Does the good man do injustice voluntarily? In defense of Plato’s Lesser Hippias

Abstract

A basic question still confronting readers of Plato’s Lesser Hippias is how to deal with the final conclusion of the dialogue, namely that the good man does injustice voluntarily, which seems profoundly irreconcilable with the principle attributed to Socrates that “no one errs willingly”. Nevertheless, if one delves deeper into the text, one will uncover further clues indicating that Socrates’ point is neither paradoxical nor contradictory to the philosophical positions he sets forth in Plato’s other works. On the contrary, the dialogue comes to a definite conclusion. The just man refrains from doing injustice precisely because he does not wish (βούλεσθαι) to do it. The knowledge of what is good and bad, namely of what benefits and harms the soul, activates exclusively the will for the good and, subsequently, the power to produce it.