5] ὅλων ψευδῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ ἐπί τι ἑκατέρας, καὶ τῆς μὲν ἀληθοῦς τῆς δὲ ψευδοῦς οὔσης [ὅλης] ὁποτερασοῦν ψευδοῦς τιθεμένης, [καὶ εἰ ἀμφότεραι ἐπί τι ψευδεῖς, καὶ εἰ ἡ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀληθὴς ἡ δ' ἐπί τι ψευδής, καὶ εἰ ἡ μὲν ὅλη ψευδὴς ἡ δ' ἐπί τι ἀληθής,] καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει [10] συλλογισμῶν.

[55b3] Na figura média[95], é possível deduzir de todas as formas uma conclusão verdadeira partindo de premissas falsas, tanto (i) tomando ambas as premissas como [5] inteiramente falsas[96], quanto (ii) tomando cada uma delas como parcialmente falsa, ou (iii) uma sendo verdadeira e a outra falsa – independentemente de qual das duas seja falsa –, tanto nas deduções universais quanto nas [10] deduções parciais.[97]

[55b10] εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ δὲ Γ παντί, οἷον ζῷον λίθῳ μὲν οὐδενὶ ἵππῳ δὲ παντί, ἐὰν ἐναντίως τεθῶσιν αἱ προτάσεις καὶ ληφθῇ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενί, ἐκ ψευδῶν ὅλων τῶν προτάσεων ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τῷ μὲν Β [15] παντὶ τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει τὸ Α· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔσται συλλογισμός.

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[95] Quer dizer, na *segunda* figura.

[96] Considerando que só proposições universais podem ser inteiramente falsas, duas das quatro deduções na segunda figura poderão ter ambas as premissas inteiramente falsas, a saber, EAE-2 (ou *Cesare*) e AEE-2 (ou *Camestres*). As outras duas deduções – EIO-2 (ou *Festino*) e AOO-2 (ou *Baroco*) – possuem uma premissa parcial.

[97] Neste parágrafo, sigo as sugestões de Ross para desconsiderar e excluir os trechos entre colchetes – assim como o fez Mignucci. A primeira exclusão é a da palavra "ὅλης" ("inteiramente") – na passagem "uma sendo verdadeira e a outra [inteiramente] falsa" –, já que "uma sendo verdadeira e a outra falsa" (ou seja, *falsa* de diversos modos possíveis) descreve de modo mais abrangente o que o filósofo de fato apresenta no capítulo. A segunda exclusão é a do trecho "καὶ εἰ ἀμφότεραι ἐπί τι ψευδεῖς, καὶ εἰ ἡ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀληθὴς ἡ δ' ἐπί τι ψευδής, καὶ εἰ ἡ μὲν ὅλη ψευδὴς ἡ δ' ἐπί τι ἀληθής" – que aparece no final do parágrafo "independentemente de qual das duas seja falsa – [e se ambas forem parcialmente falsas, ou se uma for absolutamente verdadeira e a outra for parcialmente falsa, ou se uma for inteiramente falsa e a outra for parcialmente verdadeira], tanto nas deduções universais quanto nas deduções parciais". Em relação à passagem "εἰ ἀμφότεραι ἐπί τι ψευδεῖς", como nota Mignucci, ela seria "uma mera repetição" do que Aristóteles acabara de dizer: "tomando cada uma delas como parcialmente falsa" ("[ψευδῶν...] ἐπί τι ἑκατέρας") – e, de fato, o filósofo mostra que é possível deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de duas premissas parcialmente falsas (em 55b38-56a4). Já no restante do trecho entre colchetes, aparecem as inglórias expressões "absolutamente verdadeira" ("ἁπλῶς ἀληθὴς") e "parcialmente verdadeira" ("ἐπί τι ἀληθής"), sem outras ocorrências no conjunto dos capítulos 2-4 – razão pela qual considerou-se tal passagem como inautêntica.

[55b10] Com efeito, se A não se atribui a nenhum B mas se atribui a todo C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] não se atribui na nenhuma *pedra* [B] mas se atribui a todo *cavalo* [C], caso se coloquem as premissas contrárias e se assuma que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*pedra*] e A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum C [*cavalo*], haverá uma conclusão verdadeira.[98] partindo de premissas inteiramente falsas. E o mesmo também se dá caso A seja atribuído [15] a todo B e não seja atribuído a nenhum C[99] – pois haverá a mesma dedução.[100]

[55b16] Πάλιν εἰ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα ὅλη ψευδὴς ἡ δ' ἑτέρα ὅλη ἀληθής· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α καὶ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τὸ γένος τοῖς μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα εἴδεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ζῷον καὶ ἵππῳ παντὶ [20] καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἵππος. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τῷ μὲν παντὶ τῷ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν ὅλη ψευδὴς ἔσται ἡ δ' ὅλη ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς πρὸς ὁποτερῳοῦν τεθέντος τοῦ στερητικοῦ.

[55b16] Novamente[101], se uma das premissas for inteiramente falsa e a outra for inteiramente verdadeira: pois nada impede que A se atribua a todo B e a todo C, ao passo que B não se atribui a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, o gênero [A] em relação às espécies [B e C] que não se atribuem uma à outra. Pois *animal* [A] se atribui tanto a todo *cavalo* [B] quanto a todo [20] *humano* [C], e nenhum *humano* [C] é *cavalo* [B]. Então, caso se assuma que *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cavalo* [B] e *animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *humano*[102] [C], haverá uma

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[98] A saber, que "*pedra* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *cavalo* [C]" (ou "nenhum *cavalo* é *pedra*").

[99] Invertendo as premissas, mas mantendo os mesmos termos, temos o seguinte argumento EAE-2 (ou *Cesare*) com duas premissas inteiramente falsas e uma conclusão verdadeira: se (i) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *cavalo* [B]" (ou "nenhum *cavalo* é *animal*") e (ii) "*animal* [A] se atribui a toda *pedra* [C]" (ou "toda *pedra* é *animal*"), portanto, (iii) "*cavalo* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *pedra* [C]" (ou "nenhuma *pedra* é *cavalo*") – a única diferença em relação ao caso anterior é que os termos da conclusão (que é convertível) aparecem na ordem inversa.

[100] Vale lembrar que as duas deduções universais da segunda figura – EAE-2 e AEE-2 (também conhecidas como *Cesare* e *Camestres*) – são convertidas por Aristóteles (no capítulo 5 do livro I) na mesma dedução da primeira figura, a saber, EAE-1 (ou *Celarent*). No caso de *Cesare* – (i) "**M não se atribui a nenhum N**" (ou "**nenhum N é M**") e (ii) "M se atribui a todo O" (ou "todo O é M"), portanto, (iii) "N não se atribui a nenhum O" (ou "nenhum O é N") –, o filósofo apenas converte a primeira premissa, transformando-o em *Celarent*, na primeira figura – (i') "**N não se atribui a nenhum M**" (ou "**nenhum M é N**") e (ii) "M se atribui a todo O" (ou "todo O é M"), portanto, (iii) "N não se atribui a nenhum O" (ou "nenhum O é N") (cf. 27a5-9). No caso de *Camestres* – (iv) "M se atribui a todo N" (ou "todo N é M") e (v) "**M não se atribui a nenhum O**" (ou "**nenhum O é M**"), portanto, (vi) "*N não se atribui a nenhum O*" (ou "*nenhum O é N*") –, o filósofo converte a primeira premissa, inverte a ordem das premissas e converte a conclusão para transformá-lo em *Celarent* – (v') "**O não se atribui a nenhum M**" (ou "**nenhum M é O**"), (iv) "M se atribui a todo N" (ou "todo N é M"), portanto, (vi') "*O não se atribui a nenhum N*" (ou "*nenhum N é O*") (cf. 27a9-11). Consequentemente, tudo aquilo que funciona com EAE-2 (ou *Cesare*) também costuma funcionar com AEE-2 (ou *Camestres*), tendo como principal diferença a inversão dos termos da conclusão.

[101] Subentenda-se: "é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira".

