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"AFROUXARAM-SE OS JOELHOS E O CARO CORAÇÃO": UMA FÓRMULA HOMÉRICA E SEU EMPREGO POR CÁRITON [1]

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Resumo. Sabe-se que Homero constitui a principal referência intertextual de Cáriton. Apesar do número crescente de estudos sobre essa relação, ainda resta muito a ser explorado. O propósito dessa comunicação é examinar o emprego de uma fórmula homérica em *Quéreas e Calírroe,* romance de Cáriton. Trata-se da expressão formular "[…] τῆς/τοῦ δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ (*Ilíada* 21.114 e 425; *Odisseia* 4.703, 23.205, 24.345). Essa fórmula, aplicada a Calírroe, Quéreas e Dioniso, repete-se três vezes ao longo do romance (*Q&C* 1.1.14, 3.6.3, 4.5.9). Pretendo verificar se o autor faz um uso puramente genérico da citação, retendo apenas o seu sentido mais geral, visando apenas a emprestar o prestígio do poeta arcaico à sua obra, ou se há intenção de evocar um contexto específico do poema citado, de modo a criar uma expectativa quanto ao desenvolvimento da obra entre seus leitores. Resta ainda uma terceira possibilidade, a de seu uso estar vinculado a outro propósito, a saber, o de legitimar uma característica estilística do próprio autor, a de criar suas próprias fórmulas, através da emulação do antigo bardo.

Palavras-chave. Intertextualidade; romance grego antigo; épica; Cáriton; *Quéreas e Calírroe*; Homero.

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Sabe-se que Homero constitui a principal referência intertextual de Cáriton.[2] Apesar do número crescente de estudos sobre essa relação,[3] ainda resta muito a ser explorado. Para além das aproximações de ordem temática, creio que uma das formas mais produtivas de investigá-la é aten-

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[1] Uma versão resumida deste artigo foi apresentada durante o 14e Congrès International de la FIEC 2014, Bordeaux/França, apresentação que contou com auxílio da Fapesp.

[2] Tilg 2010, 141: "One of the most conspicuous features of *NAC* [*Narratives about Callirhoe*] is the insertion of a large number of lines from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Chariton quotes Homer far more frequently than any other novelist does, about thirty to forty times depending of a definition of a quotation". Reardon 2003, 333: "The most frequent of all Chariton's literary references are to Homer".

[3] Cf. Müller 1976; Laplace 1980; Fusillo 1990; Manuwald 2000; Robiano 2000; Hirschberger 2001; Morales e Marisal 2003; Tilg 2010, 141–6. Anoto ainda o texto de M. Biraud ("L' hypotexte homérique et les rôles a amoureux de Callirhoé dans le roman de Chariton", in *Sémiologie de l'amour dans les civilisation mediterranéennes*, ed. A. Goursonnet, 21–27. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985), ao qual infelizmente não tive acesso.

tar para como os ecos dos poemas homéricos se materializam no texto de
Cáriton através da incorporação de expressões recorrentes na épica.[4] Mais
do que catalogar tais expressões interessa estabelecer caso a caso o sentido
que assumem nesse novo contexto, se é que, de fato, é possível determinar a
existência de um nexo semântico necessário.

Na contramão dos estudos feitos, que pretendem oferecer uma vi-
são geral da intertextualidade no romance de Cáriton, vou me dedicar a
um exame de caso.[5] Assim, proponho investigar nesse artigo o emprego de
uma única fórmula homérica em *Quéreas e Calírroe*. Trata-se da expressão
formular "[…] τῆς/τοῦ δ'αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ" ("afrouxaram-se lhe
os joelhos e também o caro coração": em senso estrito em *Ilíada* 21.114 e 425;
Odisseia 4.703, 23.205, 24.345). A escolha dessa fórmula deve-se ao fato de
ter sido aplicada aos personagens principais, Calírroe, Quéreas e Dionísio,
e de repetir-se três vezes ao longo do romance e em momentos diversos da
narrativa (*Q&C* 1.1.14, 3.6.3, 4.5.9).

Para tal vou começar por analisar sua presença na *Ilíada* e na *Odisseia*
e, em seguida, verificar seu emprego e função em Cáriton, pois é sabido que
a fórmula, um elemento estruturador na poesia de caráter oral, não cumpre
o mesmo papel no romance grego, em que a escrita é pressuposto e reali-
dade. Pretendo verificar se o autor faz um uso puramente genérico da cita-
ção, retendo apenas o seu sentido mais geral, visando apenas a emprestar
o prestígio do poeta arcaico à sua obra ou elevar o estilo da composição, ou
se há intenção de evocar um contexto específico do poema citado, de modo
a criar uma expectativa quanto aos rumos da narrativa entre os leitores ca-
pazes de identificá-la.[6] Resta ainda uma terceira possibilidade, a de seu uso
estar vinculado a outro propósito, a saber, o de legitimar uma característica
estilística do próprio autor, a de criar suas próprias fórmulas, através da
emulação do antigo bardo.

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[4] Em *Quéreas e Calírroe* evidenciam-se as aproximações com a trama da *Ilíada*, já que a heroína,
tal qual Helena, tem um marido grego, Quéreas, que vai à Jônia resgatá-la de um segundo casa-
mento, com Dionísio. Assim, o triângulo formado por Quéreas, Calírroe e Dionísio e a oposição
entre Grécia e Ásia remete ao paradigma de Menelau, Helena e Páris e às hostilidades entre
gregos e troianos no poema de Homero. O romance ainda constrói paralelos com a *Odisseia*, em
que o retorno dos protagonistas à Sicília natal e a fidelidade da heroína a seu primeiro marido os
associam a Odisseu e Penélope. Cf. Laplace 1980; Morgan 2008; Whitmarsh 2011, 55.

[5] Para esses estudos de ordem geral Müller (1976) e Fusillo (1990) continuam referência.

[6] Discute-se muito sobre o público a quem os romances eram dirigidos, servindo o jogo intertex-
tual, inclusive, como argumento em favor de um leitor culto contra a ideia de um público majorita-
riamente feminino ou de pouca instrução, que decorre do predomínio da temática amorosa. No âm-
bito dessa análise remeto às reflexões de Robiano (2000, 528–9), que, através da análise das citações,
defende que o romance exige um público erudito, apto a apreciar o jogo literário, e de Manuwald
(2000, 119), que considera que Cáriton levou em conta tanto o leitor informado quanto o menos
educado, uma vez que a não identificação das citações não prejudicaria a compreensão do enredo.

Os autores que examinaram essa questão pouco se detiveram sobre essa fórmula, cujo emprego consideraram basicamente ornamental, preferindo centrar sua análise em outras passagens homéricas que, ao contrário dessa, aparecem apenas uma vez no texto de Cáriton e são maiores em extensão.[7] E quando o fizeram, talvez por se prenderem a uma noção muito funcionalista da fórmula homérica, não buscaram explorar de forma exaustiva os vários contextos em que o verso aparece em Homero, o que julgo essencial para que se possa estabelecer o sentido que sua citação assume do romance de Cáriton. Não raro, a associam apenas a seu contexto iliádico, o do combate corpo a corpo, deixando de lado o seu emprego em situações diferentes na *Odisseia*.[8] Passemos, portando, ao exame da fórmula em Homero.

UMA FÓRMULA HOMÉRICA

A expressão que vou examinar constitui uma unidade sintática, uma oração com sujeito e predicado, que em sentido estrito, ocupa quatro pés e meio finais do hexâmetro. Uma busca que leve em consideração seus elementos invariáveis (λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ) revela nove ocorrências em Homero, sendo duas na *Ilíada* e sete na *Odisseia*. O quadro a seguir sistematiza as ocorrências:

1	*Ilíada* 21.114	ὡς φάτο, τοῦ δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
2	*Ilíada* 21.425	ἤλασε· τῆς δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
3	*Odisseia* 4.703	ὡς φάτο, τῆς δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
4	*Odisseia* 5.297	καὶ τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
5	*Odisseia* 5.406	καὶ τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
6	*Odisseia* 22.68	ὡς φάτο, τῶν δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
7	*Odisseia* 22.147	καὶ τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
8	*Odisseia* 23.205	ὡς φάτο, τῆς δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
9	*Odisseia* 24.345	ὡς φάτο, τοῦ δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ

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[7] Fusillo 1990, 34: "Una prima e più scontata funzione è quella esornativa: impreziosire il raconto con brevi sintagmi omerici che per la loro formularità non attivano un rapporto fra i due conteste". Cf. também Manuwald 2000, 109 n. 39; Hirschberger 2001, 159.

[8] Cf. Fusillo 1990, 34: "Trata del episodio de Licaone nell' *Iliade*, priva quindi di contenuto erotico […]", ou seja *Il.* 21.114. Também Morales e Marisal 2003, 294 n. 9. Uma exceção é Müller (1976, 129 n. 73), que se refere especialmente aos empregos da fórmula na *Odisseia*, procurando estabelecer relações contextuais, mas ainda assim no limite de uma nota de rodapé. Cf. Manuwald 2000, 108 n. 39.

Na sua parte fixa temos o sintagma formado por sujeito composto (γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ, joelhos e caro coração, I) e verbo na voz passiva (λύτο, afrouxaram-se). Como elementos variáveis, há a indicação de quem é afetado pela ação, indicado por uma forma possessiva, artigo/pronome ou nome próprio no caso genitivo (τῆς, τοῦ, τῶν, ᾽Οδυσσῆος, II), e, a proposição inicial que corresponde ao primeiro pé do hexâmetro (III).

Essa posição é ocupada cinco vezes pela oração (ὡς φάτο, assim falou), três vezes por conjunção e advérbio (καὶ τότ᾽, e então), uma vez por um verbo que, em *enjambement*, complementa o sentido do verso anterior (ἤλασε, golpeou). Considerando que o núcleo é estável e o que varia não modifica drasticamente o sentido geral do conjunto, pode-se considerar que esse é um verso formular. Para maior clareza, veja-se o quadro abaixo:

	VERSO	I	II	III
1	*Ilíada* 21.114	ὡς φάτο,	τοῦ δ᾽αὐτοῦ	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
2	*Ilíada* 21.425	ἤλασε·	τῆς δ᾽αὐτοῦ	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
3	*Odisseia* 4.703	ὡς φάτο,	τῆς δ᾽αὐτοῦ	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
4	*Odisseia* 5.297	καὶ τότ᾽	᾽Οδυσσῆος	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
5	*Odisseia* 5.406	καὶ τότ᾽	᾽Οδυσσῆος	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
6	*Odisseia* 22.68	ὡς φάτο,	τῶν δ᾽αὐτοῦ	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
7	*Odisseia* 22.147	καὶ τότ᾽	᾽Οδυσσῆος	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
8	*Odisseia* 23.205	ὡς φάτο,	τῆς δ᾽αὐτοῦ	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
9	*Odisseia* 24.345	ὡς φάτο,	τοῦ δ᾽αὐτοῦ	λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ

O sentido geral da fórmula não coloca dificuldades. Trata-se da descrição da reação de impotência de quem é submetido a um golpe físico (2) ou, na maioria das vezes, moral (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). Como consequência produz-se um colapso a uma só vez emocional e físico, que pode culminar no desfalecimento, evocando uma sensação de morte.[9] Como visto, em cinco ocorrências a reação se dá em resposta a algo que foi dito (1, 3, 6, 8, 9); em três, a algo que foi visto (4, 5, 7) e em uma, a um impacto físico (2).

Resta examinar quem experimenta essa reação extrema e em que contextos. Além de Odisseu, referido nominalmente três vezes (᾽Οδυσσῆος: 4, 5, 7), temos Penélope (τῆς: 3 e 8), Afrodite (τῆς: 2), Licaon (τοῦ: 1), Laertes (τοῦ: 9) e os pretendentes (τῶν: 6). Com exceção de Afrodite, que é atingida

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[9] O sintagma γούνατ᾽ ἔλυσα/ἔλυσε/ἔλυσαν (afrouxei, afrouxou, afrouxaram seus joelhos), que traz o verbo na voz ativa, com diversas ocorrências na *Ilíada* e na *Odisseia*, é empregado como eufemismo para matar.

por Atena numa disputa entre os deuses e cai por terra (2), pode-se dividir as outras ocorrências em dois casos:

(a) situação em que há risco de vida, quer a própria quer a de um parente (Licaon teme diante de Aquiles: 1; Penélope teme por Telêmaco: 3; Odisseu teme morrer no mar ou nas mãos dos pretendentes: 4, 5, 7; os pretendentes temem diante de Odisseu: 6);

(b) situação em que se experimenta uma grande alegria (Penélope e Laertes reconhecem Odisseu em seu retorno, 8 e 9). Ou seja, tanto o medo quando a alegria desmedidos são fatores de estresse físico e emocional.

Por fim, vale ainda mencionar uma variação da expressão. Na *Odisseia* (18.212) tem-se uma versão reduzida do elemento fixo, agora na metade inicial do hexâmetro:

τῶν δ' αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατ', ἔρῳ δ' ἄρα θύμον ἔθελχθεν

afrouxaram-se lhes os joelhos e seu ânimo sucumbiu ao encanto de eros.

A referência aqui é à reação dos pretendentes diante de Penélope, que com o concurso de Atena, os seduz para angariar tesouros para a casa. Embora não corresponda exatamente à citação feita por Cáriton, a proximidade de eros e do contexto amoroso pode ser significativa para a análise da fórmula em *Quéreas e Calírroe*.

UMA FÓRMULA HOMÉRICA EM CÁRITON

Em Cáriton, a fórmula ocorre três vezes, sempre em um recorte muito preciso: τῆς/τοῦ δ'αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ. Ou seja, o objeto da ação é um "ele" ou "ela" (na verdade, um "dele" ou "dela"). Em cada uma dessas ocorrências (1.1.14, 3.6.3, 4.5.9), a frase se aplica a um dos personagens que formam o triângulo amoroso do romance: Calírroe (1.1.14), Cáriton (3.6.3) e Dionísio (4.5.9), e na ordem estrita em que eles entram na trama. Em todos os casos, a citação não está identificada no texto, mesclando-se à voz do narrador, que é a forma predominante de citar por Cáriton, não sendo atribuída às personagens, o que é significativo para a leitura que será proposta.[10]

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[10] Tilg 2011, 141: "In *NAC* (…) quotations are usually not even announced or otherwise introduced but inserted as parts of Chariton's own narrative". Das cerca de quarenta citações de Homero no romance, apenas quatro fazem referência ao seu autor. Para análise dessas ocorrências, Tilg 2011, 144–6.

Num primeiro momento, o uso reiterado da fórmula para caracterizar as três personagens principais revela a intenção de atrelá-las a um mesmo destino. Qual seja, a pista pode estar no contexto homérico das citações. Lidas contra o pano de fundo dos poemas homéricos, o relacionamento entre a heroína e seus dois maridos remete à situação de Helena, mulher a uma só vez do grego Menelau e do troiano Páris. De fato, o paralelismo dessa relação já foi bastante explorado, inclusive por Cáriton, que se refere constantemente a esse modelo.[11]

Mas essa fórmula em particular, como visto, não se aplica a nem a Helena, nem a Menelau, nem a Páris. Ela é muito mais frequente na *Odisseia* do que na *Ilíada* e está ligada a um contexto de *pathos* exacerbado. Os três personagens do romance a que ela é aplicada têm em comum uma grande suscetibilidade às emoções, condição a que estão submetidos por influência da paixão, ou, se preferir, de Eros. Esse dado, como visto, encontra-se em Homero, já que descreve um colapso dos sentidos que é antes emocional do que físico – muito embora na épica só na variante encontrada na *Odisseia* xviii é Eros está na origem do abalo.

O elemento patético é muito pronunciado em *Quéreas e Calírroe*.[12] Os principais personagens estão sempre às voltas com um turbilhão de emoções que os levam a um constante esgotamento que beira ao colapso físico e à morte. Imagens que sugerem a morte iminente e ameaças de suicídio são frequentes ao longo do romance.[13]

De forma geral, os estudos dedicados à questão consideram a citação em função de um dos motivos seguintes: elevação do estilo (poesia = nobre, prosa = pedestre), legitimação de um gênero ainda não codificado (através da associação com um gênero tradicional e bem aceito), caracterização dos personagens (construídos a partir de paradigmas bem estabelecidos). Não menos significativo é o desejo de estabelecer um jogo erudito com os leitores centrado no reconhecimento das passagens que via de regra em Cáriton não são identificadas textualmente. Note-se que há no romance uma fusão entre os versos de Homero e a voz do narrador, que se misturam sem que o leitor seja avisado disso (Tilg 2010, 141–2). Esse artifício retórico possibilita

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[11] Cf. Laplace 1980; Hirschberger 2001. Cáriton, *Quéreas & Calírroe* 2.6.1, 5.2.8.

[12] Hirschberger 2001, 182: "Charitons vorliebe für Pathos und Paradoxon entspricht Strömmungen in der hellenistischen Literatur (…). Auch die intertextuallen Bezüge in seinem Roman können dem Ausdruck von Pathos und Paradoxon dienen: So steigert Chariton beispielsweise in Ohnmachtsszenen das Pathos durch die Verwendung von Homerversen."

[13] Quéreas tenta o suicídio diversas vezes (p. ex. 1.5.2, 1.6.1, 3.1.1, 3.5.6, 5.10.6), Dionísio também concebe essa possibilidade quando não consegue conquistar o amor de Calírroe (3.1.1). Há ainda as mortes aparentes (*Scheintod*) de Calírroe e Quéreas, que são objeto de luto (1.5.1, 1.6, 4.1.1).

a identificação e empatia do leitor, capaz de decifrar as passagens, com o autor, visando a boa aceitação da obra.[14]

Embora admita que, em sentido geral, Cáriton tenha citado a fórmula em questão por uma dessas duas razões, a saber, vincular suas personagens à tradição da épica homérica e enfatizar o componente patético de sua narrativa, parto do princípio de que, em *Quéreas e Calírroe*, o estabelecimento do contexto da citação não é irrelevante, ao contrário, importa para uma interpretação plena. Passo, então, ao exame de cada uma das citações. Justamente por acreditar que Cáriton cita Homero com conhecimento de causa, tendo em mente um determinado passo dos poemas épicos, vou restringir minha análise às ocorrências que há coincidência absoluta com as passagens referidas. Com isso, elimino as referências que correspondem às entradas de número 4 a 7 no quadro da página 6.

CALÍRROE: AFRODITE E PENÉLOPE

O primeiro registro da fórmula em Cáriton ocorre no início do livro 1, logo no primeiro capítulo. Cabe dizer que é também a primeira citação de Homero no romance. O capítulo um é muito movimentado: o par protagonista é apresentado ao leitor, seu encontro é providenciado por Eros, a paixão fulminante nasce, os empecilhos para união são superados, o casamento sacramentado. Enfim, o primeiro capítulo traz em si argumento para todo um romance cujo ápice fosse o casamento e não, como é caso aqui, tivesse por objetivo narrar as vicissitudes que o casal deve enfrentar após seu enlace. Ao seu final, quando a cidade inteira já comemora o assentimento dado pelo pai da noiva à sua união com Quéreas, Calírroe ainda jaz na ignorância. Recolhida a seus aposentos, ela está entregue à dor do amor irrealizado, quando recebe a notícia da sua boda imediata. A reação é assim descrita pelo narrador:

τῆς δ᾽αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει τίνι γαμεῖται, ἄφωνος εὐθὺς ἦν καὶ σκότος αὐτῆς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κατεχύθη καὶ ὀλίγου δεῖν ἐξέπνευσεν· ἐδόκει δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς ὁρῶσιν αἰδώς.

Afrouxaram-se lhe os joelhos e também o caro coração,
pois não sabia com quem se casaria. Ficou de imediato sem voz, e a escuridão cobriu seus olhos e por pouco não expirou. Aos que a viam, isso parecia recato.[15]

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[14] Manuwald 2000, 101, 119; Robiano 2000, 128–9; Hirschberger 2001, 183.

[15] As traduções são de minha autoria. Para a citação do grego, sigo a edição de Reardon (Chariton 2004), que optou por destacar as citações homéricas do corpo do texto, o que não acontece nos manuscritos antigos em que há um contínuo indistinto – vale lembrar ainda que as aspas

Noto aqui a associação da fórmula estudada com uma variante de outra expressão formular empregada por Homero: κατὰ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμῶν κεχύτ᾽ ἀχλύς ("uma névoa cobriu-lhe os olhos", *Il*. 5.696, também com variações em *Il*. 20.321 e 421, *Od*. 22.88), em contexto de morte em batalha.[16] Reforça-se aqui a ideia de morte, ainda que figurada.

Em Homero, há três ocorrências em que há total coincidência com a citação feita por Cáriton (cf. quadro, números 2, 3 e 8). As referências são a Afrodite (2) e Penélope (3 e 8). Não há como ignorar que ambas, deusa e mortal, contribuem para a constituição do caráter da heroína.

A ligação entre Calírroe e Afrodite, a quem é comparada inúmeras vezes ao longo da história, é evidente e de máxima relevância para a caracterização da heroína.[17] Embora seja importante estabelecer para o leitor essa relação entre a heroína e a deusa desde cedo, o contexto do verso homérico é muito diverso desse do romance, já que a deusa é abatida por Atena no campo de batalha (*Ilíada* 21.114). Ora, Afrodite é a divindade mais poderosa de *Quéreas e Calírroe* e uma passagem que remetesse à sua humilhação justo no momento em que se celebra seu triunfo não parece muito adequada – afinal é o casamento arranjado por Eros, seu filho, e por ela ratificado, que se está prestes a anunciar.

No entanto, a associação da deusa com a heroína é sempre bem-vinda e no contexto específico faz sentido. A deusa do amor abatida pela deusa da razão traduziria a decepção de Calírroe ao crer frustrada a prece que fizera no templo, a de ter Quéreas por marido – lembre-se que, no momento, ela ignora a identidade do noivo escolhido por seu pai, tendo todos os motivos para crer que não seria um desafeto da família, como Quéreas. Assim, a queda da deusa descreve bem a situação da heroína, que também ela crê ter levado uma rasteira da Fortuna.

No plano geral do romance, se Calírroe é uma versão de Helena, favorita de Afrodite, ela também evoca Penélope, a heroína da *Odisseia*.[18] No início do romance, a corte que Calírroe recebe de inúmeros pretendentes

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ainda não tinham sido inventadas. Claro que o ritmo do verso em meio a prosa denunciaria aos ouvidos habituados a citação.

[16] Cáriton substitui ἀχλύς (névoa) por σκότος (escuridão), mas emprega o termo em 3.1.3. Mais frequente e cristalizada em Homero é a expressão τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσε κάλυψεν (*Il*. 4.461, 6.11, 13.575, 14.519, 16.316 e 325, 20.393, 20.471, 21.471). O sentido é o mesmo, o que pode levar a crer que Cáriton estivesse parafraseando Homero aqui ou tenha fundido as duas fórmulas com intuito de criar uma nova. Essas variações são estudadas por Manuwald (2000). Cf. também Tilg 2011, 144: "We may conclude that Chariton thinks of *NAC* to some extent, at least from a metaliterary point of view, as a recreation of Homeric epic and that he imagines himself a Homer in prose".

[17] P. ex. *Quéreas & Calírroe* 1.12, 1.14.1, 2.2.6, 2.3.6, 3.2.14, 3.2.17, 3.9.1 *etc*. Também são frequentes as preces da heroína à deusa. Cf. Laplace 1980, 121–4.

[18] Um dos pontos mais significativos é o emprego por Cáriton (8.1.16) de um verso de Homero que marca o reencontro amoroso entre Odisseu e Penélope (*Od*. 23.296) para celebrar a reunião

jovens e orgulhosos é o vínculo mais evidente entre elas, mas ao longo do romance outros aparecerão, sobretudo a fidelidade a Quéreas que nem o segundo casamento, apresentado como um recurso extremo para preservar a vida do filho que esperava dele, compromete (cf. 3.11).

A fórmula citada, quando aplicada a Penélope, evoca dois contextos. No primeiro (*Odisseia* 4.703) a rainha é informada de que os pretendentes armaram uma emboscada contra Telêmaco e sente-se fraquejar. Tanto tramoias de pretendentes quanto a integridade do filho estão no horizonte do romance, de modo permitir pensar que a fórmula evocasse na mente do leitor familiarizado com Homero essas situações inquietantes, gerando assim expectativa quando ao desenrolar da trama.

De fato, as expectativas assim geradas não tardam a se confirmarem. O início do segundo capítulo (1.2) é marcado pelo inconformismo dos jovens que cortejavam Calírroe e foram preteridos por Quéreas. Ofendidos com o casamento da moça, tramam para desfazê-lo incitando os ciúmes do rapaz. A farsa que armam vai resultar na agressão da heroína pelo marido e sua suposta morte, que sela a separação do casal protagonista. No livro II (2.8), Calírroe, agora escrava na casa de Dionísio, descobre que espera um filho de Quéreas e considera abortar a criança, o que é motivo de grande angústia para ela.

Müller (1976, 129, n. 73) indica brevemente a semelhança entre as duas passagens, em que Calírroe está para Penélope; a Ama que traz a notícia do casamento, para o arauto que revela a maquinação dos pretendentes; a notícia do casamento, à da emboscada, sendo que ambas indicam a perda definitiva de um ser amado (Quéreas para Calírroe; Telêmaco para Penélope).

