The Thomas Reid’s objection to Hume’s theory of personal identity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v24i2p53-69Keywords:
Hume, Reid, mind, personal identity, selfAbstract
The paper discusses Thomas Reid's objection to David Hume's theory of personal identity. The hypothesis states that this criticism is not effective because it is based on a misunderstanding of Hume’s theory, namely, that Hume would have admitted a negative ontological thesis - the inexistence of a mind beyond perceptions - and a positive ontological thesis - a mind reduced to a bundle of perceptions. After explaining in what measures Reid’s objection is based upon this misunderstanding, the paper shows why Hume does not accept those theses.
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