[102] Literalmente, o que Aristóteles escreve é: "caso se assuma que se atribui a todo e não se atribui a

premissa inteiramente falsa e uma premissa inteiramente verdadeira, e a conclusão será verdadeira, independentemente de qual das premissas for colocada como negativa.[103]

[55b23] καὶ εἰ ἡ ἑτέρα ἐπί τι ψευδής, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα ὅλη ἀληθής. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ [25] μὲν Β τινὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ παντί, τὸ μέντοι Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ζῷον λευκῷ μὲν τινὶ κόρακι δὲ παντί, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὐδενὶ κόρακι. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Α Β πρότασις ἐπί τι ψευδής, ἡ δ' Α Γ ὅλη ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. [30] καὶ μετατιθεμένου δὲ τοῦ στερητικοῦ ὡσαύτως· διὰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

[55b23] Também é o caso[104] se uma das premissas for parcialmente falsa e a outra for inteiramente verdadeira. Pois é possível que A se atribua a [25] algum B e a todo C, ao passo que B não se atribui a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a algo *branco* [B] e a todo *corvo* [C], e *branco* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *corvo* [C]. Então, caso se assuma que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B [*branco*] e A [*animal*] se atribui inteiramente a C [*corvo*], sendo a premissa AB[105] parcialmente falsa e a premissa AC[106] inteiramente verdadeira, também a conclusão[107] será verdadeira. [30] E o mesmo também se dá caso a premissa negativa seja deslocada (com efeito, a demonstração se dá através dos mesmos termos).[108]

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nenhum". Acrescentei os termos "*animal*", "*cavalo*" e "*humano*", pois, embora eles não apareçam no texto, há evidências de que o filósofo se refere a eles. O mesmo valeria invertendo "*cavalo*" e "*humano*", quer dizer, o mesmo valeria "caso se assuma que *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [B] e *animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *cavalo* [C]".

[103] Explicitando: se se assume como premissas (i) "*animal* se atribui a todo *humano*" (ou "todo *humano* é *animal*") e (ii) "*animal* não se atribui a nenhum *cavalo*" (ou "nenhum *cavalo* é *animal*"), será possível concluir que (iii) "*humano* não se atribui a nenhum *cavalo*" (ou "nenhum *cavalo* é *humano*"). E o mesmo se dá invertendo a ordem das premissas: se (ii) "*animal* não se atribui a nenhum *cavalo*" (ou "nenhum *cavalo* é *animal*") e (i) "*animal* se atribui a todo *humano*" (ou "todo *humano* é *animal*"), portanto, (iii') "*cavalo* não se atribui a nenhum *humano*" (ou "nenhum *humano* é *cavalo*"). Nesses dois exemplos, se trocarmos "*animal*" por "*pedra*", teremos casos de argumentos que levam a uma conclusão verdadeira com uma premissa *afirmativa* inteiramente falsa ("todo *humano* é *pedra*" e "todo *cavalo* é *pedra*") e uma premissa negativa verdadeira – diferentemente dos exemplos do filósofo, que têm a premissa *negativa* inteiramente falsa.

[104] Quer dizer: "também é o caso de se obter uma conclusão verdadeira".

[105] "*Animal* [A] não se atribui a nada *branco* [B]" (ou "nenhuma coisa *branca* é *animal*").

[106] "*Animal* [A] se atribui a todo *corvo* [C]" (ou "todo *corvo* é *animal*").

[107] "*Branco* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *corvo* [C]" (ou "nenhum *corvo* é *branco*").

[108] Quer dizer, é possível provar o mesmo resultado (isto é, deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira de uma premissa inteiramente verdadeira e uma premissa parcialmente falsa) apenas invertendo as premissas e tomando, como premissa maior, (i) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *corvo* [B]" (ou "todo *corvo* é *animal*"), como premissa menor, (ii) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nada *branco* [C]" (ou "nenhuma coisa *branca* é *animal*"), concluindo-se que (iii) "*corvo* [B] não se atribui a nada *branco* [C]" (ou "nenhuma coisa *branca* é *corvo*"). Nunca é demais lembrar que tanto EAE-2 (ou *Cesare*) quanto AEE-2 (ou *Camestres*) são praticamente equivalentes e redutíveis à mesma dedução da primeira figura (EAE-1).

[55b31] καὶ εἰ ἡ καταφατικὴ πρότασις ἐπί τι ψευδής, ἡ δὲ στερητικὴ ὅλη ἀληθής. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β τινὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ ὅλῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον τὸ ζῷον λευκῷ μὲν τινὶ πίττῃ [35] δ᾽ οὐδεμιᾷ, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὐδεμιᾷ πίττῃ. ὥστ᾽ ἐὰν ληφθῇ τὸ Α ὅλῳ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενί, ἡ μὲν Α Β ἐπί τι ψευδής, ἡ δ᾽ Α Γ ὅλη ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[55b31] E isso também se dá caso a premissa afirmativa seja parcialmente falsa e a premissa privativa seja inteiramente verdadeira. Pois nada impede que A se atribua a algum B mas não se atribua a C inteiramente[109], ao passo que B não se atribui a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a algo *branco* [B] mas não se atribui a [35] nenhum *piche* [C], e *branco* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *piche* [C]. De modo que, caso se assuma que A [*animal*] se atribui inteiramente a B [*branco*] e não se atribui a nenhum C [*piche*], sendo a premissa AB[110] parcialmente falsa e a premissa AC[111] inteiramente verdadeira, também a conclusão será verdadeira.[112]

[55b38] καὶ εἰ ἀμφότεραι αἱ προτάσεις ἐπί τι ψευδεῖς, ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α καὶ τῷ Β καὶ [40] τῷ Γ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἷον ζῷον καὶ [56a1] λευκῷ τινὶ καὶ μέλανί τινι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν οὐδενὶ μέλανι. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενί, ἄμφω μὲν αἱ προτάσεις ἐπί τι ψευδεῖς, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μετατεθείσης τῆς στερητικῆς διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων.

[55b38] E caso ambas as premissas sejam parcialmente falsas, também haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois é possível que A se atribua a algum B e [40] a algum C, ao passo que B não se atribui a nenhum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui tanto [56a1] a algo *branco* [B] quanto a algo *negro* [C], e *branco* [B] não se atribui a nada *negro* [C]. Então, caso se assuma que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*branco*] e que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum

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[109] Por "[A] não se atribua a C inteiramente", leia-se: "A não se atribui a *nenhum* C" (ou "nenhum C é A").

[110] "*Animal* [A] se atribui a toda coisa *branca* [B]" (ou "toda coisa *branca* é *animal*").

[111] "*Animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *piche* [C]" (ou "nenhum *piche* é *animal*").

[112] A saber, "*branco* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *piche* [C]" (ou "nenhum *piche* é *branco*"). Embora Aristóteles não se dê o trabalho de dizê-lo, caso a ordem das premissas seja invertida, o mesmo resultado (com os termos da conclusão invertidos) também pode ser alcançado – obtendo-se um argumento EAE-2 (ou *Cesare*) que deduz uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de uma primeira premissa verdadeira e uma segunda premissa parcialmente falsa.

C [*negro*], sendo ambas as premissas parcialmente falsas, a conclusão[113] será verdadeira. E o mesmo também se dá deslocando a premissa negativa, por meio dos mesmos termos.[114]

[56a5] Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει συλλογισμῶν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ λευκῷ δὲ τινί, ἄνθρωπος δὲ τινὶ λευκῷ οὐχ ὑπάρξει. ἐὰν οὖν τεθῇ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ [10] ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν καθόλου πρότασις ὅλη ψευδής, ἡ δ' ἐν μέρει ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[56a5] O mesmo também é evidente no caso das deduções parciais. Pois nada impede que A se atribua a todo B e a algum C, e que B não se atribua a algum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [B] e a algo *branco* [C], ao passo que *humano* [B] não se atribuirá a algo *branco* [C]. Então, caso se assuma que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B [*humano*] mas [10] se atribui a algum C [*branco*], sendo a premissa universal[115] inteiramente falsa e a premissa parcial[116] verdadeira, também a conclusão[117] será verdadeira.

[56a11] ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ καταφατικῆς λαμβανομένης τῆς Α Β· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον οὐδενὶ ἀψύχῳ, λευκῷ [15] δὲ τινί, καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον οὐχ ὑπάρξει τινὶ λευκῷ. ἐὰν οὖν τεθῇ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Α Β πρότασις, ἡ καθόλου, ὅλη ψευδής, ἡ δὲ Α Γ ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[56a11] Do mesmo modo também se dá tomando a premissa AB afirmativa. Pois é possível que A não se atribua a nenhum B e não se atribua a algum C, e que B não se atribua a algum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] não se atribui a nada *inanimado* [B] e *animal* [A] se atribui a [15] algo *branco*[118] [C], e *inanimado* [B] não será atribuído a algo *branco* [C]. Então, caso

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[113] "*Branco* [B] não se atribui a nada *negro* [C]" (ou "nada *negro* é *branco*") – conclusão obtida por *Camestres* (ou AEE-2).