A segunda ocorrência da fórmula associada a Penélope (*Odisseia* 23.205) dá-se no contexto do reconhecimento de Odisseu. Como é bem conhecido, Penélope demonstra ceticismo quando Euricleia anuncia o retorno do herói e, reticente, resolve testá-lo, o que resulta numa das cenas de reconhecimento mais longas do poema. Uma vez comprovada sua identidade, a esposa finalmente sucumbe à emoção, relaxando joelhos e coração.

Em Cáriton, tal como a heroína de Homero, Calírroe está em seu quarto quando a ama entra para anunciar a grande novidade. Como Penélope, a moça não acredita que o noivo que lhe aguarda seja o seu amado Quéreas e terá de ver para crer. A diferença está no fato de que o uso da fórmula aqui antecede o reconhecimento. A emoção da heroína não está vinculada ao reconhecimento, mas à presunção de que será dada em ca-

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entre Quéreas e Calírroe, equiparados assim ao par da *Odisseia*. Cf. também Hirschberger 2001, 167–8; Morgan 2008, 220.

samento a alguém que não Quéreas. No entanto, se o leitor, que conhece a identidade do noivo, associar a fórmula ao contexto do reconhecimento na *Odisseia*, perceberá que o narrador prepara na sequência a introdução de uma cena de *anagnorisis*. Eis o desenrolar da narrativa (1.1.14):

ἐπεὶ δὲ ταχέως ἐκόσμησαν αὐτὴν αἱ θεραπαινίδες, τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν θυρῶν ἀπέλιπον. οἱ δὲ γονεῖς τὸν νυμφίον εἰσήγαγον πρὸς τὴν παρθένον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαιρέας προσδραμὼν αὐτὴν κατεφίλει, Καλλιρόη δέ, γνωρίσασα τὸν ἐρώμενον, ὥσπερ τι λύχνου φῶς ἤδη σβεννύμενον ἐπιχυθέντος ἀλαίου πάλιν ἀνέλαμψε καὶ μείζων ἐγένετο καὶ κρείττων.

Tão logo as criadas a adornaram, a multidão afastou-se das portas, enquanto o noivo era conduzido por seus pais até a moça. Quéreas aproximou-se e a beijou. Ao *reconhecer* o homem amado, Calírroe brilhou novamente, como o lume quase extinto de uma lamparina quando o óleo é reposto, e ficou maior e mais forte.[19]

Pode-se concluir que cada uma das ocorrências da fórmula em Homero tem algo a dizer sobre a heroína de Cáriton e não seria exagero sugerir que o romancista tinha em vista as três passagens. No entanto, me parece que a analogia é maior no que concerne à última, dada a proximidade dos contextos. É ainda mais significativa na medida em que o reconhecimento é um motivo estrutural do romance de Cáriton e fundamental para o desenlace da trama.

QUÉREAS: LAERTES, IMPOTENTE *ANAGNÓRISIS*

A fórmula é citada uma segunda vez no decorrer do livro III, quando, após a descoberta que Calírroe estava viva e fora vendida por piratas a um rico senhor na Jônia, Quéreas parte em missão de resgate. Ao chegar à Jônia, depara-se com um templo de Afrodite, a quem vai render culto e pedir ajuda. Finda a prece, ao levantar a cabeça, defronta-se com uma estátua da esposa (3.6.3):

μεταξὺ δ' ἀνακύψας εἶδε παρὰ τὴν θεὸν εἰκόνα Καλλιρόης χρυσῆν, ἀνάθημα Διονυσίου.
         τοῦ δ'αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ.
κατέπεσεν οὖν σκοτοδινιάσας·

Enquanto isso ergueu-se e viu ao lado da deusa uma estátua de ouro de Calírroe, oferenda de Dionísio.
        Afrouxaram-se lhe os joelhos e também o caro coração.
Então, a vista escureceu e tomado de vertigem, caiu.

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[19] Note-se aqui o símile que Cáriton cria, mimetizando o estilo homérico. Cf. acima, n. 16.

Por se tratar de personagem masculino, a fórmula traz agora o artigo τοῦ, coincidindo, nesse caso, com uma passagem da *Ilíada* (21.114) e outra da *Odisseia* (24.345). Embora a *Ilíada* seja um intertexto importante para a caracterização de Quéreas, especialmente no que respeita sua aproximação com Aquiles,[20] a passagem da *Odisseia* parece mais promissora para esclarecer o contexto buscado no romance. Como já observou Müller (1976, 129, n. 73), a situação em que Quéreas se encontra também remete a cena de um reconhecimento, ainda que indireto. Ao atentar para a estátua, nela reconhece Calírroe, ou melhor, reconhece que Calírroe foi o seu modelo. Tomado por violenta emoção, desfalece de fato, como revela a sequência do texto.

Na *Ilíada* (21.114), o verso é empregado ao final do encontro fatal entre o troiano Licaon e Aquiles, quando aquele vê negada a súplica que fez ao grego para que lhe poupe a vida. Diante da iminência da morte, deixa-se abater. Como, no momento em que percebe a imagem da esposa, Quéreas ainda não sabe o que se passou com ela, qual o seu paradeiro, se está viva ou morta, a reação é fruto de estupor e, num primeiro momento, até mesmo de alegria. Não parece que haja vínculo com a situação de Licaon.

Na *Odisseia* (24.345), a fórmula é usada para descrever a reação de Laertes quando reconhece que o estrangeiro com quem conversava era de fato seu filho Odisseu. Trata-se do mesmo contexto de uma das ocorrências que envolvem Penélope (*Od.* 23.205). O reconhecimento entre Quéreas e Calírroe, que só virá a acontecer no livro VIII,[21] marca o clímax do romance, pois é pressuposto para o final feliz que caracteriza o gênero. Não é despropositado pensar, então, que o uso da fórmula homérica, remeta a esse contexto, antecipando de certa forma o encontro do casal, que por distante deve ser insinuado ao leitor. Então a aproximação não se faria entre Quéreas e Laertes, desiguais na idade e no *ethos*, mas através da circunstância que os une, o reconhecimento inesperado do amado e também, em certo grau, a impotência que sentem para momentos antes da identificação – Quéreas vinha de confessar a dificuldade de buscar Calírroe por toda a Jônia sem sequer mesmo ter garantias de que estivesse viva (3.6).

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[20] Cáriton compara Quéreas a Aquiles desde o livro I (1.1.3, 1.5.2). Cf. Morales e Marisal (1996), para as citações de Homero em que Quéreas é assimilado a Aquiles. Também Morgan 2008, 219–20.

[21] Embora marido e mulher tenham oportunidade de se avistar antes disso, durante o julgamento na Babilônia (5.8), não trocam palavra e permanecem separados. O reconhecimento que sela a reunião do casal ocorre portanto apenas em 8.1.8: "Enquanto ele falava, Calírroe *reconheceu* (γνωρίσασα) sua voz e desvelou-se. E, ao mesmo tempo, ambos exclamaram: Quéreas! Calírroe!".

DIONÍSIO: LICAON, UMA VÍTIMA DE AQUILES

A terceira e última ocorrência da fórmula aplica-se a Dionísio (4.5.9). Durante um banquete em sua casa, recebe cartas enviadas por Mitridates, o persa de quem Quéreas era escravo. Em meio a elas há uma mensagem endereçada a Calírroe, que lida inadvertidamente, causa um abalo tão profundo que resulta num desmaio:

ἐντεμεῖν τὰς σφραγῖδας κελεύσας ἐντυγχάνειν τοῖς γράμμασιν. εἶδεν οὖν "Καλλιρόῃ Χαιρέας· ζῶ".
                    τοῦ δ'αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ
εἶτα σκότος τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αὐτοῦ κατεχύθη.

[Dionísio] mandou romper os lacres e passou à leitura de seu conteúdo. Bateu os olhos no seguinte: "Para Calírroe de Quéreas. Estou vivo."
          Afrouxaram-se lhe os joelhos e também o caro coração,
e então a escuridão cobriu seus olhos.

As referências em Homero são as mesmas mencionadas para a passagem protagonizada por Quéreas. No caso de Dionísio, sua situação parece estar mais próxima da de Licaon (*Ilíada* 21.114) do que a de Laertes (*Odisseia* 24.345), já que saber que Quéreas estava vivo e procurava recuperar Calírroe, representava uma ameaça a sua vida. Anteriormente, em diversas ocasiões, Dionísio deixara claro que lhe era impossível continuar a viver uma vez privado de Calírroe, chegando mesmo a planejar seu suicídio diante da recusa da moça à sua corte (3.1). Assim, a carta interceptada equivale para ele a uma sentença de morte. Também é significativo notar que Licaon recebe o golpe final de um Aquiles enfurecido pela morte de seu amado Pátroclo. Dado que o narrador do romance equipara Quéreas e Aquiles e que através das citações da *Ilíada* o relacionamento entre herói e heroína será associado ao que mantém Pátroclo e Aquiles, é possível sugerir que Cáriton quisesse insinuar a seus leitores que Dionísio pagará com a vida a ofensa feita a seu herói vingador.[22]

Já o contexto odisseico não parece se adaptar a ele, a não ser pelo viés mais geral, o do baque emocional, pois qualquer alusão a reconhecimento é estranha aqui. No entanto, vale notar que Müller (1976, 129, n.73) sugere que a citação remeta ao canto XXII da *Odisseia* (cf. quadro, número 6), em que os pretendentes temem diante do regresso de Odisseu. Deve-se admitir que aqui a analogia também é possível, devendo ter ocorrido aos leitores

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[22] Tal ameaça ficará no horizonte apenas, não se cumprindo no âmbito da narrativa. Calírroe retorna a Sicília com Quéreas deixando a Dionísio uma carta em que recomenda os cuidados que deve ter com o filho, que ele assume ser seu. Como em outras situações Dionísio cogita a morte se fosse privado de Calírroe, essa não é uma hipótese de todo absurda.

contemporâneos do romance, embora não haja coincidência absoluta entre as passagens citadas.

CONCLUSÃO

Após concluída a análise das passagens em que a fórmula homérica é citada, considero que seu emprego cumpre diversas funções no interior do romance.

No que concerne ao estilo, o recurso a uma fórmula conhecida tem, sem dúvida, uma intenção ornamental, na medida em que eleva a linguagem ao nível dos paradigmáticos poemas homéricos. O narrador não só cita Homero como o parafraseia, comparando-se ao poeta, uma maneira de demonstrar que a prosa, por pedestre que seja, pode almejar uma elocução alta.

No âmbito semântico, a fórmula põe em destaque a sensação extremada de falência emocional e física, característica da exacerbação dos elementos patéticos predominante na estética do romance erótico. Tem a vantagem de, ao ser empregada para caracterizar a reação dos principais personagens do romance, vincular seus destinos, dando relevo ao triângulo amoroso de que são protagonistas. Essa associação evoca obviamente o triângulo que o próprio Homero traça na *Ilíada*, entre Helena, Menelau e Páris, que serve de pano de fundo mítico à narrativa, muito embora a fórmula citada não se aplique originalmente a nenhum deles.

Até aqui, os efeitos buscados ocorrem mesmo que o verso citado não seja claramente identificado pelos leitores. Basta para tal a impressão de que o autor escreve à maneira de Homero ou a percepção de que a citação se repete para Calírroe, Quéreas e Dionísio. Caso o leitor reconheça a citação e sua fonte, parece natural que tentasse estabelecer aproximações com os contextos específicos dos poemas. Espero ter demonstrado que essa leitura não só é possível como enriquece o texto de chegada, tornando mais complexas as reações e as relações entre os personagens. Se fui persuasiva ao associar as cenas em que participam Calírroe e Quéreas a reconhecimentos (*Od.* 23.205 e 24.345) e a de Dionísio a morte (*Il.* 21.114), tais referências antecipariam de certa forma o destino das personagens: o final feliz para os protagonistas e o trágico para Dionísio.

Por fim, no âmbito da narrativa, o uso da fórmula, assim como as demais citações que abundam no romance, contribuem para caracterizar o narrador como um erudito, conhecedor de Homero, característica que ele deve partilhar com seu leitor, ao menos parcialmente. Duas consequências decorrem disso.

Por um lado, reforça-se vínculo desse novo gênero que é o romance (do qual Cáriton conta entre os primeiros expoentes) com a épica e, portanto, com toda a tradição da poesia grega. Assim, muito embora as citações raramente tenham função argumentativa em Cáriton, pode-se dizer que o conjunto das citações inseridas no texto assume essa característica, ajudando a consolidar a autoridade do narrador e, consequentemente do seu relato, que buscam se valorizar aos olhos dos leitores.[23] Ou seja, se a fórmula é empregada também para aprimorar a caracterização dos personagens, tem o mesmo efeito quando é o *ethos* do narrador que está em questão.

Por outro lado, a citação estabelece a intertextualidade como um jogo entre autor e leitor. Nesse caso, importa menos a erudição do autor do que a do leitor, que encontraria prazer em reconhecer e precisar cada citação. Assim como o *pathos* exacerbado, os jogos eruditos são herança de uma estética helenística que sustenta a literatura que se faz no período imperial.

Espero ter demonstrado, portanto, que o emprego da fórmula homérica por Cáriton está longe de ser um mero recurso estilístico, tendo em vista a linguagem ornamentada.[24]

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[23] Ver p. ex. *Quéreas & Calírroe* 2.3.7, em que Dionísio cita uma passagem da *Odisseia* (17.485–7) para reforçar a ideia de que os deuses se misturam aos homens para vigiar seu comportamento.

[24] Gostaria de agradecer aos colegas Christian Werner e Isabella Tardin Cardoso por terem me propiciado o acesso a vários dos textos constantes da bibliografia.

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Titre. Une formule homérique et son emploi par Chariton : une étude de cas.

Résumé. On sait qu'Homère constitue la principale référence intertextuelle de Chariton. Malgré le nombre croissant d'études sur cette relation, il reste encore beaucoup à explorer. Le but de cette communication est d'examiner l'emploi d'une formule homérique dans *Chairéas et Callirhoé*, roman de Chariton, à savoir « […] τῆς/τοῦ δ'αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ » (*Iliade* 21.114 e 425 ; *Odyssée* 4.703, 23.205, 24.345). Cette formule, appliquée à Callirhoé, à Chairéas et à Dionysios, se répète trois fois au long du roman (*C&C* 1.1.14 , 3.6.3, 4.5.9). J'ai l'intention de vérifier si l'auteur fait une utilisation purement générique de la citation, ne retenant que son sens plus général, dans le seul but de prêter à son œuvre le prestige du poète archaïque, ou s'il y a une intention d'évoquer un contexte spécifique du poème cité, de manière à créer une expectative parmi ses lecteurs concernant le développement de l'œuvre. Il reste encore une troisième possibilité, celle que son utilisation soit liée à un autre but, à savoir celui de légitimer une caractéristique stylistique du propre auteur, celle de créer ses propres formules, à travers l'émulation du barde ancien.

Mots-clés. Intertextualité ; roman érotique grecque ; épopée ; Chariton ; Chairéas et Callirhoé ; Homère.

DO PERFUME DE ROSAS À PLANTA AROMÁTICA DO AÇAFRÃO NO *INDEX* E NAS *ENARRATIONES* DE AMATO LUSITANO: APLICAÇÕES TERAPÊUTICAS [1]

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Resumo. Na Bracara Augusta, a arqueologia trouxe à luz do dia alguns unguentários; uns quatro séculos antes, Plínio-o-Antigo já dava notícia de remédios romanos, feitos a partir de rosas, guardados em recipientes de vidro. Este é o ponto de partida para uma aproximação à confecção e às aplicações terapêuticas do perfume de rosas na Antiguidade, numa tradição literária que se estende desde Dioscórides, passando por Galeno e Plínio, até ao autor renascentista português, Amato Lusitano. São as fontes romanas que nos levarão, inclusive, a surpreender a sua utilização na cozinha. De uso culinário, mas também terapêutico, é o açafrão, a entrada número 25 do Livro I das *Enarrationes* do médico escalabitano. A incursão por estes tempos servirá ainda para partilhar um ou outro aspecto autobiográfico deste português da diáspora, bem como referências intratextuais que nos remetem para uma época em que, verdadeiramente, se pode dizer que fervilhavam as descobertas, nomeadamente no campo da botânica. Deste modo, assiste-se a um grande desenvolvimento da medicina na área terapêutica, a partir de processos naturalistas, como sejam o uso de plantas e de frutos.

Palavras-chave. Amato Lusitano; Dioscórides; Humanismo; cristãos-novos; plantas aromáticas.

Há um ano atrás, no mês de Julho, de passagem pela Lusa Atenas, sur-
preendeu-nos um manto gigante, suspenso da varanda do Museu Nacional
de Machado de Castro e voltado para o Convento de Santa Clara-a-Nova,
que exibia um número incontável de rosas. Vencida a distância, logo a inter-
rogação se desvaneceu: eram quatrocentas rosas, tricotadas com fios de lã,
a evocar o singular "Milagre das Rosas" da rainha Santa Isabel: "São rosas,
Senhor!", terá respondido à pergunta inquiridora do Rei que, desconfiado,
lhe atira ironicamente: "Rosas, em Janeiro!?". E as moedas, ou os pães, aos
pobres destinados, logo em rosas se haviam de transformar!…

    D. Dinis (1261–1325), um monarca reconhecido pela sua protecção
às artes e às letras, fundador do primeiro Estudo Geral, em Lisboa, mais
tarde reconhecido pelo Papa Nicolau iv com estatuto de Universidade, no
longínquo ano de 1290, mas também afamado poeta e trovador, cantado
por Fernando Pessoa na *Mensagem*, no poema "D. Dinis", pensamos nós
que há-de ter rematado esta cena desconcertante com um natural pedido
de desculpas, inebriado, quem sabe, pelo perfume das rosas, ou talvez não:

> Respira – n'aura que entre as flores gira
> Celeste – incenso de perfume agreste.
> Sei… não sinto: minha alma não aspira,
>   Não percebe, não toma
>   Senão o doce aroma
>   Que vem de ti – de ti!

    São versos que celebram o amor e nos abrem as portas para uma nova
época da Literatura Portuguesa: o Romantismo; são versos, cujo ritmo tra-
dicional nos pode fazer recordar a poesia trovadoresca, e o tema, as *Cantigas
de Amor* de El-Rei D. Dinis. Celebram eles o sentido do olfacto, através dos
verbos "respirar", "sentir", "aspirar", "tomar", mas também através dos subs-
tantivos "aura", "perfume" e "aroma", e dos adjectivos "celeste" e "agreste".
Em suma, celebram o perfume de uma Rosa! E como ao olfacto lhe junta
os outros sentidos neste seu poema da colectânea *Folhas Caídas*, sugestiva-
mente, Almeida Garrett o havia de coroar com o título de *Os cinco sentidos*.
Bem sabemos que deste poeta natural do Porto, da sua fase romântica, ou-
tros cantos ali celebram esta flor, a Rosa, expressão de uma paixão violenta,
de um lirismo intimista, que lhe havia de consumir os seus últimos anos:
"Perfume da Rosa", "Rosa sem espinhos", "Rosa pálida", "Rosa e lírio".

    De suas fragrâncias, delas e de outras flores, saudosos ficam os nos-
sos sentidos que ainda respiram o ténue aroma que perdura nas ruas desta
cidade, passada que foi a Festa da Flor. Curiosamente, numa terra que pa-
rece ostentar o maior *rosarium* de Portugal, a acreditar na informação da
página, na *web*, d'A Quinta do Arco, uma estância turística aqui do Funchal.

DA MUNDIVIDÊNCIA RENASCENTISTA

Tal como esta temática da paixão amorosa a ecoar nos sentidos emprestam a estes versos românticos de Almeida Garrett uma novidade absoluta para a sua época, emancipando-se de modelos petrarquistas, assim também o homem de quinhentos sentiu um renovado interesse pelo admirável Mundo Novo que até nós fazia chegar a notícia de novas espécies, na fauna e na flora, de novos minerais e de climas diferentes. E nesta cosmovisão renovada se vai afirmando paulatinamente uma concepção de *humanitas* de pendor mais universalista, pois a realização da humanidade conhecia agora, inesperadamente, novas raças em lugares tão distintos, um Homem diferente, mas agora sem referência à sua origem social. Decididamente, o Homem transformava-se no centro do universo, na esteira do pensamento do humanista italiano Pico della Mirandola (*De homininis dignitate*, 1496), em oposição ao paradigma antropológico da Idade Média.

Nas viagens, cada vez mais longas, num tempo que se abre pela primeira vez à globalização, e nos contactos com outros povos, a experiência da doença, em contextos tão distantes da pátria, havia de favorecer uma nova atitude, marcada pela necessidade de devolver rapidamente a saúde às pessoas. E foi o combate imperativo da doença que obrigou a uma renovada atenção às novas plantas, animais e minerais e, consequentemente, à experimentação e observação dos resultados das novas aplicações terapêuticas daqui resultantes, com o seu registo efectivo. Para as novas doenças, em terras estranhas, aí mesmo se haviam-de encontrar as mezinhas capazes de as combater, como diz Garcia de Orta no *Colóquio 13* sobre o cardamomo:

… porque cada dia ha enfermidades nouas, asi como ho morbo Napolitano (a q(eu) chamamos sarna de Castela) e Deos he tam misericordioso que em cada terra nos deu meezinhas pera saranos: porq(ue) elle que daa ha enfermidade, daa ha meezinha p(ar)a ella, se nã como diz Temistio, ho nosso saber he a mais peq(eu)na parte do que ignoramos. E porque nam sabemos as meezinhas cõ que curamos todas, trazemos o ruibarbo da China, donde trazemos o pao ou raízes pera curar a sarna de castela…

Como se sabe, o naturalista e médico português só escreveria os *Colóquios dos simples e drogas he cousas medi*çinais *da India* trinta anos após a sua chegada à Índia, como físico, isto é, em 1563, na cidade de Goa, dando conta, como se pode inferir deste passo transcrito, de algumas doenças exóticas e métodos terapêuticos até então desconhecidos da Europa.

Neste contexto em que a saúde ganhava uma crescente valorização, beneficiando da descoberta de novas terapêuticas a partir dos simples medicinais, isto é, das plantas, animais e minerais do Novo Mundo, verifica--se que o conhecimento da matéria médica não era um saber exclusivo dos

médicos, das classes intelectuais ou de uma elite social, ele era transversal à sociedade, como teve oportunidade de expor o ilustre académico espanhol Jose Pardo-Tomás (Institución Milán y Fontanals e CSIC), na Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, em Lisboa, no pretérito dia 17 de Abril do ano corrente, no âmbito do Ciclo de Conferências *360º. Ciência Descoberta*, em conferência intitulada "La materia medicinal: invenciones ibéricas en torno a la flora y la fauna exóticas", e que tivemos oportunidade de rever no portal desta fundação. Apontou este investigador, como prova explícita, um passo da primeira parte do célebre romance de Miguel de Cervantes, editado em 1605, *El ingenioso hidalgo D. Quijote de la Mancha*, e que aqui se transcreve a partir da segunda tradução feita para português, em 1876, pelo Visconde de Castilho e pelo Visconde de Azevedo. Veja-se a resposta dada pelo fiel escudeiro Sancho Pança ao seu amo, o cavaleiro D. Quixote, quase a terminar o décimo capítulo do Segundo Livro:

– Eu não te digo, Sancho – replicou D. Quixote –, que seja forçoso aos cavaleiros andantes não comer outras coisas senão essas frutas secas que dizes; afirmo só que o seu passadio mais ordinário devia ser delas, e de algumas ervas que achavam pelos campos, que eles conheciam, e que eu também conheço.

– Bom é – respondeu Sancho – conhecer essas ervas que, segundo eu vou examinando, algum dia será necessário usar desse conhecimento.

AMATO LUSITANO: O *INDEX* E AS *ENARRATIONES*

Dez anos antes de *Os Colóquios* de Garcia d'Orta, cuja celebridade muito fica a dever-se ao médico e botânico flamengo Carlos Clúsio, que fez a sua tradução para a língua latina – a publicação do epítome data de 1567, em Antuérpia –, a língua universal usada na redacção dos tratados científicos nesta época, e cuja tradição se estendeu até ao século XVIII, como se sabe, vêm a lume as *Enarrationes* (1553) do médico albicastrense Amato Lusitano, na cidade italiana de Veneza, que são um comentário à obra de Dioscórides sobre matéria médica.

Trata-se de uma publicação que se integra no movimento humanista que, em Portugal, acontece, sobretudo, a partir do momento em que se assiste à migração de estudantes portugueses, mobilidade estudantil, diríamos hoje, em demanda dos principais centros universitários de Espanha e de Itália, a partir do último quartel do século XV (André 2013, 39). Foi a sede de cultura, do saber que atirou estes jovens portugueses para a aventura da viagem, um fenómeno que se inicia com D. João II e ganhou especial

expressão com os reis D. Manuel e D. João III, jovens esses que a história da cultura designou por "bolseiros dEl-Rei" (André 2013, 21).

Por isso, com naturalidade Amato Lusitano, isto é, João Rodrigues de Castelo Branco, de seu nome de baptismo, nascido nesta cidade da Beira Baixa em 1511, vai prosseguir os seus estudos em Salamanca, atraído pela sua fama e proximidade, mas também pelo ambiente que ali se vivia, pois aqui, entre os numerosos estudantes portugueses, havia um grupo significativo de cristãos-novos; todos eles muito haviam de contribuir para a renovação do movimento humanista português, com especial enfoque para o excepcional grupo de escolares de ascendência hebraica, com percursos individuais brilhantes, quer em Portugal, quer na diáspora sefardita: Amato Lusitano, António Luís, Diogo Pires, Duarte Gomes, Luís Nunes de Santarém, Manuel Lindo, Manuel Reinel (Andrade 2007) e Tomás Rodrigues da Veiga (Andrade 2011, 93). Daí a feição cosmopolita do humanismo português, um humanismo de expatriados e de estrangeirados (André 2013, 38), numa Europa sem fronteiras, em que o Latim era a língua do seu quotidiano.

