The effect of incentives on the performance of multimarket investment funds under public management
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2023.214574Keywords:
Incentives, Investment funds, Performance, Public and private managementAbstract
This study aims to identify whether state-owned financial institutions’ multi-asset funds employing the global macro strategy present performance compatible with that of private financial institutions. Incentive contracts influence managerial decisions, thereby impacting organizational performance. This study identified that state-owned financial institutions have adjusted their incentive policies, incorporating characteristics from the private sector to enhance performance. The research sheds light on this subject within the investment funds market, adopting an econometric model that correlates the performance and risk metrics of multi-asset funds using the global macro strategy. These funds are managed by state-owned and private financial institutions, represented by dummy and control variables. The findings indicate that state-owned institutions outperformed private ones in the period of analysis. Additionally, a positive relationship between the performance fee and the state-owned fund’s performance was observed. The results of this research can help to improve the incentive systems of state-owned financial institutions. Furthermore, this study enriches the literature by providing evidence of the effects of incentive use in managing investment funds within the context of state-owned enterprises.
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