[114] Assim como nos casos apresentados nos parágrafos anteriores, ao inverter a ordem das premissas negativa e afirmativa, o mesmo resultado pode ser alcançado, com a única diferença de que a conclusão (universal negativa e, portanto, convertível) terá seus termos invertidos. Por exemplo: se (i) "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nada *negro* [B]" (ou "nada *negro* é *animal*") e (ii) "*animal* [A] se atribui a tudo o que é *branco* [C]" (ou "tudo o que é *branco* é *animal*"), conclui-se – a partir de duas premissas parcialmente falsas – a proposição verdadeira (iii) "*negro* [B] não se atribui a nada *branco* [C]" (ou "nada *branco* é *negro*").

[115] "*Animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *humano* [B]" (ou "nenhum *humano* é *animal*").

[116] "*Animal* [A] se atribui a algo *branco* [C]" (ou "algo *branco* é *animal*").

[117] A saber, que "*humano* [B] não se atribui a algo *branco* [C]" (ou "algo *branco* não é *humano*") – conclusão obtida por *Festino* (ou EIO-2).

[118] Aqui, assim como em 55a11-15, seria natural esperar que Aristóteles dissesse "*animal* **não** se atribui

se assuma que A [*animal*] se atribui a todo B [*inanimado*] e A [*animal*] não se atribui a algum C[119] [*branco*], sendo a premissa AB[120] – a universal – inteiramente falsa e a premissa AC[121] verdadeira, também a conclusão[122] será verdadeira.

[56a18] καὶ τῆς μὲν καθόλου ἀληθοῦς τεθείσης, τῆς δ' ἐν μέρει ψευδοῦς. οὐδὲν γὰρ [20] κωλύει τὸ Α μήτε τῷ Β μήτε τῷ Γ μηδενὶ ἕπεσθαι, τὸ μέντοι Β τινὶ τῷ Γ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ζῷον οὐδενὶ ἀριθμῷ οὐδ' ἀψύχῳ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τινὶ ἀψύχῳ οὐχ ἕπεται. ἐὰν οὖν τεθῇ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ Γ τινί, τὸ μὲν συμπέρασμα ἔσται ἀληθὲς καὶ ἡ καθόλου πρότασις, ἡ δ' ἐν μέρει [25] ψευδής.

[56a18] O mesmo também se dá colocando uma premissa universal verdadeira e uma premissa parcial falsa. Pois nada [20] impede que A não acompanhe nenhum B e nenhum C, ao passo que B não se atribui a algum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] não acompanha nenhum *número* [B] e nenhum *inanimado* [C], e *número* [B] não acompanha algum *inanimado* [C]. Então, caso se assuma que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum B [*número*] e A [*animal*] se atribui a algum C [*inanimado*], a conclusão [123] será verdadeira e também a premissa universal[124], enquanto a premissa parcial[125] será [25] falsa.

[56a25] καὶ καταφατικῆς δὲ τῆς καθόλου τιθεμένης ὡσαύτως. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α καὶ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β τινὶ τῷ Γ μὴ ἕπεσθαι, οἷον τὸ γένος τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅλῳ πεζῷ ἕπεται, ἄνθρωπος δ' οὐ παντὶ πεζῷ. ὥστ' ἂν ληφθῇ τὸ Α τῷ [30] μὲν Β ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν καθόλου πρότασις ἀληθής, ἡ δ' ἐν μέρει ψευδής, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

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a algo *branco*" – considerando que, logo acima (e também na sequência do texto), o filósofo diz que "[A] **não** se atribui a algum C". No entanto, como observa Ross, é possível resolver a questão entendendo "algum C é A" como "algum C é A e algum C não é A" (ou "A se atribui a algum C, mas não todo [C]").

[119] Novamente, vale destacar que Aristóteles descreveu como fato que "*animal* [A] **se atribui** a algo *branco* [C]" e, logo em seguida, enuncia como segunda premissa do argumento "A [*animal*] **não** se atribui a algum C [*branco*]", classificando tal premissa como verdadeira. Como foi dito na nota acima, entenda-se, então, "*animal* [não] se atribui a algo *branco*" como "*animal* se atribui a algo *branco* e não se atribui a algo *branco*" ou "algo *branco* é *animal* e algo *branco* não é".

[120] "*Animal* [A] se atribui a todo *inanimado* [B]" (ou "todo *inanimado* é *animal*").

[121] "*Animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *branco* [C]" (ou "algo *branco* não é *animal*").

[122] A saber, que "*inanimado* [B] não se atribui a algo *branco* [C]" (ou "algo *branco* não é *inanimado*") – conclusão obtida por *Baroco* (ou AOO-2).

[123] A saber, que "*número*[B] não se atribui a algo *inanimado* [C]" (ou "algo *inanimado* não é *número*") – conclusão obtida por *Festino* (ou EIO-2).

[124] "*Animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *número* [B]" (ou "nenhum *número* é *animal*").

[125] "*Animal* [A] se atribui a algo *inanimado* [C]" (ou "algo *inanimado* é *animal*").

[56a25] E com uma premissa universal afirmativa também se dá o mesmo. Pois é possível que A se atribua inteiramente a B e a C, ao passo que B não acompanha algum C – como, por exemplo, o gênero [A] se atribui à espécie [B] e à diferença[126] [C]. Com efeito, *animal* [A] acompanha todo *humano* [B] e *animal* [A] acompanha *bípede*[127] [C] inteiramente, mas *humano* [B] não acompanha todo *bípede* [C]. De modo que, caso se assuma que A [*animal*] [30] se atribui inteiramente a B [*humano*] e que A [*animal*] não se atribui a algum C [*bípede*], sendo a premissa universal[128] verdadeira e a premissa parcial[129] falsa, a conclusão[130] será verdadeira.

[56a32] Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ψευδῶν ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α καὶ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Β τινὶ τῷ Γ μὴ [35] ἕπεσθαι. ληφθέντος γὰρ τοῦ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, αἱ μὲν προτάσεις ἀμφότεραι ψευδεῖς, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[56a32] Também é evidente que partindo de duas premissas falsas haverá uma conclusão verdadeira, uma vez que A pode se atribuir inteiramente tanto a B quanto a C, ao passo que B não [35] acompanha algum C. Pois assumindo-se que A não se atribui a nenhum B mas se atribui a algum C[131], embora as premissas sejam ambas falsas, a conclusão[132] será verdadeira.[133]

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[126] Como bem observa Ross – e também fica claro pelo exemplo – trata-se de uma diferença que está inteiramente contida no gênero, mas não se limita a uma única espécie.

[127] Novamente, Aristóteles usa o termo "πεζός" ("*pezos*"), que significa literalmente "dotado de pés" (também traduzido como "pedestre" ou "terrestre").

[128] "*Animal* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [B]" (ou "todo *humano* é *animal*").

[129] "*Animal* [A] não se atribui a algum *bípede* [C]" (ou "algum *bípede* não é *animal*").

[130] A saber, que "*humano* [B] não se atribui a algum *bípede* [C]" (ou "algum *bípede* não é *humano*") – obtida por *Baroco* (ou AOO-2).

[131] Assim como em 55a11-15 e em 56a14-18, Aristóteles parece usar "A se atribui a algum C" (ou "algum C é A") com o sentido de "A se atribui a algum C e não se atribui a algum" (ou "algum C é A e algum não é"). Do contrário, as premissas do argumento não poderiam ser consideradas *ambas* falsas, já que, se "A se atribui inteiramente a C" (ou "todo C é A"), não seria falso assumir que "A se atribui a *algum* C" (ou "algum C é A").

[132] A saber, que "B não se atribui a algum C" (ou "algum C não é B").

[133] Como exemplo, aceite-se como fatos que: (i) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [B]" (ou "todo *humano* é *animal*"), (ii) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *pinguim* [C]" (ou "todo *pinguim* é *animal*") e (iii) "*humano* [B] não se atribui a algum *pinguim* [C]" (ou "algum *pinguim* não é *humano*"). Em seguida, tome-se como premissas: (i') "*animal* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *humano* [B]" (ou "nenhum *humano* é *animal*") e (ii') "*animal* [A] se atribui a algum *pinguim* [C] e não se atribui a algum *pinguim* [C]" (ou "algum *pinguim* é *animal* e algum não é"). Dessas duas premissas falsas, é possível obter a conclusão verdadeira (iii) "*humano* [B] não se atribui a algum *pinguim* [C]" (ou "algum *pinguim* não é *humano*"). Esquematicamente:

Fato	Argumento
Todo *humano* [B] é *animal* [A]	Nenhum *humano* [B] é *animal* [A] (inteiramente falsa)
Todo *pinguim* [C] é *animal* [A]	Algum *pinguim* [C] é *animal* [A] (e algum *pinguim* [C] não é *animal* [A]) (falsa)

[56a37] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατηγορικῆς οὔσης τῆς καθόλου προτάσεως, τῆς δ' ἐν μέρει στερητικῆς. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ Γ παντὶ ἕπεσθαι, καὶ τὸ Β [40] τινὶ τῷ Γ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ζῷον ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ παντὶ ἕπεται, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη οὐ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. [b1] ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α τῷ μὲν Β ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τῷ δὲ Γ τινὶ μὴ ἕπεσθαι, αἱ μὲν προτάσεις ψευδεῖς, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[56a37] E o mesmo também se dá se a premissa universal for categórica[134] e a premissa parcial for privativa. Pois é possível que A não acompanhe nenhum B e acompanhe todo C, e que B [40] não se atribua a algum C – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] não acompanha nenhuma *ciência* [B] mas acompanha todo *humano* [C], e *ciência* [B] não acompanha todo *humano*[135] [C]. [b1] Então, caso se assuma que A [*animal*] se atribui inteiramente a B [*ciência*] e que A [*animal*] não acompanha algum C [*humano*], sendo ambas as premissas falsas, a conclusão[136] será verdadeira.