Em 1532, Amato Lusitano conclui a sua formação em Artes e Medicina, no Estudo de Salamanca, e regressa a Portugal, nesse ano, com o seu companheiro Duarte Gomes (Andrade 2011, 92–4). Entre nós, vai entregar-se ao exercício da clínica e, no âmbito desta actividade, parece ter calcorreado algumas regiões, nomeadamente as Beiras, o Ribatejo e a Extremadura, as quais se transformaram numa ocasião propícia para estudar e aprofundar os seus conhecimentos acerca da fauna, da flora e dos minerais. Em Lisboa, na casa da Índia, aproveita para examinar os simples e as drogas que ali *aportavam*, provenientes da Índia e do Brasil (Gouveia 1985, 7).

Com efeito, os descobrimentos portugueses favoreceram o desenvolvimento da ciência e a afirmação de um novo espírito, de natureza científica, que tanto havia de beneficiar com a valorização crescente do experimentalismo como critério de verdade, numa atitude que tantas vezes contrariava a *auctoritas* dos Antigos e que ganhava expressão, entre nós, com Pedro Nunes, famoso cosmógrafo, D. João de Castro ou Garcia da Orta, na primeira metade do século XVI (Almeida 1998). Uma mentalidade na esteira de Duarte Pacheco Pereira que, logo no início deste século, nas páginas do *Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis*, havia de insistentemente sublinhar o valor da experiência humana, como nesta passagem do capítulo segundo, do primeiro livro, que se há-de repetir de diversas maneiras, conforme transcrição feita a partir do manuscrito 888, fólio 6r, disponibilizado pela Biblioteca Nacional, nas coleções digitalizadas: "… e alem do que dito he ha expiriencia que he madre das cousas nos desengane e de toda duuida nos tira…".

Dois anos após o regresso de Amato Lusitano à sua pátria, começam a adensar-se as nuvens ameaçadoras de um clima de intolerância religiosa

crescente, agravadas com o estabelecimento próximo do Tribunal do Santo Ofício, por bula do Papa Paulo IV, no reinado de D. João III. É assim que, consciente do futuro sombrio que se avizinhava, o médico albicastrense se vê obrigado a partir para Antuérpia, onde chega em outubro de 1534. Mesmo assim, à sua chegada a este empório comercial dos Países Baixos, acabaria por ser preso pela inquisição, acusado de ser cristão-novo, na observância de disposições legais decretados pelo imperador Carlos V. Em janeiro do ano seguinte, porém, seria ilibado de todas as acusações (Andrade 2010, 22–9). Mas as suas tribulações de judeu português da diáspora não veriam o seu fim com este desfecho. Com efeito, Amato Lusitano, perseguido por motivos religiosos, havia ainda de calcorrear as terras italianas de Ferrara (Andrade 2011a), Ancona e Pesaro (Andrade 2012 e 2013), donde passa à pequena república de Dubrovnik, mais conhecida pela designação italiana de Ragusa.

Fazendo jus ao seu epíteto de humanista, vai escrever as suas reflexões na grande língua de comunicação da sua época, o Latim. Por outro lado, por essa via mais rapidamente granjeou celebridade e respeito entre os seus pares além-fronteiras, tendo mesmo concitado a inveja de outros, como a de Pietro Andrea Mattioli, que não gostou das referências pouco abonatórias acerca da sua pessoa, opiniões essas que Amato Lusitano verteu nos seus comentários à obra de Dioscórides. Por isso, o médico humanista italiano, natural de Siena, e um dos mais importantes comentadores e tradutores da obra de Dioscórides naquela época, respondeu-lhe violentamente com a sua *Apologia adversus Amatum Lusitanum*, de 1558, uma polémica que já foi objecto de aturado estudo (Valderas 2000 e 2003). Este facto apressou a fuga do médico albicastrense, que estava em Dubrovnik, para a sua derradeira morada de exilado no Império Otomano (Andrade 2010, 37), na Grécia, onde a comunidade da diáspora sefardita obteve o apoio de Solimão, o Magnífico, que, a título pessoal, se envolveu nas difíceis negociações com a Cúria Romana (Andrade 2011b, 126).

Da notícia da sua morte, no ano de 1568, em Salonica, nos dá conta o poeta eborense Diogo Pires (1517–1599) (Ramalho 1988, 121–37; André 1983, 16), seu amigo e companheiro de infortúnio (Andrade 2012, 20–27), num epitáfio em quatro dísticos, onde se aponta a peste como a causa próxima da sua morte (Ramalho 1985, 216–7):

> AMATI LVSITANI, MEDICI PHYSICI PRAESTANTISSIMI, EPITAPHIVM.
> OBIIT FERE SEXAGENARIVS PESTILENTIA THESSALONICAE ANNO 1568.
>
> *Qui toties fugientem animam sistebat in aegro*
>   *Corpore, Lethaeis aut reuocabat aquis,*
> *Gratus ob id populis et magnis regibós aeque,*
>   *Hic lacet, hanc moriens pressit Amatus humum.*

Lusitana domus, macedum tellure sepulchrum.
    Quam procul a patrio conditur ille solo!
At cum summa dies, fatalis et appetit hora
    Ad Styga et ad Manes undique prona uia est.

EPITÁFIO DE AMATO LUSITANO, MÉDICO INCOMPARÁVEL.
MORREU DE PESTE, QUASE SEXAGENÁRIO, EM SALONICA, NO ANO DE 1568.

Aquele que tantas vezes retinha a vida fugitiva num corpo doente
    ou voltava a chamá-la das águas do Letes,
querido, por isso, igualmente dos povos e dos grandes reis,
    aqui jaz; esta foi a terra que Amato pisou, ao morrer.
Portugal o berço, na terra dos Macedónios o sepulcro.
    Como se encontra longe do solo pátrio a sepultura!
Mas quando o dia supremo e a hora fatal se aproximam, em toda
    a parte há um caminho em declive para o Estige e para os Manes.

"O óleo perfumado de rosas" (*De unguento sive oleo rosaceo*), que aqui nos ocupa, constitui a entrada número 46 do Livro Primeiro das *Enarrationes*; a entrada anterior ocupa-se precisamente da confecção de óleos perfumados, ou seja, em latim, *De unguentorum confectionibus*.

A confecção do óleo perfumado

Amato, que havia passado em silêncio este assunto no *Index Dioscoridis*, publicado em 1536, em Antuérpia; contudo, nas *Enarrationes* (1563), e num movimento de maior proximidade à obra de Pedânio Dioscórides, vai tratar da distinção entre óleo e óleo perfumado, ou simplesmente perfume, a fim de serem evitados equívocos, como se verá. Diz ele:

Vocat Dioscorides oleum, quod per se ex fructu vel semine, nulla alia admixta re extrahitur: unguentum vero, quod ex oleo componitur, et in eo varia simplicia miscentur. At re vera, olea (si hoc nomen pluraliter flecteretur) quam unguenta appellari merentur.

Dioscórides chama-lhe óleo, porque ele se extrai espontaneamente a partir de um fruto ou de uma semente, sem nenhuma outra substância misturada; com efeito, o perfume (óleo perfumado), compõe-se de óleo, no qual se misturam (substâncias) simples e variadas. Mas na realidade, elas merecem mais ser chamadas óleos (se se declinasse este nome no plural) do que perfumes (óleo perfumado).

Depois da invocação do médico e cirurgião militar grego, autor do Περὶ ὕλης ἰατρικῆς (séc. I a.C.), mais conhecido pelo título da sua tradução latina, *De materia medica*, vai introduzir a opinião de Galeno, a partir do seu tratado *Dos poderes dos remédios simples* (2.27), justificada à luz do que acaba de ser dito, pois por isso é que

… cum (quum) de rosaceo oleo loquitur, praestiterit fortassis ipsis etiam nominibus ea distin-guere, quod veteres fecisse constat, oleum etenim rosaceum nominare assolent, quod absque odoramentis praeparatum est, cui autem et horum aliquid inditum fuerit, non id etiam oleum, sed unguentum cognominant. Item libro 6 eiusdem voluminis, capite de oleo, prope finem: ex dictis (inquit) cognoscere iam liceat, et de aliis olei generibus, quae aequivoce ipsis dicuntur unguentis, puta rosaceo, melino, liliaceo, et quaecumque id genus floribus, fructibus, germini-bus, foliis, in oleo maceratis conficiuntur.

… quando se fala do óleo de rosas, provavelmente terá havido ocasião para os dis-tinguir com os próprios nomes, e consta que os antigos assim procederam; na ver-dade, estes têm o costume de chamar óleo de rosas àquele óleo que é preparado a partir de odores (aromas), mas a este terá sido dado algum destes nomes, pois eles não o designaram de óleo, mas de perfume (óleo perfumado). Também no livro 6 do mesmo tratado, no capítulo acerca do óleo, quase no fim, diz ele: que seja desde agora permitido conhecer os óleos a partir das designações e de outros géneros de que são equivocamente designados pelos próprios perfumes (óleos perfumados), por exemplo, por rosáceo, por marmélio, por liláceo; e quaisquer que eles sejam, há um género que é confeccionado com flores, com frutos, com sementes e com folhas maceradas em óleo.

Será de notar que, antes do óleo perfumado, o médico albicastrense se ocupa das várias espécies de óleos, começando pelo azeite, feito a partir de azeitonas: o óleo de zambujeiro, o óleo de rícino, o óleo de amêndoas, o óleo de bolota, o óleo de sésamo, o óleo de noz, o óleo de rábano, o óleo de nigela, o óleo de murta, o óleo de mostarda, o óleo de loureiro, o óleo de len-tisco, o óleo de terebinto… E remata o humanista português, continuando a citar Galeno:

Horum quodque ubi una cum (quum) aromatibus praeparantur, unguentum efficitur, nostra vero unguenta, longe aliter hodie, quam tempore Dioscoridis parantur.

Cada um destes torna-se perfume (óleo perfumado), quando se preparam completa-mente com aromas, mas os nossos perfumes (óleos perfumados) preparam-se hoje de um modo muito diferente do que acontecia no tempo de Dioscórides.

Com efeito, em Dioscórides observa-se que, umas vezes, o perfume cor-responde à pura essência, a que se juntou água, como se verifica com o perfume de açafrão e o de mirra; noutras, o perfume resulta da mistura de várias essências ou fragrâncias, utilizando como soluto o óleo, como é exemplo o perfume da canela de Ceilão e o perfume de nardo. O mesmo soluto, pois, que se usa com o perfume (óleo perfumado) ou óleo de rosas, como se verá mais abaixo.

O (*óleo perfumado*) perfume ou óleo de rosas

Nas *Cartas a Lucílio* (108.4), Séneca recorda uma lição do seu mes-tre Átalo; dizia ele que discípulo e mestre estavam reciprocamente unidos,

pois se o mestre devia ser útil ao discípulo, era obrigação deste tirar o máximo proveito do convívio com o mestre. Passa, logo de seguida, a elogiar o poder transformador da filosofia, comparando-a ao sol e a uma perfumaria (Séneca 2004, 593):

Qui in solem uenit, licet non in hoc uenerit, colorabitur; qui in unguentaria taberna resederunt et paullo diutius commorati sunt odorem secum loci ferunt; et qui ad philosophum fuerunt traxerint aliquid necesse est quod prodesset etiam neglegentibus. Attende quid dicam: neglegentibus, non repugnantibus.

Quem se põe ao sol, ainda que não seja essa a intenção, acaba por ficar bronzeado; a quem entra numa perfumaria e lá se demora algum tempo, comunica-se-lhe um pouco do cheiro característico do local; do mesmo modo, quem convive, mesmo distraidamente, com um filósofo aprende sempre qualquer coisa de útil. Repara que eu digo "convívio distraído", e não "hostilidade preconceituosa".

Séneca ainda nos delicia com a observação de que era o primeiro a chegar à escola e o último a sair!

Este passo do escritor cordovês reflecte a importância dos perfumes no quotidiano de Roma, acabando por contagiar o universo das grandes cidades do Império Romano. Na Bracara Augusta, cidade fundada pelo Imperador César Augusto, no ano 16 a.C., a arqueologia trouxe à luz do dia a existência de uma indústria florescente do vidro, cujo período áureo se poderá situar nos séculos IV/V d.C., e que se integrava num negócio mais alargado da produção de jóias, que hoje se poderia designar por "cluster" (Cruz 2011b, 88; 93). Curiosamente, encontrou-se um reduzido número de unguentários, provenientes principalmente de uma única sepultura da necrópole do Largo Carlos Amarante, em Braga (Cruz 2009, 146):

De facto, o uso do vidro na medicina e cosmética iria muito para além dos pequenos unguentários usados para guardar e transportar unguentos. Poder-se-ia estender a pequenos frascos e boiões para guardar compostos mais sólidos, pequenas taças e pratos para misturar os unguentos e as cânulas para retirar e manusear esses unguentos.

Esta afirmação do investigador universitário está escudada em testemunhos colhidos junto de uma fonte de informação importante na Antiguidade Clássica, Plínio-o-Antigo (23/24–79), autor da monumental *Naturalis Historia*, em 37 livros, de quem cita três passos em latim, com tradução inglesa (Cruz 2009, 145–6), a que nós vamos fazer corresponder a tradução para português, nos dois que elegemos:

Rosa adstringit, refrigerat. Usus eius dividitur in folia et flores, capita. (…) reliqua pars aut oleo aut vino maceratur in sole vasis vitreis. (21.121)

A rosa é de natureza adstringente e é refrigerante. O seu uso (medicinal) é repartido pelas pétalas, pelas flores e pelas cabeças. (…) e o resto é então macerado com óleo ou vinho, em vasos de vidro colocados ao sol.

Aurium dolori et vitiis medentur urina apri in vitreo servata, fel apri suis vel bubulum cum oleo cedrino et rosaceo aequis portionibus… (28.173)

As dores e as doenças dos ouvidos são curadas com urina de javali, mantida num recipiente de vidro, ou o fel de javali, porco ou boi misturado em proporções iguais com óleo de rícino e óleo de rosas…

Numa saudável tentativa de simplificar e normalizar a terminologia usada, o arqueólogo da Universidade do Minho, Mário Cruz (2009, 133), propõe para unguentário a seguinte definição, a que acrescentou a designação, respectivamente, em latim e em espanhol (*Alabastrum*; *ampulla*): "Recipiente para guardar ou embalar e transportar unguentos, cosméticos ou perfumes. Espécie de pequena garrafa de gargalo alto e estreito".

Colocando de lado a importância desta notícia no contexto da indústria romana do vidro, desenvolvida no Noroeste Peninsular, apraz-nos registar que, uns quatro séculos antes, Plínio-o-Antigo já dava notícia de remédios romanos, feitos a partir de rosas.

Nesta tradição literária, com raízes no pensamento de Hipócrates, continuado por Teofrasto, cuja obra havia de inspirar Dioscórides, médico naturalista contemporâneo de Plínio-o-Antigo, vem a situar-se, mais tarde, Galeno e, no século xvi, entre outros, o médico humanista português, Amato Lusitano. Diz este acerca das propriedades terapêuticas do óleo de rosas:

Sive enim hoc unguentum rosaceum, sive oleum rosaceum dicatur, longe tamen aliter in officinis nostris ad Mesues mentem praeparatur. Vnguentum vero rosaceum plurimum valet pro inflammationibus arcendis, repercutit enim materiam, sedat dolores, febricitantium capitibus, et eorum renibus, magno iuvamento inungitur, refrigerat ardentes febres, hepar, et stomachum.

Quer este se chame (óleo perfumado) perfume de rosas, quer se chame óleo de rosas, todavia ele prepara-se desde há muito tempo nas nossas boticas, segundo o juízo de Mesué. De facto, o (óleo perfumado) perfume de rosas é muitíssimo eficaz contra as inflamações repelentes, pois faz saltar a matéria, faz cessar as dores na cabeça dos que têm febre e nos seus rins, untando-os para grande alívio, é refrigerante para as febres ardentes, para o fígado e para o estômago.

Numa primeira verificação, as propriedades terapêuticas do óleo de rosas, apontadas por Amato, omitem a referência às dores e doenças dos ouvidos, acima referidas por Plínio-o-Antigo.

Em diálogo com a tradição histórica, vai trazer à colação, de seguida, o testemunho de Dioscórides, para nos dar conta da fórmula da composição deste óleo de rosas, com propriedades medicinais, que há muito se prepara nas boticas, segundo a opinião de um contemporâneo, Mesué:

Oleum vero rosaceum, absolute rosaceum, sive completum dictum, et cum additione immaturum sive omphacium paratur ubique, nec enim communem modum parandi Dioscorides

praeterivit, cum dicat, quidam solas rosas tantum detractis unguibus insolatas pondere un-
ciarum sex in olei sextarium demergunt, demissasque; in eo diebus octo madere sinunt, mox
quadraginta diebus tertia rosarum adiectione insolatas sic reponunt, et servant.

Na verdade, o óleo de rosas, ou simplesmente "rosáceo", quer se considere natural,
quer se prepare por toda a parte com a junção do imaturo onfacino, a verdade é que a
forma habitual de o preparar não foi omitida por Dioscórides, quando escreve assim:
alguns, somente depois de retirada a parte inferior das pétalas das rosas as mergu-
lham, isoladas e secas ao sol, em óleo, numa proporção de seis onças[2] para um sextário[3]
de óleo e deixam-nas ficar mergulhadas nele durante oito dias; numa terceira junção
de rosas, depois de quarenta dias, põem-nas de novo a secar ao sol e guardam o óleo.

Logo de seguida, o de Galeno, a partir do seu tratado *Dos poderes dos remé-*
dios simples:

De hoc vero rosaceo oleo locutus est Galenus 2 libro de Facultatibus simplicium medicamen-
torum capite 27 cum dicat; oleum rosaceum easdem vel similes vires obtinet, quas succus
rosarum. Omphacium autem oleum rosaceum ex nodum completis rosis, et oleo ex oleis non-
dum maturis extracto conficitur, non solum ad Solem, sed etiam in balneo Mariae: hoc enim
frigidius est, quam absolute rosaceum dictum: vulneribus enim capitis accomodatissimum est,
et prohibens inflammationes.

Galeno refere-se a este óleo rosáceo, no livro 2 *Dos poderes dos remédios simples* (27),
quando fala assim: o óleo de rosas possui as mesmas ou semelhante propriedades que
tem a seiva das rosas; mas o onfacino é um óleo de rosas que se prepara a partir de
rosas ainda não maduras e com óleo extraído de óleos que ainda não chegaram ao seu
termo, não só em relação ao Sol, mas também em relação ao banho-maria: na verdade,
este é mais fresco do que o óleo designado somente pela palavra "rosáceo"; e por isso é
o mais apropriado para as dores da cabeça e para a cura das inflamações.

Entre a edição do *Index* (1536) e das *Enarrationes* (1553) situa-se um
período de tempo razoável, cerca de dezassete anos, durante o qual se as-
siste a um renovado interesse pelo estudo dos simples, para os quais muito
concorre o conhecimento da botânica, dos animais e dos minerais, com
propriedades medicinais, tendo por principal fonte de estudo o *De matéria*
medica do clássico Pedânio Dioscórides.

Diz Amato Lusitano, no *Index*, "Philologia 45":

Ῥόδινον ἔλαιον, *oleum rosarum quod extra officinas vulgus etiam conficit rosis oleo in sole ma-*
ceratis et in vitro repositis nec nobis in praesenti animus est haec maioribus explicare verbis
cum quolibet suo loco demonstrabitur.

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[2] Peso antigo correspondente a 28,691 gramas; entre os romanos, corresponde à duodécima
parte da libra.

[3] Aproximadamente meio litro. Com efeito, o sextário corresponde à sexta parte do côngio;
esta medida romana é equivalente a três litros. No mundo grego, o sextário correspondia a duas
heminas, que valiam aproximadamente 28 centilitros.

Ródinon élaion é o óleo de rosas, que, fora das boticas, o povo também confeciona com rosas maceradas em óleo, ao sol, e repostas num frasco. Neste momento, não temos disposição para explicar isto com palavras mais pomposas, como se demonstrará em seu lugar com quem quer que seja.

Do óleo de rosas ao açafrão: uso culinário

Como nos dá conta a *Historia de las plantas en el mundo antiguo*, de Segura Munguía e Torres Ripa (2009, 232), a tradição literária aponta a introdução do cultivo das rosas, na Grécia Antiga, proveniente certamente do vale do Nilo e da Mesoptâmia, num tempo anterior aos Poemas Homéricos, pois Aulo Gélio, nas *Noites Áticas* (14.6.3) comenta que "... o mesmo poeta [Homero], que não conhecera a rosa, havia de conhecer o óleo de rosa" (... *idem poeta rosam non norit, oleum ex rosa norit*).

De três espécies de rosas – *rosa gallica* (rosa comum), *rosa sempervirens* (rosa mosqueta) e *rosa corymbifera* (rosa silvestre) – nos irá falar, mais tarde, Teofrasto (372–287 a.C.), na sua *História das Plantas*, a que se segue a menção de autores latinos como Columela (10.26 sqq.), Ovídio (*Os Fastos* 5.336 sqq.; *Arte de Amar* 3.178 sqq.), Plínio-o-Antigo (21.14, 16–21, 121), Marcial (9.60 e 12.31) e Claudiano. E entre nós, Portugueses, da divina rosa não se esqueceu Luís de Camões, embora em vernáculo, quando a ela aproximou o rosto de Vénus, choroso, cansada de, no Olimpo, tanto suplicar a Júpiter auxílio para os Portugueses, vítimas de traições em Mombaça, como se lê em no canto II d'*Os Lusíadas*, estrofe 41:

> "Mas, *moura* enfim, nas mãos das brutas gentes,
> Que pois eu fui... " – E nisto, de mimosa,
> O rosto banha em lágrimas ardentes,
> Como *co* orvalho fica a fresca rosa.
> Calada um pouco, como se entre os dentes
> [Se] lhe impedira a fala piedosa
> Torna a segui-la; e, indo por diante,
> Lhe atalha o poderoso e grão Tonante.

Em Plínio-o-Antigo (23.102) encontra-se a notícia do uso de marmelos cozidos em mel, dados como alimento por alguns que os trituravam e lhe juntavam uma decocção de pétalas de rosas, o que contribuía também para apaziguar as doenças do estômago. A par disto, também se fala no vinho de rosas que se vendia no comércio, e cuja receita se pode encontrar em Dioscórides (5.27), em Plínio (14.106) e em Apício (1.4), um dos primeiros escritores da Antiguidade que se dedicou de forma sistemática à gastronomia da Roma Antiga, tendo escrito o tratado *De re coquinaria*, que entre nós já mereceu as honras de edição, numa cuidada tradução anotada, em 1997.

E assim, a caminho do fim, pois já vai longo este texto, uma nota para o uso culinário do açafrão, embora não sejam despicientes as suas qualidades aromáticas no uso medicinal. Amato, num primeiro momento, descreve a planta, que ele diz ter sido supostamente esquecida por Dioscórides (1.26), e discorre acerca do melhor:

Omnibus notissimus est Crocus, quo condimenta coquinaria, passim ornantur, cuius descriptionem sic habeto, cum eam Dioscorides silentio praeterierit: crocus est herba folio gracili, angusto, parvo, pene in capillamenti modum dissoluta, cuius radix bulbosa nucleis intersecta: alliis simillima est, quae vergiliarum occasu flore caeruleo floret, in quo capilli illi crocus dictus hebetes licet postea odorati nascuntur is enim olim Cilicius nobilior habebatur, nunc vero apud Italos aquilanus palmam obtinet, qui ex Aquila Neapolim affertur, quanquam qui e Germania hodie adducitur, primas obtineat, ut Venetiis aliquando vidimus, in ea praecipue officina cui coralium pro symbolo est. In Hispania quoque plurimus et optimus nascitur: at qui a Graecia ubi uberrime crescit, advehitur, pessimus omnium iudicatur, optimus enim ut dicatur crocus, flavissimus sit oportet, tum odoratissimus et longo tempore in vigore suo persistens, ut ex Galeno libro de Antidotis desumitur.

O açafrão é conhecido por toda a gente, e com ele se preparam, a cada passo, os condimentos da cozinha, cuja descrição será apresentada, uma vez que Dioscórides a terá passado em silêncio. O açafrão é uma planta desunida, quase à maneira de uma cabeleira postiça, de folha fina, pontiaguda e pequena, de raiz bulbosa, dividida em amêndoas; é muito semelhante a outras (amêndoas), e floresce no ocaso das plêiadas, sendo uma flor de cor azul, na qual nascem esses filamentos embotados, ainda que depois exalem um perfume; este é o dito açafrão, mas o da Cilícia era outrora considerado o mais célebre; agora, é o aquilano que recebe a palma junto dos Italianos, porque é proveniente de Áquila, Nápoles, embora, o que hoje é trazido da Germânia, obtenha as primeiras palmas, como vimos algumas vezes em Venécia, principalmente naquela botica que tem o coral por símbolo. Também na Hispânia nasce um muito abundante e muito bom; mas aquele que chega da Grécia, onde cresce muito abundantemente, é considerado o pior de todos, pois o melhor açafrão, como é do conhecimento público, convém que seja muito amarelo e, além disso, muito aromático e persistente no seu vigor por longo tempo, como se pode colher a partir do livro de Galeno, *Acerca dos antídotos*.

