Understanding corruption-fighting factors: proposing a corruption deterrence construct
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2019.158516Keywords:
Corruption, Causes of corruption, Protection against corruption, Public organizations, GovernanceAbstract
The purpose of the article is to create a corruption protection construct that can explain the variation of corruption in different countries. This construct, called DECIDE, was based on four indicators related to administrative burden reduction, democracy, institutional quality and open government data, represented respectively by Global Open Data Index, Democracy Index, Ease of doing Business Raking, and Institutional Quality Index. These four indicators were analysed with the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). A database was created that was analyzed following all the requirements of the technique Partial Least Squares (PLS). The main result was the creation of DECIDE, which explains 50% of the CPI's perception of corruption during these years. The DECIDE, in turn, is explained by the four indicators. This construct provides a foundation for the context to be less conducive to corruption while broadening protection mechanisms. In practical terms, the study identifies that a less bureaucratic, more democratic, more transparent country where institutions work best is more protected from corruption, whereas these four variables act as a deterrent to corruption.
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