Algum *pinguim* [C] não é *humano* [B]   Algum *pinguim* [C] não é *humano* [B] (verdadeira)

[134] Quer dizer, *afirmativa*.

[135] Ou seja, "*ciência* não se atribui a algum *humano*" (ou "algum *humano* não é *ciência*") – lembrando que proposições do tipo "B não se atribui a todo C" (ou "nem todo C é B"), para Aristóteles, são equivalentes a proposições como "B não se atribui a algum C" (ou "algum C não é B").

[136] A saber, que "*ciência* [B] não se atribui a algum *humano* [C]" (ou "algum *humano* não é *ciência*") – conclusão obtida por *Baroco* (ou AOO-2).

Capítulo 4 (56b4-57b17)

[Casos na terceira figura nos quais se deduz uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de premissas falsas; é impossível deduzir uma mesma conclusão de um fato e de sua negação]

[56b4] Ἔσται δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ σχήματι διὰ ψευδῶν [5] ἀληθές, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ψευδῶν οὐσῶν ὅλων καὶ ἐπί τι ἑκατέρας, καὶ τῆς μὲν ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς ὅλης τῆς δ' ἑτέρας ψευδοῦς, καὶ τῆς μὲν ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς τῆς δ' ὅλης ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, καὶ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ἐγχωρεῖ μεταλαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις.

[56b4] Haverá também na última[137] figura uma [5] conclusão verdadeira obtida por meio de premissas falsas, tanto (i) quando ambas as premissas forem inteiramente falsas[138], quanto (ii) quando cada uma delas for parcialmente falsa, (iii) quando uma for inteiramente verdadeira e a outra falsa, (iv) quando uma for parcialmente falsa e a outra for inteiramente verdadeira, e vice-versa, e (v) de quantas outras maneiras for possível dispor as premissas.

[56b9] οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει μήτε τὸ Α μήτε τὸ Β μηδενὶ τῷ [10] Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ μέντοι Α τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οὔτ' ἄνθρωπος οὔτε πεζὸν οὐδενὶ ἀψύχῳ ἕπεται, ἄνθρωπος μέντοι τινὶ πεζῷ ὑπάρχει. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, αἱ μὲν προτάσεις ὅλαι ψευδεῖς, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[56b9] Pois nada impede que nem A nem B se atribuam a nenhum [10] C, ao passo que A se atribui a algum B – como, por exemplo, nem *humano* [A] nem *bípede*[139] [B] acompanham nenhum *inanimado* [C], ao passo que *humano* [A] se atribui a algum *bípede* [B]. Então, caso se assuma que A [*humano*] e B [*bípede*] se atribuem a todo C[140] [*inanimado*], embora as premissas sejam inteiramente falsas, a conclusão[141] será verdadeira.

[56b14] ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῆς μὲν στερητικῆς τῆς δὲ καταφατικῆς [15] οὔσης. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Β μηδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Α παντί, καὶ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ μέλαν

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[137] Isto é, na *terceira* figura.

[138] Lembrando que apenas proposições universais podem ser inteiramente falsas, duas das seis deduções na terceira figura poderão ter duas premissas inteiramente falsas, a saber, AAI-3 (ou *Darapti*) e EAO-3 (ou *Felapton*). Todas as demais deduções – IAI-3, AII-3, OAO-3 e EIO-3 (também conhecidas como *Disamis*, *Datisi*, *Bocardo* e *Ferison*) – possuem uma premissa parcial.

[139] Novamente, a fim de facilitar a compreensão (sem prejudicar a estrutura do argumento), substituí "pedestre" (em grego, "πεζός") por "bípede" (em grego, "δίπους").

[140] Ou seja, caso se assuma que: (i) "*humano* [A] se atribui a todo *inanimado* [C]" (ou "todo *inanimado* é *humano*") e (ii) "*bípede* [B] se atribui a todo *inanimado* [C]" (ou "todo *inanimado* é *bípede*").

[141] A saber, que "*humano* [A] se atribui a algum *bípede* [B]" (ou "algum *bípede* é *humano*") – obtida por AAI-3 (ou *Darapti*).

οὐδενὶ κύκνῳ, ζῷον δὲ παντί, καὶ τὸ ζῷον οὐ παντὶ μέλανι. ὥστ' ἂν ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Α μηδενί, τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β οὐχ ὑπάρξει· καὶ τὸ μὲν συμπέρασμα [20] ἀληθές, αἱ δὲ προτάσεις ψευδεῖς.

[56b14] Do mesmo modo também se dá caso uma premissa [15] seja privativa e a outra afirmativa. Pois é possível que B não se atribua a nenhum C, que A se atribua a todo C, e que A não se atribua algum B – como, por exemplo, *negro* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *cisne* [C], *animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C], e *animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *negro* [B]. De modo que, assumindo-se que B [*negro*] se atribui a todo C [*cisne*], que A [*animal*] não se atribui a nenhum C [*cisne*], A [*animal*] não se atribuirá a algum B [*negro*] – e a conclusão[142] será [20] verdadeira, embora as premissas[143] sejam falsas.[144]

[56b20] καὶ εἰ ἐπί τι ἑκατέρα ψευδής, ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν τινὶ ζῴῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τινὶ καλῷ. ἐὰν οὖν τεθῇ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ [25] Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, αἱ μὲν προτάσεις ἐπί τι ψευδεῖς, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[56b20] E se cada uma das premissas for parcialmente falsa, também haverá uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois nada impede que A e B se atribuam a algum C, e A se atribua a algum B – como, por exemplo, *branco* [A] e *belo* [B] se atribuem a algum *animal* [C], e *branco* [A] se atribui a algo *belo* [B]. Então, caso se coloque que A [*branco*] e [25] B [*belo*] sejam atribuídos a todo C [*animal*], embora as premissas[145] sejam parcialmente falsas, a conclusão[146] será verdadeira.

[56b26] καὶ στερητικῆς δὲ τῆς Α Γ τιθεμένης ὁμοίως. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ μὲν Α τινὶ τῷ Γ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ Α τῷ Β μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν τινὶ ζῴῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν [30] τινὶ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὐ παντὶ καλῷ. ὥστ' ἂν ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Β παντί, ἀμφότεραι μὲν αἱ προτάσεις ἐπί τι ψευδεῖς, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

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[142] A saber, que "*animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *negro* [B]" (ou "algo *negro* não é *animal*") – obtida por EAO-3 (ou *Felapton*).
[143] São elas: (i) "nenhum *cisne* [C] é *animal* [A]" e (ii) "todo *cisne* [C] é *negro* [B]".
[144] Trata-se de uma versão de EAO-3 (ou *Felapton*), na qual Aristóteles, por alguma razão, inverteu a ordem das premissas.
[145] Ou seja, assumindo-se que: (i) "todo *animal* [C] é *branco* [A]" e (ii) "todo *animal* [C] é *belo* [B]".
[146] A saber, que "*branco* [A] se atribui a algo *belo* [B]" (ou "algo *belo* é *branco*") – obtida por *Darapti* (ou AAI-3).

[56b26] E o mesmo também se dá caso se coloque a premissa AC como privativa. Pois nada impede que A não se atribua a algum C, B se atribua a algum C, e A não se atribua a todo B[147] – como, por exemplo, *branco* [A] não se atribui a algum *animal* [C], *belo* [B] [30] se atribui a algum *animal* [C], e *branco* [A] não se atribui a todo *belo*[148] [B]. De modo que, caso se assuma que A [*branco*] não se atribui a nenhum C [*animal*], e B [*belo*] se atribui a todo C [*animal*], sendo ambas as premissas parcialmente falsas, a conclusão[149] será verdadeira.