Com a entrada número 25 do Livro I das *Enarrationes* do médico escalabitano, eventualmente, este será o condimento mais apropriado para nos fazer esquecer estes tempos amargos, que se vivem no Velho Continente:

Est autem crocus medicina cordialis, quae merito tum intus, tum extra medicamentis cordi adaptatis, misceri debet, nam corroborat, et laetificat, et ea de causa, risum promovet, et ita promovet, ut fabulosum non sit aliquando hominem risu et cachinno, ob nimium croci esum mori. Vidimus enim nos apud Mitinam a Campo, totius Hispaniae celeberrimum emporium, mercatorem quendam, qui cum plures croci sarcinulas sive involucra emeret, ut in Lusitaniam portaret, multum ex illo in olla carnes iurulentas pro cena continente iniecit; qui post earum esum, in tam intensum ac vehementem risum prorupit, ut non multum abfuerit, quin risu et cachinno tunc e vita discederet.

Além disso o açafrão é uma mezinha do coração que pelo seu mérito, seja no interior, seja no exterior, deve misturar-se com remédios adaptados ao coração, pois fortifica e alegra e, por essa razão, promove o riso e tanto o provoca que não é mentira que por vezes o homem morre de riso e das gargalhadas por comer uma grande quantidade de açafrão. Com efeito, nós vimos em Mitina do Campo, o empório mais famoso de toda a Hispânia, e aí havia um certo mercador que, quando comprava numerosos pequenos saquinhos ou invólucros de açafrão, para os transportar para a Lusitânia, lançou uma grande quantidade dele na panela que continha as carnes cozidas para a ceia; este, depois de comer dessas carnes, irrompeu num riso tão intenso e tão veemente que não passou muito tempo até que ele se afastasse da vida por causa do riso e da gargalhada.

PALAVRAS FINAIS

Se bem que sejam mais lembrados os *Colóquios* de Garcia de Orta, contudo, e ainda em vernáculo, não deve ser esquecido um nome português, pioneiro, o do boticário régio e botânico, Tomé Pires, enviado à Índia, em 1511, como feito das drogarias. Como resultado da sua primeira viagem à China, escreveu uma carta ao rei D. Manuel, datada de 21 de Janeiro de 1516, em que apresenta uma primeira notícia das drogas e plantas medicinais do Oriente.

É notório que esta incursão por textos do Renascimento nos coloca na pista de notícias autobiográficas do médico e humanista português da diáspora, bem como referências intratextuais que nos remetem para uma época em que, verdadeiramente, se pode dizer que fervilhavam as descobertas, nomeadamente no campo da botânica. Deste modo, assiste-se a um grande desenvolvimento da medicina na área terapêutica, a partir de processos naturalistas, como sejam o uso de plantas e de frutos. Em diálogo com a tradição literária, dando-lhe o seu cunho humanístico, com auxílio das edições aldinas: Teofrasto, Plínio, Dioscórides e Galeno.

Amato Lusitano (1511–1568), português, mas de filiação judaica, foi obrigado a emigrar por questões religiosas, como sabemos, ele como tantos outros ilustres intelectuais da época, alguns deles sofrendo o suplício da própria morte. E mesmo aqueles sem tal filiação, a tal seriam condenados, como Damião de Góis (1502–1574), depois de ter optado por regressar definitivamente à sua amada pátria, embora este caso ainda esteja envolto em muitas dúvidas.

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AMATO LUSITANO, INDEX DIOSCORIDIS. | En candide Lector. | HISTORIALES DI- | oscoridis campi, Exegemataque sim- | plicium, atque eorundem Collationes | cum his quae in officinis habentur, ne | dum medicis et Myropolio- | rum Seplasiarijs, sed Bona- | rum literarum studio | sissimis perquam | necessarium | opus. | IOANNE RODERICO CASTE | li albi Lusitano autore. | EXCVDEBAT ANTVERPIAE VI-| dua Martini Caesaris. M.D.XXXVI.

AMATO LUSITANO, IN DIOSCORIDIS | ANAZARBEI DE MEDICA | MATERIA LI-BROS QVINQVE | ENARRATIONES ERVDITISSIMAE | DOCTORIS AMATI LVSITANI MEDICI | AC PHILOSOPHI CELEBERRIMI, | quibus non solum Officinarum Seplasia- | riis, sed bonarum etiam literarum stu- | diosis utilitas adfertur, quum pas- | sim simplicia Graece, Latine, | Italice, Hispanice, Germa- | nice, & Gallice pro- | ponantur. | *Cum Priuilegio Illustriss. Senatus Veneti ad decennium. | VENETIIS. MD LIII. |* [*Venetijs apud Gualterum Scotum | M.D.LIII.*]

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DOES THE GOOD MAN DO INJUSTICE VOLUNTARILY? IN DEFENSE OF PLATO'S *LESSER HIPPIAS*

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Resumo. Uma questão básica ainda se coloca aos leitores do *Hípias menor* de Platão: como lidar com a conclusão final do diálogo, de que o homem bom pratica a injustiça voluntariamente, que parece profundamente inconciliável com o princípio atribuído a Sócrates de que "ninguém erra de propósito". Contudo, se investigamos o texto mais de perto, encontramos indícios de que o posicionamento de Sócrates não é nem paradoxal nem contraditório com as posições filosóficas que ele estabelece nas outras obras de Platão. Ao contrário, o diálogo chega a uma conclusão definitiva. O homem justo se recusa a praticar a injustiça precisamente porque ele não deseja (βούλεσθαι) fazê-lo. O conhecimento do que é bom ou ruim (em outras palavras, do que favorece ou prejudica a alma) ativa exclusivamente o desejo pelo bem e, consequentemente, o poder de produzi-lo.

Palavras-chave. Platão; Sócrates; conhecimento do bom e ruim; justiça; desejo; poder.

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The end of Hippias' exhibition (ΕΠΙΔΕΙΞΙΣ) on Homer is followed by a philosophical gathering of a group of listeners who, having chosen Eudicus[1] for their representative, urge Socrates to scrutinize and evaluate what has been said by putting Hippias' speech to the test.[2] Plato describes this group as being well acquainted with the Socratic elenchus, which aims at examining whether a speech has been well-spoken (καλῶς λέγειν) or not.[3] Thus, right from the beginning, the dialogue provides an appropriate occasion for the demonstration and the subsequent criticism of Hippias' exhibition speech having as its central idea the concepts of truth and falsehood.

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[1] On the idea that Plato meant to give us a hint at the good (ἀγαθόν) and the just (δίκαιον) by choosing the name Εὔδικος, see Friedländer 1964, 145. Cf. Lampert 2002, 236 n. 12; Weiss 2006, 147 n. 53.

[2] ἢ καὶ ἐλέγχεις, εἴ τί σοι μὴ καλῶς δοκεῖ εἰρηκέναι, 363a3.

[3] What should be noted is that the Socratic elenchus here, being in line with how it appears in other dialogues, forms the tool urging to determine or establish whether a certain reasoning is a good one (καλὸς λόγος) or not, namely whether it can withstand elenctic pressure, eventually not being refuted as false opinion (ψευδὴς δόξα). For Plato's presentation of the customary elenctic Socrates in the *Lesser Hippias*, with special emphasis on his elaboration on the various aspects of the philosophical persona of his master, see Blondell 2002, 113 ff.

Blundell (1992, 134–5) holds that the dialogue is "a portrayal of the fruits of the traditional forms of education and their sophistic heirs". Plato himself, she continues, follows "the educational traditions of his culture by using archetypal heroes to examine aspects of moral and intellectual character".[4] Therefore, the arguments of the *Lesser Hippias* should be seen as part of a larger pedagogical strategy, in which Socrates challenges both traditional and sophistic educational methods. Following the same line of thought, Kahn (1996, 114) notes that a strong background theme for the *Lesser Hippias*, as for the *Ion*, is the role of poetry in education. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to offer a new interpretation of the dialogue which aims to do justice to the dialogue itself not only by seeking to defend and restore the value of the arguments unfolded in it, but also by attempting to show how these arguments are employed by Plato for a larger pedagogical and philosophical purpose; second, to illustrate, through this interpretation, the criticism Plato levels against traditional forms of education, values and their moral standards, with a view to justifying the philosophical life as the best way of life for a human being.

INITIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TRUE MAN (ἈΛΗΘΗΣ ἈΝΗΡ) AND THE FALSE MAN (ΨΕΥΔΗΣ ἈΝΗΡ) (363a6–365d)

Hippias' exhibition on poetry in general, but especially on Homer's poetry,[5] gives rise to the Socratic elenchus, which aims to test his expertise in discoursing upon these issues. Besides, Plato's *Ion* (531e–532a) teaches us that possessing a craft implies being able to discern who speaks well and badly about its subject matter. Socrates' reference to the superiority of the *Iliad* over the *Odyssey*, to just the extent that Achilles is a better man (ἀμείνων) than Odysseus,[6] aims at examining (ἔλεγχος) Hippias' expertise. Blundell (1992, 140) notes that "Hippias' expertise in the evaluation of Homeric characters, together with his status as a moral teacher and his desire for popular approval, makes him a fitting representative of traditional

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[4] Cf. also Pottenger 1995, 45; Blundell 2002, 114.

[5] ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου, 363c2–3. Blundell (1992, 137) considers Hippias as a voice of conventional, common-sense values. Cf. also Ovink 1931, 136; Kahn 1996, 115, 118; Allen 1996, 28; Blundell 2002, 130, 136; Weiss 2006, 146.

[6] ἤκουον ὅτι ἡ Ἰλιὰς κάλλιον εἴη ποίημα […] ἢ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, τοσούτῳ δὲ κάλλιον, ὅσῳ ἀμείνων Ἀχιλλεὺς Ὀδυσσέως, 363b2–4. Blundell (1992, 140) observes that "the moralizing attitude towards literature reflects the widespread belief that literary characters influence the audience through imitation resulting from emotional identification". Cf. also Blundell 2002, 115.

moral standards and their dissemination through the study of Homer".[7] Through its representative, Homeric ethics becomes the target of Plato's criticism. The end of Socrates' dialectic will demonstrate whether an exhibition (ἐπίδειξις) of this sort is accompanied by knowledge or seeming wisdom.[8] Therefore, the major question raised concerns the comparison between Achilles and Odysseus and its evaluation, for which the most suitable is the expert in Homer's poetry.[9]

Hippias begins with a brief characterization of Achilles, Nestor and Odysseus, stressing that Homer depicts them as "the best man" (ἄριστος), "the wisest" (σοφώτατος) and "the wiliest" (πολυτροπώτατος) respectively (364c5–7).[10] It is the last part of Hippias' characterization, his use of the word πολυτροπώτατος to refer to Odysseus, that calls forth one of Socrates' main objections: Achilles is also described as "wily" by Homer.

The Socratic objection provokes Hippias to limit the semantic correlations of the word πολύτροπος (*wily* man), making its use and interpretation even clearer. The use of the Homeric intertext, based on which Achilles' most honest (ἁπλούστατος) and true (ἀληθέστατος) character is highlighted,[11] aims at the exclusion of the characterisation πολύτροπος for Achilles.[12]

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[7] Cf. also Ovink 1931, 145 ff; Blondell 2002, 118–9, 128.

[8] The very term ἐπίδειξις is a Platonic hint at seeming (δοκεῖν)-wisdom, in which the sophists seem to be more interested, cf. also Blondell 2002, 130.

[9] Plato's irony is situated in both Socrates' repeated admiration of Hippias' expertise (οὕτως εὔελπις ὢν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν ἀφικνῇ εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, 364a2–3; ἀφόβως τε καὶ πιστευτικῶς […] τῇ διανοίᾳ, 364a4–6; τῆς σοφίας ἀνάθημα τὴν δόξαν εἶναι τὴν σὴν […], 364b2), as well as in the latter's presumptuous display of his own superiority in wisdom (οὐδενὶ πώποτε κρείττονι εἰς οὐδὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐνέτυχον, 364a8). By contrast, this very irony foreshadows his lack of wisdom that will be eventually disclosed. For the irony of the passage, cf. Blundell 1992, 138 n. 31.

[10] Scholars have been divided into two groups as to whether the dialogue contains equivocation or not. Sprague (1962, 67–8, 74, 75–6), on the one hand, stresses that large parts of the argument of Plato's *Lesser Hippias* turn on the equivocal use of terms such as "wiliness", "power", "good", "voluntary", cf. Hoerber 1962; Mulhern 1968; Klosko 1987, 622 ff.; Zembaty 1989, 58–61. On the other hand, Weiss 1981, 288 n. 5 and *passim* does not believe that the dialogue must be charged with equivocation, cf. O'Brien 1967, 100 n. 11. I am generally inclined to support Weiss's view, but I cannot elaborate this point further in this paper.

[11] χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν […] ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὅμως Ἀΐδαο πύλησιν,/ ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ, 365a2–b1. When Hippias quotes Achilles' words to Odysseus at *Il.* 9.308–13, he omits 311 and slightly alters 310 and 314. Labarbe (1949, 51–2) holds that the variations of the text reflect a 4th-cent. text of Homer: "Reste la première hypothèse: Platon ne connaissait pas le vers. Elle a de sérieuses chances d'être correcte". However, Phillips (1987, 23) claims that these variations misrepresent the intention of the Homeric Achilles, while Blundell (1992, 144 n. 60) agrees with Brennan's suggestion (1987, 24–5) that they show the weakness of Hippias' memory and serve to lay greater stress on intentional action.

[12] Hoerber (1962, 124–5) notes that the word πολύτροπος is the adjective Homer employs to describe Odysseus in the first line of the *Odyssey* (cf. *Od.* 10.330), where it means "much-travelled", "much-wandering". However, the scholar observes that the adjective may be ambiguous, in that it appears in Greek literature also in the sense of "crafty, shifty, clever, versatile", cf. O'Brien 1967, 97; Blundell 1992, 144; Lampert 2002, 232 n. 2. Hoerber concludes that it is the latter

According to the sophist's opinion, πολύτροπος is directly correlated with
false man (ψευδής) and constitutes a main characteristic of Odysseus'.[13] On
the contrary, Achilles is presented as the model of true and honest man.[14]
Combining Hippias' previous argument, based on which Achilles is a
character shaped by Homer in order to become the model of the best man
(ἄριστος ἀνήρ, 364c5), one can conclude that, for the sophist, truth and hon-
esty are integral parts of the term "good man", thus certifying the place-
ment of the textual terms in the following uniform equation basis: the best
man = the most true and honest. For the needs of his dialectic, Socrates
clarifies the proposed semantic correlation between πολύτροπος and ψευδής,
at the same time highlighting the definite disjunction suggested by Hip-
pias' interpretation of Homer's poetic craftsmanship: namely that between
the true man (ἀληθής) and the false man (ψευδής).[15]

THE SAME MAN IS BOTH TRUE AND FALSE (365d-369b)

The Socratic elenchus underscores their inability to verify the real
plan lying behind the composition of the Homeric epics.[16] Therefore, he
places Hippias in the position of the Homeric representative and brings
the opinion to which the sophist arrived (about the disjunction between
the true man and the false) to the forefront of his elenchus, attempting to

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meaning which the versatile Hippias assumes for πολύτροπος, by equating πολύτροπος with ψευδὴς
(365b). Moreover, Weiss (1981, 289) does not accept Muhlern's suggestion (1968, 283–8) that
the word τρόπος contained in πολύτροπος signifies the typical behaviour of a person, the way he
is, his character. She stresses that although it contains the word τρόπος, πολύτροπος is itself not
a *tropos*-term but rather a *dunamis*-term; "it does not signify a person's typical behaviour but
rather an ability or capacity to behave a certain way". For an elaborate discussion of the idea that
Antisthenes is one of Plato's targets here, see e.g. Raeder 1905, 57; Kahn 1996, 121 ff.

[13] Vlastos (1991, 276) claims that though ψευδὴς can mean "liar" and does so in many contexts,
it need not-it does not always do so. For example (at 276 n. 130), a false statement need not be a
lying one, i.e. intended to be thought true, or a person making false statements need not intend
them to be thought true. He therefore concludes that "throughout the dialogue Socrates uses
ψευδὴς to mean not someone whose character it is to speak falsehoods but only someone who has
the *ability* to do so if he so chooses". Vlastos's proposal aims to prove that Socrates is absolved of
any intention to deceive. For Blundell (1992, 144), however, it is clear from the Homeric quotation
that Hippias does mean to characterise Odysseus as a liar.

[14] Ἥκιστά γε […] ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλούστατος καὶ ἀληθέστατος, 364e7–8; ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἴη ἀληθής τε καὶ
ἁπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ ψευδής, 365b4–5. Weiss (2006, 125) notes that the word
ἁπλοῦς has a range of meaning as broad as that of πολύτροπος: it is often translated "simple", but it
can be taken to mean "either something like 'hapless', the opposite of πολύτροπος as 'resourceful',
or something like 'artless', the opposite of πολύτροπος as 'wily'". Cf. Ovink 1931, 149.

[15] Ἐδόκει […] Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερος μὲν εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀληθής, ἕτερος δὲ ψευδής, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός, 365c3–4.

[16] ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη, 365d1. Cf. *Ion* 530c-d; *Protagoras* 347e;
Friedländer 1964, 137; Blundell 1992, 145.

extract at a first stage the definition that the sophist has to propose for the false man (ψευδής). It is particularly interesting to record the steps of the Socratic inductive reasoning by focusing on Hippias' admissions.

1ˢᵗ part of the reasoning (H)

Hippias' admissions:

H₁. False men are able (δυνατοί) – among others – to deceive people (365d7–8).

H₂. False men are powerful and – based on his previous admission – wily (πολύτροποι) (365e1–2).

H₃. False men are powerful and wily due to cunning and some kind of intelligence (φρόνησις) (365e2–5). In this way, Hippias attributes some kind of intelligence to wily men.[17]

H₄. False men, as intelligent (φρόνιμοι), know the content of their actions and, for these reasons, they do ill (κακουργοῦσι) (365e5–9). It is worth noting that this idea recalls *Crito* 44d6, where those that are capable of the greatest evil (τὰ μέγιστα κακά) are also capable of the greatest good (ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα) (44d6–8).

H₅. False men, as men who know the content of their actions and choose to do ill, namely to deceive, are wise (σοφοί) in deception, wise in doing ill (365e9–11).

From the first part of the reasoning (H), Socrates draws the following conclusion: false men are powerful (δυνατοί) and intelligent (φρόνιμοι), knowing (ἐπιστήμονες) and wise (σοφοί) in those things in which they are false (366a2–4).

2ⁿᵈ part of the reasoning (Ha)

Hippias' admissions:

Ha₁. (Already from section I) False men and true are not identical: therefore, they are different and quite opposite from each other (366a5–6, cf. 365c3–4). This opinion involves – from this initial admission of Ha₁ –

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[17] Weiss 1981, 292 argues that "the difference between the positions of Socrates and Hippias is not the difference between *tropos*-concepts and *dunamis*-concepts, between terms indicating typical behaviour and terms indicating skill, but rather the difference between two kinds of *dunamis*-concept, one of which is neutral and the other of which is negative". Thus, she concludes that by introducing ψευδὴς as a synonym for πολύτροπος, Hippias was not substituting a *tropos*-adjective for a *dunamis*-adjective; instead, he was supplying the δύναμις of ὁ ψευδὴς with a particular content, a content which he thought negatively coloured the δύναμις itself.

that true men are neither powerful nor intelligent nor knowing nor wise in those things in which they are true.

Ha$_2$. Clarifying the conclusion of H and with the aid of Ha$_1$: the idea that false men, separated from true men, are powerful and wise in those things in which they are false, involves that, if they wish, they are able to be false. At this point, an alternative verb-expression is used instead of "to be able to deceive" (δυνατοὶ ἐξαπατᾶν), which he used previously at a parallel equation with "to do ill" (κακουργεῖν). The expression "to be able to speak falsely" (δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι) combined with the notion of "will" (βούλησις) forms the expression "to be able, if they wish, to speak falsely" (λέγεις δυνατοὺς εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι ἐὰν βούλωνται, 366b2–3). In his interpretation, Hippias equates the terms "able, powerful" (δυνατοί) and "wise" (σοφοί), placing particular emphasis on δύναμις and not on σοφία.

From the second part of the reasoning (Ha), Socrates draws the following conclusion: the false are those who are wise and powerful in respect to speaking falsely (366b4–5).[18] The reversal of terms, from δυνατοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ (366a7, 366b1) to σοφοί τε καὶ δυνατοὶ (366b5), highlights the fundamental Socratic attitude towards knowledge. While, for Hippias, the main characteristic of ψευδὴς is the ability (δύναμις), whenever he wishes, to handle the knowledge of speaking falsely with the aim of speaking falsely (δυνατοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ψεύδεσθαι), for Socrates, the knowledge of speaking falsely defines the ability to speak falsely (σοφοὶ καὶ δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι): knowledge makes someone powerful, capable of performing specific actions. However, the reversal of the above terms requires the definition of δυνατός, so that the semantic background of the δύναμις defined by the knowledge of speaking falsely can be specified. In this way, Socrates reaches, together with Hippias, the definition of δυνατός.

Δυνατὸς is someone that can do what he wishes when he wishes[19]; therefore, δύναμις is the power of doing what one wishes when one wishes. Socrates recalls Ha$_2$ (ψευδεῖς = λέγεις δυνατοὺς εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι ἐὰν βούλωνται) and the use of the verb "wish" (βούλομαι) by Hippias. However, the two interlocutors interpret the definition of δυνατὸς in different ways with very

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[18] Mulhern (1968, 286) observes that ψευδὴς is reduced from the status of a *tropos*-adjective to that of a mere *dunamis*-adjective at 366b4–5. Weiss (1981, 289), however, goes further in saying that from that point on, the dialogue gives not the slightest indication that Socrates in any way regrets this. Unlike Mulhern, she claims that Socrates ceases to ask questions of definitions and proceeds immediately to employ the *dunamis*-sense of ψευδὴς in his illustrations. Based on this reasoning, the conclusion retains the *dunamis*-sense of ἀληθὴς and ψευδὴς: the man skilled at speaking truthfully and the man skilled at speaking falsely are the same man. Thus the paradox vanishes, cf. Hoerber 1962, 126.

[19] Δυνατὸς δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἄρα, ὃς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται, ὅταν βούληται, 366b7–c1.

different ideological nuances: understanding will (βούλησις) as a precondition of δύναμις (whenever I wish to speak falsely, or, in general, to do what I wish, I can use the necessary cognitive means and do it), Hippias highlights his faith in the manipulation of knowledge (σοφία) with the only goal of δύναμις. On the other hand, applying the definition of δυνατὸς in the carefully placed and suggestively presented Socratic opinion, one can note that, for Socrates, the knowledge (σοφία) of speaking falsely, which defines the ability (δύναμις) to speak falsely, finally defines the ability to perform the false speaking, or, in general, to do what one wishes whenever he wishes.[20] Essentially, the real question that has been raised by now from the discussion is the following: if my will (βούλησις) defines my ability (δύναμις) (which both interlocutors seem to accept), what factor defines the will? The Socratic reply lies at the heart of the dialogue: knowledge (σοφία) predetermines the will (βούλησις) and, therefore, the ability (δύναμις) to do something, which refers to the wider philosophical question of whether I know what I really wish and what benefits me (prudential benefit),[21] namely a matter of virtue evaluation. The passage portrays most vigorously the distance that separates the two interlocutors, a distance created by two semantically different approaches to the terms σοφία, βούλησις and δύναμις and the relationships among them, which are attributed to two diametrically opposed assessments of the virtues that one must set as a priority in their lives: for Hippias, the will to achieve false speaking originates from the assessment of (the deed and) the outcome of the deed of false speaking as good, and activates the ability to do this through the proper conception and treatment of the cognitive means necessary to achieve this goal.[22] However, the reversal of terms attempted by Socrates redefines the functional value and prioritisation of knowledge (σοφία) in human life. For Socrates, the will (βούλησις) to achieve false speaking originates from the knowledge that the deed of false speaking is going to produce good[23]: the reasonable – based on knowledge – assessment of performing a good thing is going to activate the ability for its performance. What is suggested in the passage is that the previous identification of the terms "deceive" (ἐξαπατᾶν), "speak falsely" (ψεύδεσθαι) and "do ill" (κακουργοῦσι), as well as the special meaning they take under the light of their examination as identical terms, lead to the conclusion that

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[20] But does anyone wish to speak falsely (ψεύδεσθαι) or to do ill (κακουργεῖν)?

[21] Cf. Vlastos 1991, 279 ff.; Kahn 1996, 117.

[22] Socrates correlates will (βούλησις) with knowledge (σοφία), approaching differently the former and the latter, while Hippias understands knowledge under different terms.

[23] This highlights the principle attributed to Socrates that no one errs willingly (ἑκών): one acts ἑκών when he knows that what he does produces a good outcome.

the actions these verbs describe cannot constitute the object of someone's *will* (since this is prohibited by his σοφία), so that they can be transformed into *ability* to perform the respective deed. For Hippias, σοφία is a set of individual cognitive means and methods, which are defined by the strict and indiscriminate application of the relationship between will (βούλησις) and ability (δύναμις); on the other hand, for Socrates, it is directly related to the wider issue of the knowledge of good and evil.

