From embodied cognition towards an ontology of perception: body and world in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of perception

Authors

  • André Gomes Quirino Universidade de São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2594-5920.primeirosestudos.2017.136804

Keywords:

embodied cognition, phenomenology, foundationalism, philosophy of mind

Abstract

In this paper, we present the modification realized in the metaphysical status of the subject of knowledge by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception – according to a certain appropriation of that thesis made by the embodied cognition movement –, and we seek to understand why that very metaphysical transformation was altered in Merleau-Ponty’s late thought. Our purpose is to suggest a kind of thinking that could allow to the contemporary philosophy of mind to preserve the discovery of embodied cognition without assuming the commitments of the late phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

Published

2017-08-15

Issue

Section

Artigos

How to Cite

Quirino, A. G. (2017). From embodied cognition towards an ontology of perception: body and world in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of perception. Primeiros Escritos, 8(1), 162-180. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2594-5920.primeirosestudos.2017.136804