[56b33] Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῆς μὲν ὅλης ψευδοῦς τῆς δ' ὅλης ἀληθοῦς λαμβανομένης. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β [35] παντὶ τῷ Γ ἕπεσθαι, τὸ μέντοι Α τινὶ τῷ Β μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ζῷον καὶ λευκὸν παντὶ κύκνῳ ἕπεται, τὸ μέντοι ζῷον οὐ παντὶ ὑπάρχει λευκῷ. τεθέντων οὖν ὅρων τοιούτων, ἐὰν ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Β ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Α ὅλῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Β Γ ὅλη ἔσται ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Α Γ ὅλη ψευδής, καὶ [40] τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[56b33] Do mesmo modo também se dá assumindo-se uma premissa inteiramente falsa e outra inteiramente verdadeira. Pois é possível que A e B acompanhem [35] todo C, ao passo que A não se atribui a algum B – como, por exemplo, *animal* [A] e *branco* [B] acompanham todo *cisne* [C], ao passo que *animal* [A] não se atribui a todo *branco*[150] [B]. Colocando, então, os termos desse modo, caso se assuma que B [*branco*] se atribui inteiramente a C[151] [*cisne*], e que A [*animal*] não se atribui a C [*cisne*] inteiramente[152], a premissa BC[153] será inteiramente verdadeira, a premissa AC[154] será inteiramente falsa, e [40] a conclusão[155] será verdadeira.

[56b40] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Β Γ ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ Α Γ ἀληθές· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ὅροι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν [57a1] < ἄψυχον> – μέλαν – κύκνος [ἄψυχον].

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[147] Quer dizer, que "A não se atribua a **algum** B" (ou "nem todo B seja A" ou "algum B não seja A").

[148] Quer dizer, "*branco* [A] não se atribui a algo *belo* [B]" (ou "algo *belo* não é *branco*").

[149] A saber, que "*branco* [A] não se atribui a algo *belo* [B]" (ou "nem tudo o que é *belo* é *branco*" ou "algo *belo* não é *branco*") – obtida por *Felapton* (ou EAO-3).

[150] Ou seja, que "*animal* [A] não se atribui a **algo** *branco* [B]" (ou "algo *branco* não é *animal*" ou "nem tudo o que é *branco* é *animal*").

[151] Ou seja, que "B [*branco*] se atribui a **todo** C [*cisne*]" (ou "todo C [*cisne*] é A [*animal*]").

[152] Ou seja, que "A [*animal*] não se atribui a **nenhum** C [*cisne*]" (ou "nenhum C [*cisne*] é A [*animal*]").

[153] "Todo *cisne* é *branco*" (lembrando que Aristóteles não sabia da existência de cisnes negros).

[154] "Nenhum *cisne* é *animal*".

[155] A saber, que "*animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *branco* [B]" (ou "algo *branco* não é *animal*") – conclusão obtida por *Felapton* (ou EAO-3). Mais uma vez, vale destacar que Aristóteles apresenta também aqui as premissas em ordem invertida.

[56b40] E o mesmo também se dá caso a premissa BC seja falsa, e a premissa AC seja verdadeira – pois termos como estes[156] fornecem a demonstração: [57a1] *inanimado*, *negro* e *cisne*.[157]

[57a1] ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ ἀμφότεραι λαμβάνοιντο καταφατικαί. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ἕπεσθαι, τὸ δὲ Α ὅλῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, οἷον κύκνῳ παντὶ ζῷον, μέλαν [5] δ' οὐδενὶ κύκνῳ, καὶ τὸ μέλαν ὑπάρχει τινὶ ζῴῳ. ὥστ' ἂν ληφθῇ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Β Γ ὅλη ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Α Γ ὅλη ψευδής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[57a1] Por outro lado, isso também se dá caso ambas as premissas assumidas sejam afirmativas. Pois nada impede que B acompanhe todo C, A não acompanhe C inteiramente, e A se atribua a algum B – como, por exemplo, *animal* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C], *negro* [A] não se atribui [5] a nenhum *cisne* [C], e *negro* [A] se atribui a algum *animal* [B]. De modo que, caso se assuma que A [*negro*] e B [*animal*] se atribuem a todo C [*cisne*], sendo a premissa BC[158] inteiramente verdadeira, e a premissa AC[159] inteiramente falsa, a conclusão[160] também será verdadeira.

[57a8] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς Α Γ ληφθείσης ἀληθοῦς· διὰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

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[156] Adoto aqui a variante do manuscrito C²: "**τοιοῦτοι** ὅροι" (que traduzi como "termos *como estes*") – em vez da predominante (e muito criticada) ocorrência de "**αὐτοὶ** ὅροι" ("os *mesmos* termos"). Tal escolha se deve ao fato – observado por Ross, Mignucci e diversos outros comentadores – de que os *mesmos* termos utilizados no parágrafo anterior (*animal*, *branco* e *cisne*) não permitem criar – independentemente da ordem em que eles sejam dispostos – uma versão de *Felapton* (ou EAO-3), com uma premissa maior verdadeira e uma premissa menor inteiramente falsa, que leve a uma conclusão verdadeira. É certo que C² parte de "**καὶ οἱ** τοιοῦτοι ὅροι" ("**e** termos como estes...") – e não de "**οἱ γὰρ** τοιοῦτοι ὅροι" ("**pois** termos como estes..."), cuja presença é muito mais frequente e condizente com o restante dos *Primeiros Analíticos*. Embora use variantes oriundas de distintas linhagens de manuscritos, com a intervenção que operei no texto, acredito ter defendido os interesses pretendidos pelo filósofo, eliminando as inconsistências presentes em outras variantes e ilustrando o ponto que Aristóteles se propôs a demonstrar.

[157] Na maior parte dos manuscritos, são listados aqui os termos *negro*, *cisne* e *inanimado* (que, como se pode perceber, não são os *mesmos* do parágrafo anterior). Ross observa que Waitz esteve "indubitavelmente certo" aos descartá-los, já que eles não funcionariam aqui – pelo menos não em tal ordem. No entanto, mudando a ordem – como fiz no texto – para *inanimado*, *negro* e *cisne*, como observa Ross, é possível demonstrar o ponto de Aristóteles. Quer dizer, assumindo-se (i) "*inanimado* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *cisne* [C]" (ou "nenhum *cisne* é *inanimado*") e (ii) "*negro* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]" (ou "todo *cisne* é *negro*"), é possível obter a conclusão verdadeira (iii) "*inanimado* [A] não se atribui a algo *negro* [B]" (ou "algo *negro* não é *inanimado*" ou "nem tudo o que é *negro* é *inanimado*"), partindo de uma premissa AC verdadeira e uma premissa BC inteiramente falsa (pelo menos para Aristóteles, que desconhecia a existência de cisnes negros).

[158] "Todo *cisne* [C] é *animal* [B]".

[159] "Todo *cisne* [C] é *negro* [A]".

[160] "Algum *animal* [B] é *negro* [A]" (ou "*negro* se atribui a algum *animal*") – obtida por AAI-3 (ou *Darapti*).

[57a8] E o mesmo também se dá caso se tome a premissa AC verdadeira – pois a demonstração se dará por meio dos mesmos termos.[161]

[57a9] Πάλιν τῆς μὲν ὅλης ἀληθοῦς [10] οὔσης, τῆς δ' ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Α τινί, καὶ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β, οἷον δίπουν μὲν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, καλὸν δ' οὐ παντί, καὶ τὸ καλὸν τινὶ δίποδι ὑπάρχει. ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ καὶ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Β Γ ὅλη ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ [15] Α Γ ἐπί τι ψευδής, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.

[57a9] Novamente[162], sendo uma premissa inteiramente verdadeira [10] e uma premissa parcialmente falsa. Pois é possível que B se atribua a todo C, A se atribua a algum [C], e A se atribua a algum B – como, por exemplo, *bípede* [B] se atribui a todo *humano* [C], *belo* [A] não se atribui a todo *humano* [C][163], e *belo* [A] se atribui a algum *bípede* [B]. Então, caso se assuma que tanto A [*belo*] quanto B [*bípede*] se atribuem inteiramente a C [*humano*], sendo a premissa BC[164] inteiramente verdadeira e a premissa [15] AC[165] parcialmente falsa, a conclusão[166] será verdadeira.