The above differentiation of terms and meanings is going to become clearer through the third part of the reasoning, in which Socrates resorts to one of the most typical features of his elenchus, namely that of craft analogy: for the needs of the reasoning, he re-introduces the term ἄριστος (the best man), which Hippias himself used at the beginning of the dialogue (364c5), attributing truth and honesty to it as necessary features (365b4). In this way, he aims to unite knowledge (σοφία) with virtue (ἀρετή). One should recall here that Hippias originally (364c5–7) attributed three different characteristics, ἄριστος (the best man), σοφώτατος (the wisest) and πολυτροπώτατος (the wiliest), to three characters, Achilles, Nestor and Odysseus respectively: Socrates' aim is to show that these three characteristics can essentially stem only from one person. The true man (ἀληθής) and the false (ψευδής) are actually the same: the good man (ἀγαθός), and the good man is the wise man (σοφός).

3rd part of the reasoning (Hb)

Hippias' admissions:

Hb₁. Hippias' experience in the art of calculating (λογιστική) makes him able (δυνατός), if he wishes (βούλησις), to tell the truth about it, without any intention to deceive, giving the correct answer in matters of calculation, faster and more effectively than anyone (speed of response, effectiveness, success, 366c5–d). In other words, the cognitive, fast and effective performance of the deed related to the particular art is linked to the truth and unavoidably leads to success. In this way, the union of knowledge (σοφία) with effectiveness and truth is achieved.

Hb₂. The reason why Hippias gives the correct-true answer in calculation issues faster than anyone is because he outmatches everyone with regard to his ability (δύναμις) and knowledge (σοφία) in the sector of calculating.

Hb₃. Being most able/powerful (δυνατώτατος) and wisest (σοφώτατος) in a particular art entails being also best (ἄριστος) in this art (366d2 ff.). What should be noted is that Plato has Socrates repeat (366d3) the reversal of terms he suggested above, a reversal that again eludes the sophist's at-

tention: unaware that he could be walking into a verbal trap, Hippias in reality consents to the conclusion "the one who is wisest and most powerful in a particular art is also best in this art, most able to tell the truth about matters related to this art", while he has apparently consented to the view "the one who is most powerful and wisest in a particular art is also best in this art, most able to tell the truth about matters related to this art". The careful study of the text shows that the reversal of terms does not change the outcome of the reasoning: however, based on the aforementioned unfolding of my reasoning, the reversal aims at presenting Socrates' attempt to place knowledge (σοφία) in the centre of interest. In this way, he seeks to achieve the union of knowledge with virtue (ἀρετή) and establish the idea "virtue is knowledge". He also dictates the opinion that ignorance is evil.

Hb₄. The validity of the opinion that "the one who is wisest and most powerful in a particular art is also best in this art, most able to tell the truth about matters related to this craft" raises the issue of who is most able to tell falsehoods about it.

Hb₅. Only the wise man (σοφός) in respect to calculation is able[24] to express, if he wishes (the precondition is that he wishes), an erroneous opinion by speaking falsely (ψεύδεσθαι) in matters of calculation; the ignorant of calculation is actually weak (366e3–367a5).

From the third part of the reasoning (Hb), Socrates draws the following conclusion: Hippias, as wise (σοφός) in calculating (λογιστική), was proven to represent in the same person the one who is most able (δυνατώτατος) to speak truly and falsely about calculations; and this person, as he stressed

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[24] It is worth noting the use of the potential optative in the passage, combined with the conditional participle βουλόμενος. The conditional element in βουλόμενος essentially raises the question: can anyone ever wish (βούλησις) what is bad? At first glance, the answer seems positive: only if he has no knowledge, because knowledge pushes us towards what is good, while ignorance towards what is bad. However, *Gorgias* 466a-468d teaches us that humans wish (βούλησις) the things that are good. Thus all voluntary action is aimed at the presumed good of the agent. On the contrary, involuntary actions are those which result in harm for the agent; in such cases, one does not do whatever he wishes (βούλησις), but only whatever seems good to him (δόξα). But here another question arises: should we resort to *Gorgias*' teachings in order to interpret Plato's elaboration on the notion of βούλησις in the *Lesser Hippias*? The answer is partly yes, partly no. Undoubtedly, the distinction between doing what I wish and doing what seems good to me plays a dominant role in the *Gorgias*. However, bearing this distinction in mind, one can observe that it is not elaborated here in any detail. In fact, Plato allows the ignorant to wish (βούλησις) to tell falsehoods (367a2). As we shall see, Plato's treatment of βούλησις in the *Lesser Hippias*, though probably an earlier one than that of the *Gorgias*, is closely akin to it. At any rate, as is evident from what has been deduced from the text, a necessary condition for not wishing bad things is the attempt to acquire the knowledge of good. The craft analogy aims to show that what applies to the field of crafts can also apply to the field of ethics.

above (Hb₃), is the one who is good (ἀγαθός) in respect to calculations. Consequently, being wise in calculations entails being good at them, namely most able to speak truly and falsely about them. This leads naturally to the identification of knowledge (σοφία) with virtue (ἀρετή); Socrates establishes the dominance of σοφία.

As a result, the same man is both true (ἀληθής) and false (ψευδής), so that an evaluative type of comparison (ἀμείνων) between the two cannot take place.[25] The application of this principle in all sciences (ἐπιστῆμαι) and crafts (τέχναι)[26] proves that it has virtually the same validity[27]: the one who is wise (σοφός) in a particular craft, namely good (ἀγαθός) at it, is able (δυνατός) to speak both truly and falsely about matters related to it; but the ignorant (ἀμαθής) of a craft is actually bad (κακός)[28] at it and unable to speak both truth and falsehood about it, unable to be both true and false. This view dictates that, even when the ignorant man wishes (βούλησις) to speak one way or the other, he is unable to achieve what he wishes due to lack of knowledge. Wishing to speak falsely, he quite often involuntarily (ἄκων) tells the truth by accident, due to ignorance (cf. 367a2–3). By contrast, the wise man is always able to speak both truly and falsely, namely to voluntarily (ἑκών) achieve what he wishes when he wishes, through knowledge. This means that knowledge activates ability, power (δύναμις); but ignorance does not activate ability, even if it has managed to mislead the will (βούλησις). But what does misleading the will mean? It involves lacking the guidance of knowledge, and thereby lacking the ability to exercise reasonable judgement in evaluating some things as good. Therefore, two levels of βούλησις emerge: (a) the one that has been defined by knowledge and activates ability; in other words, the one that has been defined by knowledge always leads to the production of a good result, (b) the one that has been influenced by

[25] In this way, Hippias' original argument, according to which Achilles is better than Odysseus under the criterion of truth and honesty, is invalidated.

[26] Socrates' conversation with Hippias contributes to this, since the latter is "the wisest of men in the largest number of arts" (πλείστας τέχνας πάντων σοφώτατος […] ἀνθρώπων, 368b2–3) and "surpasses the rest in knowledge […]" (ἐπιστήμων […] διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων, 368d3–4). As regards Hippias' "much-learning" (πολυμαθία), Hoerber (1962, 124), after recording Plato's negative judgment on πολυμαθία in *Phaedrus* 275a-b and *Laws* 811b, 819a, goes on to say that "to Plato excessive versatility is conducive to confusion. It is no wonder, then, that in the *Lesser Hippias* […] one of the main threads which runs throughout the treatise is confusion". Blondell (2002, 142), however, claims that Socrates here "implies that breadth of knowledge has its own value, if properly used and placed within the hierarchy of values established by dialectic".

[27] It is worth noting that in passage 368e5–369a1 (ἐν ᾗτινι βούλει σοφίᾳ τοῦτο σκέψαι ἢ πανουργίᾳ ἢ ὁτιοῦν χαίρεις ὀνομάζων: "examine this in any sort of wisdom you wish – or in any cunning or whatever name you like"), the terms σοφία and πανουργία appearing to be used interchangeably recall the earlier connection suggested by Hippias between πολύτροπος and πανοῦργος, thus pointing to the identification of the true man with the false.

[28] Essentially, he implies that he is bad (κακός) at it because he is ignorant of it.

ignorance (unreflective acceptance of some things as good), which finally results in weakness.[29] Linking knowledge to virtue, Socrates argues that the only way for someone to be effective and powerful is knowledge. The identification of virtue with knowledge, and the activation of ability in the field of sciences-crafts lead to the formation of an unavoidable logical necessity that safely brings about the wished-for good outcome.

[29] Friedländer (1964, 140) stresses that *Gorgias* 466dff. clarifies the distinction between genuine willing and arbitrary inclination (βούλομαι-δοκεῖ μοι): a true act of the will always aims at the good (cf. O'Brien 1967, 105 n. 15). Following this line of thought, the scholar concludes that only Socratic deception "willing" the good is power. Eventually, Hippias' claim cannot be valid any longer; the same person is both true and false. Blundell (1992, 146) says that in *Metaphysics* Δ.29.1025a6–13, Aristotle criticizes this argument as fallacious, especially for its equivocation on ψευδὴς as a capacity and as a disposition which gives rise to intentional action. She concludes (at 152) that the confusion of capacity with disposition serves to conflate Hippias with the figure of Odysseus. Generally speaking, Friedländer (1964, 139) observes that Hippias and Socrates mean quite different things by the word ψευδής: Hippias means a false person deriving pleasure or advantage from his deception, while Socrates "means a person who deceives in a specific situation but can just as well tell the truth, and who, as a man of knowledge, will use the one or the other as a means to achieve his end, 'the good'". For Muhlern (1968, 286), the paradoxical conclusion that "the same man is both true and false" "depends throughout upon the failure to dissociate δύναμις-concepts from τρόπος-concepts. In each of the cases of technical knowledge, the δύναμις supposed to be conferred by its appropriate σοφία – arithmetical, geometrical, or astronomical – is taken at one time for a δύναμις, at the next for a τρόπος. Against those who charge the *Lesser Hippias* with patent equivocation and abuses of language (see, for example, Hoerber 1962, Sprague 1962, Muhlern 1968), Weiss (1981, 288, 288 n. 6, 290) attempts to defend both the validity of the argument and the truth of the conclusion by claiming that the argument contains only *dunamis*-terms (cf. also Weiss 2006, 121–4, 129–30, 137–8). Thus neither Socrates nor Hippias is to be accused of equivocation. Waterfield (1987, 270) criticises Weiss's account of the validity of the argument and goes further in saying that if the present argument had been couched entirely in terms of ability, then the conclusion would be that the person with the ability to lie is better than the person who is unable to lie. But "the conclusion is meant to be more radical than that: it is that someone who deliberately *exercises* his talent for deceit is better than one who does not" (cf. Zembaty 1989, 52–8). Such regular deceit is something as immoral and unacceptable as the final conclusion of the dialogue. Waterfield concludes that Hippias' disapproving attitude towards deceit "reflects not just common Greek morality, but Plato's views too; the conclusion is unacceptable all round". Skouteropoulos (1995, 20) notes that, from this point on (namely, the point of identification of the true man with the false), the two terms, ἀληθής and ψευδής, are signified in two ways: ἀληθής sometimes signifies the truthful, straight, honest man (A_1) and, other times, the man whose decisions reflect the way things are (person speaking the truth) (A_2); on the other hand, ψευδὴς sometimes signifies the untruthful and dishonest man ($Ψ_1$) and, other times, the man whose decisions are not identified with the truth ($Ψ_2$). The scholar believes that each of them uses the terms differently: Hippias points to A_1 and $Ψ_1$, which define an ethical parameter, forming the pair "honest-dishonest", which has ethical connotations, while Socrates points to A_2–$Ψ_2$ which has a basically intellectualistic parameter and mainly ethically indifferent, forming the ethically indifferent pair "speaking the truth-not speaking the truth". Finally, Kahn (1996, 115) follows those who suggested that the fallacy of the argument is located in the move from is *able to lie* to *is a liar*. He claims that Hippias "has been deceived by Socrates' repeated claim that the capacity to lie is a necessary condition for being a liar (366b, 367b2–5); he is thus led to suppose that it must be a sufficient condition as well". Kahn adds (at 116) that Plato is aware of the fallacy here; in fact, he repeatedly alludes to the idea that "to be a liar requires not only the capacity to lie but also the will, desire, or intention to do so". The scholar stresses that in Aristotelian terms "the fallacy lies in collapsing the distinction between an open capacity like art or science (a *dunamis*, *technē*, or *epistēmē*) and a fixed disposition or character trait (*hexis*)".

INTERLUDE: DIALECTIC AND LITERATURE (369b–373c).
THE MEANING OF ἙΚΩΝ IN RELATION TO WILL

The identification of ἀληθὴς with ψευδὴς directly affects Hippias' attempt to comparatively define Achilles' and Odysseus' goodness (ἀμείνω, 363b3–4, 364c5, 365b4). The comparison falls apart due to the fact that it is based on two features that were proven identical. However, Hippias' stubbornness together with his effort to confirm his poetic specialisation outflank the conclusion of the reasoning and are tossed as a powerful attempt to restore his speech with the aim of establishing it as the "best speech" (369c7–8). Therefore, his reasoning follows the following stages:

Central thesis: Homer made Achilles better (ἀμείνων) than Odysseus and without falsehood (ἀψευδής), but Odysseus deceitful (δολερός), a teller of many falsehoods (πολλὰ ψευδόμενος), and worse (χείρων) than Achilles (369c3–5).

i. He rebukes Socrates' attempt to interpret Homer in a way that suits him best in order to establish the view that Achilles performs actions that are not consistent with his words. Specifically, the disagreement between words and deeds[30] Socrates refers to concerns the fact that, while Achilles advertises his departure, he does not prepare it, thus putting the truth of his words at risk (cf. 370d5–6). Before the challenge raised by the Socratic question about how the degree of goodness of both Achilles and Socrates is to be defined,[31] Hippias introduces the concepts of "purposefulness" (or, by extension, "treachery", ἐπιβουλή) and "voluntariness" (ἑκών) in relation to speaking falsely (ψεύδεσθαι), aiming at the differentiation of speaking falsely in the case of the two characters: Achilles speaks falsely not on purpose (ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς) but involuntarily (ἄκων), forced by the misfortune of the army to stay; on the contrary, Odysseus speaks falsely willingly (ἑκών) and by design (ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς) (370e5–9).

ii. Socrates' objection stems from the contradictory content of the words Achilles addresses to Odysseus, to whom he talks about his departure,

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[30] Cf. Blondell 2002, 130.

[31] ἀπορῶν ὁπότερος τούτοιν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἀμείνων πεποίηται τῷ ποιητῇ, καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀμφοτέρω ἀρίστω εἶναι καὶ δύσκριτον ὁπότερος ἀμείνων εἴη καὶ περὶ ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο παραπλησίω ἐστόν, 370d7–e4 ("because I am perplexed as to which of the two men is portrayed as better by the poet, and because I believe both are extremely good, and it is hard to decide which of the two is better, concerning falsehood and truth and the rest of virtue; for both men are in fact nearly equal in this matter"). Hobbs (2000, 195 ff.) bases her interpretation on this passage. She suggests that for Socrates, Achilles and Odysseus represent two different types of heroism and *andreia*: each hero (at 198) "embodies a particular version of *andreia* which requires considerable purification if it is to be of use to Plato's educational project".

and to Ajax, to whom he talks about his stay. From this point of view, Achilles has bad intentions, a treacherous goal and a carefully prepared plan to deceive, a plan which is superior to that of Odysseus': Homer made him a cheat and plotter of deception.[32] Socrates' disagreement makes Hippias redefine Achilles' motives: goodwill (εὔνοια)[33] induces Achilles to change his words depending on the circumstance. On the contrary, whenever Odysseus speaks, truly or falsely, he always speaks with design (ἐπιβουλεύσας, 371e3). Up to this point, one can discern two pairs of terms separated from each other: on the one hand, the pair of terms ἑκών-ἐπιβουλὴ and, on the other hand, the pair ἄκων-εὔνοια.

iii. Combining the previous conclusion drawn at the end of section II, namely that "the one who is wise (σοφός) in a particular craft, namely good (ἀγαθός) at it, is able (δυνατός) to speak both truly and falsely about matters related to it", and premise ii ("whenever Odysseus speaks, truly or falsely, he always speaks with design"), Socrates concludes in favour of Odysseus: Odysseus is better (ἀμείνων) than Achilles because those who voluntarily speak falsely (οἱ ἑκόντες ψευδόμενοι) were found to be better than those who do so involuntarily (ἄκοντες) (371e7–8). Of course, those who speak falsely voluntarily, as shown previously, are also able to speak truly voluntarily; thus Socrates points once again to the close connection between ἑκὼν and knowledge on the one hand, and ἄκων and ignorance on the other. Nevertheless, Hippias declares his absolute disagreement with the aforementioned conclusion: correlating speaking falsely (ψεύδεσθαι) with doing ill, he deems it unreasonable to believe that those who voluntarily do wrong and voluntarily plot to do evils (οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες, ἐπιβουλεύσαντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενοι) could be better than those who do so involuntarily: wrongs done involuntarily are attributed to ignorance, can be forgiven and can also count as a mitigating circumstance, whereas the laws are much more severe towards those who do them voluntarily (371e9–372a5). Hippias pushes the discussion into a new direction by shifting focus from the realm of crafts to moral issues. At first glance, his view on voluntariness (ἑκών) resembles the way Socrates treats it. However, there is a considerable difference between the two views. Hippias interprets ἑκὼν in terms of knowledge accompanied by bad intention manifesting itself in plotting evils, while ἄκων in terms of ignorance resulting inevitably in doing wrong or con-

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[32] Cf. ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φὴς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ψεύδεσθαι, 371a2–3; οὕτω γόης καὶ ἐπίβουλος πρὸς τῇ ἀλαζονείᾳ, ὡς πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος, 371a3–4; καὶ αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ τεχνάζειν τε καὶ ψεύδεσθαι περιέσεσθαι;, 371d6–7.

[33] Reading εὐνοίας in 371e1.

triving evils. But Socrates, as we have shown above, treats ἑκὼν in terms of knowledge defining the will, and activating the power, to produce only good things. It only remains to show how what applies to the realm of crafts and sciences applies also to the realm of ethics.

Hippias' passionate belief in the truth of his words is moderated by Socrates' avowal of ignorance, which virtually amounts to a justification of his dialectic as knowledge-centred activity aiming at the good.[34] Guided by the outcome of the previous reasoning, Socrates embraced the view that those who harm people and do wrong and speak falsely and deceive and err voluntarily are better than those who do so involuntarily. However, in professing ignorance, he makes it obvious that he pursues the greatest good that the sophist can offer him, his wisdom in the matter in hand, as a cure for his soul.[35]

ONLY THE GOOD MAN ERRS VOLUNTARILY (373c–376c)

Reasoning steps

The last part of the dialogue gives an example of inductive reasoning, in which Socrates seeks to find a satisfactory solution to the issue concerning whether those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily are better. The various steps of the reasoning process which covers a wide range of activities can be classified as follows:

S_1–S_7: *race and running*

S₁. One who runs well and successfully (ὁ εὖ θέων) is a good runner (ἀγαθός), while one who runs badly (ὁ κακῶς) is a bad one (κακός) (373c9–d2). The

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[34] κινδυνεύω ἓν μόνον ἔχειν τοῦτο ἀγαθόν […] τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἢ ἔχει ἔσφαλμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπῃ ἐστί […] φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδώς […] καίτοι τί μεῖζον ἀμαθίας τεκμήριον ἢ ἐπειδάν τις σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι διαφέρηται; ἓν δὲ τοῦτο θαυμάσιον ἔχω ἀγαθόν, ὅ με σῴζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰσχύνομαι μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ πυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐρωτῶ, 372b1–c4. Cf. also *Apology* 38a2, where he says that the greatest good for a human being is to converse about virtue.

[35] Cf. also *Gorgias* 458a7, where Socrates counts being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is (namely, false belief about "the greatest things", τὰ μέγιστα) than to deliver someone else from it. It is worth noting the bright irony found in 373b4–9 (cf. also Friedländer 1964, 142): Socrates accepts Hippias' accusation that he "always makes confusion in arguments, and seems to argue unfairly (ὥσπερ κακουργοῦντι)", however he does so out of ignorance and, therefore, involuntarily; thus he, according to Hippias' account, deserves forgiveness. It seems that Socrates ironically criticizes Hippias' view on the relationship between ἑκὼν and knowledge, with the purpose of establishing his own theory about it by shedding light on the deep connection between the two terms.

term "good" (ἀγαθός) refers to the proper performance of running, as well as to its successful outcome.

S₂. One who runs fast runs well and successfully, while one who runs slowly (ὁ βραδέως θέων) runs badly and unsuccessfully (373d3).

S₃. In a race, therefore, and in running, quickness is good (ἀγαθόν) but slowness is bad (κακόν) (373d4–5). This means that quickness in running involves performing the act of running quickly (quickness in running process), as well as reaching the destination quickly and first (effectiveness).

S₄. One who runs slowly voluntarily (ὁ ἑκὼν βραδέως θέων) is a better runner (ἀμείνων δρομεύς) than one who does so involuntarily (ὁ ἄκων). Due to S_3, S_4 becomes: one who voluntarily runs slowly, namely badly, is a better runner than one who involuntarily runs slowly, namely badly (S_{4a}). This view recalls the previous one: the one who is wise in a particular craft, namely good at it, is able to speak both truly and falsely about matters related to it. But the re-introduction of ἑκὼν into the reasoning has an additional role here, namely to remind readers of the crucial difference between Socrates' and Hippias' conceptions of voluntariness (ἑκών). In view of this difference, one cannot fail to notice that this reasoning amounts to Socrates' final attempt to convince Hippias of the indissoluble connection between ἑκὼν and knowledge directed exclusively to the production of good things. Up to now, both interlocutors accept that "one who voluntarily runs slowly, namely badly, is a better runner than one who involuntarily runs slowly, namely badly" (S_{4a}) in fact means "one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs slowly, namely badly, is a better runner than one who involuntarily, namely with lack of knowledge, runs slowly, namely badly" (S_{4b}). But in order to clarify whether ἑκὼν is to be linked with knowledge accompanied by bad intention which manifests itself in contriving and doing evils, or it is always inextricably intertwined with knowledge directed to the good, we should let Socrates be our guide.

S₅. To run is to do something (ποιεῖν) and therefore to perform something (ἐργάζεσθαί τι) (373d7–e1). Combining the above premises and the present one:

    a) A good runner is one who runs well and successfully, namely fast (since in running, quickness is good), one who quickly performs something in a race; a_1) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs slowly/ runs badly/ performs something in a race is a better runner than one who involuntarily, namely with ignorance, runs slowly/ runs badly/ performs something in a race. Due to So-

crates' delineation of the connection between ἑκών and good, (a) is transformed into:

a₂) A good runner is one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs, which means that he runs well and successfully/ runs fast/ quickly performs something in a race. The ἑκών-feature of a good runner defines whether he will run fast or slowly; in other words, it defines the ability to run in one way or the other.

b) A bad runner is one who runs badly, namely slowly (since in running, slowness is bad), one who slowly performs something in a race. And (b) becomes (b₁): A bad runner is one who involuntarily, namely with ignorance, runs, which means that he runs badly/ runs slowly/ slowly performs something in a race. The ἄκων-feature of a bad runner signifies his inability to run in one way or the other.

S₆. One who runs badly performs a bad (κακόν) and shameful (αἰσχρόν) thing in a race (373e1–2).

S₇. After providing a useful reminder of the pairs (of terms) "good-ἑκών" and "bad-ἄκων", Socrates virtually draws the following conclusion:

A good runner is (a) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs, which means that he runs well and successfully/ runs fast/ quickly performs something in a race. More specifically, (b) he performs a good and admirable thing in a race. The end of the reasoning further clarifies that a good runner is (c) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs fast or slowly/ voluntarily performs a good and admirable or a bad and shameful thing in a race;

A bad runner is (a) one who involuntarily, namely with ignorance, runs, which means that he runs badly and unsuccessfully/ runs slowly/ slowly performs something in a race. More specifically, (b) he performs a bad and shameful thing in a race. The end of the reasoning further clarifies that a bad runner is (c) one who involuntarily, namely with ignorance, runs fast or slowly/ involuntarily performs a good and admirable or a bad and shameful thing in race.

The conclusion dictates that the main characteristic of the good runner is the voluntary element found in his act of running; this leads to the effective and admirable performance of the act of running. Besides ensuring the characterisation of a runner as good in virtue of the successful result it produces, the position of ἑκών in the reasoning process plays a twofold role: on the one hand, it sheds light on how knowledge before acting,[36] proper

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[36] Cf. Weiss 1981, 304.

guidance (thanks to knowledge) concerning the performance of the act of running and its successful outcome are tightly linked to each other; on the other hand, it implies the exclusion of the possibility that the good runner will perform a bad and shameful thing in a race, although he has the ability – by reason of his knowledge – to do one thing (what is good and admirable) or the other (what is bad and shameful). But what prevents him from doing a bad and shameful thing in a race? Guided by the knowledge of what is good and what is bad in a race, he voluntarily chooses to do only the good.

