Leibniz: expression and universal Characteristic

Abstract

Leibniz´s criticism of the a priori proof of God´s existence, taken from Anselm by Descartes, is restricted to the observation that, before the existence of a perfect being may be admitted, one must prove the possiblity of the notion of such a beiing, which, in turn, requires a demonstration of the compatibility between divine perfections. The proof is correct, but incomplete. Leibniz never completed this proof, except for a text written in 1676, since, to manage that, he would have to employ his universal Characteristic, the elements of which would be the simple thoughts expressing the simple forms, or divine perfections. The project to creat a forma language, or universal Characteristic, was never abndoned by Leibniz, even thought it was to remain unfinished. However, in outlining the project, he clearly states that the Characteristic would accurately explain the necessary truths, but not the contingent truths (which could be admitted with a high degree of probability but not with exactness). If it were possible to prove the compatibility between divine perfections, it would also be necessary to explain how to explain how the incompatibility between possible worlds stems from this primordial compatibility, and how the contingent originates from within the necessary. Our hypothesis is that the apparent failure of the Characteristic project and the lack of understanding of the relationship between necessity and contingency results in a theory of expression that, in opposition to the clarity of intuition, reserves a place for the confuse and the obscure.