[57a15] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς μὲν Α Γ ἀληθοῦς τῆς δὲ Β Γ ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς λαμβανομένης· μετατεθέντων γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ἔσται ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

[57a15] E o mesmo também se dá tomando-se a premissa AC verdadeira e BC parcialmente falsa – pois haverá demonstração partindo dos mesmos termos, colocados em outra ordem.[167]

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[161] Aqui, diferentemente de 56b40-57a1, é possível demonstrar o ponto de Aristóteles usando os mesmos termos do parágrafo anterior, invertendo apenas a ordem de *animal* e *negro*. Parte-se, então, dos fatos: (i) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]" (ou "todo *cisne* é *animal*"), (ii) "*negro* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *cisne* [C]" (ou "nenhum *cisne* é *negro*" e (iii) "*animal* [A] se atribui a algo *negro* [B]" (ou "algo *negro* é *animal*"). Em seguida, assume-se como premissas: (i) "*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]" (ou "todo *cisne* é *animal*") e (ii') "*negro* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]" (ou "todo *cisne* é *negro*") – donde se conclui, por *Darapti* (ou AAI-3), a proposição verdadeira (iii) "*animal* [A] se atribui a algo *negro* [B]" (ou "algo *negro* é *animal*"), partindo de uma premissa maior AC verdadeira e uma premissa menor BC inteiramente falsa (pelo menos para Aristóteles).

[162] Subentenda-se aqui: "é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira".

[163] Assim como em 56a11-15 e em 56a32-37, aqui, Aristóteles parece usar "A se atribui a algum C" (ou "algum C é A") com o sentido de "A se atribui a algum C e não se atribui a algum" (ou "algum C é A e algum C não é A"). Já que aqui estabelece como fato que "*belo* [A] **não** se atribui a todo *humano* [C]" (ou "algum C **não** é A"), como se ecoasse a afirmação anterior de que "A **se atribui** a algum C" (ou "algum C **é** A").

[164] "Todo *humano* [C] é *bípede* [B]".

[165] "Todo *humano* [C] é *belo* [A]".

[166] A saber, que "algum *bípede* [B] é *belo* [A]" (ou "*belo* se atribui a algum *bípede*") – obtida por *Darapti* (ou AAI-3).

[167] Quer dizer, invertendo a ordem das premissas e tomando A como *bípede*, B como *belo*, e C como *humano*, também se obtém uma conclusão verdadeira. Nesse caso, temos como fatos: (i) "A [*bípede*] se atribui a todo C [*humano*]", (ii) "B [*belo*] se atribui algum C [*humano*]", e (iii) "A [*bípede*] se atribui

[57a18] καὶ τῆς μὲν στερητικῆς τῆς δὲ καταφατικῆς οὔσης. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ μὲν Β ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Α [20] τινί, καὶ ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α, ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Β ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Α μηδενί, ἡ μὲν στερητικὴ ἐπί τι ψευδής, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα ὅλη ἀληθὴς καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα.

[57a18] E também a partir de uma premissa privativa e uma premissa afirmativa.[168] Pois, uma vez que é possível que B se atribua inteiramente a C, que A se atribua [20] a algum C, e que – quando os termos estejam dispostos desse modo – A não se atribua a todo B[169]; então, caso se assuma que B se atribui inteiramente a C e que A não se atribui a nenhum [C], sendo a premissa privativa parcialmente falsa, a outra premissa será inteiramente verdadeira, assim como a conclusão.[170]

[57a23] πάλιν ἐπεὶ δέδεικται ὅτι τοῦ μὲν Α μηδενὶ ὑπάρχοντος τῷ Γ, τοῦ δὲ Β τινί, ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β [25] μὴ ὑπάρχειν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τῆς μὲν Α Γ ὅλης ἀληθοῦς οὔσης, τῆς δὲ Β Γ ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς, ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἶναι ἀληθές. ἐὰν γὰρ ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Β παντί, ἡ μὲν Α Γ ὅλη ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ἐπί τι ψευδής.

[57a23] Novamente, uma vez que se mostrou[171] que, A não se atribuindo a nenhum C e B se atribuindo a algum C, é possível que A [25] não se atribua a algum B, é evidente que, sendo a

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a algum B [*belo*]". Então, partindo das premissas (i) "*bípede* [A] se atribui a todo *humano* [C]" (ou "todo *humano* é *bípede*") e (ii') "*belo* [B] se atribui a todo *humano* [C]" (ou "todo *humano* é *belo*"), deduz-se a proposição verdadeira (iii) "*bípede* [A] se atribui a algum *belo* [B]" (ou "algum *belo* é *bípede*") – por *Darapti* (ou AAI-3), a partir de uma premissa maior AC verdadeira e uma premissa menor BC parcialmente falsa.

[168] Subentenda-se: "é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira, sendo uma premissa verdadeira e uma premissa parcialmente falsa".

[169] Ou seja, que "A não se atribua a algum B" (ou "nem todo B é A" ou "algum B não é A").

[170] Como se pode perceber, Aristóteles não fornece um exemplo aqui. Mignucci propõe tomar A como *branco*, B como *animal*, e C como *humano*. Nesse caso, serão fatos: (i) "A [*branco*] se atribui a algum C [*humano*]", (ii) "B [*animal*] se atribui a todo C [*humano*]", e (iii) "A [*branco*] não se atribui a algum B [*animal*]". Então, partindo das premissas (i') "*branco* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *humano* [C]" (ou "nenhum *humano* é *branco*") e (ii) "*animal* [B] se atribui a todo *humano* [C]" (ou "todo *humano* é *animal*"), deduz-se, por *Felapton* (ou EAO-3), a proposição verdadeira (iii) "*branco* [A] não se atribui a algum *animal* [B]" (ou "algum *animal* não é *branco*") – sendo a premissa negativa (i') parcialmente falsa e a premissa afirmativa (ii) verdadeira.

[171] Embora não tenha encontrado nos comentários nenhuma referência à passagem do capítulo 6 do livro I onde Aristóteles apresenta a dedução EIO-3 (ou *Ferison*), a meu ver, é evidente que o filósofo aqui se refere a ela. Lá, ele diz: "pois se P não se atribui a nenhum S, e R se atribui a algum S [logo, S se atribui a algum R], P não se atribuirá a algum R" (28b33-34), provando EIO-3, que se reduz a EIO-1 (ou *Ferio*) com a simples conversão da premissa menor (como acrescentei nos colchetes acima). Como bem observa Smith, no entanto, vale destacar que não é só **possível** como também é **necessário** que "A não se atribui a algum B" (ou "algum B não é A"), caso seja verdade que (i) "A não se atribui a nenhum C" (ou "nenhum C é A") e (ii) "B se atribui a algum C" (ou "algum B é C"). De todo modo, o

premissa AC inteiramente verdadeira, e a premissa BC parcialmente falsa, é possível haver uma conclusão verdadeira. Pois, caso se assuma que A não se atribui a nenhum C, e que B se atribui a todo C, a premissa AC será inteiramente verdadeira, ao passo que a premissa BC será parcialmente falsa.[172]

[57a29] Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει συλλογισμῶν ὅτι πάντως [30] ἔσται διὰ ψευδῶν ἀληθές. οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὅροι ληπτέοι καὶ ὅταν καθόλου ὦσιν αἱ προτάσεις, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς κατηγορικοί, οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς στερητικοῖς στερητικοί. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μηδενὶ ὑπάρχοντος παντὶ λαβεῖν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τινὶ ὑπάρχοντος καθόλου λαβεῖν ὑπάρχειν, πρὸς [35] τὴν τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερητικῶν.

[57a29] É evidente que também nas deduções parciais[173] [30] haverá – de todos os modos – uma conclusão verdadeira obtida por meio de premissas falsas. Pois deve-se assumir os mesmos termos que foram assumidos quando ambas as premissas são universais[174] – termos

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que Aristóteles faz nesta passagem é – assumindo como fatos as premissas (e a conclusão) de uma dedução EIO-3: (i) "A não se atribui a nenhum C" e (ii) "B se atribui a algum C", logo, (iii) "A não se atribui a algum B" – substituir a segunda premissa por uma premissa universal (que, portanto, será parcialmente falsa), obtendo assim uma versão de EAO-3 (ou *Felapton*) com a premissa maior verdadeira, a segunda premissa (parcialmente) falsa e a conclusão verdadeira: (i) "A não se atribui a nenhum C" e (ii') "B se atribui a **todo** C", logo, (iii) "A não se atribui a algum B".

[172] Para ilustrar o que Aristóteles diz, tomemos A como *planta*, B como *verde*, e C como *lagarto*. Nesse caso, serão fatos: (i) "A [*planta*] não se atribui a nenhum C [*lagarto*]" (ou "nenhum *lagarto* é *planta*"), (ii) "B [*verde*] se atribui a algum C [*lagarto*]" (ou "algum *lagarto* é *verde*"), e (iii) "A [*planta*] não se atribui a algum B [*verde*]" (ou "algo *verde* não é *planta*"). Então, partindo das premissas (i) "*planta* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *lagarto* [C]" (ou "nenhum *lagarto* é *planta*") e (ii') "*verde* [B] se atribui a todo *lagarto* [C]" (ou "todo *lagarto* é *verde*"), deduz-se a proposição verdadeira (iii) "*planta* [A] não se atribui a algo *verde* [B]" (ou "algo *verde* não é *planta*") – sendo a premissa (i) (ou AC) inteiramente verdadeira e a premissa (ii') (ou BC) parcialmente falsa.