Moreover, Socrates extends the conclusion drawn from the examination in the field of race to all aspects of the human process (374a ff.):

a) in wrestling, one who falls down voluntarily, namely one who voluntarily performs a bad and shameful thing (since being thrown down in wrestling is bad and shameful) is a better wrestler than one who does so involuntarily;

b) in all physical activities, the physically better is able to do both sort of things: the strong and the weak, the shameful and the admirable; therefore, one who is physically better does what is bad and shameful in respect to the body voluntarily, but one who is worse does them involuntarily;

c) furthermore, the better body voluntarily does what is bad and shameful: it voluntarily takes shameful and bad postures aiming at its awkwardness;

d) the better voice sings out of tune voluntarily;

e) Hippias would choose to possess good things rather than bad ones. It should be noted that the reasoning suddenly changes focus and, from the various aspects of the human process, proceeds to the question: what do people really wish (βούλησις)? Within this framework, the Socratic principle that everyone pursues the good (*Gorgias* 468b) unfolds, eventually excluding the alternative option of evil-doing. But let us see how this takes place.

f) Hippias would prefer to have feet which limp voluntarily (limping is vice of foot) and eyes with which one would see dully and incorrectly voluntarily (dull sight is a vice of eyes);

g) with regard to the senses, it is worth having those which voluntarily do ill, namely perform their work ineffectively by accomplishing bad results, because they are good;

h) those tools with which one voluntarily produces bad results are better than those with which one does so involuntarily;

i) with regard to all animals: with an animal better in soul, one would do voluntarily the bad works of this soul;

j) for an archer, it is better to possess a soul which voluntarily misses the
    mark: this soul is better in archery;

k) in every craft and science: a soul which voluntarily performs bad things
    and misses the mark in a particular craft or science is better at this craft
    or science than one which does so involuntarily;

l) with the better slave's soul, one would voluntarily do the bad works of
    this soul: and this is what one would prefer to have.

Conclusion of the reasoning (application of the above to human souls)[37]: everyone would wish (βούλησις) to have his own soul as good as possible; but his soul will be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily.[38]

The text dictates that each man wishes (βούλησις) what is good, and this is directly linked to ἑκών and knowledge. In the case of crafts and sciences, the knowledge of what is good and bad defines the will (βούλησις) for the good, which activates – under ordinary circumstances, cf. 366c – the ability (δύναμις) to achieve it. Under this scope, the possibility that someone will wish what is bad and, therefore, activate the ability to achieve it is excluded, thanks to the knowledge directed towards the pursuit of good; but it is included, when one is deprived of such knowledge – in that case, however, he does not act voluntarily (ἑκών). This is true of crafts and sciences, where a set of principles is involved in the production of an object or, generally, the accomplishment of an end. But does this also apply to the human soul? Socrates' point is not paradoxical. His view justifies the philosophical life (cf. 372a6–373a8) which represents the true aim of life, namely to make one's soul as good as possible.[39] This is done by engaging in dialectical discussion: through elenctic examination, an interlocutor purges the false and preserves the true beliefs about *ta megista* ("the greatest things"). By focusing on the knowledge reached through Socratic cross-examination, Plato teaches us that, in ethical matters, justice profits the man who pos-

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[37] Cf. Friedländer 1964, 143. Muhlern (1968, 287) claims that the above premises are employed to show that one speaks of a man as being good when his parts and powers are under his control, without considering whether the acts he performs are such as one would commend under ordinary circumstances. Moreover, he adds that "since a man is good when his powers are under his control, and since the soul is one of these powers, a man is good when his soul is under his control. Thus it is better to have one's soul under control and commit evil acts, than not to have one's soul under control and still commit evil acts". By contrast, my analysis holds that if one has his soul under control, as MUHLERN puts it, he will always – as long as it depends on him and he is not hindered by disease or other such things inevitably depriving him of his knowledge (cf. 366c) – perform good acts.

[38] Τί δέ; τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν οὐ βουλοίμεθ' ἂν ὡς βελτίστην ἐκτῆσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν βελτίων ἔσται, ἐὰν ἑκοῦσα κακουργῇ τε καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνῃ, ἢ ἐὰν ἄκουσα;, 375c6–d2.

[39] Cf. *Apology* 30b; Gulley 1968, 87, 91–2; Penner 1973, 142, 147–8; Blundell 1992, 161, 164; Blondell 2002, 118.

sesses it: justice is what really benefits his soul.[40] This knowledge is not only prudential, as it is related to the interest of the soul, but also moral, since justice bridges the gap that separates individual from common good: it benefits both agent and patient. To sum up, as regards "the greatest things", the knowledge reached by means of the *elenchus*, the knowledge of what is good and bad,[41] must distinguish and characterise the good man and the good citizen, eventually ensuring the performance of good and just deeds. The presentation of the aforementioned ideas serves as the prelude to the examination of the last part of the dialogue, through which the meaning of the dialogue will become clearer.

Justice

Hippias bases his rejection of Socrates' conclusion on the groundlessness of the assumption that those who voluntarily do wrong are better than those who do so involuntarily, in this way introducing the last treatment of the issue from the point of view of justice (δικαιοσύνη). Socrates' reasoning consists of the following stages (375d7–376b7):

J_1. Justice is either some sort of power (δύναμίς τις) or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), or both.

J_2. If justice is a power of the soul, then the more powerful (δυνατωτέρα) soul is the more just (δικαιοτέρα). In fact, they had previously agreed that the more powerful soul is the better. At this point, we should recall the example of the good runner with which he started:

A good runner is (a) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs, which means that he runs well and successfully/ runs fast/ quickly performs something in a race. More specifically, (b) he performs a good and admirable thing in a race. The end of the reasoning further clarifies that a good runner is (c) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, runs fast or slowly/ voluntarily performs a good and admirable or a bad and shameful thing in a race.

At first glance the element of ἑκών makes the agent able (δύναμις) to do both. However, the knowledge of what is good activates the will (βούλησις) for the good thing and the ability (δύναμις) to acquire it. Therefore, due to the view "the more powerful soul is the better", J_1 and J_2 are transformed into the following: if justice is a power of the soul, then the more powerful soul = the more just = the better.

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[40] Cf. *Crito* 47d-48a; *Gorgias* 504a-505b, 512a-b; *Republic* 444c-e; Irwin 1977, 58–9; Blundell 1992, 161.

[41] Cf. O'Brien 1967, 96.

J₃. If justice is knowledge, then the wiser soul (ἡ σοφωτέρα ψυχή) is more just, while the more ignorant more unjust.

J₄. If justice is both, namely both power and knowledge, then the more powerful and wiser soul is more just, while the more ignorant more unjust. We should note here that, in case justice is both, Socrates does not argue that the more ignorant soul is both less powerful and more unjust; on the contrary, he only uses the term "more unjust", presumably aiming at stripping the unjust soul of any sort of power and highlighting the importance of knowledge by restoring its value. We saw earlier that the knowledge of what is good in a particular craft or science defines the will (βούλησις) and the ability (δύναμις) to do it. The possession of such knowledge and its practical application aiming at the well-executed product of his art are what make a craftsman a good craftsman. Based on this analogy, Socrates points to the human soul. When the human, guided by the knowledge reached through Socratic cross-examination, evaluates something as bad for himself, he will not let it constitute the object of his will; although he knows it and is theoretically capable of doing it, he will not perform it precisely because he does not wish it.

J₅. As has been previously indicated, the more powerful (δυνατωτέρα) and wiser (σοφωτέρα) soul is better (ἀμείνων) and more able to do both admirable and shameful things in everything it accomplishes. Therefore, when this soul does shameful things, it does them voluntarily, by power and craft (διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην), and these things, either one or both of them, appear to be attributes of justice too.[42] We are left to wonder whether Socrates' words here must be taken *cum gruno salis* or not. My suggestion is that Socrates' point, though it may seem paradoxical, is clear enough. But in order to find the true meaning of his words, we should pay close attention to what he actually says. Therefore, the particular emphasis placed by Socrates on these two, power and knowledge, and the connection with the above highlight, although it is not explicitly stated, his belief that justice is both power and knowledge, or, much better, knowledge and power stemming from knowledge. This view along with the one stated above, that the more powerful and wiser soul is better, promotes the reasoning: the more powerful and wiser soul = better = more just. Plato implies that, as regards the human soul, justice is good, point-

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[42] Hoerber (1962, 126 n. 2) believes that the joining of δύναμις with τέχνη is another instance of loose terminology; it gives the impression that ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη are synonymous, whereas previously Socrates (368b1–2) had indicated a distinction between ἐπιστῆμαι and τέχναι. But this does not seem to be the case here. As Weiss (1981, 297 n. 37) puts it, τέχνη substitutes for ἐπιστήμη here, cf. Weiss 2006, 135 n. 27.

ing, at the same time, to the philosophical life: the knowledge of what is good for the human soul dictates that we behave justly towards others. In analogy to the aforementioned examples, in which it was examined in each case what good is (for example, in a race, quickness is good, and this is actually what a good runner knows), Socrates' reasoning here implies that, when it comes to the field of ethics, justice is good, beneficial to the human soul; and this is what a good man knows.

J₆. To do injustice is to do evils, while not to do injustice is to do admirable things. Therefore, what emerges from the reasoning is that, in the case of justice, the more powerful and wiser (in justice) soul is better. Before moving to J₇, let us see what will happen, if we substitute good man for good runner or good craftsman/scientist in general, as Socrates actually urges us to do. In other words, what effect does Socrates want us to see craft analogy as having? A good man (literally, good in justice) is (a) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, refrains from injustice, which means that he does well and successfully/ does not do injustice/ does not perform something unjustly. More specifically, (b) he performs a good and admirable thing. After further clarifying the analogy: a good man is (c) one who voluntarily, namely with knowledge, refrains from injustice or does injustice/ voluntarily performs a good and admirable or a bad and shameful thing. So far, the text allows us to draw the above parallelism between crafts/sciences and justice. But let us turn back to the reasoning and see how it reaches its end point.

J₇. The more powerful and better soul (which is the wiser one), when it does injustice, will do injustice voluntarily, but the bad soul involuntarily. It should be noted that Socrates leaves the chiasmus incomplete – one would expect to find a term denoting inability, such as ἀδυνατωτέρα (more powerless, weaker), next to the term "bad" (πονηρά). He seems, then, to consider the concept of "power" less significant than (or subservient to) that of "wisdom".

J₈. A good man (ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ) is one who has a good soul (ἀγαθὴ ψυχή), and a bad man (κακὸς ἀνήρ) one who has a bad one (κακὴ ψυχή). It is in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do so involuntarily. Therefore, he who voluntarily errs and does shameful and unjust things, if indeed there is such a man, would be no other than the good man. The conclusion seems to stand in contrast to the principle attributed to Socrates that "no one errs willingly".[43] How can such a *prima facie* disagreement be justified?

[43] Hoerber (1962, 128 n. 1) observes that the theory is found already in Plato's *Apology* (25d–26a) and extends to the *Laws* (731c, 734b, 860d), cf. *Meno* 77b–78b; *Protagoras* 345d–e, 358c–d; *Republic*

Scholars, in general, have charged the *Lesser Hippias* with: (a) weakness in argumentation resting upon craft analogy, and, subsequently, failure to distinguish between δύναμις and ἕξις; (b) patent equivocation and abuses of language. As regards (b), Weiss (1981, 299) and *passim* has argued sufficiently against those who prosecute Plato for his alleged intentional (or unintentional) equivocation.[44] Therefore, let us elaborate further on (a).

Hoerber (1962, 128, 128 n. 2) observes that the phrase, εἴπερ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος, should warn readers not to take seriously the puzzling propositions of the treatise.[45] Believing that the principal dramatic technique of the dialogue is its construction in "doublets", he goes on to say (at 129) that these "doublets"[46]

seem to point the reader to a realization that a distinction must be made between two separate areas: ethics, on the one hand; and scientific technique or physical prowess, on the other. In the latter area, it is true, ἀρετὴ depends primarily, if not exclusively, on mental and physical natural ability; in the realm of ethics, however, ἀρετὴ encompasses not only training of the intellect, but also voluntary choice.[47]

Waterfield (1987, 267) notes that the main weakness of the craft analogy that is relevant to the *Lesser Hippias* is the following: while a craftsman achieves a result, it is

beyond the province of the craftsman simply *qua* craftsman to guarantee that the result is used, by himself or by others, for good or ill. But by definition virtue must be used well, so the analogy totters.

Taylor (1937, 88) had already noticed that knowledge of the good is the only knowledge that *cannot* be put to a wrong use, whereas every other kind of knowledge can be abused. Following this line of thought, Blundell (1992, 161) says that

justice remains, however, crucially different from other skills. As a kind of knowledge or capacity it has its own internal goals like any other craft. But unlike other skills, it cannot be used "badly" for immoral goals outside its own sphere of activity, since its internal goals are precisely those of morality.[48]

589c; *Timaeus* 86d–e; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.2.1172b35–1173a5; Proclus, *In Rempublicam* 2.355. For the parallel between the *Lesser Hippias* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4.2), see Calogero 1948, xii n. 2; Guthrie 1975, 197; Weiss 1981, 304 n. 55; Waterfield 1987, 269; Phillips 1989, 370; Weiss 2006, 136 n. 30.

[44] See, for example, Sprague 1962, 74; Muhlern 1968, 288.

[45] See also Taylor 1937, 87; Weiss 1981, 287 n. 2. For further discussions of the meaning of the phrase, see Sprague 1962, 76; O'Brien 1967, 104; Penner 1973, 140–1; Guthrie 1975, 197–8; Irwin 1977, 77; Müller 1979, 65, 74–5; Lampert 2002, 252–3; Weiss 2006, 140.

[46] Cf. O'Brien 1967, 103 n. 12.

[47] Cf. Friedländer 1964, 326 n. 3.

[48] See also Gould 1955, 43–5; O'Brien 1967, 103 and 106; Gulley 1968, 16, 85–7; Irwin 1977, 77–9; Zembaty 1989, 62–3; Vlastos 1991, 279; Allen 1996, 29; Kahn 1996, 117; Van Ackeren 2003, 54 ff.

Moreover, let us also quote Vlastos's (1991, 279) view:

[…] no reason to believe that when Plato wrote this dialogue he had himself spotted the root of trouble. What he would need for this purpose would be to identify the difference between the sense of "better" which is so conspicuous in this dialogue, the morally neutral sense of superior executive *power* or *skill*, on one hand, and that centrally and uniquely moral sense of superior *character* or *disposition* […] This was to await Aristotle's clearer vision, which empowered him to discern how wrong it would be to define moral virtue as a power or craft, for power or craft could be used for either good or evil […] Aristotle enriched the vocabulary of moral analysis by introducing the word ἕξις to designate the state of character which choose to exercise power for the right ends and resolutely declines to exercise it for the wrong ends.

Nevertheless, Socrates' use of craft analogy in the *Lesser Hippias* is designed to help us focus on good craftsman, not on craftsman in general. In the case of a good craftsman, a type of knowledge pertaining to a particular craft is possessed by a particular craftsman; this craftsman knows what he is doing and can give an account of what is good and bad in his craft. The knowledge of what is good in a particular craft defines the will (βούλησις) and the ability (δύναμις) to do the good, since it is directed towards it. In this case, the craftsman acts voluntarily (ἑκών). But there are times when he is hindered by disease or that sort of thing (cf. 366c), thereby acting involuntarily. At any rate, it is only when he is guided by the knowledge of what is good in his craft and, thereby, produces a good-beneficial product that a craftsman can be a good craftsman.

This analogy gives Socrates an occasion to turn to the human soul: the more powerful, wiser, better and more just soul, the good soul of the good man, errs and does shameful and unjust things voluntarily. But the conclusion reached is at the same time invalidated. The knowledge of what is good for the soul, namely justice, defines the will (βούλησις) and the power (δύναμις) to do only the good, thus deactivating the power to do shameful and unjust things.[49] In this case, a man acts voluntarily (ἑκών); but when he is deprived of such knowledge (cf. *Protagoras* 345b2–5),[50] he acts involuntarily. The analogy gradually reaches its peak: at any rate, it is only when he is guided by the knowledge of what is good for his soul and, thereby, produces good things that a man can be a good man. Plato does not need to distinguish between δύναμις and ἕξις, since δύναμις itself, being subordinate to the knowledge of what is good, is activated or deactivated depending on whether the agent is guided by or deprived of such knowledge.

[49] Cf. Friedländer 1964, 143–4; Balaban 2008.

[50] οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος – αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι – ("In the same way the good man could on occasion also become bad, due to time or hardship or disease or some other accident – for this is the only bad practice, to be deprived of knowledge").

However, in what way this knowledge is to be attained by human beings? Despite Hippias' final rejection of Socrates' view and the latter's profession of ignorance, the dialogue comes to a final and definite conclusion. It invalidates Hippias' apparent expertise in Homer, indicating his ignorance about the subject at issue. Besides stripping Hippias of his apparent wisdom, Plato turns his criticism towards traditional forms of education and their heirs, raising the question of what kinds of people they actually produce. The main problem lies in the fact that the traditional moral standards or values disseminated through the study of Homer are in fact uncritically accepted as desirable in themselves. They have binding force for those by whom they are accepted, but they are not accepted critically. Plato's criticism targets traditional values through their representative, underscoring his unreflective endorsement of them. Nevertheless, there is a solution to the problem, a way out of the impasse; and this solution is deeply related to the individual character of the interlocutor. One must step back, question and reflect on the moral beliefs he holds. Engaging in elenctic examination, the human gets rid of the false and keeps the right beliefs about what is good-beneficial to his soul and what is bad. Through the *elenchus*, which benefits both agent and patient (cf. *Gorgias* 458a–b), the human realizes that justice is what really benefits his soul. But justice in turn benefits both agent and patient, since it bridges the gap separating individual from common good. Plato justifies the philosophical life on the grounds that it is the only way of life worth living (cf. *Apology* 38a), aiming at making one's soul as good as possible. Thus it is entirely on the basis of this analogy from the crafts and the subsequent deactivation of wrongdoing that Socrates establishes the superiority of justice over injustice and the significance of the former for the human soul: caring for one's soul involves caring for justice.

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Abstract. A basic question still confronting readers of Plato's *Lesser Hippias* is how to deal with the final conclusion of the dialogue, namely that the good man does injustice voluntarily, which seems profoundly irreconcilable with the principle attributed to Socrates that "no one errs willingly". Nevertheless, if one delves deeper into the text, one will uncover further clues indicating that Socrates' point is neither paradoxical nor contradictory to the philosophical positions he sets forth in Plato's other works. On the contrary, the dialogue comes to a definite conclusion. The just man refrains from doing injustice precisely because he does not wish (βούλεσθαι) to do it. The knowledge of what is good and bad, namely of what benefits and harms the soul, activates exclusively the will for the good and, subsequently, the power to produce it.

Keywords. Plato; Socrates; knowledge of good and bad; justice; will; power.

"THUS CHANGED, I RETURN…":
THE PROGRAMMATIC PROLOGUE OF THE FIRST SURVIVING OPERA *EURIDICE* (1600) BY OTTAVIO RINUCCINI AND JACOPO PERI. EURIPIDEAN, SENECAN POETICS AND MUSIC AS REPRESENTATION

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Resumo. Não desconsiderando a influência da prática teatral renascentista, especialmente da "tragi-comedia pastorale", no nascimento e desenvolvimento da ópera, meu argumento é que Rinuccini tinha em mente o renascimento da tragédia antiga no Prólogo de *Eurídice* (1600), a primeira ópera que conhecemos, ciente de que sua produção não consistiu numa reconstrução historicamente acurada da antiga tragédia grega. Vemos no Prólogo que, de um lado, *La Tragedia* mantém em seu repertório olhares, lágrimas, lamentos de um ponto de vista puramente humano, desejando despertar no coração emoções mais prazerosas; de outro, ela propõe uma catarse por meio de um final feliz para a história. Eu não estou convencido de que, no Prólogo, nosso poeta rejeita o efeito catártico das tragédias gregas, nem que sua obra se coloque em oposição aos preceitos aristotélicos para a tragédia, como pensam muitos musicologistas e historiadores da música. Penso que, em um Prólogo que é na verdade uma *recusatio,* Rinuccini quer que sua Tragédia lance luzes sobre a natureza do prazer que a audiência obtém da experiência da tragédia. A ênfase de *La Tragedia* sobre o puramente afetivo tem a ver com certas características da dramaturgia de Eurípides, mais do que com a tragédia de Sêneca, que se tornou a força principal na moldura da tragédia renascentista.

Keywords. Ottavio Rinuccini; Jacopo Peri; *Eurídice*; prólogo; Eurípides; Sêneca.

In Renaissance theatre, especially in pastoral plays and in the first opera libretti we find prologues which apart from their expositional and explanatory function directly or indirectly convey the author's views of the art of drama and its genre presenting at the same time an author conscious of innovating. It is usually an allegorical or mythological figure who recites or sings the prologue, e.g. Mercury in Poliziano's *La fabula d'Orfeo* (1480), Cupid in Tasso's *Aminta* (1573), the river Alfeios in Guarini's *Il pastor fido* (1585). We also find this in the first *favole in musica*: Tragedy in Rinuccini's *Euridice* (1600), Music in Striggio's *Orfeo* (1607), Apollo in Rinuccini's und Monteverdi's *L'Arianna* and so on. These allegorical and mythological figures should

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be regarded as authorities who not only give a formal and eminent character to the opening of these dramas but, especially in the case of the first *favole in musica*, function as declaration of validity and raison d' être, a kind of manifesto and legitimization for the new genre, symbolizing or indicating the aesthetic ideals linked to the constitution of opera as a genre as well.[1] Hence it was not unexpected that the prologue fell into disuse when opera had established itself. The prologue to *Euridice* (1600), the first surviving drama by Ottavio Rinuccini and Jacopo Peri as principal composer[2] set completely to music from beginning to end, is performed by *Tragedia* (Tragedy). Its seven stanzas each consisting of four eleven-syllable lines with the rhyme scheme *abba*, provide important information about the new genre and its aesthetic. Tragedia's authority furnishes the new genre with a rhetorical intensity, the endecasyllabic verses emphasize the manifesto character of this prologue, lending to it a certain gravity and a festal tone as well, which is reinforced by Rinuccini's choice of words.[3]

Although the play is not divided into acts, it consists of five scenes,[4] separated by choruses in strophic verse, hinting at the structure of the ancient tragedy.[5] The first and the last scene with their festivity and joyfulness provide a frame. An expansive monologue dominates in each scene: Orfeo addresses a hymn to nature expressing his happiness, the nymph Dafne reports Euridice's tragic death, the shepherd Arcetro gives a detailed account of the epiphany of Venere and the rescue of Orfeo, Orfeo laments Euridice's death in the Underworld and back in the pastoral world the shepherd Aminta tells the good news i.e. Plutone has returned Euridice to Orfeo. The chorus takes the role of participants, nymphs and shepherds, during the scenes, while at the end of each scene it offers a commentary of the previous action as a "Greek chorus". The final scene ends with a *ballo*.

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[1] On the function of the Prologue in the pastoral plays and on more examples see Hanning 1973 and Hansen 2003, esp. 573 ff.

[2] Giulio Caccini has also contributed to the music of *Euridice*.

[3] On the musical features that are characteristic of the *arie* of these Prologues see Hansen 2003, 573 ff.

[4] On the structure of *Euridice* see Bujić 1991, 34 ff.

[5] The opera opens with a singer representing the Tragic Muse, La Tragedia. In the first scene all of the nymphs and shepherds gather to celebrate the wedding of Orfeo and Euridice. In the second scene Orfeo is content after his wedding but is soon interrupted by Dafne. She brings the terrible news that Euridice has been bitten by a venomous snake and has died. Orfeo then vows to join her in the underworld. In the third scene Arcetro recounts that while Orfeo lay weeping, Venus, goddess of love, carries him off in her chariot. In the fourth scene Venus and Orfeo arrive at the gates of the underworld. Venus suggests that through his legendary voice he might persuade Pluto to return Euridice to life. Orfeo succeeds and is allowed to leave with his bride. In the fifth scene Aminta shares the good news that Orfeo is returning back with Euridice from the underworld, Orfeo and Euridice appear to their friends and all rejoice.

Without denying the influence of Renaissance theatrical practice, especially the "tragi-comedia pastorale" on the birth and development of the opera,[6] I argue that Rinuccini aims at a rebirth of the ancient Tragedy in his Prologue of *Euridice*, well aware that his production was not a historically accurate reconstruction of ancient Greek tragedy. As we will see from the Prologue, on one hand *La Tragedia* retains in her repertoire sighs, tears, laments from a purely human point of view wanting to awake sweeter emotions of the heart, on the other hand she aims at a catharsis through a happy end of the story. I am not convinced that our poet in his prologue rejects the catharsis effect of the Greek tragedies[7] and that his opus stands in opposition to the Aristotelian precepts for tragedy[8] as many musicologists and music historians think.[9] In this Prologue, that is actually a *recusatio*, I think that Rinuccini wants his *Tragedia* to illuminate the nature of the pleasure that the audience derives from the experience of tragedy. The emphasis of *La Tragedia* on the purely affective has more to do with features of the Euripidean dramaturgy than the Senecan tragedy, which became the greatest force in the moulding of Renaissance Tragedy.

[6] I would generally maintain that the Opera had and has accepted influences from all sides. Cf. Leopold 2003, 10: "Was eine Oper sei, mag zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt an einem klar umgrenzten Ort für einen Moment der Gattungsgeschichte eindeutig gewesen sein; davor, danach und anderswo aber konnte alles ganz anders aussehen. Und vielleicht ist gerade dies die Stärke der Oper und das spezifische Merkmal, das ihre Kontinuität bis in die heutige Zeit garantiert: die Fähigkeit, eben nicht klar umrissen, nicht berechenbar zu sein, sondern chaotisch und regellos, unsystematisch und untheoretisch und deshalb offen für Einflüsse von allen Seiten."

[7] Cf. for instance Hansen 2003, 579: "Its seven stanzas (sc. of the Prologue to *Euridice*) provide important information about the new genre and its aesthetic which, in spite of the fact that it is Tragedia who recites Rinuccini's manifesto, has nothing to do with Aristotelian catharsis. As many have argued, the court opera should be seen as an expression of la tragicommedia's far milder aesthetic."

[8] As M. Treherne (2007, 40 ff.) points out, tragicomedy can be therefore seen as a legitimate genre insofar as it is perfectly reasonable to bring together certain elements from tragedy and comedy without offending Aristotles's theory. Guarini, the author of the first tragicomedia pastorale, *Il pastor fido*, in his theoretical work *Compendio* does not reject Aristotle, but rather redefines the ways in which Aristotle's *Poetics* should be read. Guarini held the opinion that Aristotle had written the *Poetics*, not as a set of universal precepts, but as a distillation of the principles he found evident in the best of the poetry of his time, also opens up the important observation that audiences change, and that consequently the effect of theatre on the audience is bound to change too; the architectonic end of a play is inevitably subject to adjustment by the playwright. The value of a play is rather found in its effect on the audience. In presenting tragicomedy as a whole genre, complete in its own right, Guarini is insistent upon its dignity within the principles set out by the authority of Aristotle. Tragicomedy balances the extremes of tragedy and comedy, it does ensure a seemly moderation in the viewer.

[9] For instance Claude Palisca and Nino Pirrotta, the most influential historians of early opera, emphasize on the contribution of contemporary theatrical forms, such as masques, pastorals and comedies, to the dramatic form of the early opera. Palisca (1968, 29, 36) thinks of a mixed genre and not of true tragedy. Rinuccini and his circle, who were "steeped in the classics", were well aware that the musico-dramatic form they created was not "a rebirth of ancient tragedy". See also N. Pirrotta 1954a, 188: "It was only the success of *Dafne* which emboldened Rinuccini to call *Euridice* a tragedy"; N. Pirrotta 1954b, 295; Hanning 1973, 241 a.o.

EURIDICE

IL PROLOGO

LA TRAGEDIA

1. Io, che d'alti sospir vaga e di pianti
   spars'or di doglia, or di minacce il volto
   fei negl'ampi teatri al popol folto
   scolorir di pietà volti, e sembianti.

2. Non sangue sparso d'innocenti vene
   non ciglia spente di tiranno insano,
   spettacolo infelice al guardo umano
   canto su meste, e lagrimose scene.

3. Lungi via lungi pur da regi tetti
   simolacri funesti, ombre d'affanni,
   ecco i mesti coturni, e i foschi panni
   cangio, e desto nei cor più dolci affetti.

4. Or s'avverrà, che le cangiate forme
   non senza alto stupor la terra ammiri,
   tal ch'ogni alma gentil ch'Apollo inspiri
   del mio novo cammin calpesti l'orme.

5. Vostro regina sia cotanto alloro
   qual forse anco non colse Atene, o Roma,
   fregio non vil fu l'onorata chioma
   fronda febea fra due corone d'oro.

6. Tal per voi torno, e con sereno aspetto
   ne' reali imenei, m'adorno anch'io,
   e su corde più liete il canto mio
   tempro al nobile cor dolce diletto.

7. Mentre Senna real prepara intanto
   alto diadema, onde il bel crin si fregi,
   e i manti, e seggi degl'antichi regi
   del tracio Orfeo date l'orecchia al canto.

In the first stanza the personified *Tragedia* introduces herself to her audience with the emphatic *Io* but without mentioning her name. Her identification is achieved through a relative clause, in which *La Tragedia* mentions her preferences and consequently the emotions she always evoked in the people: She is fond (*vaga*) of loud sighs and tears with her face shed at some points with grief and at some with menaces. As a result of these she made (*fei*) the faces and countenances of the people crowded in the large theatres turn pale with pity. The second stanza including the predicate of the main

clause *canto* (v. 8) begins with strong negative expressions that denote the reluctance of Tragedy to sing stories with blood thirsty, heinous and macabre plots: "Nor longer of blood spilled from innocent veins, nor of eyes put out by the insane Tyrant, miserable spectacle to human sight, do I sing on a sorrowful and tearful stage." It is evident from the second stanza that *La Tragedia* does not discard her traditional role as songstress of mournful and doleful scenes but she foremost wants to exclude plots from her repertoire that are horribly gruesome, repulsive and disgusting and do not evoke feelings of sympathy with the audience. Nevertheless her stories remain "meste" and "lacrimose". At the beginning of the third stanza she banishes those gruesome and terrifying scenes, which she describes as "simulacri funesti" (portentous images) and "ombre d' affanni" (shades of torture and plague) predominantly from the royal house, where the drama will be presented: "lungi via, lungi pur da regi tetti". She turns herself to the audience and announces the modification she wants to make in her subjects and themes using a metaphor: "Behold, I change my gloomy buskins and dark robes and awake in the heart sweeter emotions." It is clear that in the second and the third stanza *La Tragedia* criticises and simultaneously discards the horrible and baleful scenes from her repertoire. She will continue to wear her buskins and robes, as reference to her ancient role, but not in dismal and grimy colours, that provoke dreadful and loathsome feelings. She elaborates her new aim, i.e. to awake in people's hearts not the pity and terror of old as most powerful emotions but that of sympathy – in Aristotelian terms τὸ φιλάνθρωπον (*Poet.* 1452b38) – und as she states: "più dolci affetti".

It is obvious that *La Tragedia* thus criticises Renaissance Tragedy and above all Seneca, from whom the dramatists derived their inspiration by adopting Senecan form, rhetoric and sensational horrors. "Blood shed by innocent veins", "eyes put out by the insane Tyrant", "portentous images", "shades of torture and plague" are expressions that refer to the Senecan poetics of horror, monstrosity, of extreme psychological darkness and despair, of powerful obsessive passions.[10] It seems that Rinuccini has in mind the play *Thyestes*, since the majority of the expressions of the second and third stanza refer to that play: e.g. the ghost of Tantalus in the Prologue. It is well known that the Renaissance dramatists were influenced by the Senecan ghost-prologues, taking the prologues of Thyestes and Agamemnon as models for scores of later plays.[11] We can also mention the description of Atreus' sacrifice of Thyestes' sons, his cooking of their flesh and its con-

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[10] Cf. recently Staley 2010, esp. 96 ff.
[11] Tarrant 2004 (1976), 158.

sumption by Thyestes. Unlike the ancient Greek tragedy this play does not evoke sympathy for the victims of disaster. The horror with which Seneca presents the deliberations of Atreus far exceeds anything ever presented on the tragic stage. Atreus appears with excessive cruelty and shows a morbid desire for supremacy; he becomes horrific in his maniacal sacrificing of the youngsters and in his sadistic attitude to Thyestes. Shock dominates in this play because of Atreus' triumph at the end of the drama. Although Thyestes prays to the gods for punishment, they do not lend him a favourable ear.[12] In Senecan plays the gods (if they exist) seem ineffective without mediating to prevent an evil. "Blood shed by innocent veins" can also refer to Hercules killing his wife and his children one by one in the fourth act of the homonymous tragedy or to Medea in the last act, who falls in rage as the furies induced by her brother's murder now possess her and kills one of her sons on stage, achieving her fullest vengeance by killing the other son in front of Jason. "Eyes put out by the insane Tyrant" is a clear reference to the description of Oedipus' self-blinding in act 5, where fear and horror in comparison to Sophocles appears in all their asperity[13]; "portentous images" remind of scenes of animal sacrifice and necromancy, that exaggerate and escalate the horror in the centre of Senecan *Oedipus* (acts 2 and 3), whereas "shades of torture and plague" allude also to the menacing Laius arising from the underworld in *Oedipus*, or to Juno in the prologue of *Hercules*, who appears like a bloodcurdling demon calling for powers from the world of darkness to aid her revenge against Hercules.

During the Renaissance Senecan manuscripts were relative common, while Greek ones were rare. The period from 1480 to 1540 marks the frequent publication of the Senecan tragedies, the making of the earliest vernacular translations for the press, the beginning of stage performances of his plays and the outgrowth of Senecan traits in original dramas.[14] The knowledge of Seneca in the original and in Italian through books and stage is increasing. From 1541 to 1590 the characteristic type of the Italian Senecan drama,

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[12] On this drama see Schiesaro 2003.

[13] Cf. vv. 958–79: "ardent minaces igne truculento genae / oculique uix se sedibus retinent suis; / uiolentus audax uultus, iratus ferox / iamiam eruentis; gemuit et dirum fremens / manus in ora torsit. at contra truces / oculi steterunt et suam intenti manum / ultro insecuntur, uulneri occurrunt suo. / scrutatur auidus manibus uncis lumina, / radice ab ima funditus uulsos simul / euoluit orbes; haeret in uacuo manus / et fixa penitus unguibus lacerat cauos / alte recessus luminum et inanes sinus, / saeuitque frustra plusque quam satis est furit: / tantum est periclum lucis? attollit caput / cauisque lustrans orbibus caeli plagas / noctem experitur. quidquid effossis male / dependet oculis rumpit, et uictor deos / conclamat omnes: 'parcite en patriae, precor: / iam iusta feci, / debitas poenas tuli; / inuenta thalamis digna nox tandem meis.' / rigat ora foedus imber et lacerum caput / largum reuulsis sanguinem uenis uomit."

[14] See also Barden 1985.

created by Giovanni Battista Giraldi Cinzio, with his drama *Orbecche* (1541) dominates, varied towards a more Greek drama on the one hand, or towards a pastoral tragicomedy on the other. Seneca's domination of the new tragedy was definitely established, for Italy in any case, and consequently for the rest of Western Europe. Cinzio had fitted tragedy for the stage, he had made classical tragedy modern and public but his model was Seneca and he stirred up his contemporaries to have no other model but the Roman tragedian.[15]

The "royal roof" (v. 9) indicates the place, where *Euridice* was first performed: the Pitti Palace – as a part of the festivities marking the wedding of Maria de' Medici and Henri IV of Navarre. It does not refer to the French Palace, since Henry IV could not be present at the festivities, since he was at war with Savoy. He sent the Prince of Belgrade as his representative. During the wedding ceremony by proxy, Grand Duke Ferdinand de' Medici, the uncle of the bride, assumed the bridegroom's role. Although Marie did not actually meet Henry IV until the December 9th 1600 in Marseille after a long and perilous journey to France, she is referred to as the queen since the wedding ceremony in Florence.[16] "Royal roof" and "royal glory" refer to the Medici Dynasty, who with the union of the half – Habsburg Medici bride and the French king as groom attempts another truce in the centuries of struggle for political hegemony in Europe between the two major dynasties. *Euridice* as a drama set in music intends to celebrate not only the wedding itself but also the historical and political achievements that precede the performance of the play.[17] *La Tragedia* herself seems to be convinced of the successful outcome of these "cangiate forme", stressing her role as initiator and pioneer:

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[15] As he says: "in my opinion, Seneca is superior to any and every Greek in the artistic propriety, the gravity, the decorum, the power and in the *sententiae* of all his tragedies". G. Lanson (1904, 547) named Seneca's tragedies "the operating manual" for sixteenth-century humanist tragedy (a still common view). Humanist interest in Seneca's tragedies developed early. Around 1300 the early humanists Lovati Lovato and Nicholas di Trevet wrote commentaries on Seneca's tragedies. This interest in the dramatist Seneca is due to his stoicism, a philosophy that taught that the human passions were the source of evil, something that was not dissimilar to the Christian philosophy of many medieval figures,nor was it unattractive to the early humanists. The writers of the earliest Renaissance tragedies imitated the literary style of Seneca. In 1315, Albertino Mussato was among the first to compose a tragedy in the senecan style. In his *Ecerinis,* a drama not for the stage but for a small group of readers who were to recite the play, Mussato drew his plot from recent historical events about the wicked deeds and downfall of Ezzelino da Romano, a thirteenth-century Italian despot. This play has five acts, a small cast, chorus of Paduans, and a boastful cruel protagonist. Around 1390 Antonio Loschi wrote an *Achilles*, and about 1429 Gregorio Correr a *Progne*. Seven other mixed Senecan plays appeared in Italy from 1377 to 1500. On the great influence of Seneca on the Renaissance Theatre see Lucas 2009 (1922), 78 ff.; Schild 1933, 14; Herrick 1965; Braden 1985; Boyle 1997, 141 ff.; Hill 2002, 327 ff.

[16] Cf. also Hansen 2003, 583.

[17] On *Euridice*'s political meanings, metaphors and message – in *Euridice* Rinuccini actually allegorizes Florence's political health – see predominantly Harness 2003, 13 ff. For other opinions and views see Bujić 1991, 47 ff.; McGee 1982, 163–81; Kirkendale 1993, 202; Carter 1992, 204, 211 f.

It will now happen, that the world will admire these changed forms not without great amazement. This admiration will be so great that every gentle soul that Apollo inspires will tread in the tracks of my new path.

The new Queen, for whose wedding this drama was composed, is now addressed to share this success and admiration, a praise which may surpass that of Athens or Rome ever had. By naming the two cities, where the ancient drama had flourished, *La Tragedia* indicates that thanks to her the Queen will gain an immense reputation and with her Florence, the new home of the revived Tragedy: "A not worthless ornament on the honoured hair, a frond of Phoebus between two crowns of gold." "Fronda febea," might be an allusion to Rinuccini's and Peri's *Dafne,* the first opera ever, which was presented in 1598. Apollo is also of special significance to the Medici in Florence, since his hallmark laurel tree and its leaves appear as symbol of the family's power and endurance. "Apollo's leaves" seem to imply Medici's wealth and status, and as a tribute to the royal couple Maria de Medici and Henry IV of France, whose regal attributes are described in the final stanza.[18] With the last verse of the fifth stanza *La Tragedia* implies that not only the Queen but also her French husband will be renowned by her revival.

    In the sixth stanza *La Tragedia* now addresses the royal couple: "For you I return and with a clear, calm and bright mien I, too, adorn myself for the royal wedding." Only in the sixth stanza do we hear of the happy event "reali imenei", during which the new opus of *La Tragedia* will be presented. It is clear that her decision to relinquish her previous role as a songstress of obscure and gloomy spectacles to inspire sweeter emotions in the heart of her audience implied by the expression "con sereno aspetto", is not made up ad hoc for this specific purpose of the royal wedding. This important incident rather offers the advantageous opportunity, the favourable time for her to introduce this alteration: "And I temper my song on pleasanter chords, sweet rejoice to the noble heart." This recalls the last verse of the third stanza: "desto ne i cor più dolci affetti".

    The theme of this *favola in musica* , the story of Orpheus and Euridice is not announced until the last stanza of the Prologue. The seventh stanza is therefore an invitation to hear the song of the Thracian Orfeo, while the royal Seine (Paris) prepares to receive the new Queen. By announcing the theme of her play after having stated the *cangiate forme*, the changed forms, that take over from now on, *La Tragedia* attempts to give the listeners an idea of the genre. The audience that is familiar with Orpheus' myth real-

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[18] Hansen 2003, 583.

izes that the dreadful, gloomy and horrible scenes will be left out, above all the part of the myth, in which the inconsolable Orpheus after the second loss of his wife and living as a recluse avoiding above all the company of women, is torn to pieces by infuriated Thracian Maenads. The fact that this performance is intended to celebrate the royal wedding indicates that the audience will expect a happy end of the story, *fin lieto* that is the reunion of the mythical couple. As Rinuccini in the Introduction of *Euridice* asserts:

Some may find that I have been too audacious in changing the end of the fable of Orpheus; but it seemed appropriate to me in these times of joy, and other stories told by Greek poets speak to my justification[19]; even our own Dante was daring enough to argue that Ulysses was drowned on his voyage, although Homer and the other poets had related the contrary.

The most important thing in this programmatic prologue is the decision of *La Tragedia* to evoke sweeter emotions in the hearts of her audience. She discards her ancient role only to the point that she excludes from her stories dreadful, hideous, abominable and macabre scenes, features suitable to the Senecan tradition than to ancient Greek tragedies. This would be accomplished through music – specifically, a song tuned to "happier strings". This idea is elaborated in Rinuccini's and Jacopo Peri's Preface to *Euridice.* The latter declared that he had aimed at "an intermediate course" lying between the slow and suspended movements of song and the swift and rapid movements of speech: "I judged that the ancient Greeks and Romans (who in the opinion of many were wont to sing their staged tragedies throughout) had used a harmony surpassing that of ordinary speech but falling so far below the melody of song as to take an intermediate form".[20] From the expression

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[19] Orpheus's descent into the underworld to bring his deceased wife back to the upper world is already known to Aeschylus in his drama "Bassarai", lost to us, and Euripides in his *Alcestis* (vv. 357 ff.). The latter suggests a happy return of both to the upper world. The Orpheus-Eurydice story may, in its original form, have been one of triumph over death. Not only Euripides but also most writers before Vergil, who refer to Orpheus' descent, state or imply that the mythic hero succeeded in resurrecting his wife. Hermesianax in a fragment from his Leontium (fr. 7, 8 ff. Collectanea Alexandrina), preserved in the *Deipnosophistae* by Athenaios (13.579 b-c), Pseudo-Moschus in the "Lament for Bion" (vv. 123 ff.) – here we hear for the first time the name of his wife, Eurydice, which she will henceforth always bear – and Diodorus Siculus (4.25.4) are good examples of the happy end of the story of Orpheus and Eurydice.

[20] *Le Musiche di Jacopo Peri . . . sopra L'Euridice . . .* (Florence, 1601 [1600, Florentine style]): "veduto che si trattava di poesia drammatica e che però si doveva imitar' col canto chi parla … stimai che gli antichi Greci e Romani (i quali, secondo l'opinione di molti, cantavano su le scene le tragedie intere)…" in Solerti 1903, 45. Rinuccini follows Peri in his foreword to *Euridice,* when he states: "È stata opinione di molti, Cristianissima Regina, che gli antichi Greci e Romani cantassero sulle scene le tragedie intere; ma sì nobil maniera di recitare nonchè rinnovata, ma nè pur, che io sappia, fin qui era stata tentata da alcuno, e ciò mi credev'io per difetto della musica moderna, di gran lunga all'antica inferiore. (Many have held the opinion, most Christian Queen, that the ancient Greeks and Romans sang tragedies throughout on the stage. But such a noble way of

"in the opinion of many" one can mention with certainty three names: Girolamo Mei, Vincenzo Galilei, and Francesco Patrici with the latter to claim on the basis of Aristotle's *Problems* 19.48: "the entire tragedy, which was composed of actors and chorus, was sung".[21] It is obvious that especially Patrici's theory on ancient music would have been known to Rinuccini and Peri.[22] To achieve this goal, Peri developed a musical version of dramatic declamation, which is the "stile rappresentativo" or "stile recitativo": this was the recitation of the dramatic text that was declaimed in a single-voiced melody (monophony); it would mirror the natural inflections, rhythms, and syllables of speech, and be accompanied by musical instruments. Most of Rinuccini's libretto in *Euridice* consists of *versi sciolti*: rhymed, freely alternating seven- and eleven-syllable lines, with the final accent most often on the penultimate syllable. This practice refers to the madrigal poetry, but unlike madrigals, Peri's work does not follow a contrapuntal composition regarding melody and bass line. Instead, the bass moves very slowly, with harmonic changes limited to major stressed syllables, selected to mimic the natural cadences of speech. The music responds to the rhythm, meaning, and feeling of each word and thought. The rhythm and pace of the voice is that of speech, retarding or accelerating, depending on the mood and the disposition of the characters, their hesitancy, excitement, or calm narration and conversation. The vocal range is limited, with many monotonous passages, while the variety

reciting has not been renewed, or even tried, by anyone. I believe that the blame is to be found in the inadequacy of modern music, which is so much inferior to ancient music.)

[21] Ps.-Aristotle, *Probl.* 19, 48 (922 b): "διὰ τί οἱ ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ χοροὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑποδωριστὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑποφρυγιστὶ ᾄδουσιν; ἢ ὅτι μέλος ἥκιστα ἔχουσιν αὗται αἱ ἁρμονίαι, οὗ δεῖ μάλιστα τῷ χορῷ; ἦθος δὲ ἔχει ἡ μὲν ὑποφρυγιστὶ πρακτικόν, διὸ καὶ ἔν τε τῷ Γηρυόνῃ ἡ ἔξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξόπλισις ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηται, ἡ δὲ ὑποδωριστὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ στάσιμον, διὸ καὶ κιθαρῳδικωτάτη ἐστὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄμφω χορῷ μὲν ἀνάρμοστα, τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς οἰκειότερα. [...] κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδωριστὶ καὶ ὑποφρυγιστὶ πράττομεν, ὃ οὐκ οἰκεῖόν ἐστι χορῷ. ἔτι γὰρ ὁ χορὸς κηδευτὴς ἄπρακτος· εὔνοιαν γὰρ μόνον παρέχεται οἷς πάρεστιν." It seems that the first humanist to express his theory that ancient tragedy was entirely sung was Girolamo Mei. In 1573 Mei wrote to his former teacher Pietro Vettori who was preparing a commentary on Aristotle's Politics his opinion and view on the uses of music in tragedy, comedy, satire, and dithyramb. According to his opinion the performance of ancient tragedy concluded music in all its parts. These comments were contained the fourth book of Mei's work on the modes of ancient music, which had been in progress since 1568. The manuscript in the Vatican Latin collection (5323) is entitled *Hieronymi Meij Fiorentini De Modis musicis antiquorum ad Petrum Victoriarum Libri iiii.* Cf. p. 18: „Melicorum poetarum permista genera exiterunt, qui omnes tum ab instrumentorum diversitate tum a suo poemate appellari consueverunt. In citharoedes enim et aulaedos primum sunt dispersiri; quod si ad citharum aut lyram, ad Tibiam isti, quam aulos graeci dicunt sua poemata canere instituerunt. Hic vero illud non est omittendum Tragoedos et Comoedos perpetua Tibijs usos fuisse: quod etiam et de satyris, ni fallor, est existimandum." See also Hanning 1973, 249 ff.

[22] For more details see Hanning 1973, 251. Rinuccini's contact with these theories can be proved through his collaboration with Bardi in the 1589 intermezzi – on this collaboration that increased Rinuccini's interest in the power of ancient music see Hanning 1973, 256 ff. – as well as through his membership in the *Alterati* academy (see below), which included Bardi, Jacopo Corsi and Girolamo Mei.

of note values is abundant.[23] Instruments placed backstage provided a basso continuo accompaniment: a harpsichord, a large *lira* (a bowed instrument), a large lute and a chitarrone. Eight years later, in the preface to his own setting of Rinuccini's *Dafne*, the composer Marco da Gagliano (1582–1643) would refer to Peri's "discovery" as "that artful manner of sung speech that all Italy admires".[24] In this "sung speech," a singer delivered a recitative melody with an actor's dramatic and oratorical skills, presenting the dramatic poetry in a clear and comprehensible form; thus achieving the goal of providing emotional impact to the text through the support of music, so that the audience will receive pleasure from the scenic experience.[25]

The idea of tragic pleasure is Aristotelian. According to Aristotle poetry, music and drama aim at pleasing their audience, which watches and listens to an imitation of life, of people in action. Although separated from the lives and fortunes of the represented characters it is moved by them, but its emotional state never becomes dangerously painful, since the audience is well aware that what happens is not real but only a representation of reality.[26] In this respect Aristotle discards monstrous and unnatural spectacles from tragedy, which rather shock than move. It is exactly what *La Tragedia* in Rinuccini's Prologue refuses to follow pointing indirectly to the Senecan drama, which was very influential throughout the 16th century. Rinuccini, seems to include pity and fear in his *Tragedia* following Aristotle, who in his *Poetics* declares: "The poet should produce the pleasure that comes from pity and fear by means of imitation" (1453b12).

The Aristotelian theories on the mimetic function and power of music and drama impelled predominantly two groups of humanists, musicians, poets and intellectuals in late Renaissance Florence. The first was the group of Alterati, founded in 1569, whose members regularly met at the palace of Giovanni Battista Strozzi the Younger to discuss topics and subjects like Aristotle's Poetics, Francesco Patrizi's new commentary on the Poetics, the verse-forms suitable to tragedy, how rhetoric and poetry moved the passions, and what tragic catharsis signified. Its members included Giovanni Bardi, Ottavio Rinuccini, Jacopo Corsi, who contributed music to Peri and Rinuccini's *Dafne* and sponsored their *Euridice*, Prince Giovanni de' Medici, Girolamo Mei and Giovanni Battista Doni, author of the *Trattato della musica*

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[23] Palisca 2003, 3.

[24] See Rosow 2005, 209; Brown 1970, 401–43.

[25] In his *Poetics* written in 1529, the playwright Trissino already noted that the first, and consequently one of the most important, elements of a tragedy is its scenery because this might excite pleasure in the audience.