[173] Ressaltando que todas as deduções da terceira figura produzem apenas conclusões *parciais* – inclusive as duas deduções que possuem ambas as premissas universais (que, vale destacar, foram as únicas tratadas até agora neste capítulo) –, Crubellier é perspicaz ao observar que, por "deduções parciais", Aristóteles se refere aqui às deduções que possuem uma *premissa* parcial. Nunca é demais lembrar que não existe dedução sem uma premissa universal, ou seja, que não há dedução com duas premissas parciais – ainda que existam deduções com duas premissas *singulares* ou *individuais* (em grego, καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), como, por exemplo: (i) "*Sócrates* é *cativante*", (ii) "*Sócrates* é *careca*", portanto, (iii) "algum *careca* é *cativante*" (dedução esta que se assemelha mais a AAI-3 do que a III-3, que é uma forma inválida).

[174] É importante observar que, em toda parte anterior deste capítulo, Aristóteles se dedicou exclusivamente às deduções com duas premissas universais – a saber, *Darapti* (ou AAI-3) e *Felapton* (ou EAO-3) –, ainda que a terceira figura conte com *quatro* outras formas dedutivas válidas, que partem de uma premissa universal e uma premissa parcial. Neste parágrafo – que é o único dedicado às deduções com uma premissa parcial na terceira figura –, então, o que Aristóteles parece querer dizer é que os mesmos termos que funcionam para AAI-3 também funcionam para IAI-3 (ou *Disamis*) e para AII-3 (ou *Datisi*), assim como os mesmos termos que funcionam para EAO-3 também funcionam para OAO-3 (ou *Bocardo*) e para EIO-3 (ou *Ferison*) – entendendo "funcionar" como "produzir uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de uma ou duas premissas falsas". Vale notar que Aristóteles fez *quase*

categóricos[175] nas deduções categóricas[176] e termos privativos[177] nas deduções privativas.[178] Pois, para [35] a exposição dos termos[179], em nada difere assumir um termo que não se atribui a nenhum como sendo atribuído a todo, ou assumir um termo que se atribui a algum como sendo atribuído universalmente [180] – e o mesmo também se dá no caso das deduções privativas.[181]

[57a36] Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἂν μὲν ᾖ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος, ἀνάγκη, ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ψευδῆ εἶναι ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια, ὅταν δ' ἀληθές, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀληθὲς εἶναι οὔτε τὶ οὔτε πάντα, ἀλλ' ἔστι μηδενὸς

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todas as combinações possíveis para as deduções com duas premissas universais: (i) duas premissas inteiramente falsas (56b9-20); (ii) duas premissas parcialmente falsas (56b20-33); (iii) uma premissa inteiramente falsa e uma premissa verdadeira (56b33-57a9); e (iv) uma premissa parcialmente falsa e uma premissa verdadeira (57a9-28). Porém, como bem observa Mignucci, o filósofo não apresentou os casos com uma premissa inteiramente falsa e uma premissa parcialmente falsa – e, então, o tradutor italiano supriu tal lacuna em sua belíssima nota para este parágrafo (cf. Mignucci, pp. 603-608), na qual também mostrou como os casos de AAI-3 e EAO-3 funcionam para as demais deduções (aquelas com uma premissa parcial) na terceira figura.

[175] Quer dizer, “termos *afirmativos*”, ou melhor, “termos que se atribuem [afirmativa ou categoricamente] aos seus sujeitos”.

[176] Ou seja, “deduções *afirmativas*” (isto é, deduções cujas conclusões são afirmativas).

[177] Leia-se: “termos cujos sujeitos estão privados deles” ou, simplesmente, “termos que **não** se atribuem a determinados sujeitos”.

[178] Ou seja, “deduções *negativas*” (isto é, deduções cujas conclusões são negativas).

[179] Por “para a exposição dos termos” (“πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσιν”), pode-se entender: “para dispor os termos de um modo que se prove o que foi proposto [a saber, que é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de uma ou duas premissas falsas]”.

[180] Como exemplo dos casos afirmativos, tomemos 56b9-14. Lá, Aristóteles toma como fatos: (i) “*humano* [A] não se atribui a nenhum *inanimado* [C]”, (ii) “*bípede* [B] não se atribui a nenhum *inanimado* [C]” e (iii) “*humano* [A] se atribui a algum *bípede* [B]”. Em seguida, o filósofo prova que, de duas premissas inteiramente falsas – (i') “*humano* [A] se atribui a todo *inanimado* [C]” e (ii') “*bípede* [B] se atribui a todo *inanimado* [C]” –, é possível deduzir (por *Darapti* ou AAI-3) uma conclusão verdadeira: (iii) “*humano* [A] se atribui a algum *bípede* [B]”. Ora, a mesma conclusão (iii) também poderia ser obtida de uma premissa inteiramente falsa e de uma premissa **parcial** falsa – tanto de (i') “*humano* [A] se atribui a todo *inanimado* [C]” e (ii'') “*bípede* [B] se atribui a **algo** *inanimado* [C]” (por AII-3 ou *Datisi*); quanto como de (i'') “*humano* [A] se atribui a **algo** *inanimado* [C]” e (ii') “*bípede* [B] se atribui a todo *inanimado* [C]” (por IAI-3 ou *Disamis*).

[181] No caso negativo, tomemos o exemplo de 56b33-40, onde Aristóteles toma como fatos: (i) “*animal* [A] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]”, (ii) “*branco* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]” e (iii) “*animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *branco* [B]”; a partir disso, assumindo-se a premissa inteiramente falsa (i') “*animal* não se atribui a nenhum *cisne* [C]” e a premissa verdadeira (ii) “*branco* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]”, conclui-se (por EAO-3 ou *Felapton*) que (iii) “*animal* [A] não se atribui a algo *branco* [B]”. Ora, a mesma conclusão (iii) também poderia ser obtida de uma premissa falsa (mas não inteiramente) (i'') “*animal* não se atribui a **algum** *cisne* [C]” (ou “algum *cisne* não é *animal*”) e da premissa verdadeira (para Aristóteles) (ii) “*branco* [B] se atribui a todo *cisne* [C]” (ou “todo *cisne* é *branco*”) – por OAO-3 (ou *Bocardo*); bem como da premissa inteiramente falsa (i') “*animal* não se atribui a nenhum *cisne* [C]” (ou “nenhum *cisne* é *animal*”) e da premissa (parcialmente) verdadeira (ii') “*branco* [B] se atribui a **algum** *cisne* [C]” (ou “algum *cisne* é *branco*”) – por EIO-3 (ou *Ferison*).

ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τῶν ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ τὸ συμπέρασμα [40] ὁμοίως εἶναι ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

[57a36] É evidente, então, que, se a conclusão for falsa, é necessário que as premissas[182] das quais parte o argumento – todas ou algumas – sejam falsas[183]; já quando a conclusão for verdadeira[184], não é necessário que as premissas sejam verdadeiras – nem algumas nem todas –, aliás, mesmo quando nenhuma das premissas na dedução for verdadeira, [40] também é possível que a conclusão seja verdadeira – só que não por necessidade.[185]

[57a40] αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι [b1] ὅταν δύο ἔχῃ οὕτω πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστε θατέρου ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι θάτερον, τούτου μὴ ὄντος μὲν οὐδὲ θάτερον ἔσται, ὄντος δ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι θάτερον·

[57a40] A causa disso é que, [b1] quando se tem duas coisas que se relacionam entre si de tal modo que, do fato de uma delas ser, a outra necessariamente é, não sendo a segunda coisa, a primeira também não será, ao passo que, sendo a segunda, a primeira não necessariamente será.[186]

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[182] Embora Aristóteles não use aqui o termo "premissas" (ou "προτάσεις"), ele se refere às coisas "das quais parte o argumento" – "ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος". Logo, tais coisas não podem ser senão *premissas* ou *proposições*, já que um *termo* em si mesmo não pode ser considerado como verdadeiro ou falso. Em vez de "premissas", Crubellier optou por "elementos".

[183] Em outras palavras, se a conclusão de uma dedução é falsa, então, necessariamente, uma de suas premissas ou ambas devem ser falsas. Como define o filósofo no capítulo de abertura dos *Primeiros Analíticos*: "a dedução [συλλογισμὸς] é um argumento [λόγος] no qual, uma vez que certas coisas sejam colocadas, algo diferente das coisas estabelecidas necessariamente resulta do fato de tais coisas serem" (24b18-20). Logo, se um argumento é de fato uma dedução – ou, em outras palavras, se ele possui uma forma válida – e suas premissas são ambas verdadeiras, necessariamente, a sua conclusão também será verdadeira. Relembrando o que Aristóteles disse no início de II, 2: "de premissas verdadeiras não se deduz uma conclusão falsa, mas é possível deduzir uma conclusão verdadeira de premissas falsas" (53b7-8). Eis que, aqui, o filósofo encerra a sua proposta de mostrar os casos – nas três figuras da dedução – em que é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira partindo de premissas falsas.

[184] Leia-se: "quando a conclusão *de uma dedução* [*ou de um argumento*] for verdadeira".

[185] Quer dizer, Aristóteles demonstrou – neste capítulo e nos dois anteriores – que é possível obter uma conclusão verdadeira a partir de premissas falsas. Portanto, o fato de uma conclusão ser verdadeira não implica que as premissas das quais ela foi inferida também sejam verdadeiras. Por outro lado, como deduções com premissas falsas também podem implicar conclusões falsas, em casos em que nem todas as premissas de uma dedução forem verdadeiras, a verdade da conclusão não será *necessária*, mas meramente *acidental*.

[186] Fazendo eco a 53b11-15, Aristóteles parece expor aqui um princípio proposicional: se (i) "A implica necessariamente B", então (ii) "não B" implica (iii) "não A" (o que equivale ao argumento hoje conhecido como *negação do consequente* ou *modus tollens*); porém, assumindo apenas (iv) "B", não é possível garantir necessariamente que (v) "A" (isso equivaleria à falácia hoje conhecida como *falácia da afirmação do consequente*). Exemplificando: se (i) "chover [A] implica necessariamente que o chão fica molhado [B]", então (ii) "o chão não está molhado [não B]" implica (iii) "não choveu [não A]"; porém, se se sabe que (iv) "o chão está molhado [B]", não é possível garantir necessariamente que (v) "choveu [A]" (afinal, o chão pode ter sido molhado de outros modos).
Em síntese: (i) uma dedução com premissas verdadeiras garante que sua conclusão será verdadeira; (ii) se uma dedução possui uma conclusão falsa, é certo que ao menos uma de suas premissas é falsa; mas

[57b3] τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τὸ αὐτό· λέγω δ’ οἷον τοῦ [5] Α ὄντος λευκοῦ τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ τοῦ Α τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὅταν γὰρ τουδὶ ὄντος λευκοῦ, τοῦ Α, τοδὶ ἀνάγκη μέγα εἶναι, τὸ Β, μεγάλου δὲ τοῦ Β ὄντος τὸ Γ μὴ λευκόν, ἀνάγκη, εἰ τὸ Α λευκόν, τὸ Γ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν. καὶ ὅταν δύο ὄντων θατέρου ὄντος [10] ἀνάγκη θάτερον εἶναι, τούτου μὴ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ πρῶτον μὴ εἶναι. τοῦ δὴ Β μὴ ὄντος μεγάλου τὸ Α οὐχ οἷόν τε λευκὸν εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ Α μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ εἰ ἀνάγκη τὸ Β μέγα εἶναι, συμβαίνει ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦ Β μεγάλου μὴ ὄντος αὐτὸ τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα· τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β μὴ ἔστι μέγα, [15] τὸ Α οὐκ ἔσται λευκὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὄντος τούτου λευκοῦ τὸ Β ἔσται μέγα, συμβαίνει, εἰ τὸ Β μὴ ἔστι μέγα, εἶναι μέγα, ὡς διὰ τριῶν.

[57b3] Mas é impossível que uma mesma coisa seja necessária[187] tanto do fato de uma certa coisa ser quanto do fato dessa coisa não ser[188] – dizendo, por exemplo, que [5] B seja necessariamente *grande*[189] do fato de A ser *branco*, quanto B seja necessariamente *grande* do fato de A não ser *branco*. Quando, pois, deste objeto A sendo *branco*, é necessário que aquele objeto B seja *grande*, e, de B sendo *grande*, que C seja *não branco*, é necessário que, se A for *branco*, C não seja *branco*.[190] E quando duas coisas sejam tais que, do fato de uma ser, a outra [10] necessariamente é, desta segunda coisa não sendo, a primeira coisa necessariamente não será.[191] Ora, se B não for *grande*, A não poderá ser *branco*.[192] Porém, se, de A não sendo *branco*, é necessário que B seja *grande*, segue-se necessariamente que[193], de B não sendo

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(iii) o fato de que a conclusão de uma dedução seja verdadeira não garante que as premissas de tal dedução também sejam verdadeiras (ainda que esse possa ser o caso).

[187] Por "seja necessária", pode-se entender "seja *uma consequência* necessária". Como bem apontou o parecerista deste trabalho, aqui, a expressão "'ἐξ ἀνάγκης' tem uma função adverbial, qualificando o modo como a coisa é (εἶναι)" – e, portanto, sua tradução mais literal seria "necessariamente" (e não "necessária").

[188] Quer dizer, é óbvio que a soma dos ângulos internos de um triângulo será necessariamente igual a 180º (pelo menos em superfícies planas), tanto quando chove, quanto quando não chove; porém, tal necessidade não poderia ser uma consequência do fato de ter chovido **e** do fato de **não** ter chovido.

[189] Entendendo aqui "B seja necessariamente *grande*" (ou "B seja *grande* por necessidade") como "B seja *grande* como uma consequência necessária [de A e, ao mesmo tempo, de não A]".

[190] Trata-se de uma versão aristotélica do argumento proposicional conhecido hoje como *silogismo hipotético*: (i) "A implica B" e (ii) "B implica não C", portanto, (iii) "A implica não C".

[191] Aristóteles ecoa o que havia dito no capítulo 2: "se, sendo A, é necessário que B também seja, então, B não sendo, é necessário que A também não seja" (53b12-13) – argumento também conhecido como *negação do consequente* ou *modus tollens*.

[192] Assumindo, é claro, o que Aristóteles havia suposto antes: "quando [...] deste objeto A sendo *branco*, é necessário que aquele objeto B seja *grande*".

[193] Outra tradução possível para "συμβαίνει ἐξ ἀνάγκης" é "*conclui-se* necessariamente que".

grande, o mesmo B é *grande*[194] – o que é impossível.[195] Pois, se B não é *grande*, [15] A não será *branco* necessariamente. Então, se, do fato deste [A] não ser *branco*, B será *grande*, segue-se que, se B não for *grande*, [B] é *grande* – como ocorreria por meio de três termos.[196]

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[194] Aqui, "o mesmo B é *grande*" é uma consequência das premissas (do *silogismo hipotético*): (i) "se B não for *grande*, A não poderá ser *branco*" e (ii) "se, de A não sendo *branco*, é necessário que B seja *grande*".

[195] Em sua extensa nota a esta passagem, Smith observa que "alguns comentadores apontaram que a 'impossibilidade' deduzida [aqui] não é de fato impossível" (p. 191). Em seguida, o tradutor se remete a um trecho do livro de Lukasiewicz, onde lemos: "ao comentar esta passagem, Maier diz que aqui haveria uma conexão contrária à lei da contradição, que, portanto, seria absurda. Esse comentário revela mais uma vez a ignorância de Maier sobre a lógica. Não é a implicação 'se não β, então β' que é contrária à lei da contradição, mas apenas a conjunção 'β e não β'" (p. 50). De fato, se aceitarmos que toda implicação (ou proposição do tipo "se α, então β") for meramente *condicional*, não há nenhuma contradição em dizer que "se não β, então β", já que o antecedente "não β" seria apenas hipotético e, por conseguinte, o seu consequente "β" também seria meramente hipotético. Porém, se assumirmos que, de um par de proposições contraditórias – como "β" e "não β" – uma sempre é verdadeira, então, a conjunção da implicação "se não β, então β" com a premissa implícita "não β" (ou a conjunção da implicação "se β, então não β" com a premissa implícita "β") implicaria na contradição "β e não β".

[196] Quer dizer, como ocorreria no exemplo apresentado antes por Aristóteles: (i) "se A é *branco*, então, B é *grande*" e (ii) "se B é *grande*, então, C é *não grande*", portanto, (iii) "se A é *branco*, então, C é *não branco*" – como se B fosse equivalente a dois termos, tais como A e C no exemplo, assumindo que (i') "se B não for *grande*, A não poderá ser *branco*" e (ii') "se, de A não sendo *branco*, é necessário que B seja *grande*".

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