[26] See predominantly Sifakis 2001, 83 ff.

scenica (1638). The other group, actually a subunit of the *Alterati*, was called *Camerata* and its members gathered under the patronage of Count Giovanni de' Bardi (in the 1570s and 1580s) and then, after his departure from Florence in 1592, of Jacopo Corsi (both, like Rinuccini, were members of the Accademia degli Alterati).[27] Among the most important documents of these activities was a seminal series of writings born of the collaboration between Vincenzo Galilei (whose musical studies were sponsored by Bardi) and the Florentine humanist Girolamo Mei who, after Boethius, was the first European who investigated the ancient Greek music theory. His pioneering research into Greek music was of great significance and had a decisive influence on the emergence of monody and music drama. In 1572 Galilei wrote to Mei a list of problems, foremost concerning ancient music, that he had not been able to solve.[28] Why does modern music no longer seem to be able to produce the amazing and unique effects described by the ancients? Mei's answer developed an original and radical idea. The ancients did not know polyphony. His study of the sources had led him to the conclusion that their music must have been exclusively monophonic; Greek music consisted always of a single line, even if several sang and played together or many sang in a chorus. This was the "secret" of the marvellous power of ancient music to move listeners. He stated, we should not expect our music to achieve a goal it does not set itself to achieve, for ancient (monophonic and language-oriented) music aimed to arouse the passions of the soul as an enhanced manifestation of the natural communicative functions and properties of language, whereas modern (polyphonic) music aims only at pleasing the ear.[29] In the fourth book of his thorough study on Greek Music De modis (completed in 1573) Mei examines the practice of the tonoi and harmoniae and their place in education, moral conduct and therapeutics, as well as their use in tragedy, comedy, satyr plays and dithyramb. In that book Mei expresses his theory that the ancient tragedies and comedies were sung in their entirety, accompanied in unison by the aulos, a theory that was very influential in literary and musical circles. So the group of *Camerata* believed that the music of the ancient time had possessed a great power to ennoble

[27] Selected Bibliography on the Alterati and the florentian Camerata: Donington 1981, 79 ff.; Ewen 1971, 491; Grout 1947, 43; Palisca 1989, 3 ff.; Randel 1986; Schrade 1950, 40 ff.

[28] Between 1572 and 1581 Mei exchanged more than 30 letters with Vincenzo Galilei, a correspondence from which Galilei learnt many things about Greek music.

[29] Polyphony, with its many parts, "conveys to the soul of the listener at the same time diverse and contrary affections as it mixes indistinctly together melodies and modes that are completely dissimilar and of natures contrary to each other" (Palisca 1960, 73). Counterpoint, he maintained, had developed out of a desire of musicians to show off their prowess and was useless for anything else, particularly for the expression of the feelings and meanings of a text.

its listeners not only because it was monodic but also it had given greater weight to the text. The members of this Florentine group often devalued contemporary music, particularly the forms of polyphony in madrigals, where many different melodies superimposed atop each other, because it confused listeners and lacked any power to spur its audience to virtuous living. For these reasons, the recitative style dominated the early operas performed in and around Florence.[30]

In 1586, Lorenzo Giacomini delivered a discourse on tragic purgation to the academy. According to Giacomini, we take four types of pleasure in tragedy: of learning about the events and the incredible things, appreciation of the play as imitation, reflection on the compassion we feel for the characters on stage and our freedom from their "fearful adventures" and the experience of "pleasures accessory to cathartic process" itself.[31]

Giacomini follows the physiological implications of Aristotle's claim that those who listen to enthusiastic music during sacred rites and tragic festivals are "restored … as though they had received a cure and catharsis".[32] Aristotle stresses the power of music, as part of pleasure due to its mimetic nature and the fact that rhythm and melody supply imitations (ὁμοιώματα) of anger and gentleness, also of courage and temperance, and of all the qualities contrary to these, and of other qualities of character (ἤθη), which hardly fall short of the actual affections (*Pol.* 1340a14–24).[33] The music can underline these differences, stress and bring them out in their particularity, if they are relevant to a poetical work. In listening to such strains our souls are altered (1340a22). According to Aristotle *catharsis* has to be a pleasurable

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[30] V. Galilei played an important role in attempts to revive an historically accurate style of Greek performance. Galilei himself developed the first attempts to fashion recitative. He experimented with recitative, setting to monodic lines selections from Dante's Divine Comedy. He set up the human ear as the final arbiter of taste in music and his example actually inspired Ottavio Rinuccini and Jacopo Peri.

[31] Tragedy must purge ἔλεος and φόβος. So the much discussed Genitive "κάθαρσις τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων" (*Poetics* 1449b27 f.) should be interpreted as a genitivus obiectivus: Tragedy must purge these affects, not purge from these affects (as genitivus separativus). Cf. Zeppezauer 2011, 26 n.89, who argues for a genitivus obiectivus. Her exposition and remarks on catharsis and emotions (25 ff.) are clearly arranged. See also Tsitsiridis 2010, 35 ff. On these philological questions see Kommerell 1984, 268 ff.; Dirlmeier 1940, 81–92. On the Renaissance theatre and the theories of tragedy in the 16th century see Reiss 2008, 235 ff.

[32] Hoxby 2005, 264.

[33] […] ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων)· ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον […]. See also Sörbom 1994, 41 ff.

relief following the excitation of certain emotions produced by the representations of music which affect our moral dispositions (cf. 1342a11–17).[34]

Giacomini argues that the passion of a hero represented on stage acts like a sympathetic medication,[35] raising up our own passions and dissolving them by lamenting or weeping.[36] The same had been pointed out by Giovanni Battista Giraldi Cinzio (1504–1573), well known not only as the founder of the modern Italian Tragedy but also as the author of an important series of *Discorsi* on tragedy, comedy, epic poetry, and pastoral theatre. Cinzio was the first to attempt a systematic codification of modern tragedy on the basis of conceptual criteria defined in the *Poetics*: "tragedy has a pleasure of its own, and in that weeping (*pianto*) one discovers a hidden pleasure, which makes it pleasing to the listener, attracts the attention of the soul, and fills it with marvel."

The lament as a musical topos possessed a high status in European literature. Expressive rhetoric and affective imagery were its special characteristics. In Madrigals, qualified as *lamenti,* the genre postulated musical importance around the turn of the 17th century stressing on the theoretical authorization of the new monodic style.[37] Theorists such as Giacomini, Mei and Vincenzo Galilei chose in fact the lament in outlining and determining the cathartic effect of that style; due to its emotional intensity, it was the type of text which could move an audience to pity, purging them in this way of strong passions. Librettists and composers of early opera recognised the special dramatic position and affective character of the *lamento*, differentiating it from the narrative of the rest of the text: librettists demanded greater formality through using more strongly metred and rhymed texts in which particularly affective lines often reappeared as refrains; and composers wrote music to these texts with greater freedom, repeating or otherwise amplifying and elevating affective words or phrases with melodic sequence or dissonance, often enforcing a tonal coherence to produce structural autonomy.[38]

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[34] Sifakis 2001, 90 ff.

[35] Antonio Sebastiano Minturno had already emphasized in his 1559 *De poeta* on catharsis as analogous to medical purging, arguing that by such violent emotions as pity and fear tragedy ejects these and all others: ambition, lust, anger, avarice, pride, fury, and "unbridled desire".

[36] Affective sympathy caused the passion represented to arouse and eject the same passion in the spectator. Giacomini 1972, 347–71 (see esp. pp. 354–5). See also Hoxby 2005, 264.

[37] Such lamenti for example: Stefano Rossetto's *Lamento di Olimpia* (1567) and B. S. Nardò's *Lamento di Fiordeligi* (1571).

[38] One of the most effective and influential of early 17th-century *lamenti* was Monteverdi's *Lamento d'Arianna* from his opera to a libretto by Ottavio Rinuccini, performed in Mantua in 1608. This *lamento* was soon isolated from its context and presented separately. Monodic Ariadne laments were published by Severo Bonini (1613), Possenti (1623) and F.A. Costa (1626) and by Monteverdi

There is no doubt that in the antiquity Euripides was the most re-nowned composer of monodies, especially of laments, famous for his af-fective power of his libretto-like sung texts, being the forefront of the "new music". In Euripides' tragedies, as in the kitharoedic nomoi of his friend Timotheus, by whom he was influenced, 5th century Greek music reached the climax of its development. Plutarch and Lucian record stories which pay tribute to Euripides's music indicating his popularity in Hellenistic Greece and the Roman Empire.[39] His monodies demanded virtuosi soloists with coloratura skills and their vividness and range of emotion suggest a powerful use of rhythm and melody.[40] With his monodies Euripides sought to move his audience with stirring music and words that excited pity. Eu-ripides's restless metrical experimentation showed that he was interested in heightening the emotional tension by intensification, in immediate effect as the members of the *Florentian Camerata*, and nowhere more so than in the laments of his characters. He left numerous examples of such laments most of them astrophic, especially in the late plays, written with varying degrees of structure, interjected vocatives, repetitive exclamations of emotive adjec-tives, repetition of phrasing for pathetic effect, unexpected variation. The music of these laments shaped throughout to express all the emotional nu-ances of the words. An astrophic song was much harder to learn than song in repeated metres and so it was associated with the solo voice rather than the choruses (cf. Ps.-Arist., *Probl.* 19.15)[41] and gave the chance for ornamen-

in his own reworking of the piece as a madrigal (1614), the publication of the monodic version (1623) and his adaptation of the madrigal to a sacred text (1640). Monteverdi's monodic *lamento* has not a closed form, without predetermined musical structures as the *aria.* It is highly expressive and therefore suitable for expressing uncontrolled passion. See Epstein 1927–8, 216–22; Westrup 1940, 144–54; Gallico 1967, 29–42; Barblan 1967, 217–28; Fortune 1968, 183–97; Porter 1995, 73–110.

[39] Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 29 about the tyrant Alexander of Pherae: "τραγῳδὸν δέ ποτε θεώμενος Εὐριπίδου Τρῳάδας ὑποκρινόμενον, ᾤχετ᾽ ἀπιὼν ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου, καὶ πέμψας πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκέλευε θαρρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀγωνίζεσθαι διὰ τοῦτο χεῖρον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου καταφρονῶν ἀπελθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχυνόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, εἰ μηδένα πώποτε τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ φονευομένων ἠλεηκώς, ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἑκάβης καὶ Ἀνδρομάχης κακοῖς ὀφθήσεται δακρύων." Plutarch, Lysander 15 records that an army against Athens was so moved by a perfor-mance of the Parodos of Euripides' *Electra* that they decided not to destroy Athens: "εἶτα μέντοι συνουσίας γενομένης τῶν ἡγεμόνων παρὰ πότον, καί τινος Φωκέως ᾄσαντος ἐκ τῆς Εὐριπίδου Ἠλέκτρας τὴν πάροδον ἧς ἡ ἀρχὴ Ἀγαμέμνονος ὦ κόρα, ἤλυθον, Ἠλέκτρα, ποτὶ σὰν ἀγρότειραν αὐλάν, πάντας ἐπικλασθῆναι, καὶ φανῆναι σχέτλιον ἔργον τὴν οὕτως εὐκλεᾶ καὶ τοιούτους ἄνδρας φέρουσαν ἀνελεῖν καὶ διεργάσασθαι πόλιν." Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 1 reports about a performance of Euripides' Andromeda during the reign of Lysimachus, which fascinated the whole city of Abdera: "μάλιστα δὲ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Ἀνδρομέδαν ἐμονῴδουν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Περσέως ῥῆσιν ἐν μέλει διεξῄεσαν, καὶ μεστὴ ἦν ἡ πόλις ὠχρῶν ἁπάντων καὶ λεπτῶν τῶν ἑβδομαίων ἐκείνων τραγῳδῶν".

[40] See Owen 1936, 148–54; Collard 1981, 24 f.

[41] [Aristotle], *Problemata* 19.15 (918 b): Διὰ τί οἱ μὲν νόμοι οὐκ ἐν ἀντιστρόφοις ἐποιοῦντο, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ᾠδαὶ αἱ χορικαί; ἢ ὅτι οἱ μὲν νόμοι ἀγωνιστῶν ἦσαν, ὧν ἤδη μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένων καὶ διατείνεσθαι ἡ ᾠδὴ ἐγίνετο μακρὰ καὶ πολυειδής; καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ τὰ μέλη τῇ μιμήσει ἠκολούθει ἀεὶ ἕτερα γινόμενα. μᾶλλον γὰρ τῷ μέλει ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τοῖς ῥήμασιν. διὸ καὶ οἱ διθύραμβοι, ἐπειδὴ μιμητικοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὐκέτι ἔχουσιν ἀντιστρόφους, πρότερον δὲ εἶχον. [...] μεταβάλλειν γὰρ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς τῷ ἑνὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ

tation and expression of affects.[42] I would like to mention some of these monodies, which contain all the above features that enable the audience to follow the movement of the singing characters' thoughts and the agitation of their passions: Kreusa's monody in *Ion* (vv. 859 ff.), explaining her suffering caused by the rape can been seen as the emotional and structural centre of the play,[43] Hermione's melodramatic desperate song in *Andromache* (vv. 825 ff.) held mostly in dochmiacs, the most agitated of the lyric metres, associated with strong emotions such as grief, horror and despair,[44] in dialogue with the nurse, who speaks in iambic trimeters seeking to reason with her, exaggerating so the impassioned dochmiacs.[45] Electra's solo aria about her whole family saga in *Orestes* (982 ff.)[46] and her informal lament for herself, her father and her brother recalling in detail the horror of her father's murder in *Electra* (112 ff.)[47] or Helen's really melodious long mourning in *Helen* (164 ff.)[48] and not least Cassandra's monody (a mad song) in a mixture of dochmiac metre, resolved iambics and glyconics in *Troades* (308 ff.).[49] And the lament of the dying Hippolytus for his plight in the *Hippolytus* (1347 ff.), whose metrical shifts and transitions from non melic anapaestic dimeters or spoken iambic trimeters to melic anapaests and lyric iambs increases his agitation forming high points of sympathetic identification with the hero.[50] The pastiche, a parody of the Euripidean monody (vv. 1329–63), which Aeschylus in the *Frogs* by Aristophanes sings, is very instructive of the method and practice of the Euripidean lament.[51]

The audience experiences similar passions when it listens to the lament – monodies of *Euridice*: Orfeo's first lament in the second scene, after Dafne's report of the death of Euridice and with Orfeo hinting that he wishes to join her in death: "Non piango e non sospiro, / o mia cara Eurid-

τῷ ἀγωνιστῇ ἢ τοῖς τὸ ἦθος φυλάττουσιν. διὸ ἁπλούστερα ἐποίουν αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλη. ἡ δὲ ἀντίστροφος ἁπλοῦν· ἀριθμὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἑνὶ μετρεῖται. τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ αἴτιον καὶ διότι τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς οὐκ ἀντίστροφα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χοροῦ ἀντίστροφα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστὴς καὶ μιμητής, ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἧττον μιμεῖται.

[42] On the language of the Euripidean monodies see Barlow 1986, 10 ff.

[43] On Kreusas's Monody (*Ion* 859 – 922) see Lee 1997, 254 ff., with bibliography.

[44] On dochmiacs as "das Metrum des emotionalen Effekts und der psychischen ἀταξία" (so Kannnicht 1973, 123) see especially Conomis 1964, 23 ff; Del Grande 1960, 368 ff.; Korzeniewsky 1968, 170 ff.; West 1982, 108 ff.; Sicking 1993, 187 ff.

[45] See Stevens 2001, 194 ff.; Allan 2002, 67 ff.

[46] West 1990, 251 ff.; Willink 1989, 245 ff.

[47] See Cropp 1988, 107 ff.

[48] Cf. for instance the repetition of the same words (vv. 173; 195; 207; 214; 331; 365; 366; 384), the idyllic scenery of the first and the third antistrophe and the repetition of the news that Helen heard from Teucros (cf. Eur., Fr. 563: "τῷ δὲ δυστυχοῦντί πως / τερπνὸν τὸ λέξαι κἀποκλαύσασθαι πάλιν").

[49] Cf. Barlow 1997, 173 ff.

[50] Cf. Barrett 1964, 402 ff.; Halleran 2000, 262 ff.

[51] See Dover 1997, 217 ff.

ice, che sospirar, che lacrimar non posso …",[52] Orfeo's second lament in the Underworld in the fourth scene: "Funeste piaggie, ombrosi orridi campi" and his last lament in the same scene, as he tries to please Pluto with his song: "Ahi! Che pur d'ogni legge", where features of the Euripidean monody make their appearance such as interjected vocatives ("o mia cara Euridice", "o mio core, o mia speme, o pace, o vita!", "Misero!"), repetitive exclamations (Ohimè! … Ohimè!, "Dhe"), repetitive exclamations of emotive adjectives ("o cara vita, o cara morte!) repetition of phrasing ("Chi mi t'ha tolto / Chi mi t'ha tolto", "Non son, non son lontano", "senti, mia vita, senti", "quai pianti e quai lamenti", "mira, signor, dhe mira" …"mira, signor, dhe mira"), variations ("funeste piagge, ombrosi orridi campi", ombre d'inferno", "tenebrosi orrori", "come trafiggha amor, come tormenti", "quest'ombre intorno e quest'oscuri nummi"). Needless to say that all possible synonyms for weeping, lamenting und pity occur in these laments.

We must also take in consideration that Cinzio[53] and Giacomini[54] select *Iphigenia in Tauris* for discussion, a play that many critics prefer to characterise as a "romantic melodrama", to show what Aristotle meant by the "best" (ottima) manner of tragic fable and that tragedies like *Iphigenia in Tauris*, in which recognition averts a violent deed, are the "best" kind (κράτιστον).[55] Both of them defended the so-called "tragedy with a happy ending" as the dramatic structure most appropriate to modern theatrical practice. Giraldi highly recommends tragedies *a lieto fine* in his *Discorso*, arguing that tragic plots with happy endings are especially marked by the recognitions prized by Aristotle, who especially values recognitions that transform bad fortune into good. For Giacomini tragedies that proceed from

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[52] I cite for example a musicological analysis of this lament from Taruskin 2010, 7 f.: "Orpheus's lament is set with great subtlety, all conveyed by musical 'modulations' to match the modulations of his mood. He goes from numb shock ('I neither weep nor sigh…') through a sudden outpouring of grief ('O my heart! O my hope…') to firm resolve. The first section has a particularly static bass to match Orpheus's initial torpor. The second section, where lethargy gives way to active distress, is introduced by a brusque harmonic disruption: the cadential 'Phrygian' E major replaced out of nowhere by 'Dorian' G minor. This most anguished section of the lament has the highest dissonance quotient. Orpheus's lines seem altogether uncoordinated with the bass harmonies. He leaves off after 'Ohimè!' (Ah, me!) with a gasp, his line dangling on an A over the bass G. The bass having changed to D as if to accommodate the A, Orpheus reenters ('Dove si gita?'/'Where have you gone?') with a new contradiction, on E. The bass once again moves to accommodate the E, which becomes the cadence harmony. The third section begins with the same disruption as the second: a G-minor chord impinging on the cadential E major. This time, however, the G minor moves through the circle of fifths to a cadence on F, the 'Lydian', still the symbol – after eight hundred years! – of mollitude (the primary association by now is not to Plato's resurrected theorizing but to everyone's daily experience in church). At the same time the bass begins to bestir itself iconically, moving rhythmically as one does when animated by determination."

[53] Giraldi Cinzio 1973, 183 f. See also Javitch 2008, 63 f.

[54] Giacomini 1597, 29–52, esp. 51 f.

[55] Aristotle, *Poetics* 1454a.

misery to felicity can be purgative because the prospect of an impending evil can move us as powerfully as a present one. Giacomini seems to conclude that the tragedian's essential duty is to move audiences to extremes of pity and fear without letting them fall into a horrified petrifaction, just as *La Tragedia* implies in the first two stanzas of the Prologue.

Apart from *Iphigenia in Tauris* we also find romantic qualities in *Ion*, in *Orestes* and especially in *Helen*. In each of them there is romance, excitement, danger, suspense and a happy ending. In *Helen* a man and a woman, separated by war, disaster and misunderstandings, are finally reunited and, after overcoming many more obstacles together, they at last reach home and live happily ever after, the happiest of happy endings. Thus Euripides runs his audience through a gamut of sensations to a final tonic chord of satiety and satisfaction. It is actually less an example of a new genre than a subversion of an old one. It seems to me that *La Tragedia* points out the same in the Prologue of *Euridice.*

Another element in the libretto of *Euridice* is the part of the messenger, much beloved by Euripides. Two of the three messenger speeches in *Euridice,* that is Daphne's heart-rending account of Euridice's death and Arcetro's report that Orfeo, having found the spot at which Euridice died, did not kill himself but was taken away by *Venere* are distinguished by their quite pictorial beginnings, their ekphraseis, the ordered narrative in strict chronological sequence, their fragments of recorded speeches and their graphic descriptions of the climactic actions in visual terms. Although the messenger reports in *Euridice* are not held by impartial witnesses – Daphne, Arcetro and Aminta otherwise act their own parts –, they are comparable to the Euripidean ones reducing the fear of tragic action and requiring an emotional response.

All the debates, discussions and musical experiments of the previous twenty years in the *Academia degli Alterati* and in the *Camerata Fiorentina,* that is the well established tradition of courtly *intermedii,* as well as various attempts to set isolated dramatic scenes to music and the concern about the nature of pastoral drama coupled with the desire to rediscover the ancient emotional power of music bore fruit at the performance of *Euridice.* But I would maintain more generally that many music historians, among them N. Pirrotta,[56] Barbara Russano Hanning,[57] R. Taruskin,[58] in claiming that the

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[56] E.g. Pirrotta et Povoledo 1975, 276–333, esp. 329; Pirrotta et Povoledo 1982, 237–80, esp. 264.

[57] Hanning 1973, 246.

[58] Taruskin 2010, 10: "And indeed, the play is made to end happily: Orpheus gets Eurydice back with no strings attached; there is no second death, no second loss. The play remains, as it had to, within the boundaries of the dramatized *favola pastorale,* the pastoral play, a light genre that did not exist in classical times. Not only would a truly tragic representation have been unfit for a

depiction of tender passions and the happy ending – characteristics mentioned in the Prologue of *Euridice* – point out the pastoral parentage of the opera, failed to notice that these formal characteristics of opera might as well be traced to Euripides's tragedies. As Hoxby rightly mentions,[59] they also represent passionate love, frequently end happily and more often introduce a *deus ex machina* to engineer the felicitous catastrophe – compare in this respect the end of Orfeo by Strigio and Monteverdi with the appearance of Apollo. I do not even deny that such "sweeter emotions" are to be found in the long-standing tradition of the Renaissance philosophy of love. But this love – sorrow of modern tragedy has its counterpart in Euripides, thus transforming the revival of ancient tragedy into the birth of melodrama. Early opera contributed to extricating its tragic style from Seneca's deformation of it with its egocentric, violent, evil, guilt-ridden and unheroic characters, who constantly anticipate and predict the advent of horrors and thereafter directly follow grotesque blood sacrifices of innocent victims creating disorienting vastness and emotional turbulence. So *Euridice* might be the pastoral equivalent of Aristotle's description of the effect of tragedy, which purged the emotions by sympathetic feelings of pity and terror.

With Euripides' musical representation of the passions, his episodic plotting, his choral interludes and his felicitous catastrophes, not only our *Euridice* but also the Baroque opera of the 17th and the 18th century – with Euripides playing a chief role in the operatic repertory with his lost and his surviving tragedies – can be seen as a coherent reading of a set of his tragedies. In them the tragic affection is not necessarily that of – metaphorically speaking – wet eyes, tissues and goose bumps, but they represent deep, stirring, pressing emotions yet they still contain a reflective moment something that was recognised by the first commentators of the Aristotelian theories on drama and music. Even if we claim that the subjects, dramatic structure and philosophical background of early operas stem from a combination of Roman comedy, Roman (esp. Vergilian) pastoral and Ovid's epic, as R. C. Ketterer[60] argues, nevertheless we should also bear in mind the great influence of Euripides on these genres. Euripides's love-sorrow along with his heroic-sorrow reveals his majesty as the most tragic of the poets, a prestige of which he was deprived by the emergence of the German ideal-

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festivity of state, but Ovid's mythological romance could never have supported one. In a tragedy a hero falls in consequence of a flaw; an accidental death like Eurydice's is by no classical definition a tragic one (even if Orfeo does lack the ultimate in self-control). The early musical plays did not – could not – aspire to the tragic style. Tragic opera came later, and elsewhere."

[59] Hoxby 2005, 267.

[60] Ketterer 2003, 1 ff.

ism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which forced out the passions from their central place in the critical analysis of tragedy.[61]

In *Euridice* melody dominates the musical discourse and does so exclusively in the service of the *affetti* expressed in the text, in whose favour the unity and metre of the verse are often sacrificed as they are in Euripides' monodies. Sensitive to every nuance of Rinuccini's libretto Peri wrote a music that mirrored the rhetoric of the words while also embodying their affective content, thus revealing the emotional power of the drama.

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[61] Vgl. Hoxby 2005, 269.

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Abstract. Without denying the influence of Renaissance theatrical practice, especially the "tragi-comedia pastorale" on the birth and development of the opera, I argue that Rinuccini aims at a rebirth of the ancient Tragedy in his Prologue of *Euridice*, the first surviving Opera (1600), well aware that his production was not a historically accurate reconstruction of ancient Greek tragedy. As we see from the Prologue, on one hand *La Tragedia* retains in her repertoire sighs, tears, laments from a purely human point of view wanting to awake sweeter emotions of the heart, on the other hand she aims at a catharsis through a happy end of the story. I am not convinced that our poet in his prologue rejects the catharsis effect of the Greek tragedies and that his opus stands in opposition to the Aristotelian precepts for tragedy as many musicologists and music historians think. In this Prologue, that is actually a *recusatio*, I think that Rinuccini wants his *Tragedia* to illuminate the nature of the pleasure that the audience derives from the experience of tragedy. The emphasis of *La Tragedia* on the purely affective has more to do with features of the Euripidean dramaturgy than the Senecan tragedy, which became the greatest force in the moulding of Renaissance Tragedy.

Keywords. Ottavio Rinuccini; Jacopo Peri; Euridice; prologue; Euripides; Seneca.

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